INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

CIDOB

Spanish foreign policy and international relations in 2008

Country profile: United States of America

Coordinator
Francesc Fàbregues

Editorial team
Anna Ayuso, Francesc Bayo, Laia Bonet, Anna Borrull, Carmen Claudín, Oriol Farrés, Álex González, Elisabet Mañé, Ignasi Oliveras, Yolanda Onghena, Gemma Pinyol, Enric Royo, Eduard Soler

Documentation
Sílvia Serrano

Collaborators on appendixes
Mariana Foglia, Antonio V. García, Fadela Hilali, Francisco Pérez, Marc Pérez, Pamela Urrutia

Translations
Michael Bunn

Advisory Council
Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, Esther Barbé, Oriol Casanovas, Luis de Sebastián†, Albert Galinsoga, Francesc Granell, Rafael Grasa, Ferran Iniesta, Joaquim Novella, Joan Lluís Piñol, Josep Ribera, Josep Ripoll, Xavier Roig, Francisco Veiga, Blanca Vilà, Pere Vilanova, Ángel Viñas

Graphic design
François Stauffacher

Infography
Joan Antoni Balcells

Cover
Carles Calvera

Printing
Color Marfil, S.L.

The opinions expressed in articles do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB.

© CIDOB, 2009
Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona
Tel. (34) 93 302 64 95 - Fax 93 302 21 18
URL: http://www.cidob.org
D.L.: ????????????????

CONTENTS

COUNTRY PROFILE: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ARTICLES

APPENDIXES

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Foreword.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

FOREWORD

Ten years after the Barcelona Centre for International Relations was founded in 1979, CIDOB started publishing an International Yearbook. Twenty years later, this publication has become an important reference for policymakers, experts and scholars in international studies throughout the international Spanish speaking community. Year after year, the volume provides a comprehensive monitoring of the international state of world affairs and offers keys to interpreting international relations, the policies of the EU and Spain's relations to foreign powers. It includes articles analyzing the international political affairs, the global economic situation, changes within and outside the EU, Spain's foreign relations and the Spanish international economic sector. It includes a wide range of documentary appendixes. An in-depth analysis of a potentially significant country in the international arena is also included.

As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of this publication we thought it would be appropriate to broaden the scope of our readers and reach out to those who speak English. An edition in English of the CIDOB International Yearbook will therefore start this year when the country profile has been devoted to the United States of America.

The present Yearbook is structured in two sections. The first includes articles devoted to different aspects of international politics and relations, starting with an analysis of global trends since 1989. It also presents three studies dedicated to the evolution of the European politics in 2008 which are focused on the EU's integration process, its foreign policy and the global challenges the continent is facing. Finally, it includes an outline of Spain's foreign relations that covers the period staring from the first edition of the Yearbook – in 1989 – up until the present. This first section also contains documentary appendixes dedicated to the international scene and to the European Union, hence putting the articles in a broader context.

The second part of this first English Edition includes a country profile devoted to the United Sates of America. This section contains three articles, beginning with a general overview of the country in 2008, and then focusing on the relations between the US and Spain. The documentary appendixes of this chapter offer a complete analysis of the country, including internal politics, historical chronology, foreign relations, economy and migration.

The CIDOB International Yearbook remains the flagship publication of the Barcelona Centre for International Relations, and this first English Edition both celebrates the 30th anniversary of our institution, the 20th anniversary of the Yearbook itself, and symbolises our whish to reach out to the broader international community, thus contributing to a better understanding of this ever more complex world.

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

The World in the last 20 years, tendencies and evolution.

Alyson J.K. Bailes

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

The World in the last 20 years, tendencies and evolution

Alyson J.K. Bailes,
Visiting professor at the University of Iceland

Given the dominance of the very young in fields like pop music and sport, international society is being shaped today by cultural icons who were not even born in 1989. Given the tendency, even in large countries, to look for younger recruits to decision-making, there are many government ministers serving today who were still in lower or middle school when the Berlin Wall fell. In general this is healthy since a new age needs new solutions, and new eyes can usually see new needs more clearly. Yet some of the forward trends of the early 1990s now seem to be turning back on themselves, bringing cyclical interpretations back into fashion, while others have not moved in as straight a line as hoped. Genuinely new challenges can also echo old ones *in part*, so that at least some old do's and don'ts may still be relevant.

For all these reasons, the twentieth anniversary of a new world dispensation is a good time to look back as well as forward. But twenty is not an age at which a person or community is usually best placed to make the most subtle and final analysis of their experience. The impossible task of summarizing global trends since 1989, and their significance for today and tomorrow, can only be approached in a humble spirit and in provisional mode.

Here, the trends and changes since the end of the Cold War will be grouped under five headings that reflect the author's limited competence rather than any absolute priorities. The question of overall global power structures and 'polarity' imposes itself as a starting point. The parallel economic question about the apparent triumph and possible crisis of capitalism demands inclusion in any summary written during 2008. Changes in the content and balance of the security agenda are considered in general terms, and trends relating to armaments and disarmament are then looked at more deeply. The last of the five themes is the European method of multilateral integration: is it the 'best of the bad' solutions for 21st-century governance? The text ends with brief words on preparing for the future.

Who rules the world?

Twenty years is long enough for events at the start of the period to be reinvented and, in the process, increasingly misunderstood. The number of people who in 2008 have asked if the Cold War is returning is one clear enough sign of how far the real Cold War has been forgotten. A more subtle but also common mistake is for commentators to describe the period 1945-1990, with more or less ironic nostalgia, as a time when everything was simple. The world was bipolar and the two great armed camps balanced each other: everyone else in the world had to choose sides. or drop out of the strategic balance as 'non-aligned'.

It is of course true that the world before the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact was *more* bipolar than now. The Western democratic alliance, concretized in NATO, faced an opponent that was its close mirror image as well as close to equal in strength. Both sides did seek to make countries in other regions their allies and proxies, and the resulting wars - as in Korea, South-east Asia or Central America - powerfully affected the fates of local nations. But all kinds of other things were going on as well. The same period saw major processes of decolonization by European powers, also involving many wars, in which Communist exploitation was not always significant and even less often decisive. The Middle East confrontation was not at bottom an East-West affair and the actors on either side could never really be controlled by Washington or Moscow. Regions largely classified as 'non-aligned' could also have their own local battles, like the sequence of violence between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Western camp was regularly split on whether and how to intervene in these non-European crises, and the Communist camp had two distinct poles of power centred on Moscow and Beijing.

It cannot, therefore, be true to say that the events of 1989-90 left just one pole of power standing – synonymous with or at least dominated by the USA. Nor was democracy the winner everywhere: the World Bank still classified 39% of states (though fewer than ever before) as undemocratic in 1997. China, the world's

single largest nation, has remained Communist after putting down the pressures for change at Tian'anmen. The different power struggles of non-European regions have become, generally, less open than before to manipulation by the big powers.

What does seem to have happened (though even this is an over-simplification) is that (a) the Euro-Atlantic family grew larger and more divided; (b) the USA felt dominant enough to be able to intervene worldwide with limited risk; and (c) any resistance or [counter-] attack tended to drive US thinking towards visions of a new bipolarity. The frustrations and failures that all three of these trends have brought for the democratic community since 2003/4 have started to lead Western thinkers back towards acknowledging both the world's *de facto* multipolarity and the complexity of its power processes. Yet our understanding is not ready to embrace any single improved model of world dynamics, let alone one that would point to remedies for all the remaining contradictions.

To look at the story in more detail: the Cold War's end opened the way for most of Europe to reunite itself in the double framework of the EU and NATO. Most ex-Communist states did the hardest work themselves to change their systems and to heal old disputes with neighbours. The former Yugoslavia broke up violently instead but the integration process, notably in the EU, has by now been recognized as the only way to let its successor states eventually live together in peace. The shock of the Balkan wars arguably did much to give NATO new purpose in the 1990s and to ensure that the wider EU would evolve as a security-conscious community with its own military options. The much greater challenge for Europe's expansion, as we now have to recognize, was all along the fact that the Russian Federation was not capable of being integrated and not willing to reinvent itself as 'just another nation'. Its relative weakness through much of the 90s forced Moscow to gain what it could through forms of partnership with the West that required no decisive internal transformations, and to acquiesce in successive enlargements that brought the West up to its own front door in North-East Europe. But Russian policy never abandoned the parallel tracks of trying to herd its remaining post-Soviet neighbours back into Moscow-dominated economic and military groupings, and making increasingly formal deals on coexistence with China (most recently: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) to secure its rear from attack.

The violence and oppression that we have seen lately both in Russia itself and towards neighbours like Georgia is, first and foremost, Russia's own fault but the West shares some responsibility for lack of understanding and attention. For most of the last decade most Western capitals have neither taken a Russian 'threat' seriously, nor worked hard enough to maintain the formal constraints on use of force in an East-West context – namely, the inheritance of disarmament and confidence building measures that we brought from the Cold War and continued to enrich for a while in the 1990s. The EU and NATO both failed to face up to how much more difficult any enlargement beyond the Balkans would be, and failed to create any alternative 'neighbourhood' policy that would either stabilize this outer zone or powerfully boost the internal transformation of local states, including Russia itself. History may have to conclude that the OSCE, in many ways the true hero of the Cold War's peaceful conclusion, found its raison d'être mortally weakened as a result. Some analysts would no doubt also cite the story of European lack of seriousness towards the Middle East and North Africa as a rather close parallel, with failure to understand Turkey taking the place of wishful thinking towards Moscow.

At a deeper level, the growing incoherence over key European security issues can be linked with the USA's waning strategic interest in this continent after the Cold War ended – while 'Europe' (itself still an ambivalent concept) was slow in filling and has arguably still not filled the gap. In the early 1990s the US hoped it need never run risks to defend Europe again, and promoted enlargement partly to make the continent less vulnerable and more self-sufficient. After an early setback when US troops tried to play the 'world policeman' role in Somalia, the Gulf War helped build Washington's confidence about blocking challenges to Western interests elsewhere; and in 2001 it was provoked to use the strongest measures against enemies striking its own homeland from afar.

> *"The apparently united world market is thus horizontally divided and the means of bridging the divisions seem increasingly inadequate"*

The events of 11 September 2001 also triggered the clearest attempt to reconstruct an opposite 'pole' for the US that would both demand and justify as mighty a war effort as was ever mounted against Moscow: namely the constellation of Islamic terrorism, of 'evil' states, and of weak states colluding with both. Unlike Cold War bipolarity, however, this vision defined an enemy that could and should be hit actively, even pre-emptively, with the confidence that the US mainland now faced minimal risk of backlash from fighting elsewhere. This sense that immunity for the homeland was both vital and possible has also driven the US ballistic missile defence project, which still stands unsolved as a clash of strategic understandings - not just of interests - between Washington and Moscow.

By today, it is a commonplace to recognize that terrorism and the 'axis of evil' were never a single Communist-type threat, and that military intervention was the wrong tool for trying to eliminate them any-

way. Immunity from non-state hazards is an impossible dream that can lead to states infringing their own citizens' as well as others' rights. The proximate effects of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have been actually to reduce Western prestige and grip over strategic developments in those regions, while undermining the other attributes (notably, moral and economic) of US power. The only thing that can still be said for the US unipolar vision is that no other large power, as yet, is in a position to offer any better vision of order – let alone enforce it - for the Islamic 'arc of crisis'.

Meanwhile, other conflicts that might have won relief with the investment of a fraction of the resources and commitment used in these two West-generated wars have sunk further into stalemate. Violence in the Middle East may have been largely corralled into a single front between Israel and the Palestinians, yet it continues to divide all players of the region and to divide the region as a whole from Europe's peace-infusing dynamic. Washington has tolerated or even supported Israeli tactics that now look self-defeating: notably, making the Palestinian lands more ungovernable, despite the now near-unanimity of world opinion that a two-state solution is both fair and inevitable. The latest bloody clashes with Hamas at end-2008 merely underlined how Israeli refusal to acknowledge the Palestinians' own preferred leaders forces both sides into extreme, even self-destructive behaviour. The pattern of conflict elsewhere shows gains in peace where states and regions have been ready to transform themselves (like Southern Africa), but endless cycles of violence where the outside world does not care enough (Congo, Sri Lanka) or is still tempted to take side and play proxy games (the Horn of Africa and Sudan.)

Europe is in no position to distance itself from, or mock at, the curve of US over-reach followed by disillusionment that has marked the years since 2000. The Europeans went along with the transformation of NATO from a conflict-avoiding engine in Europe to a conflict-waging machine worldwide. If Afghanistan now risks turning into an Iraq-style failure, it will be their failure too. Some of them also accompanied the US into Iraq and the others found no way to stop it. The EU has not managed to transform itself into a collective defence entity that could fill the gap in strategic support for its own territory, and it has not succeeded in showing that it can solve challenges like Iran in a less violent way. Here, the best that can be said is that Europe's weaknesses help to improve its chances of continued co-existence with Russia, and even a partial partnership with the fast-rising China. But without a strong US, Europe's chances are not great of making either of these poles of power behave in a way that either reflects European values or respects European interests. Whether there is an alternative reading of multipolarity that would put more cards in Europe's hand, and identify more true friends for it, is a question re-opened under the fifth topic below.

The rise – and fall? – of capitalism

The capitalist free market model was a creation of the modern nation state in its Western, liberal democratic incarnation. It had just as much claim to be considered the winning ideology in the Cold War as democracy did. If Russia, in retrospect, seems not to have moved as far as was hoped from state-centric practices in the economy as well as politics, this is balanced by the steady progression of China towards a 'market communism' that also increases its genuine integration in the world system. Putting it the other way round, for the last two decades there has been no other principle of socio-economic organization that could offer an ideological alternative to capitalism as the old Communism did. If this has tended to make the world system 'unipolar' in terms of economic philosophy, the forces of globalization have also gone further towards making it a single independent economic organism. It is important not to overstate this: the EU, for instance, conducts more of its total trade on an intra-EU basis than in 1989, and only 5,6% of African citizens have internet access, when the world percentage is at 23%. But growing interdependence is reflected as much by phenomena like technology diffusion, inter-continental outsourcing and virtual social habitats as by common suffering when financial markets crash.

Even before the credit crisis of mid-2008, however, there were signs of the capitalist regime both becoming increasingly diversified and exposing more inherent weaknesses. As to diversity, combinations have developed of free-market trading with more centralized social and/or political management, ranging from those that are widely approved of (the 'Nordic model') to those that the West considers not fair play (the populist nationalism of a Chavez, the strategic manipulation of the energy sector by a Putin). Even within the group of OECD countries or members of the G7, pressures for protectionism have been clear and often divisive, as globalization strips the richest states of comparative advantages that once sustained their growth. It seems to be an illusion that countries interacting on the same economic market, with roughly the same economic rules, will necessarily converge in their political cultures and values – the West's relations with the Arab world are an obvious case. Even societies that share more of each others' governance assumptions, like the Western states and their former colonies in the Southern hemisphere, can also be set at odds by diverging economic needs.

The fact is that over the last 20 years, world-wide, the rich nations have grown richer and the poor, poorer. A class of countries in the middle have reaped benefits from globalization by picking the right areas for specialization, from high technology to tourism, and some 130 million of the world's citizens have escaped

extreme poverty since 1990. But over 1 billion still live on less than a dollar a day, effectively excluded from the freedoms of the new order as well as its benefits. The apparently united world market is thus horizontally divided and the means of bridging the divisions seem increasingly inadequate. Most of the Millennium Goals agreed by the UN in 2000 for improving the conditions of the world's most unfortunate have been missed. The expenditure of the world's richest powers has, especially since 2001, tilted away again from altruistic aid towards self-interested (and often unsuccessful) military ventures. The Doha round of the World Trade Organization has ground to a halt as a result superficially of North-South divisions and the mutual recriminations of the rich, but perhaps more profoundly because of a kind of 'tragedy of the commons'. If the leading capitalists themselves do not see how integrally their own model depends on global free trade, what hope is there that weaker and less convinced disciples can come to the rescue?

The present state of capitalism thus poses problems both of justice and sustainability. It also challenges the capacity of national political systems and law-making, not just because of the power of multinational companies, but because even those companies are at the mercy of imperfectly understood co-dependencies and transnational dynamics. Forecasting and conflict prevention are imperfect arts in any sphere of global governance but have failed mankind most spectacularly in the world of finance and trade. The global financial crisis that has deepened since August 2008 may have arisen from excesses on the unregulated fringe of capitalism. But as it starts to eat into the viability of real economies, it is forcing governments everywhere to take back responsibilities for industrial and social, as well as monetary, decision making for which two decades of laisser-faire have left their skills distinctly rusty. Should they fail to muster consent for the necessary disciplines and sacrifices, even the Western world could start to learn that democracy's conquests are more fragile than those of capitalism itself.

It is too early, but plausible, to see the current crisis also as speeding up the shift of supremacy from the USA – where the trouble started – to non-Western poles of economic power like China, India and possibly Brazil. These large emerging nations have on their side population, liquidity, increasing technical mastery and remaining headroom for growth. Their regional military dominance should make them immune from strategic shocks, so long they have sense to avoid US-type 'wars of choice'. Their challenge is that they are growing in a historical era when the rest of the world is not an undeveloped new frontier (as it largely was for the Western imperialists) but a combination of first-generation capitalist powers still clinging to their status, and impoverished or explosive 'weak regions'. To lead the way in renewed global growth they will need products to sell both to the rich and the poor, further emancipation of their own populations (not just as consumers), and willingness to do more for curbing global disorder – which means being willing at least initially to help in shoring up the most important West-created rules. The effect of economic setbacks in driving Russian leaders back towards both copying and supporting Western rescue attempts is an illustration close to home. The rapid (if generalized) consensus reached at an epoch-making meeting of the G20 group in November 2008 signalled two things: that the G7 are moving perhaps irreversibly towards sharing global management with the leaders of the East and South, but also that the newcomers to the table are – for now - on their best behaviour.

One thing the crisis has not altered - as the Europeans to their credit have been first to stress – is the way that economic choices for rising, failing and static powers alike are complicated by climate change. Whether or not this phenomenon can be squarely blamed on capitalism itself, it is certainly aggravated by the shortages that modern economic demands create in energy commodities, food, and strategic minerals. Many of the world's fastest-growing populations coincide with areas that are likely to become less habitable as global warming advances, and where more violent weather is liable to cause mass casualties. Richer nations, including the 'rising powers', thus face a multiple conundrum of how to secure the resources needed to maintain their own lifestyles and/or grow further; but also of whether and how to help the poor survive, including the options of accepting more 'climate migration' and of massive economic exploitation of the Arctic.

"Old security agendas have been overtaken, but several new ones have been superimposed upon, such as economy, energy and environmental security"

It is a safe guess that the strategic importance of land, which had been fading under the impact of modern economic models and communications and the new emphasis on non-state threats, will reassert itself as the 21st century advances. Arab, Chinese and Korean initiatives to buy up arable land in other continents, while green-minded millionaires buy up forests to prevent them being turned into food factories, are perhaps the first moves in what might turn out to be a whole new strategic Great Game. The USA's choices since 1989 to cut back long-term troop basing worldwide and minimize its extraterritorial ties generally – even NAFTA seems to be under permanent attack! - may turn out to have been yet another false direction.

Security agendas: more themes, more actors, less control

The dawning acceptance of climate change as a *security* issue and the West's sudden rediscovery of 'economic security' reflect another strong, if complex, current of change in the last two decades. It is not so much that old security agendas have been overtaken, but several new ones have been superimposed upon them; while quickly changing fashions in the grading of threats have left policy makers both divided and confused over how to approach multi-dimensional risk management.

As always, the world's 'chattering classes' have been over-influenced by West-centric visions and the accompanying mood swings. The first popular slogan of the 1990s was Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history': the hope that with the – truly momentous – disappearance of the bloc confrontation in Europe and with it the risk of total nuclear war, the Euro-Atlantic space would become a single 'home' or zone of stable non-zero-sum cooperation. When the dream was shattered above all by the Balkan wars, the conventional wisdom became that military force was still needed by enlightened states to help solve other people's problems. After 9/11 the Western agenda swung back to *self*-defence against the allegedly 'new' but actually age-old phenomenon of terrorism, now linked with more genuinely new risks such as the further proliferation of mass destruction technologies and the globalized significance of weak states as refuges for bad guys of all kinds. Both these agendas defined a new, primarily 'expeditionary' role and standard for Western armed forces – and for those in other continents trying to set up peacekeeping clubs – with the difference that in Iraq and Afghanistan the US camp was intervening to start conflicts rather than stop them. Meanwhile, a lot of powers in the world including Russia and China had never given up the primary view of defence as requiring convincing military force to secure the homeland (preferably plus a buffer zone). The Western rediscovery in 2008 of the Russian 'threat' has brought the military strand of defence thinking full circle, by underlining that strategic competition among the major Northern hemisphere powers is still far from being demilitarized either. The reflection of all these factors in weaponry trends in discussed further in the next section.

At the same time, other challenges of human experience have increasingly been brought within the definition of security. For the rich world they are to some extent filling the 'worry gap' left by direct military threat – which helps explain the temptation for governments to revive old paradigms by declaring 'war' on everything from terrorism to drugs, AIDS and smoking. Post-Cold War analysis of conflict and underdevelopment has underlined that in the poorer regions too, humans are still ten times more likely to die from curable disease, hunger and poverty than from conflict violence or crime. While deprivation does not directly correlate with violence – some of the worst terrorists come from rich families – it is nevertheless also clear that weaknesses in military and non-military security are organically linked. An African army can be decimated by AIDS as a Western one might be paralysed by cyber-sabotage or lack of fuel. The fact that every single 'major' conflict (ie with more than 1000 combat deaths a year) in 2007 was an internal one helps underline that societies are now much more likely to break down under their internal political, economic, social and ethnic contradictions than under conventional attack.

The non-military threat and risk spectrum, still a relatively novel topic in the early 1990s, is now familiar enough for most people to agree on what belongs to it. It stretches from intentional crime, terrorism, sabotage, smuggling and trafficking and problems of internal order, through damage from infrastructure breakdown and possible nuclear accidents, to interruptions of supply and finally events beyond human control like high-mortality pandemic disease and natural disasters. These last can, of course, be indirectly human-caused through the mechanism of climate change: and as already noted, the dimensions of energy and environmental security are among those most recently rising to the top of world agendas. Food and financial security have joined them in the headlines in 2008.

However, it is harder to find a single concept embracing and ordering all these different elements that could be said to have universal support and credibility. One strong school favours 'human security' as a construct combining freedom from fear and freedom from want, which in some versions also emphasizes the importance of quality of life and political rights. However, it is an agenda mainly developed by thinkers in the Northern hemisphere (and much less taken up, so far, by decision makers) for handling the South. Within the North, the US concept of 'homeland security' has gained somewhat aggressive, exclusionist overtones and certainly did not prepare the nation to handle Hurricane Katrina properly. The EU's famous Security Strategy document of 2003 is now seen to have been weak on Europeans' own internal security concerns, including the ecological dimension. The notion of 'societal security' developed by some Nordic countries perhaps has more promise, as it tests the impact of solutions on whole communities rather than either old-style state security or the isolated individual. Another approach is to bring as many problems as possible into the category of 'risks', which allows some comparative quantification, and also reminds us that humans themselves have a part in determining which risks they face and which they are ready to accept. If the events of 2008 give a boost, as they should, to

efforts for a closer interface between security and economic analysis, the language of 'risk' could provide a useful bridge.

At any rate, all parts of the security spectrum today are understood to involve many actors other than the sovereign state and its armies. In recent years, the power of non-state actors in conflict – rebels, smugglers, profiteers, mercenaries – has been so much highlighted that people almost forgot to look for risks of state attack, as in Georgia. The hyping of terrorism as a monolithic non-state 'superpower' has already been mentioned. These emphases have led to some useful understandings in particular of the complexity of post-conflict reconstruction, including the value of broad-band security sector reform both in this context and for conflict prevention. NGOs and other civil society movements are accepted as an important part of re-building the legitimate and durable state.

What still seems under-analysed is the importance of legitimate *economic* actors, businesses and banks and traders, in reconstruction and also in non-violent transformation processes. The international financial institutions are starting to acknowledge that their approach to weak-state economics has often been at odds with weak-state security. More generally, the growing recognition of mankind's dependence on good 'functional' security – infrastructure, goods supply and communications, energy, environment and health as well as law and order – has not yet led to new institutional or governance models that could bind together the different actors' contributions needed for each. One of the less noticed weaknesses of the UN is that it is separated from the organs of world economic governance and not even very good at coordinating its own functional agencies. National governments have realized that they need military, police and emergency services sitting on the same security committees, but not so many have grasped that economic, social and health ministers - let alone business's own representatives – frequently deserve a place there. Business self-regulation is not to be despised but cannot fill the whole gap, and the penalties of leaving capitalist market forces in full control have already been discussed.

"Societies are now much more likely to break down under their internal political, economic, social and ethnic contradictions than under conventional attack"

Armaments and (lack of) disarmament

It is not unfair to give commercial motives some of the blame for the world's failure to cut back military spending and arms levels permanently after the Cold War. Both Western and ex-Communist firms did what they could to find new markets as massive cuts were taken in forces and equipment by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries during the first post-1990 honeymoon. Cases of unwanted European armaments being sold on to some of the worst non-European crisis spots have been well documented. However, some larger explanation is needed for why global military expenditure had returned by 2007 (in real terms) to its Cold War peak, with a total value of 1339 billion US dollars. The obvious answer is that US spending was responsible for some 45% of it, having grown by an average of 10% per year in real terms since 2001 as a result both of its overseas wars and of new equipment orders (including missile defence) not compensated for by pruning obsolete programmes. China's and Russia's spending is currently estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (using market exchange rates) at around one tenth and one fifteenth respectively of the US military budget, but their annual rates of increase are higher – as are those of many other leading regional powers and/or oil exporting countries. Correspondingly, the global arms trade which was declining for part of the 1990s has since resumed a vigorous growth and now is worth some US$45 billion a year.

At first sight this is strange in a world where interstate conflict has dwindled, interdependence grown, and non-military threats gained a higher place in the agenda. The poor countries where the most stubborn conflicts take place account for a very small portion of global defence spending, not least because so much killing there takes place with small arms. Partly, the answer must be that regional power balances outside the Euro-Atlantic nexus are still expressed or at least symbolized in terms of demonstrated military capacity. Another part is that - as already argued - no stable enough accommodation has yet been made between the main Cold War players, the US, Russia, and China, to allow any of them to abandon its national insurance against a possible high intensity war. On top of this comes the massive military and financial bill for the USA's decision to address the 'new threats' with coercive force; and the costs for smaller states (also in developing regions) who want to contribute to peace missions. Overseas deployments are inherently costlier than self-defence and the problem has been aggravated because few states have yet cut away all the dead wood of traditional military structures. In turn this is a reminder that, in our own region as others, military establishments can play a number of roles – political, economic, internal-security, psychological and symbolic – besides that of actually fighting.

Nuclear developments over the same period have suffered somewhat from hype. True, India, Pakistan and North Korea have come into the open as nuclear weapon states and Iran is close behind them, but Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan returned all nuclear

warheads to Russia after the Soviet Union broke up. South Africa, Argentina and Brazil voluntarily halted their weaponization programmes, Iraq was forced to do the same (as we now know) by UN measures after 1992, and Libya's programme was simply bought out. The Six-Party Talks process designed to reverse or at least contain North Korea's nuclear breakout is still limping along, and perhaps one of the achievements of President GW Bush's second term was the negative one of refraining from a preemptive attack on Iran. Meanwhile, the post-2001 fears of terrorist use of mass destruction weapons have been somewhat put back in proportion, as it has been shown that it is hard for non-state actors to cause mass casualties (as distinct from massive expense and disruption) unless they got very lucky with a bio-weapon.

Nevertheless, the dangers of even a small WMD incident are real above all because the chain of consequences is so hard to see. Even if Cold War-style escalation to global war is ruled out, national nuclear programmes are so intimately linked with regional balances that one break-out could all too easily lead to others. And while nuclear affairs remain shrouded by suspicion and complicated by North-South resentments, the world is patently not able to pull together as it should to guarantee safe control and non-transfer of such nuclear capacities as exist, and ensure that the anticipated growth of civil nuclear power will not merely multiply the proliferation risks.

This makes it all the more disturbing that traditional arms control has been so often, and deliberately, weakened in the last decade. While smaller powers have torn holes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the US has abandoned the ABM Treaty, refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, led NATO into a deadlock with Russia that resulted in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty being effectively frozen, and has left it very late to prepare a replacement for the basic US-Russian strategic nuclear accords that expire in 2009. The Bush team was at least been consistent in following through its beliefs that old-style treaties do not work, that it should not be constrained by them in its legitimate self-defence and that the real task is to block off new acquisitions by the 'bad guys'. It is harder to excuse European neglect of this whole policy area and the channeling of almost all influential NGO agitation into the important but limited area of mines, SALW and other anti-'humanitarian' weapons. Before August 2008 it was looking as if US Presidential candidates had at last woken up to the good the US could do for its own interests by reviving formal nuclear arms control, and progress was being made at the UN (with EU support) on the idea of an Arms Trade Treaty. President-elect Obama has given some grounds to hope that Georgia has not in his mind reversed this current of thought but rather, has underlined that mutual restraint deserves the hardest work when mutual tension is highest.

The European 'model' and its global significance

The European Union of today is more than twice as big as it was twenty years ago (12 to 27 members), endowed with a single currency and Central Bank, with most internal security functions now brought within the Treaties, and with military operational agencies that have run more than 20 operations (including civilian ones) so far. It has also suffered bitter disappointments ranging from the large – a constitutional reform process for the 21st century twice being stopped by referendum, so that the 2004 'Big Bang' enlargement took place without extra 'deepening' – to smaller but corrosive ones like the lack of a peace settlement in Cyprus. It remains divided on many existential issues, as reflected in the number of nations still outside EMU and Schengen as well as in Europe's split over the Iraq war, and it has fumbled the issue of a common energy policy. While France and the UK came together reasonably fast to lead common reactions to the latest financial emergency, it remains unclear whether further European strategies on this new life-and-death issue will strengthen the common institutions as such.

However, in the twenty-year perspective EU vitality and EU survival are also impressive. The EU notoriously makes its biggest leaps forward under pressure of crisis, but that is another way of saying that its nations do show centripetal instincts in tough times and that it does learn from its mistakes. Another factor of its buoyancy is that it covers so many dimensions and can find diversions and compensations after any individual disaster. As illustration, a failure in Afghanistan would surely be far more dangerous for NATO's survival – thin as the alliance's record now is on European security and disarmament – than any imaginable operational setback would be for the EU.

The Union also has other strengths in terms of the emerging global picture sketched above. It has the resources in territory, wealth, and influence over its immediate neighbours that are typical of a large power (or perhaps better in view of its diversity, a latter-day 'empire'), without any of a traditional power's military overinvestment and propensity to make enemies. In face of the diversification of security actors, the growing interdependence between sectors of public policy and the ascendancy of non-state actors, it combines two assets that no other institution can claim to the same degree: law-making power, and financial resources big enough to change the course of both its own and others' internal development. Perhaps even more basic is the abiding relevance of the EU's semi-supranational, 'unity in diversity' experiment for a globalized world system that weakens states, but has no way to overcome its own problems without them.

Today when the mantra of US unipolarity rings less confidently, it may be interesting to look around the world and see who is most influencing the *voluntary* processes of change. China, as noted, is a looming strategic challenge in several dimensions; but if it stands now to gain from the West's over-reach and self-inflicted divisions, that is partly because its path over the last two decades has resembled European-style risk aversion and 'soft power' rather than US adventurism. And while several aspects of Chinese national solutions may appeal to states in other regions, as a model for organizing the regions themselves the EU has no rivals. Those groupings that have been trying for the longest to emulate Europe's path are in fact among those that have coped best with the last two decades' changes.

ASEAN weathered the last Asian financial crisis, has peacefully integrated Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, is still trying with Burma, and has calmed down some possible points of strategic friction with China. Latin America except for Colombia, and the Caribbean except for Haiti, have grown remarkably quiet in security terms over the last decade despite serious political upheavals. The African Union suffers from the contrast between its immaculately formulated goals of peace, good government and development and its actual performance under stress: but it is still far from being discouraged or discredited. The Gulf Cooperation Council dreams of building its own EMU system, while big thinkers (most recently Joschka Fischer) argue from time to time that the Middle East's problems can ultimately only be solved by its own Monnet-Schumann process. Even the trouble that Russia and China have taken to make their SCO look like a real multifunctional security organization, bringing benefits also to its smaller Central Asian members, is a kind of back-handed tribute to the power that the 'Big Idea' of regional integration still holds - for all its gaps and humiliations.

"Global military expenditure had returned by 2007 (in real terms) to its Cold War peak, with a total value of 1,339 billion US dollars"

The role of the United Nations needs a mention at the end of this analysis, even if it has not dominated the last two decades in a way that would have demanded attention at the start. Just as the big powers kept the whole conduct of the Cold War outside the UN's arena, the largest changes since that confrontation ended have been driven by other dynamics through other channels. Yet the UN's unchallengeable achievement - no less than with NATO and the EU in Europe - is to be still there after 20 years of profound global transformation, and even sending out some new roots and shoots of growth.

The UN forum did allow the world to agree on the Millennium Goals, if it could not enforce their fulfillment. While failing to agree on reform of the Security Council, or even of its relationship with its own agencies, it has presided over innovations in the theory of intervention ('responsibility to protect') and conflict management, peace building and the administration and transformation of war-torn territories. It has created something very like directly binding universal laws against terrorist finance and WMD smuggling. In all these ways it has adapted rather well to the new panoply of security actors, the widening of security concepts and the new focus on 'humanity'. If the biggest challenges to its authority continue to come from problems with overweening, politically protectionist nation-states, it is equally true that a new complementarity is emerging between strong 'regionalized regions' and a UN that can both harmonize and legitimize their security efforts. The EU and its imitators know that they need the UN, just as surely as the UN will need them to carry its orders and ideals into practice. Could the head as well as the heart of a new US President, working to rebuild his country's image as well as its strength and temperamentally inclined to order and prudence, lead him towards his own version of Europe's 'effective multilateralism' creed?

Looking forward

It remains an open guess whether the 21st century could be Europe's century, or –more realistically- a time when our continent makes fewer mistakes than some and survives better than most. The prestige of forecasting is about as low in late 2008 as it could ever be, vindicating the writer Nicholas Taleeb's warning that truths that seem beyond question can be overturned by a single 'Black Swan'. Change will continue to be the driving feature of global experience, and change management will be an increasingly essential skill from the individual to the institutional level. Europe will need realism and the readiness to go on making somewhat inglorious choices and messy bargains, if that is the best way to minimize harm to itself and others. It will need idealism and solidarity, as events will doubtless repeatedly call for sacrifices to preserve the common good. Twenty years from now it will probably still be struggling for both those things; but this author's guess is that it will still be there.

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

The Year of unanswered questions. Evolution of european integration.

Piotr Maciej Kaczyski

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

The year of unanswered questions. Evolution of european integration

Piotr Maciej Kaczyński,
Research Fellow,
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

The evolution of European integration took a few interesting turns in the course of 2008, but the process did not bring any significant answers. On the contrary, in fact, there are more questions on the European table today than there were twelve months before. Three main topics dominated the debate: 1) the future and fate of the attempts at treaty reform; 2) the EU presidencies, which received a new spin in the second half of the year; and 3) the increasingly vocal question about European leadership.

The Treaty of Lisbon was supposed to enter into force in January 2009, but since the process is being delayed, the important events of 2009 will face major challenges. In June 2009 the new European Parliament will be elected, but the final number of MEPs will not be determined until the new treaty enters into force. Another unknown piece of information relates to the European Commission. A new College of Commissioners should take office following the EP elections, but in the absence of a treaty, the size of the Commission is unknown. The possibility of an interim Commission between November 2009 and the treaty's entry into force was debated during the French Presidency, and there are other issues related to this topic, such as the new distribution of powers among the institutions, as well as within them.

The two EU Presidencies in 2008 could not have been more different. The small, new member state of Slovenia valiantly struggled with carrying out its responsibilities. It clearly was a lower-profile Presidency. Then the French turn was the opposite, as one of the largest, richest and most influential member states took over for the 12th time as head of the EU. It was also a time of a very high-profile Presidency. The ultimate new question related to those two examples is which one will become dominant in the EU of 27 member states, especially in the light of establishing a future permanent President of the European Council – would this post have more of Mr. Janša or more of Mr. Sarkozy?

The French Presidency also re-awakened the debate on European leadership, the need of which became very clear during a period of permanent and multiple crises. This discussion is not limited to who would take what functions, but it relates also to several important unanswered questions: Under the new treaty, what is, what should be and what will be the inter-institutional balance in the EU? Is the European Union capable of returning to a stronger and more dominant position for the European Commission? Is the intergovernmentalisation process unavoidable and what are its positive and negative consequences?

These are a few of the new questions that were posed in the course of 2008.

Institutional Reform, continued

After many years of struggling with the adoption of a new European treaty, the year 2008 was supposed to bring a finalisation to the process. By 1 January 2008, the Lisbon Treaty – signed just a few weeks before – was already ratified in the Hungarian Parliament. The Hungarians rushed to win the prize for being 'the first'.[1] This was characteristic of the entire Lisbon Treaty ratification process: European leaders decided to ratify as fast as possible in order to avoid any potential problems. In doing so they also succeeded to avoid public debate. The entire plan was for the new treaty to enter into force by 1 January 2009, but this target was probably overly-ambitious, as most of the recent European treaties (also on enlargement) took longer than 12 months to be ratified by all member states.

Initially the ratification process continued according to the plan. Countries ratified the document one by one without any problems, without much debate and without much attention. By June, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia finished their parliamentary procedures. The culmination of votes took place on 11 June on the eve of the Irish referendum when Estonia, Finland and Greece also agreed to the document.

TABLE 1. TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN SIGNING AND RATIFICATION OF EUROPEAN TREATIES (1993-2009)

Treaty	Date signed	Entered into force	Ratification time	Number of ratifications
Maastricht Treaty	7 Feb 1992	1 Nov 1993	21 months	12
Amsterdam Treaty	2 Oct 1997	1 May 1999	19 months	15
Nice Treaty	26 Feb 2001	1 Feb 2003	23 months	15
Accession Treaty 2003[2]	16 Apr 2003	1 May 2004	12,5 months	25
Accession Treaty 2005[3]	25 Apr 2005	1 Jan 2007	20 months	27
Lisbon Treaty	13 Dec 2007	1 dec 2009	22,5 months	27

Source: Comisión Europea http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm

The question on holding referendums on the Lisbon Treaty has been posed in a number of countries. Clearly the ambition was to avoid as many popular votes as possible. In one case it proved impossible: Ireland. The Irish constitutional situation made it necessary to organise a referendum. The decision to organise a vote was taken in the spring; the referendum took place on 12 June 2008. The Irish campaign was dominated by the wide coalition of the 'no' camp, who attacked the document from various angles. The pro-treaty campaigning came late, when the public debate was already framed by the other side. The government and all parliamentary political parties (but one – Sinn Féin) supported the document. At the same time many politicians did not know the provisions of the treaty.[4] The pro-Treaty camp was also damaged by the Prime Minister's corruption scandal which forced Bertie Ahern to step down just a month ahead of the vote. The 'yes' campaign was based on the premise that the nation trusts its leaders and hence would support the document.[5]

"The French Presidency showed probably for the first time in a long time that crisis management should lie at the core of every Presidency"

At the same time the 'no' camp was gaining momentum. The creation of a wide coalition from the extreme left through labour unions to a new business group called Libertas allowed for clear victory. On 12 June 2008, the Irish rejected the Treaty of Lisbon with 53.4% of voters against the document and 46.6% in favour. What came as a surprise to the 'yes' camp was that this result came with a high turnout of 53.1%.[6] After the vote there was a major report published in Ireland explaining the outcome of the vote (Post…, 2008). In general, the public did not understand what the Treaty was about and decided to vote against the unknown.

The Irish referendum completely changed the dynamics of the ratification process elsewhere in Europe. Timely entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was threatened. As the results from Ireland were coming in on Friday, June 13th, Europe faced the danger of a repetition of the 2005 divisions that developed after the failed French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty. The biggest threat in June was not that the Treaty of Lisbon would not enter into force. The risk was that individual countries would discontinue the ratification process. By so doing, they would put the document in a legal limbo without a clear indication of what was to happen next.

This consternation did not last long. Unlike 2005, in 2008 governments confirmed one by one their will to pursue the ratification process despite a negative Irish vote. The most important message came from London, where Prime Minister Gordon Brown firmly stood by the continuation of the process and opposed motions for a British referendum on the subject. Six days after the Irish vote, the House of Lords approved the Lisbon Treaty. The following day the Royal Assent was granted and the ratification process in the United Kingdom ended. The subsequent European Council confirmed this approach despite some opposition from Czech Republic (Council of the European Union, 2008).

Once the immediate threat to the process was over, new problems occurred. Legal challenges to the Lisbon Treaty were tabled and accepted for consideration in the Czech Republic and Germany. In November 2008, the Czech Constitutional Court gave a green light for ratification in this country.[7] The German court did not conclude its deliberations by the end of December. Political difficulties appeared in Poland and the Czech Republic. In Poland the President Lech Kaczyński stated that he will not complete the ratification process until the Irish have reconsidered because he was against "cornering the Irish". In the Czech Republic the process has been significantly delayed as both parliamentary chambers have postponed their votes pending the Court's decision. They have initiated the ratification process only after the Court ruling has been given. Apart from the legal and parliamentary difficulties, the Czech President Václav Klaus also opposed the document.[8]

The December European Council for the first time examined the issue of how to legally address a potential

second referendum in Ireland. The meeting concluded that there is a call for "necessary legal guarantees" to be given to Ireland in the areas of 1) taxation, 2) security and defence as well as 3) the right to life, education and family (Council of the European Union, 2009). The nature of those necessary legal guarantees has not been determined and the final decisions were left to be taken in the course of 2009.

Therefore the Treaty of Lisbon, which was supposed to enter into force as the year 2008 ended, has still not been ratified in four countries. Until Ireland, Czech Republic, Poland and Germany deposit their materials in Rome, the document is not legally binding. Nevertheless, the prospects for the Lisbon Treaty looked better in December than six months earlier. Firstly, public opinion in Ireland seemed to begin to change its opinion about the document. In November, the first opinion poll since the referendum was published indicating that a majority of respondents said they would back the document.[9] Secondly, in the Czech Republic a first hurdle (the Court) was just overcome. Simultaneously, by late November (after partial elections) the Czech Senate became a more treaty-friendly chamber than before as some of the treaty-opposing senators lost their seats and pro-treaty candidates were elected. Both Czech and Polish presidents, regardless of their reasons for objecting to ratification, seemed prepared to sign the ratification documents once the second Irish vote was positive. The year ended with a cautious approach that the treaty *might* be implemented and there was a chance that the Irish would reconsider.

The evolving nature of EU presidencies

The European Union's rotating presidencies have taken place since 1958. Every six months, another EU member state undertakes the task of chairing hundreds of meetings in the Council, as well as representing the Union in the external affairs. In January 2008, Slovenia took the 101st EU Presidency; and France served as the 102nd rotating head of the EU. For Slovenia, it was its first undertaking of this scale. France held its 12th mandate. The lifespan and importance of any EU Presidency is extremely short. Half a year is too short for legislative innovations; most European legislation takes years before it is adopted. During 6 months, an EU Presidency cannot develop any significant dialogue with a third partner– each time the American or Russian leader meets his European counterpart, he meets a different person. The EU Presidency however, is not about pursuing a different agenda or developing new processes only for the purpose of 180 days of the Presidency. The system functions so that each country holding the rotating chairmanship has an incentive to try to move the European integration closer to its national agenda. At the same time it forces European leaders to cooperate more closely with other preceding and succeeding presidencies in order to carry on processes and dialogues.

EU Presidencies are also short-lived politically. The preparations of each member state to hold the term begin months (at least 12), and often years ahead. Yet the political focus on the Presidency ends either on 30 June or 31 December each year. Retrospectively, out of 100 EU Presidencies between 1958 and 2007 very few, if any, left office with a significant longer-term legacy.

The primary function of any EU Presidency is to chair hundreds of working groups and the Council and the European Council proceedings. The Presidency does not have any executive function; it cannot take any legally binding decisions on its own. Therefore the country holding the Presidency is only primus inter pares among other nations. Another function is to represent the EU vis-à-vis third parties and the citizens. Due to those limitations there are numerous examples of ambitious objectives of some Presidencies never having been accomplished; the states, which held this – in fact ungrateful – position, did not possess any particular advantages with the exception of knowing the procedures and possessing experienced negotiation skills.

Yet many European leaders who hold the rotating Presidency still try to use this tool for different objectives, such as the promotion of national political interests, or the socialisation of their national administration with EU affairs, or promoting EU issues

TABLE 2. EU PRESIDENCIES 2007-2009

EU Presidency	EU Presidency holding nation	Which EU Presidency is it?	Recent experience
2007– 99 th	Germany	12 th	1994, 1999
2007– 100 th	Portugal	3 rd	1992, 2000
2008– 101 th	Slovenia	1 st	–
2008– 102 th	France	12 th	1995, 2000
2009– 103 th	Czech Republic	1 st	–
2009– 104 th	Sweden	2 nd	2001

domestically, etc. 2008 was a year full of interesting new developments in this respect. First, Slovenia was the first country of the 2004 'big-bang' enlargement to take up the job. Just three-and-a-half years since EU accession, the two million Slovene citizens had to face probably the biggest logistical and political challenge in their history: to lead, for six months, political entity of half-a-billion people. Second, France offered a spectacular comeback to European politics after a period of certain ambivalence following the referendum in 2005. Nicolas Sarkozy's style gave a new look at how an EU Presidency could be used to push an ambitious agenda, take on unexpected endeavours and gain support domestically and respect abroad.

In the first half of the year, the Slovene Presidency's main success was that it managed to survive until the end of the term without a major setback. The self-assessment of the country's performance was rather high (Kajnc, 2008), yet the struggle with the capacity was quite apparent. There were even some statements arguing that the Slovenians managed only because of the structural support coming from the General Secretariat of the Council and from other members of its trio-presidency (especially Germany). The six-month period was marked by two events: in February Kosovo unilaterally declared independence and in June the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty. Kosovo's independence declaration was especially unfortunate for the Presidency. Slovenes were supposed to be the ones in the EU with enough expertise on the Western Balkans to deal with the region's problems. In political terms it meant that Kosovo was a test for Slovenia – should it was able to maintain EU unity on the issue, it would keep the clout for its other projects. EU internal divisions brought a sudden political end to Slovene leadership. Institutionally they chaired the meetings for the remaining months, but on all other points on the agenda that spring, the key stakeholders were not in Ljubljana. It is notable that when the Irish voted down the Lisbon Treaty, all the eyes were focused on what the upcoming French leaders had to propose, not the incumbent Slovene chairmanship.

"In its actions in Georgia the EU surprised Russian counterparts who probably for the first time recognised the EU as a political entity in hard security matters"

In the second half, the French presidency took over with an enormously ambitious programme, which they largely succeeded in implementing. The most important elements were the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, as well as the climate change package of legal instruments. The most visible exceptions where the French gave up during their term were the harmonisation of the corporate taxation base and cooperation on defence matters. Both issues were dropped due to the results of the Irish vote, although the defence debate is expected to be relaunched in 2009, following France's return to the military structure of NATO.

Yet it was not the ambitious agenda that made the front pages of the European press in the second semester of 2008. Conflict resolution became the Presidency's brand. The French Presidency showed probably for the first time in a long time that crisis management should lie at the core of every Presidency. It was an experienced and a big country Presidency that did not avoid high expectations. Quite to the contrary, it provoked many of those expectations. In July 2008 the French took over the works of the Council in a situation of very high agricultural world prices and a similar development occurred with energy resources prices. In some countries outside of Europe, this led to riots and raised questions about the stability of those states. Then in August the Georgian-Russian conflict over South Ossetia erupted, which overshadowed the issue of global prices. The fate of the Lisbon Treaty was also present following the earlier Irish vote. In the fall the financial markets crisis began, followed by economic recession. Among other problems were i.e. relations with China marked by controversies over the Olympic Games in August and the cancellation of the EU-China summit in December due to meeting between Nicolas Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama.

In most of those situations, the French President and French diplomacy showed deep engagement and dedication. The truce and beginning of negotiations of the final status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Geneva in October – though without any spectacular results by the end of the year – coupled with the opening of negotiations with Russia of a new framework agreement, have to be perceived as a step forward. In its actions the EU surprised Russian counterparts who probably for the first time recognised the EU as a political entity in hard security matters.[10] The Lisbon/Irish debate was much more delicate to tackle and could not be fully addressed during the French term. The economic crisis showed how apparent was the lack of European leadership; yet proposals for European debate on the situation came primarily from Paris (and London).

In 2008 a new institutional formula was tested. The first of trio-presidencies, which began in 2007, has ended. German-Portuguese-Slovenian cooperation was rather smooth and unproblematic. Cross-cutting issues were addressed (e.g. climate change and the Treaty of Lisbon) throughout the three mandates. Simultaneously each of the Presidencies showed specialisation in some areas (in foreign affairs, e.g., the Germans tried a new opening to Central Asia, the Portuguese promoted relations with Africa and within the Mediterranean ba-

sin, and the Slovenes focused on Western Balkan issues). The countries however did not have a point of historical reference, so only their experience can be used for comparisons with the following trio presidencies. In 2008 the Franco-Czech-Swedish trio had begun its work. The cooperation within this group was very limited to the extent that the mottos of two first countries were almost exactly opposite one another: the French advocated a "more protective Europe", whereas the Czechs promoted "Europe without barriers".

The quest for European leadership

2008 was also important as the year when the debate on European leadership shifted. If in January only a few specialists would argue that there was a significant leadership void in Europe, by the end of the year such a statement became commonplace. The combination of many crises with the charismatic and controversial leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy in the second semester showed the public what a strong leadership means. For those reasons the main question on 31 December was whether the Czech presidency would be able to meet the high standards set by Sarkozy. After all, the Czechs took over the EU Presidency for the first time; it is also a small and relatively poorer nation. Yet those questions had not been asked twelve months earlier, when another newer, much smaller and relatively poorer country took up the job. For Slovenia the main question was on institutional capacity to smoothly manage the hundreds of meetings.

There are two main types of political leadership in the European Union. Firstly, in the highly institutionalised Union, there is a historical tendency for a strong formal (institutional) leadership. Secondly, there is the personal leadership, which does not necessarily result strictly from the function, but also from the character and charisma of a political leader and the public's emotional reactions to him or her. In both cases, in order to become a true leader the actor (institution, politician) needs to 1) inspire the public debate, initiate policies and propose visions of the future and 2) know how to implement his or her ideas. Charisma without organisational capacity is not sufficient and, in fact, means populism. The possession of excellent skills in managing public policies could be described as technocratic bureaucracy – important, but again, not sufficient in itself. Therefore both conditions are necessary to qualify as leadership in any political formula.[11]

The political class of the European Union has been widely criticised for not having the capacity to produce new leaders who compare with Europe's great historical leaders, such as Schuman, Monnet, de Gaulle, Spaak, Kohl, Mitterrand, de Gasperi or Delors.[12] The institutional leadership for many years has been with the European Commission, where the new ideas moving the integration process forward were generated.

The process of moving the institutional and political centre away from the Commission and towards the European Council had begun well before 2008. But it was only last year that this development manifested itself fully, especially since the financial crisis in the fall, and the subsequent economic downturn. The French EU Presidency with President Sarkozy also contributed to the process.

In 2008 the European Commission found itself taken over by a certain inertia. Firstly mainly because of the upcoming Irish referendum, potentially controversial topics such as defence or taxation were removed from the agenda. The inertia also continued after the referendum because of the result. In such a context the financial crisis began to unfold, yet again the Commission was perceived as largely inactive and its initiatives were "too little, too late" ("Beyond…, 2008; Lannoo, 2008); in contrast, the Presidency was feeling rather victorious, having negotiated a truce in the Caucasus conflict. Besides the Georgian-Russian war, the French leadership undertook other initiatives. The Union for the Mediterranean was launched in the spring. The Immigration Pact has been proposed over the summer. Reactions "on behalf of the EU" to the chain of events: food prices crisis, Irish referendum, oil prices, etc. came much more frequently from Paris than from Brussels. Nicolas Sarkozy took up a role of self-claimed EU President, although the official function was President of the European Council. This charismatic leader was not afraid to address important European and global problems. He initiated debates, proposed solutions and brokered deals in difficult negotiations such as the climate change package in December. Some of the French ideas were rejected (e.g. the economic governance idea), some were significantly modified and adopted (e.g. the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean); while some were postponed (defence cooperation) or dropped from the agenda (taxation cooperation). Sometimes the Presidency acted controversially (e.g. taking contact with the Dalai Lama in the run-up to the EU-China summit in December, holding the EU-Russia summit in Nice in November, as well as the mediation in the Caucasus war) – but it never lacked political will to lead. The only problem of the Nicolas Sarkozy's term was that it only lasted for six months and the baton then had to be passed on to the next country in the line-up.

The active French Presidency relaunched the debate on European leadership and how best to organise it. The behaviour of the French leaders inspired the belief that if the Lisbon Treaty came into force, it would be easier for the EU to act in situations like the one

that erupted in Georgia last August.[13] This approach has been challenged with the argument that even with the Lisbon Treaty the decision on *who* is the European Council permanent president would be taken by European leaders, who have a personal political interest in choosing a weak rather than a strong person, which would effectively mean that nothing would change.

In the final analysis, the year 2008 did not bring us any closer to answering the question either of *where* should the political leadership in the European Union reside (the Commission or the European Council), or *who* would be able to take up the challenge. The Commission and the European Parliament began their final full calendar year in 2008, which meant less motivation to engage in strong political manoeuvres. The outlook for the present year (2009) was rather grim: the Commission does not know when its term will end or how many Commissioners the next College will have; the Parliament does not know the size of a new chamber to be elected in June (736 or 754) or what will be the scope of its powers; there is also a growing concern that the new Parliament would be much more euro-skeptic than the outgoing one; the Council faces an uncertain future under the Czech Republic, a country run by cautious, if not euro-skeptic, leaders, and whose government had only a minority support in the national parliament.

"By the end of the year the financial crisis forced a closer cooperation among three largest states (France, Germany and the United Kingdom)"

This newly reinvigorated debate on European leadership will continue in the following months and years. In the meantime the question of political leadership in the EU of 27 member states remains unanswered, which causes many concerns. The unofficial decision-making mechanisms proved insufficient and a need for new mechanisms became apparent. The French idea of a smaller coordinating group of the six largest nations was not applied, although by the end of the year the financial crisis forced a closer cooperation among three largest states (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). As it has turned out so far at least, however, the three have not been able to work out a consensus on the European approach to the financial crisis. At the same time, two new developments have arisen. In the first instance, the number of European Council meetings, which were not always productive, has been inflated. During the French Presidency alone, there were four such meetings (two ordinary, one extraordinary and one unofficial). And since those meetings were not always successful, the second new element has manifested itself: a superficial show of unity covering over serious internal divisions on various issues.

Notes

1. The Hungarian parliament ratified the Lisbon Treaty on 17 December 2008, and three days later the President László Sólyom granted his assent.

2. The Accession Treaty of 2003 concerns the 2004 EU enlargement to ten new countries: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

3. The Accession Treaty of 2005 concerns the 2007 EU enlargement to two new countries: Bulgaria and Romania.

4. For example, the Irish Commissioner Charlie McCreevy admitted that he had not read the Lisbon Treaty from cover to cover, and said he would not expect any sane person to do so (see RTE News on 23 May 2008, www.rte.ie/news/2008/0523/eulisbon.html).

5. See www.yestolisbon.ie/ for the Yes Camp website.

6. See www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=34239

7. See http://aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=623170

8. More on the German, Czech and Polish cases in: Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, Sebastian Kurpas and Peadar ó Broin, "Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: Problems not only in Ireland", EPIN WP No. 18, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels 2008, http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1716

9. See "Voters may approve new Lisbon Treaty, poll reveals", The Irish Times, 17 Nov 2008. 43% of polled said they would vote "yes" in a referendum and 39 "no". The support for "yes" votes has increased in the following polls. See www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2008/1117/1226700659487.html

10. The story of President Sarkozy taking EU flag with him on the plane to Moscow for peace talks is emblematic. Allegedly, during a press interview, when the Russians stated they did not have an EU flag and proposed to put the French flag next to Mr. Sarkozy, he said he brought one with him, because he did not come to Moscow as the French President, but as Europe's leader.

11. On the question of political leadership in Europe, see Jonas Tallberg, *Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

12. There are many critical articles on the subject. See for example, Goulard, Sylvie, "Can France reclaim intellectual leadership of the EU?", *Europe's World*, Autumn 2008.

13. For example, M. Wallstrom wrote on her blog on 2 September 2008: "I was encouraged and impressed by the determined action taken by the French Presidency but can not help thinking that with a new treaty it would have been easier to have a better coordinated response, faster and with greater authority. A high representative with a mandate both from the Council and the Commission would be stronger and better equipped in a situation like the one we have seen this summer in our neighbourhood." Full text available at http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/wallstrom/georgia-on-our-minds/

Bibliography

"Beyond banking [on line]: What the financial crisis means for the EU" (2008). *Policy Brief* (Centre for European Reform). London, October 2008. www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_fin_crisis_23oct08.pdf) [Checked on: 03.19.09]

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2008). *Brussels European Council 19/20 June 2008* [on line]: *Presidency Conclusions*. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 17 July 2008. 24 p. 11018/1/08 REV 1 CONCL 2. www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/101346.pdf. [Checked on: 03.19.09]

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009). *Brussels European Council 11 and 12 December 2008* [on line]: *presidency conclusions*. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 13 February 2009. 22p. 17271/1/08 REV 1 CONCL 5. "I.3". www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/104692.pdf [Checked on: 03.19.09]

KAJNC, Sabina (2008). "The Slovenian Presidency of the EU Council [on line]: How the 16th Member State Performed", *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano* (ARI). No 105, 2008. 9p. www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Europe/ARI105-2008 [Checked on: 03.19.09]

LANNOO, Karel (2008). "Concrete Steps towards More Integrated Financial Oversight [on line]: The EU's Policy Response to the Crisis". *Centre for European Policy Studies, Task Force report*. Brussels, December 2008. 59 p. http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1762 [Checked on: 03.19.09]

Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum Research Findings[on line]: September 2008. [Dublin]: Millward Brown IMS, 2008. 47 p. www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Publications/Post 20Lisbon 20Treaty 20Referendum 20Research 20Findings/final 20- 20post 20lisbon 20treaty 20referendum 20research 20findings.pdf [Checked on: 03.19.09]

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

EU Foreign Policy.

Karen E. Smith

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

EU foreign policy

Dr. Karen E. Smith,
Reader in International Relations
and Director of European Foreign Policy Unit,
London School of Economics and Political Science

In February 2008, a leading commentator, Simon Serfaty, argued that 2008 could be the 'year of Europe', in which Europe and America renewed their partnership. A chastened US was reaching out to allies, and a new generation of more pro-American leaders had assumed office in France and Germany. 'The moment is propitious, and it is one that a new generation of European leaders cannot afford to spurn' (Serfaty, 2008). Indeed, the prospects also looked promising for the EU to play a more leading role in world politics, with better relations between the major powers in Europe itself, and the rescuing of the 'EU constitution' from oblivion with the Lisbon Treaty, signed in December 2007.

But 2008 was definitely *not* the year of Europe. As another commentator argued, it was a 'bad, bad year' for EU foreign policy: 'bad in events, bad in outcomes, bad in management' (Bet-El, 2008). In a series of crises, weaknesses in the EU's foreign policy system were exposed to all. And while some commentators hailed French President Nicholas Sarkozy, in charge of the EU presidency in the second half of 2008, for being the 'right man for the right moment in Europe' and having 'made the EU sparkle' on the world stage ("Sarkozy…", 2008), Sarkozy's hyper-diplomacy also highlighted limitations in the EU's institutional set-up.

This article first considers institutional questions. It then analyses the EU's response to a series of crises and other foreign policy challenges, followed by a consideration of the 'addition' to the European Security Strategy agreed in December 2008. Finally, it evaluates the prospects for EU foreign policy in 2009.

The rise, fall and still uncertain future of the Lisbon Treaty

At the start of 2008, the long, tortured history of the EU's 'constitutional treaty' seemed likely to come to a successful end. In December 2007, EU leaders signed the Lisbon Treaty, which incorporated, virtually unchanged, the constitutional treaty's provisions on foreign, security and defence policy. The treaty creates the post of new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the UK insisted on this name over the constitutional treaty's pithier 'foreign minister'), who is to serve as vice-president of the Commission, continue the functions currently undertaken by Javier Solana in the CFSP pillar, act as the permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (replacing the rotating presidency), and represent the Union in dialogue with third parties and in international organisations. A European External Action Service (EEAS) is to be created, composed of officials from the Council secretariat, European Commission and national diplomatic services. Other foreign and security policy provisions of the treaty have already been implemented: for example, the European Defence Agency was established in 2004, and member states have formed 'battle groups', or combat units of about 1500 soldiers which could be deployed rapidly, particularly in response to a request from the UN. In the spring of 2008, politicians were already maneuvering to influence the shape of the EEAS, and gossip was rife about who might be selected as the new High Representative and the 'permanent' European Council president.

The Irish rejection of the treaty in a referendum in June brought the gossip and bureaucratic politics to an abrupt halt. For six months, the EU simply waited for the Irish to come up with a solution. That they finally did in December 2008, with the Irish government announcing that a second referendum would be held by October 2009, and in return, the European Council agreed that the European Commission would indeed be composed of one Commissioner per member state (rather than reduced in size), and that 'legal guarantees' will be given that the Lisbon Treaty does not affect EU competence in taxation, prejudice Irish neutrality, or alter Irish constitutional provisions regarding the 'right to life', education and the family.

While the Irish 'problem' may be solved in 2009, another potential institutional crisis looms: if elections are held in the UK before the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, a new Conservative government would hold a referendum on the Treaty, which would almost undoubtedly reject it. But for the moment, it looks as though 2009 may be the year in which the EU finally moves on from its seemingly endless squabbles over institutional reform.

But Sarkozy's hyper-diplomacy raises questions about the implications of the Lisbon Treaty's foreign policy provisions. Sarkozy single-handedly arranged a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia, launched a 'Union for the Mediterranean', finalised an EU climate-change deal, and held an emergency summit on the financial crisis. Some observers – and Sarkozy himself – argued that his activity showed that the EU needed a popular politician from a large member state at the helm; Tony Blair suddenly became (again) the frontrunner for the post of European Council president (Taylor, 2009). But having a 'big beast' in that post may make the position of High Representative unattractive – and the division of labour between them could become quite an awkward question (quite who does what is not entirely clear in the treaty text). Furthermore, in an international crisis, would Sarkozy, or any other leader of a large member state, step aside in favour of a European Council president or High Representative?

"Without EU agreement on the future of Kosovo, how can the EU integrate the Western Balkans into the Union?"

In addition, it could be risky to marginalise the contributions of small member states (witness the backlash against a smaller European Commission). While the new High Representative solves the perceived problem of not having a continuous 'voice for Europe', the presidency system allows for the maintenance and strengthening of links between the national and EU levels in foreign policy, and gives all the member states (even the smallest) a high profile internationally and the opportunity to try to ensure their foreign policy preferences are included on the EU agenda.[1] Without that link, we could see more, not fewer, squabbles over foreign policy, as member states of all sizes seek to ensure their interests and views are taken into account.

Foreign policy challenges in 2008

At the start of the year, Kosovo looked set to be a major challenge for the EU, and so it proved. Throughout 2007, it had proved impossible to reach international agreement on the 'Ahtisaari plan' for the 'supervised independence' of Kosovo. But in the first few weeks of 2008, the EU seemed fairly united on Kosovo. On 4 February 2008, EU member states unanimously agreed to send an EU special representative, and a 'rule of law' mission (EULEX) to Kosovo. EULEX would take over from the UN's mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and help the 'Kosovo authorities' develop 'an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices' (Council of the European Union, 2008). The EU would send 1900 police officers, prosecutors judges, and customs officials, making it the third largest ESDP mission.

But a few days later, the appearance of EU unity crumbled. On 17 February, Kosovo declared independence. A day later, the External Relations Council could merely 'take note' of the declaration and affirm that individual member states would decide, 'in accordance with national practice and international law, on their relations with Kosovo'. Five EU states have refused to recognise Kosovo: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. But unlike in December 1991, when precipitous German recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence dragged the rest of the EU into recognising those states, the situation regarding the recognition of Kosovo independence remains at a stalemate. Domestic considerations are stronger than any embarrassment that the EU is divided over the issue.

Only 54 countries have recognised Kosovo as an independent state, and in October 2008, Serbia and Russia successfully lobbied the UN General Assembly to request the International Court of Justice to assess whether the declaration of independence is legal. The stalemate thus looks set to continue, as a judgment is unlikely before 2010. In the meantime, Russia and Serbia blocked plans for EULEX to replace UNMIK; Serbia declared it would cooperate only with UNMIK itself, because it is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which mentions Kosovo autonomy 'within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'. The UN Secretary-General then mediated an agreement in November that EULEX would operate under the umbrella of UNMIK, which would continue to exist. This paved the way for the actual deployment of EULEX throughout the country, starting on 9 December (Deimel and García Schmidt, 2009).

For now, 'Serbia pretends that Kosovo is not independent and Kosovo's government pretends to be sovereign over the whole country' ("Kosovo…", 2008). The EULEX-UNMIK arrangement cannot paper over the divisions within the EU over Kosovo's future status. And without EU agreement on the future of Kosovo, how can the EU integrate the Western Balkans into the Union?

The Kosovo issue has chilled EU-Serbian relations, which at the start of 2008 had been warming. In the final round of Serbian presidential elections in February 2008 a pro-EU candidate, Boris Tadic, won, and following parliamentary elections in May 2008 an EU-leaning coalition government was also formed. EU carrots were used quite openly to try to influence the election outcomes: a visa facilitation and readmission agreement entered into force in January; a 'European partnership' was offered in February; and a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed in April. This last carrot was particularly controversial, as Belgium and the Netherlands had initially blocked it because Serbia had not transferred indicted war criminals (including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic) to the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The SAA will only be ratified, however, if the EU Council is satisfied that Serbia is cooperating fully with ICTY. In July, the EU's patience appeared to pay off, as Radovan Karadzic was captured in Belgrade and sent to ICTY in The Hague. But two indictees remain on the run, Mladic and Goran Hadzic, so the SAA should remain in limbo.

Elsewhere, some progress was made towards fulfilling the EU's promise of a 'European perspective' for south-eastern Europe (Commission of the European Communities, 2008b). Croatia looks set to join the EU in 2010 or 2011. Montenegro submitted a membership application in December 2008. Albania made some progress on political reforms. The EU signed an SAA with Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 2008, even though the country continues to be deeply divided over constitutional arrangements. As a result, while the EU toyed with the idea of withdrawing its peacekeeping force (EUFOR-Althea), in November 2008 the EU Council decided to postpone consideration of its future until March 2009.

But in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, elections in June 2008 were marred by violence, particularly in ethnic Albania areas. The country was also rocked by Greece's veto over its entry into NATO in April 2008. Greece objects to the country calling itself 'Macedonia' and has even threatened to block negotiations for EU membership if the issue is not solved to its satisfaction. FYROM has reacted recklessly, for example taking Greece to the International Court of Justice in November 2008 ("Macedonia's…", 2009). Relations between the two countries are now worryingly bad, with inevitable knock-on effects for the EU's overall strategy for the region. Yet the EU has assumed responsibility for stabilising the Balkans, via integration into the EU itself, and thus will be judged on how successfully it does so. Right now, this looks to be a very tough challenge.

As if this wasn't enough trouble in the neighbourhood, in early August 2008, Russia and Georgia went to war. Georgia launched an attack on the separatist region of South Ossetia; Russia responded by pushing Georgian forces out of South Ossetia, occupying parts of Georgia proper, and entering another separatist region Abkhazia. The EU's response to this was mixed. On the one hand, the familiar divisions between EU member states over relations with Russia appeared forcefully – with countries such as Germany and Italy viewing Georgia as the provocateur, and others such as the Central and East European countries seeing this as another example of Russian revisionism and aggression. But on the other hand, Sarkozy brokered a cease-fire on 12 August, which ended the war. On 1 September, the EU even agreed to suspend negotiations with Russia on a new partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) until Russian troops withdrew to the positions they were in before the start of the war. On 15 September, the EU decided to send 200 ceasefire monitors, which were deployed, in impressively short order, on 1 October.

But Russia has not allowed the monitors to cross into South Ossetia or Abkhazia, and Russian troops remain in areas where they had not been before the war began. Nonetheless, EU member states in favour of 'engagement' with Russia successfully pressed for the EU to resume negotiations on the PCA on 10 November. The implications of this should be, frankly, highly embarrassing for the EU, as the EU ignored patent Russian non-compliance with its condition ("Russian…", 2008b). Clearly it is ridiculously easy for an outside power to 'divide and rule' the EU. In addition, Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 26 August. The recognition of Kosovo by the US and most EU member states has been cited as a precedent – an assertion that is difficult to counter merely by stating that Kosovo is *sui generis*.

The spectre of Russian assertiveness in its 'backyard' prompted a re-think of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP covers both Mediterranean non-member countries and Eastern European countries, and there had long been calls from within the EU to separate the regions – such calls came particularly from those countries that support the eventual enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe. A Swedish-Polish initiative for an 'Eastern Partnership' was welcomed by the June 2008 European Council, and six months later the Commission put forward proposals for deeper bilateral relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (should the latter turn away from authoritarianism), and for a framework for multilateral dialogue (involving regular meetings at several levels) (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a). The Eastern Partnership is due to be launched in spring 2009. In October 2008, the EU Council lifted travel bans against several high-ranking

Belarusian officials, despite the fact that there has been little progress towards democracy and respect for human rights there – showing once again that the penchant for 'engagement' is currently very strong.[2]

The Mediterranean too was extracted from the ENP. Sarkozy's 'pet project', the Union for the Mediterranean, was finally revised enough to meet with EU (particularly German) approval. The Union for the Mediterranean replaces the old Euro-Mediterranean partnership (or 'Barcelona process), which was widely considered to have shown too little results. Whether the Union for the Mediterranean, launched at a grand summit in Paris in July, can do any better remains to be seen. The biggest innovations over the Euro-Med partnership appear to be the setting up of a small secretariat in Barcelona, and a 'double Presidency' system (one Mediterranean country, one EU country). Bizarrely, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro also participate in it, even though they were never part of the Euro-Med partnership.

The EU's record in several African conflicts or crises was mixed. The year began with widespread violence in Kenya, following a hotly disputed presidential election there on 27 December. The EU, though, was hardly involved in this crisis. Zimbabwe then went from bad to worse, with President Mugabe clearly intending to hold onto power, despite probably losing presidential elections outright in March 2008, and despite his ZANU-PF losing to the opposition MDC party in parliamentary elections the same month. A second round of presidential elections in June was boycotted by the opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai because of widespread violence against his supporters. EU election monitors were refused entry, but even observers from African organisations found that the elections had not complied with African Union standards. While the then South African president, Thabo Mbeki, mediated a power-sharing agreement in September, to this day the details have not been worked out and Mugabe remains solely in power. In July, the EU lengthened the list Zimbabwean officials and politicians subject to its 'smart sanctions'. But it appeared both powerless and unwilling to become any more involved, even as a cholera outbreak killed hundreds, inflation is now incalculable, and the political stalemate continues. In retrospect, allowing Mugabe to attend the EU-Africa summit in December 2007 looks precipitous and naïve; 'engagement' led neither to a change in behaviour by Mugabe nor to increased EU influence in diplomatic efforts to end the tragedy.

"Several weaknesses stand out in 2008. The first and most important is the persistent differences of views among the member states over a wide variety of foreign policy issues"

Elsewhere, rather than intervene in Darfur, Sudan (though the EU has bankrolled African Union peacekeepers there), the EU in 2007 agreed, somewhat reluctantly, that it would instead send an ESDP mission to try to protect Sudanese refugees in Chad (and to a lesser extent in the Central African Republic). This was a French initiative, and some EU member states were suspicious of French motives, seeing the mission as boosting support for its ally, the Chadian government. Officially it is a one-year 'bridging mission'; in March 2009, the UN will take over and the EU will withdraw. The mission consists of 3300 troops (down from an initially-envisaged 4000), about half of whom are French and most of whom were deployed only in mid-2008. Right from the start the EU faced major difficulties in launching the mission. First, deployment of the mission was delayed when in early February, rebels tried to oust the government. Second, and more seriously, very few helicopters were available that could operate in the desert conditions. Eventually, the EU had to approach Russia for help with helicopters and in October 2008 (a mere two months after the Russia-Georgia war), Russia agreed to send four helicopters ("EU…", 2007 and "Russia…", 2008a).

In autumn 2008, intense fighting broke out in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between the government and rebel forces supported by Rwanda. At the end of October, UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner flew to the region, tried to get the DRC and Rwanda to engage in diplomacy, spoke strongly about the need for humanitarian aid corridors to be set up and for more UN peacekeepers to be sent – and then promptly left. And when UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon asked the European Union to send troops to help the UN's peacekeeping mission there (MONUC), EU foreign ministers were divided. Belgium and France were supportive, but the UK and Germany were opposed, arguing they were overstretched by deployments elsewhere (Afghanistan). Miliband said that European countries could send troops to the UN mission ("EU…", 2008 and Vogel, 2008). None have so far. This despite the fact that the EU has sent troops to the DRC before, currently has two ESDP missions to the country (EUSEC and EUFOR RD Congo) to help reform the security, police and justice sectors, and has declared that these prove its 'determination to contribute to DRC stability, which ultimately has a bearing on that of the Great Lakes region as a whole' ("The European…", 2005). As Richard Gowan argued, 'The Congo crisis tested three widely proclaimed EU priorities: its partnership with Africa, its strategic support to the UN, and its belief in the need to protect the vulnerable. Yet even combined, these priorities did not create enough momentum for military action' (Gowan, 2009).

In another case, however, the EU was much quicker to act – where its material interests (international shipping) were at risk. Pirates have been operating from Somalia for some years now, but in 2008 the number of acts of piracy ballooned. Alarmed, ships from several EU states (alongside ships from other countries such as India and the US) began patrolling off the Somali coast to try to deter piracy. In December 2008, the EU launched EU NAVFOR, aimed at deterring and repressing acts of piracy, and protecting World Food Programme vessels delivering aid to Somalia. At any one time, six frigates and three patrol aircraft may be deployed. The mission is set to last for one year.

The year ended with an Israeli air attack on Hamas fighters in the Gaza strip – on 27 December it began bombing Hamas targets (though in the process killing hundreds of civilians). While an EU delegation led by the new Czech presidency toured the region, so did Sarkozy, leading to considerable confusion over who was 'speaking for Europe'. The disarray in the European ranks distracts attention from the fact that the EU did not have much of a strategy vis-à-vis the peace process in 2008, other than to engage Israel. In June, the EU and Israel had agreed to 'upgrade' their relations. But as in the case of Zimbabwe and the EU-Africa summit, one must question whether this attempt at engagement influenced Israeli behaviour. Three weeks after the Israeli offensive began, the Czech presidency announced that negotiations over the upgrade were 'paused'.

Strategic issues

In the fall of 2007, French President Sarkzoy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt called for the revision of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), echoing an earlier call by the European Parliament. The argument was that the ESS needed updating to include new security concerns, and there should be a greater focus on implementation, Javier Solana duly drafted a 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World', which was approved by the European Council in December 2008 (Report…, 2008). The key threats identified in 2003 remain threats in 2008, though there is more emphasis on threats to Europe's energy security, the security implications of climate change, and the problem of piracy.[3] The three strategic goals are the same: build a more capable and effective Europe to address the threats, engage with the neighbourhood, and work for effective multilateralism. The report exhorts the EU to act strategically:

To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support

But it is not clear that the 2008 addition to the ESS will be of much more help in guiding policy-makers than the 2003 ESS was in the first place. Member states appear to be deeply divided over numerous issues, including the interpretation of threats and appropriate responses, and how to ensure security in the neighbourhood.

Conclusion: and in 2009…?

First of all, it worth noting some of the EU's achievements in 2008. The EU launched five new ESDP missions in 2008, some at quite short notice: EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic; EULEX Kosovo; EU NAVFOR off the coast of Somalia; the monitoring mission in Georgia; and a security sector reform mission in Guinea-Bissau. A solution to the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty was found. Sarkozy helped to end the fighting in Georgia.

But it is the disappointments of 2008 that must attract even more analysis, if the EU is to be 'more effective and visible around the world'. Several weaknesses stand out. The first and most important is the persistent differences of views among the member states over a wide variety of foreign policy issues, and their unwillingness to make compromises for the sake of EU unity and effectiveness. Without greater unity, none of the other weaknesses can ever be addressed. And there are several more: the lack of a backbone (the EU sets conditions for relations only to back down later); the persistent and embarrassing capability deficits (even though Europe is one of the richest and most advanced economies on earth), and the related tyranny of short-termism (for example, most ESDP missions have time-limited mandates). In addition, the promotion of human rights and democracy has virtually disappeared from the EU's 'high politics', which counters the EU's own oft-repeated philosophy that such matters are critical for long-term stability, security and prosperity. The Lisbon Treaty would not solve these issues overnight – if it can solve them at all. A new, dynamic, US Administration – sharing more of the EU's values – may allow the EU to mask over some of its weaknesses. But if EU action is entirely dependent on US support, then the situation is perhaps even more serious than widely believed.

Notes

1. As Ben Tonra found in his study of Danish, Dutch, and Irish foreign policy, small states place considerable value on the presidency: 'officials and ministers in all three states insist that the equal right of all states to host the presidency is an important principles and is of immediate practical value.' Ben Tonra, The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p 258.

2. In another appalling example of this, in October EU foreign ministers lifted 'smart sanctions' on Uzbekistan – even though it has not yet allowed an international enquiry into the 2005 massacre at Andijan. See Toby Vogel, 'The end of the road for EU sanctions?', European Voice, 13 November 2008.

3. Climate change received much attention in 2008. In March, the European Commission and High Representative presented a report to the European Council on 'Climate Change and International Security', document S113/08, 14 March 2008. In December, the High Representative presented a follow-up report with recommendations (document S412/08, 18 December 2008). The reports highlight the negative implications of climate change for security (more conflicts over resources), and suggest priority areas for action (which largely consists of more dialogue with countries at risk).

Bibliography

BET-EL, Ilana (2008). 'The End of a Bad, Bad Year' [on line]. *European Voice*. 18 December 2008. <www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/the-end-of-a-bad,-bad-year/63465.aspx. [Checked on: 03.13.19]

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2008a). Eastern Partnership [on line]: communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 3.12.2008. 14 p. COM (2008) 823 final. <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/com08_823_en.pdf.
[Checked on: 03.18.09]

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2008b). Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009 [on line]: communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 5.11.2008. 66 p. COM (2008) 674 final. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_incl_country_conclu_en.pdf.
[Checked on: 03.18.09]

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2008). Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO [on line]. Official Journal of the European Union. L 42 (16 February 2008), p.92-98. "Article 2, Mandate". <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:042:0092:0098:ES:PDF. [Checked on: 03.18.09]

DEIMEL, Johanna; GARCÍA SCHMIDT, Armando (2009). 'Kosovo 2009 [on line]: uncertain future'. Spotlight Europe Nº1, January 2009. <www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-4C4909DC-62E0AADC/bst_engl/Engl_spotlight%20europe_Kosovo_09-01-05.pdf.
[Checked on: 03.16.09]

'EU Split on Congo Troop Mission' [on line] (2008). BBC news. 8 December 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7770916.stm. [Checked on: 03.16.09]

'EU Unlikely to Deploy Chad Force on Time Due to Dispute over Funding, Helicopters' [on line] (2007). International Herald Tribune, 28 November 2007. <www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/28/europe/EU-GEN-EU-Darfur-Spillover.php?WT.mc_id=rssap_europe. [Checked on: 03.16.09]

'The European Union's Engagement Towards Stability and Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)' [on line] (2005). Background (EU Council Secretariat), 23 May 2005. 3 p. <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Background-23.5.05.en.pdf. [Checked on: 03.18.09]

GOWAN, Richard (2009). 'Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes' [on line]. *E! Sharp*, January-February 2009, p. 58. Available access previous subscription. <www.esharp.eu/issue/2009-1/Viewpoint-Good-intentions-bad-outcomes. [Checked on: 03.18.09]

'Kosovo and Serbia [on line]: Deployment Days' (2008). *The Economist*, 30 December 2008. <www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12868172. [Checked on: 03.16.09]

'Macedonia's Name [on line]: breaking the deadlock' (2009), Europe briefing Nº. 52, 12 January 2009. Available access previous registration. www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5862. [Checked on: 03.16.09]

'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy [on line]: providing security in a

changing world' (2008). Brussels: [Council of the European Union]. Document Nº. S407/08, 11 December 2008. <www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf. [Checked on: 03.18.09]

'Russia "ready to help EU" in Chad' [on line] (2008a). BBC news. 29 September 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7642600.stm
[Checked on: 03.16.09]

'Russian lessons' [on line] (2008b). *The Economist*. 6 November 2008. <www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12562305. [Checked on: 16.03.09]

'Sarkozy: the right man at the right time' [on line] (2008). *European Voice*. 18 December 1008. <www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/sarkozy-the-right-man-at-the-right-time/63458.aspx. [Checked on: 16.03.09]

SERFATY, Simon (2008). 'The Year of Europe?' [on line]. EU Institute for Security Studies, Opinion, Nº.0, February 2008. <www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Europe_SS.pdf [Checked on: 16.03.09]

TAYLOR, Simon (2009). 'Shaping EU and world politics the Sarkozy way' [on line]. *European Voice*, 8 January 2009. <www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/shaping-eu-and-world-politics-the-sarkozy-way/63558.aspx. [Checked on: 16.03.09]

VOGEL, Toby (2008). 'Why Europe is split over troops for Congo' [on line]. *European Voice*, 11 December 2008. <www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/why-europe-is-split-over-troops-for-congo/63357.aspx. [Checked on: 13.06.09]

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

The challenge of Europe, dangerous analogies.

Ivan Krastev

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

The challenge of Europe, dangerous analogies

Ivan Krastev,
Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

"Analogy: a comparison between things essentially or generically different, but strikingly alike in one or more pertinent aspects"

Webster's **New Dictionary**

"Are you blind, don't you see that the European Union will end up the same way Tito's Yugoslavia ended?" As a rule the people who ask this question are middle class, middle age, intelligent and traumatized ex-Yugoslavs living in the European Union. These doomsayers are not prophesying blood wars Balkan style, nor they hate the European Union, but they are captured by disturbing analogies. In sleepless nights their traumatized minds have produced a long list of troubling similarities between the factors, sentiments and actors that led to the collapse of Yugoslavia and some of the trends they see in the EU today. Their list of dangerous analogies has different versions but the essential parts are always the same. Tito's Yugoslavia was torn apart by a lack of solidarity. The rich republics- Slovenia and Croatia- were not interested any more to pay for the development of Kosovo or Macedonia. The EU today is also threatened by the deficit of solidarity. The richer states and regions in the EU are less and less willing to share with the poorer and old European member states are becoming hostile and suspicious to the newcomers. Yugoslavia collapsed because its political and intellectual elites underestimated the power of national sentiments and managed falsely to convince themselves that ethnic nationalism is something from the past. The EU elites are making the same mistake. They like to talk about European identity and multiculturalism when Europe today faces the rise of nationalism and xenophobia. The fear of the immigrants brought to power several governments in Europe, who openly preach intolerance and live in "us versus them" world. The list makers are eager to point out that the current EU like Tito's Yugoslavia has lost its narrative and that now when the generation of the founding father has passed away the new generations have forgotten what the EU was about. The debate about EU in many member states is focused much more on what they are losing in the Union than on what they gain out of it. Exactly like in Yugoslavia in 1980s. The federal center/Brussels today, Belgrade then/ has become the enemy of choice for the opportunistic national politicians. The referenda in France and Netherlands made list makers convinced in the validity of their fears. People who are eager to ask the "are you blind" question do not believe that prosperity or democracy is enough to keep the Union together. Prosperity will probably end some day and in their troubled memories the process of democratization gave power to the people and the result was that people destroyed the country they lived in. What followed after the popular vote was the popular fight.

It is not surprising that those shaped by traumatic experience tend to be extreme in their opinions and their fears. What makes survivors of Yugoslavia's collapse so different from the ordinary EU citizen is his newly found knowledge of fragility of things with which we live? "Everything was forever, until it was no more" can be the title of the collective memoir of a generation. The citizens and the elites in the EU new member states know this strange feeling when you witness when something that looks stable and unchangeable collapse over night.

In reality analogies between the European Union and Tito's Yugoslavia are striking but also misleading. Tito's Yugoslavia at the end of the day was a communist dictatorship and its collapse was rooted in the nature of its political regime. It is not by accident that none of the communist federations/Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia/ have survived. The League of the Yugoslav Communists, Yugoslav army and Josip Bros Tito were probably the only truly Yugoslav things about Yugoslavia. So, to compare Tito's "pragmatic dictatorship" with the democratic EU is a false starting point. Yugoslavia was an economic failure and the EU is an economic success. Yugoslavia was at best a mid-size country at the periphery of Europe; the EU is a project of continental scale. Democracy deficit and not simply "democratic deficit' was the defining element of Tito's project. Tito's Yugoslavia was a charismatic regime that failed to find a new model of existence after the death of its founder. After Marshall Tito's death the country was in a state of permanent crisis.

It all is true, but to maintain that Yugoslavia was doomed to die from its earliest days or that there was no chance for democratic Yugoslavia makes no more sense than to posit that its creation was inevitable, in fashion

of post-war Titoist historiography. Tito's Yugoslavia collapsed not because it was metaphysically doomed but because there were not enough political actors who were pro-Yugoslav and pro-democratic at the same time. Yugoslavia failed because its leaders failed to re-perceive the world in which they live and to re-imagine how a post-Tito Yugoslavia can look like. Taking Yugoslavia for granted turned to be the most tragic mistake of those who preyed for its survival.

So, when some traumatized ex-Yugoslavs consciously or unconsciously compare their present experience in the EU with their experience in the now dead Tito's federation they have a point that some of us tend to miss. The point is that the European Union should not be taken for granted and that some of the external factors that contributed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia will play role in shaping European Union's fate in the next decade. In the way Yugoslavia was profoundly destabilized by the end of the Cold war and in the way Yugoslavia was de-legitimatized by the sudden death of socialism, in this same way the EU will be shattered by the collapse post-Cold war world and by the crisis of liberalism and the shift in ideological fashion in the world.

The New "Old World"

"The EU was never enthusiastic about geopolitics but it has a lot to gain from the world of geoeconomics"

The statement that the end of Cold War status quo was one of the major factors contributing to the dissolution of Yugoslavia is an ultimate triviality. It is also true. The first Yugoslavia/the one created in 1918/ was invented by the Great Powers, but the second Tito's Yugoslavia was sustained by the super-powers of the Cold war. The shortest explanation why it was unthinkable that Yugoslavia was going to collapse in 1970s was that the Soviet Union and the United States were not going to allow this to happen. Tito's "national way of communism" was useful for both Moscow and Washington. And this allowed Tito to get the loans of the imperialists and to be one of the leaders of the struggle against imperialism at the same time. Tito's Yugoslavia was the main critic and the main beneficiary of the Cold War status quo. It was in Belgrade in 1961 that the Non-Aligned Movement was founded and it was Tito who declared "we have no wish to depend on anyone. We do not want to be small change; we do not want to be involved in any policy of spheres of influence". Now it is easy to forget how popular Tito's Yugoslavia was in the days of the confrontation between the super-powers. But when the Cold war was over Yugoslavia felt victim to its geopolitical irrelevance.

Is "irrelevance" a legitimate concern for the EU? In the last year European economy has become the biggest single economy in the world thus contradicting those who just some years ago were ready to view European economic model as inefficient and without future. The euro is on its way to turn into world currency. European companies that were often criticized in the 1990s for their lack of dynamism perform in the moment much better than their American counterparts. The claims that the European welfare state hurts economy turned to be a myth. In short Europe is doing well and what is not less important the EU is appreciated by the rest of the world. According to the polls the EU is the world's most admired world power. So, why EU should be worried about the shifts in the geopolitical context? Is the EU not set to be the biggest beneficiary of the coming geopolitical shift?

In reality the EU has reasons to worry. The European Union was one of the major beneficiaries of the post-cold war world order that was dominated by the United States. Despite of the fact that in recent years Europe was one of the sharpest critics of America's unipolar world in realty America's world was quite hospital to the European project. It was due to the America's global hegemony that the EU has emerged on the world stage as free riding super power. America's global hegemony allowed EU to be a super power without the need to be nation-state type of actor. It was Washington's global hegemony that allowed the EU to enlarge itself and to concentrate on its internal institutional architecture. America's security umbrella allowed EU to become global power without the need to become real military power. America's global hegemony that turned the world in competition between companies and not competition between states perfectly fitted European interest. The EU was never enthusiastic about geopolitics but it has a lot to gain from the world of geoeconomics.

It seems now that all this is going to change. American hegemony is over and Europe is going to face new and less hospitable world. "The world has become normal again. Struggle for status and influence in the world have returned as central features of the international scenes". It turned out that there are two exist from the 20th century-one is towards EU like 21 century, the other is back to the 19th century. In the new post-American world the world stage will be dominated most probably by 19 century minded traditional powers that fundamentally differ in their assumption from the Brussels consensus. It was Kishore Mahbubani the best known prophet of the Asian century who made the verdict that "Europe cannot continue to be a giant Switzerland. The Swiss can feel secure because they are surrounded by Europe." Europe is not surrounded by Europe. While EU citizens live in a bubble of security but each day they feel a rising psychological insecurity about their future. According to the opinion polls like Americans and unlike Chinese or Indians, the majority of Europe fears the future. European publics' fear of the future is the best manifestation of the general mood of uncertainty when it comes to EU's relevance on the global stage.

The paradox about the EU's position in the world is that it is both a giant and a dwarf. The EU being a post-modern political formation can only to lose from a world where the rivalry between great powers will determine the global agenda. The EU will either forced to develop a single state qualities, by introducing European army and external service or the tensions between the member states will rise. At present the EU has a surplus of popularity but a deficit of power. But the sentiments of European publics make the prospect for more federalist Europe highly unlikely. Since its enlargement up to 27 member states the EU is not realistically viewed any more as a federalist state in making. Federalist rhetoric is still alive in certain corners of Europe but the federalist dream is given away. The challenge for the EU is how to be powerful and relevant in a 19th century minded world in its present constitutional form. Will the "return of the 19th century" will not lead to the re-nationalize of the foreign policies of the big member states and are these states big enough to claim any global role. In short, the decline of American power and the collapse of American hegemony/nevertheless how you feel about it/ is more a risk than an opportunity for the European project.

The shift in ideological fashions

The change of the geopolitical status quo is not the only change that can threaten the European project. In reality, the change of the geopolitical context is accompanied by a major ideological shift that will affect EU and its relations with the rest of the world. Here the comparisons with Yugoslavia can be instructive. Tito's Yugoslavia for almost three decades functioned in the world of ideas as an embodiment of the fashionable theory of the convergence between communism and capitalism. Tito's empire serves as the model for the reform minded communists in the Eastern block and as a hope for détente minded anti-communists in the Western block. But Tito's version of the Third way lost its attractiveness in the awake of 1989. Overnight Yugoslavia went out of fashion. The velvet revolution of 1989 and their anti-communist message made irrelevant Yugoslav attempt to represent a humanized version of state socialism, one based on self-management and solidarity with the Third World. The citizens and political elites of Yugoslavia lost the belief that they are on the progressive side of history and that the world moves in their direction. Yugoslav elites turned to other ideas in their search for inspiration.

The EU can be hardly hit by the change of ideological fashions. For the last decade the European public opinion assumed that globalization is synonymous with the decline of the nation state and nationalism as a political force. The EU was tempted to read its own experience of overcoming of ethnic nationalism and political religions as a universal trend. The end of history was American slogan but European reality in the 1990s. As Mark Leonard has put it in his book "Why Europe will run 21 century" "Europe represents a synthesis of the energy and freedom that come from liberalism with the stability and welfare that come from social democracy. As the world becomes richer and moves beyond satisfying basic needs such as hunger and health, the European way of life will become irresistible". But what till yesterday looked universal in European experience today starts to look exceptional. It is enough to look at China, India, and Russia in order to see that both ethnic nationalism and religion are back in shaping global politics. Post-modern post-nationalism and secularism are making Europe different than the rest of the world. Nationalism and religion are back as major ideological driving forces. The world is becoming more capitalist but this does not necessary means more democratic. China and Russia start to be view as alternative to the model of democratic capitalism. It is not difficult to predict that in the next ideological cycle liberalism will be in retreat. The rise of ethnic nationalism and the return of religion are not only more and more present in the non-European world; they are also more present within Europe itself. Brussels as a capital of the EU is very different in its spirit than Brussels as a capital of Belgium. EU's Brussels is in love of diversity and multiculturalism while Belgium's Brussels is witnessing the rise of symbolic politics and the ghost of the ethnically driven partition.

In short, European project can be in danger as a result of misreading its own history. The current European Union is at one and the same time the outcome of the defeat and the success of ethnic nationalism. It is enough to re-read Tony Judt superb history of Europe, not accidentally called Post-War in order to recognize that it was the destructions and trauma of the WWII that learn European publics to hate nationalism but it was the "ethnic cleansing" in its version of "ethnic transfers" that followed the War that made European states homogenous enough for tolerating diversity.

Most people brought up in Western Europe during the Cold war have imbibed consciously or unconsciously a Whig interpretation of European history. European history since 1945 has been told to them as a story of progress towards more prosperity, more freedom and more federal EU. The East Europeans were more than happy to buy this version of history. But the new geopolitical and ideological reality that EU can face in the next decade will make all these assumptions problematic. What the dangerous analogies between the EU and Tito's Yugoslavia demonstrates is that there two major risks that the EU faces at the present moment of its history. The one risk is to take the EU for granted and be unable to see the change when it comes. The second risk is to be paralyzed the shock of the change and to lose trust in your own model. Tito's Yugoslavia happened to fail in both of these tests. We should hope that the EU will do much better.

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Reflections on two decades of Spanish foreign policy.

Josep A. Duran i Lleida

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

Reflections on two decades of Spanish foreign policy

Josep A. Duran i Lleida,
Chairman, Commission of Foreign Affairs,
Spanish Parliament

As I write this, all the media on the planet are covering the inauguration of Barack Obama as the new president of the United States of America. At the same time, the press are covering (each in their own way) the effects of an economic crisis that makes no distinction between continents or political systems.

Everything points to the transformation – either gradual or by force – of the existing world order. In the same way that the bipolar system that resulted from the Second World War collapsed along with the Berlin Wall, American unilateralism now seems to be teetering before the blasts of the first trumpets of the apocalypse. Thus we find ourselves at a time that is to historic to a certain extent, and facing an uncertain future that may culminate in a new, multipolar international order; one in which dialogue and consensus must prevail over the use of force.

Within this context (and though it might seem to be a simple anecdote destined never to appear in the history books) lies an issue that has kept Spain's international policy on tenterhooks for weeks: the Spanish prime minister had expressed a pressing need to participate in the Washington Summit in November 2008, an event that was rather pompously devised to re-launch capitalism, and to this end he mobilised the country's entire diplomatic resources. Not one foreign office escaped from the pressure of these efforts. Suddenly, all the grandeur and misfortunes of our foreign policy, which had been so hard-earned with each successive term of office, had resulted in endless trips, contacts and declarations. But at least they did achieve the artificial snapshot of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero being welcomed into the White House by a weary George W. Bush, in a gesture that had taken more than four long years to bring about, a situation that would have been unthinkable with any other allied nation.

This photograph provokes several reflections concerning Spain's foreign policy in recent decades. Foreign relations are a fragile, sensitive issue; they are not built from one day to the next, and yet they can deteriorate with great speed.

In any serious state that aspires to play a respected role on the international stage, foreign policy cannot vary in accordance with successive governments. There must be a continuity of purpose and a slow orientation that grants an identity to the foreign policy and enables it to consolidate alliances and stances. Our image overseas, and our greater or lesser international prestige cannot depend on temporary situations or events due to the fact that one party or another is currently in government. It is a matter of State, of a policy of State that requires the maximum consensus, beyond the easy temptation to use it for the purpose of domestic electoral interests. Both government and opposition should be aware of the impact of each of their actions on the international stage. The famous image of the then-leader of the opposition remaining seated as the US flag passed before him, as a kind of protest against the Iraq war, should be understood in terms of Spain's domestic politics, though its effects when the PSOE came to power proved devastating for relations between Spain and the leading world power. It was a massive mistake, and one that was similar, however, to the mistake made by José María Aznar when he attempted to construct an unconditional pro-American policy without previously establishing the necessary domestic consensus. As one would expect, two mistakes do not result in a right answer, but instead in a mistake that is twice as serious.

It is obvious that consensus on this issue cannot be circumscribed to the political sphere. It should go beyond this, and be interwoven into the heart of Spanish society for a dual reason: firstly, a social consensus on the main guidelines of our foreign policy will prevent the recurring temptation (to which I refer above) to use foreign policy in accordance with political party criteria, but furthermore (and given the progressive multiplicity of agents with an international influence, such as NGOs, media organs and centres for learning or opinion creating, among other, analogous bodies), it goes without saying that foreign policy actions should also meet with, as far as possible, a broad, general consensus so as to prevent disagreeable incidents on this State issue.

The certainty of the fragility foreign policy and the parsimony with which positive results are achieved also force us to consider that we should begin drafting our international roadmap for the coming decades right now. The brief period of any term of office is not sufficient for establishing the guidelines for our overseas actions. And even less so should we change them with each succeeding term of office. Today, all the main states, and all the major areas of international policy attempt to draft their objectives and strategies for the long term. Opening up markets, consolidating our image overseas, forecasts for migration flows, taking on new responsibilities, obtaining energy resources – these are all areas in which we must not improvise, and much less so substitute important-sounding declarations for facts and results.

Likewise, Spain must also take its membership of Europe seriously, both because of the historical and cultural characteristics of its different regions and for practical reasons deriving from its geographical location, and the fact that it belongs to this common political and economic space. As we have heard on more than one occasion, Europe is not simply an objective of our foreign policy, but instead, we *are* Europe; Europe is our essence and, of course, our future.

"Aznar and Rodríguez Zapatero have deployed much more 'national' European policies than Felipe González's Europeist vision"

Once we have established (as indeed we must) this initial premise, it is clear that our foreign policy should also consider other objectives. The first, without any doubt, is the constant strengthening of our relations with the United States of America, not only because it is the leading world power, but also because we belong to the Western world, to the defence system that resulted from the North Atlantic treaty and to the values that characterise the United States as an originally European culture; an extension in many ways of values, ideas and principles that were developed in Europe.

And of course, Spain's history also provides us with comparative advantages in our relations with Latin America, as well as with the Mediterranean, and thus we can legitimately feel ourselves to be called upon to play important roles in both areas. However, the globalisation of the economy, communications and international politics means that we must not neglect any area of the planet, especially when the decisive nuclei of the world's economy and finance are becoming consolidated around the Pacific.

The globalisation of the world and the desire to access all the regions that could turn out to be of interest for our economy, or for establishing alliances that will be to our advantage, or that of Spain's international influence – all of this leads to the very globalisation of international politics, in which there are no insignificant objectives any longer.

The European Union

Without any doubt, Europe has been the main objective of our foreign policy almost from the very moment the different constitutive treaties came into being. Let us remember that our first application to join Europe was submitted in February 1962, though obviously, the Spain of that time was not in any condition to join an organisation based on the principles of parliamentary democracy. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the Spanish application, submitted following the initial success of stabilisation plans and at the beginning of the country's period of economic development known as *desarrollismo*, did not receive any response from the other side of the Pyrenees. Nevertheless, following repeated efforts by the regime, they did manage to sign a preferential trade agreement in 1970 and a Protocol agreement in January 1973.

However, the death of the dictator and the hesitant opening-up of the democratic transition process meant that Spain could knock on the doors of the European institutions once more. The consensus expressed in the dialogue between the government and the opposition with respect to the need to democratise the State and to proceed with the imminent approval of a constitution comparable with those of other European democracies enabled Spain to gain access to a number of different institutions, such as the Council of Europe in 1977. One only has to look back at the newspapers of that time to see that the democratisation process of those years was linked with becoming a full member of the European Economic Community.

The result of the political transformation on which Spain had embarked became visible in February 1979, just two months after the constitution had been passed, on the occasion of the formal opening of negotiations between Spain and the EEC, and which led to (not without significant difficulties, including blocking by France) the signing of the Treaty of Accession on 12 June 1985 and Spain's full membership of European institutions on 1 January 1986.

It is clear that this access to the heart of Europe would not have been possible without the efforts made by the transition governments led by Adolfo Suárez and Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, thanks to which Spain began to open up to the outside world. Europe, in addition to Spain's joining NATO, were the two basic pillars of our foreign policy and, in spite of the anti-Atlantic fickleness of the opposition at that time, there is no doubt that they represented a very wise decision. We must at this point make some mention of the international prestige that had been gained by the king of Spain, a figure who on many occasions represented to the other countries' foreign offices the only guarantee for the process of the democratisation of the state and the stability of the fragile system that emerged from the 1978 Constitution.

We should also highlight the *seny* or sound judgment that the effect of coming to power in 1982 injected into the PSOE, led by Felipe González. Left-wing fickleness and a policy to some extent typical of non-aligned countries, plagued with references and admiration for the revolutionary Central America, were opportunely replaced by a reorientation toward the Western world, as we will have the opportunity of observing in greater detail when we examine our Atlantic policy and our relations with the United States of America.

In this process of conversion and negotiation, both for Spain's joining Europe and during subsequent periods, we must acknowledge the work of Felipe González's foreign affairs ministers, particularly Fernando Morán and later Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, as well as Manuel Marín - the former President of the Chamber of Deputies, and who was at that time the State Secretary responsible for the negotiations, to become one of the key figures in the whole process, and who later played a very important role as member of the European Commission.

Despite the unquestionable pro-European feeling in Spanish society, and the existing political consensus with respect to our full integration into Europe, it is true that each of the country's successive governments has adopted different guidelines for action, which have not always been in accord with the need to bring together and strengthen the institutional framework of the Union. No common "State policy" has existed in terms of Felipe González, José María Aznar or José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's perception of Europe, or that of their respective foreign affairs ministers.

Without any doubt, the 14 years when Felipe González led the Spanish government was the time when our foreign policy gave Europe the greatest importance, as well as the time when Spain had the most influence over the process of constructing Europe and decision-making. Correspondingly, it was also the time when Spain achieved the greatest results from its membership of Europe, given that they led to the arrival of the cohesion and regional development funds that have contributed so much to Spain's spectacular economic progress over the past two decades.

As I have already mentioned repeatedly, in my opinion, Felipe González created a foreign policy suited to Spain's interests. Its main asset was González's excellent understanding with Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, as a result of which Spain became an important element of support for the France-Germany axis. One decisively influential aspect in the González-Kohl relationship was the clear support the Spanish prime minister provided to the process of German unification following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of East Europe in 1989. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that on many occasions the then-federal chancellor should refer to Felipe González as "my friend", and not only for reasons of protocol or courtesy. It was also a time when *Jabugo* ham formed part of Helmut Kohl's diet in his foreign office.

Thus, the solid *entente* formed by the governments of Germany, France and Spain produced excellent results for Spain, in the context of the passing of the Maastricht Treaty and other European agreements. The transformation of the EEC into the European Union enabled us to move towards a Europe that would transcend that "community of merchants" to become a Union with important powers, its own single currency, intergovernmental coordination with respect to a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the establishing of its own policies on justice and internal affairs. We should also remember, to be fair, the complicity and participation of Jacques Delors in the drive to construct Europe at that time.

González's European policy, when we look back at it from afar (and also in light of the policies deployed by his successors), shows us the characteristics that any Spanish action with any serious claims for itself should possess in this sphere: commitment to the future of Europe, conviction of the wisdom of, and the political need for a stronger Europe in political, social and economic terms.

Aznar and Rodríguez Zapatero, with all their obvious differences, have deployed much more "national" European policies, in which Felipe González's Europeist vision has been replaced by a use of the Union for Spanish purposes, especially under José María Aznar's mandate.

The PP governments evaded González's persistent desire to go to Brussels to champion a specific idea of Europe that would bring it increasing solidity and content. Neither Aznar nor the rest of the so-called "Valladolid Clan" possessed, deep down, a Europeist view – a view that, paradoxically, has always been possessed by Europe's Christian Democrat family to which (theoretically, at least) Spain's PP nominally belonged. What's more, Aznar has never been a convinced European and, therefore, neither was his foreign policy, which was always characterised by a distrust of the European Union. This was an objective fact that was well known in the foreign offices of Europe, some of which (for example, Germany's) sent express messages to Convergència i Unió asking the party to exert all possible pressure to ensure that the future Aznar government would involve itself in compliance with European objectives and the birth of the Economic and Monetary Union. Felipe González himself, with a notable vision of the state and above any party considerations, also exhorted us to support the new PP majority with the aim of achieving the European objectives.

I believe that in its support for the Aznar government in its first time of office, CiU was decisive in ensuring that Spain complied suitably with the Maastricht criteria. In spite of this, the Aznar government's policy resulted in a short-sighted defence of Spain's presumptions before the European Union; this led, firstly, to a breaking of previous governments' traditional alliances, and secondly – now that Spain's presence was

consolidated in the Council of Europe, and that Aznar's government held an absolute majority in the Spanish legislative chambers – to the establishing of new alliances which, in the months leading up to the second Iraq war, placed the European Union's unity of action in danger.

In any case, José Maria Aznar's term of office coincided in time with, on one hand, the exits of Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand from the political stage, and on the other, with the coming into force of the Economic and Monetary Union, which meant that for some years, greater attention was paid to the Single Market than to political union. In short, all of this resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty that was devised to develop the Maastricht Treaty and which could only be partially implemented, and the subsequent Nice Treaty, the main function of which was to prepare the European Union for its enlargement to include the countries of the East, particularly with respect to decision-making methods and the make-up and functions of the European Commission and the EU Council of Ministers. These were, without any doubt, issues that were deeply linked with political union, the cession of sovereignty and shared sovereignty, and in which (as we have seen) the political leaders of the time failed, the first of these being José Maria Aznar and Spain's European policy. The PP wanted to defend at all costs the advantageous position they had inherited from Felipe González, but they never managed to comprehend that the great weapon of the González governments was their decided commitment to the European project, which also brought them a favourable position when it came to defending Spain's interests. José Maria Aznar and his foreign affairs ministers focused solely on this second aspect; it is to say, on the defence of what they understood as being Spain's direct interests, but without the necessary vision of State and of the future that has enabled Europe to move forward during the past half-century.

"With the arrival of the new Obama Administration, Spain may even succeed in re-establishing the good relations of the days of Felipe González"

In fact, Spain complied with the Maastricht criteria and even did so better than Germany. It was the result of the efforts of social and economic agents and of Spanish society as a whole, without ignoring the efforts of the then-Vice-President and Minister of the Economy Rodrigo Rato and the pressure and influence of Convergència i Unió, which always pressed for and championed a commitment to a productive economy in compliance with the set objectives. Nevertheless, Aznar's European myopia made itself felt on many occasions, particularly when he went so far as to boast of Spain's good results before the leaders of Germany, having forgotten that those results were made possible thanks to the cohesion funds that the "pesky" González had obtained from Helmut Kohl.

Aznar should also be chided for his exaggerated abuse of the Spanish nationalist card in the European debates, to the extent of obstructing the process of European unification, as was the case at Nice and even in relation to the later project of European Constitution. Perhaps he persisted with this approach with the aim of obtaining electoral gains, but in some way it was useful for strengthening a Europeist feeling in Spanish society. Of course, defending Spanish interests is not only legitimate but also necessary, but Aznar lacked any statist vision in this area, and he did not understand the compatibility that can exist in defending both interests – of both Spaniards and Europeans – and that the progress of the European Union also adds value to Spain's interests.

Finally, Aznar's continuing support for George Bush's policy on the Iraq issue, to the detriment of the predominant stances in Europe, resulted in the deterioration of Spain's position in Europe. Beyond any assessment, it is true that Aznar achieved significant international importance deriving from his rapprochement to US policy, and it is also true that both Chirac and Schröder behaved rather frivolously on this issue, but the result of it all, in addition to the sacrificing of European relations, was no less than a considerable rupture in the heart of Spanish society, and the support for a war that did not receive any approval at all from the international community.

In contrast with the actions of José María Aznar, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's European policy has its virtues, but also its drawbacks. On the positive side, there was the breaking of some of the Aznar government's alliances and approaches which aligned Spain with the most Euro-sceptic states in Europe, such as Poland and the United Kingdom, which have often acted in complete contradiction to the interests of France and Germany, who should always be Spain's natural allies. I consider it a virtue that on the issue of Europe, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has promptly returned to a network of alliances at the European Union level that are much more in accord with Spain's recent history. The big problem, however, lies in the fact that the dynamic of the pendulum is not always the correct approach in politics. Zapatero's return to Europe has not led to an assumption of those policies of commitment to Europe and the simultaneous defence of Spain that characterised Felipe González; instead, the current prime minister has all too often chosen to delegate in France or Germany, without making himself a member of the important nucleus that these countries comprise and yet, in contrast, placing himself at their disposal. To date, Rodríguez Zapatero has not managed to become an outstanding member of the European Council, and this fact is clearly visible in Spain's aforementioned massive difficulty in gaining access to the Washington Summit – a summit that we necessarily had to attend

owing to Spain's economic and international weight – and which can also be perceived in the informal summits called by the European presidency to debate anti-crisis measures, where they did not even bother to include the Spanish prime minister.

The transatlantic relationship and Spanish-US relations

Apart from Spain's joining the European Communities, one of the most outstanding landmarks in our foreign policy since democracy has been Spain's incorporation into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which took place in December 1981.

Ever since the very beginning of the transition to democracy, successive governments have expressed interest in joining the Atlantic body. But significant obstacles existed – both abroad and at home. For example, we had to win over the opposition of certain European countries that did not yet consider Spain to be a full democracy. On the domestic level, it is undeniable that the greatest concern of Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez was the ramblings of our domestic policy and the need to successfully complete (against the constant din of sabre rattling) the country's transformation into a full democracy. Another domestic problem we should consider was the nonexistence of any consensus at all with the socialist opposition, which was against the idea of Spain becoming part of the Atlantic Alliance.

However, joining NATO clearly turned out to be a key step in Spain's incorporation into the Western bloc. And without any doubt, this was greatly aided by Spain joining the European Economic Community.

With a notable sense of State, and despite the obvious difficulties of the time, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo mentioned Spain's incorporation into NATO in his investiture speech, an issue that was debated on several occasions in Parliament. But not only this: the socialist theories, at that time inspired by old-fashioned left-wing views that found no echoes in the family of European socialism, always represented a political and social obstacle to the full acceptance of Spain's role in the defence of the West; this attitude was expressed in that famous slogan *OTAN, de entrada NO* ("No entry for NATO"), though it had to be rapidly replaced in 1982, following Felipe González's victory in the general elections, right up until the grotesque, incomprehensible referendum of 1986, when the electoral slogan was completely different: *OTAN en el interés de España* ("NATO, in the interests of Spain"). But however it was achieved, the PSOE's transformation with respect to the Atlantic Alliance produced the right result, and even made it possible for one of its leaders at that time –Javier Solana– to end up becoming the Secretary General of the organisation, and to then go on to reach the executive position of "Monsieur PESC" in the heart of the European Union.

It is also a cliché to claim that Spain's entry into NATO involved a change in Spanish-US, which resulted in the new Agreement on Defence Cooperation of 1988, the undeniable result of Spain's democratic consolidation and the end of the Cold War.

Nevertheless, relations with the United States have been difficult, generally speaking. In spite of Spain's contribution to the independence of the new State, which specifically involved not only significant financial aid but also military intervention by Bernardo de Gálvez in Pensacola, or the easy relations that George Washington, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay enjoyed with leading Spanish national heroes such as the Count of Aranda, the fact is that subsequently relations between the two countries were conditioned by a certain "decolonisation" of what are now American territories that once belonged to Spain, but also by growing American influence in areas that are sensitive for Spain, such as Latin America and the Philippines. We need only remember that the 1898 war and the loss of Cuba and the Philippines resulted in relations between the two countries during the first third of the 20th century being described as one of "mutual forgetting", though it is also unquestionable that the 1998 war marked the emergence of the United States of America as a world power.

After the Spanish Civil War, anti-American sentiment grew among the Spanish population, not only because of the outbreak of the war in itself (as US support from public figures and citizens' movements in defence of the existing legality was greater there than in some neighbouring European countries), but rather over the US stance on General Franco's the dictatorship, expressed through Eisenhower's celebrated embrace and the explicit support that the 1953 Agreements represented within the framework of the Cold War.

This anti-Americanism was also influenced by the 'back-yard policies' the US practiced toward Latin American countries, as well as by Spain's perception of the Cold War, especially when Spain (owing to its regime) had been excluded from the Marshall Plan's aid, and from the bonanza that accompanied the "German miracle", and which contrasted diametrically with the poverty and shortages of Spain's post-war period.

A perceptible distancing also took part on the part of the USA. American society, until not long ago, had great difficulty in locating Spain on any map of the world and undoubtedly a great majority still do not know the difference between 'Spanish' and 'Hispanic'.

But we don't want to recall past offences. Whatever happened in the past, we should celebrate the fact that anti-Americanism has been decreasing in Spanish society, at least with respect to the country and society as a whole, despite the fact that under President George W. Bush's recently-concluded term of office, a major sense (or at least a "progressive" pose) of hostility was expressed, not so much toward the country in itself, but rather towards the US government.

It is also true that in recent years, Spain has stood out as one of the main investor countries in the United States of America (in spite of the inverse data that shows that the US is the leading investor in Spain), and that Spain is present in such important American sectors as energy, the iron and steel industry, transport, banking and the food industry. Another aspect that is often mentioned in this sense is the scale of contacts between the two countries, given that Spain has become the country that receives the second-largest number of American university students, second only to the United Kingdom.

In any case, while the relationship between the two countries was consolidated during Ronald Reagan's terms of office, the most notable changes took place under the administration of President Bush Senior. Felipe González's policy, based on a pro-European approach, good relations with Latin America and Spain's strategic position on the Mediterranean checkerboard, all helped Spain to achieve an excellent relationship with the leading world power, at the highest level, but without the submissiveness to US interests that was experienced under José María Aznar's second term of office.

This situation changed notably after 11-S and Spain's involvement in the Iraqi War thanks to Prime Minister Aznar, a point I have already mentioned.

"The designation of Barcelona as the headquarters of the Union for the Mediterranean has granted Spain a leadership that it should make full use of"

José María Aznar's unconditional pro-American policy was brought to an end on 17 April 2004, the day that Rodríguez Zapatero came to power, on which he immediately declared that he would be withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq, without any prior consultation (though mention has been made of a prior warning five minutes earlier) to the US President. It was an act that followed on from the ostensible lack of respect that Zapatero showed during the march past of the Stars & Stripes on 12 October 2003 on Madrid's Paseo de la Castellana.

In the years that followed, and in spite of continued efforts by Spain to disguise the reality, the fact is that relations with the main world power have been icy, even more so when Rodríguez Zapatero incessantly express his desire that the leaders who had appeared in the Azores photograph should be defeated at the ballot box, as well as exhorting all the nations with troops in Iraq to withdraw them. However, this marked coolness did not prevent Zapatero from becoming closely involved in the war in Afghanistan, in an attempt to alleviate the serious external consequences of his unilateral decision.

Given all the above, and following the many actions Zapatero deployed to enable him to attend the Washington Summit (where he repeatedly thanked the American president for his invitation and professed *urbi et orbi* a true loyalty to American interests), the fact is that Spain is now on the path toward the normalisation of bilateral relations. And now, with the arrival of the new Obama Administration, Spain may even succeed in re-establishing the good relations of the days of Felipe González.

In any case, the relationship between Spain and the USA goes hand in hand with the relationship that the European Union succeeds in establishing with the great nation, given that there is no doubt that transatlantic cooperation is of basic importance for the development of the societies of Europe and America. The European Union cannot be a world reference point without a strategic association (in political, military and trade terms) with the United States.

This does not mean subjecting ourselves uncritically to US policy, but neither should we seek disagreement, and much less so clashes or confrontations. Europe must seek its own path, within transatlantic cooperation, at a time in which the centre of the world is apparently shifting from the Atlantic axis to the Pacific axis.

The Mediterranean area

Together with Latin America, the Mediterranean must unquestionably be another of the main focuses of our foreign policy, and the truth is that over the past few decades, developments in the area have been rather tempestuous.

The ancient Mare Nostrum of the Romans is nowadays the stage on which many of the great issues of international policy can be found. The conflict (or alliance) between civilisations that we are experiencing nowadays is not so different to that of the Crusades, or the campaigns against the Turks that led us to fight the Battle of Lepanto. The Mediterranean is a geographical area in which different cultures and civilisations are constantly linked. It is also the scenario for migratory movements and, on a small scale, it could be a representative microcosm for dialogue and intercommunication between Europe and Islam. Unquestionably, the great issues of international policy are nowadays developed in a global, planetary fashion, and not just on one side of the Mediterranean or the other, though the comparison that is often made between this small sea and the planet as a whole never fails to surprise.

One of the most important landmarks of Spanish foreign policy in this field was unquestionably the Barcelona Process, which marked a 'before' and an 'after' in the Mediterranean policies of both the European Union and Spain.

The end of the Cold War, the 1991 conference and the 1993 Oslo Peace Agreements, as well as the freeing-up of trade, all went to shape the Mediterranean area as one of global geostrategic importance.

In this context, the first step for a Euro-Mediterranean policy was established by the 5+5 Agreement (France,

Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta + Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya). In 1990, the Advanced Mediterranean Policy (PMA) was introduced; this did not function when it tried to apply traditional cooperation, but it did prove useful to highlight the need for concerted global action between all the Mediterranean's neighbours. It led to the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Association.

In 1995, during Spain's presidency of the European Union, Felipe González's government proposed holding the Barcelona Conference. The fact that Europe was looking towards the East following the fall of the Berlin Wall meant that Spain was feeling distinctly alone in its relations with the countries of the Mediterranean's southern shores. This led Spanish diplomacy to reflect and consider that what was needed was for the entire Union to be involved in Mediterranean policies, if they were to have any chance of success.

The Barcelona Conference defined the Mediterranean – for the first time – as a geopolitical reality that had its own legal status. It also represented an attempt to establish an area of peace, stability and prosperity. It was proposed that the instruments of cultural exchange and economic liberalisation should be used to achieve democratic changes in the southern countries, and that these countries should promote stability and security in the region. In fact, an imbalance or disagreement took place between the aims or ambitions of the two shores, since the northern shore was seeking peace and security, as well as a way of controlling migration flows, while the southern shore was interested in economic development.

However, the development of the Euro-Mediterranean area is entirely conditioned by the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the possibility of a peace process between Palestinians and Israelis brought about the first Barcelona Conference in 1995, the resumption of the conflict also brought it to a grinding halt. Likewise, the European Union's changing priorities (preoccupied as it was with the introduction of the single currency, the eastward and southward enlargement and defining its political model) also hindered the development of the objectives set in Barcelona.

Neither did the loss of interest by Aznar's Spain and Berlusconi's Italy help in any way, in addition to the lack of support from Germany and, subsequently, the Euro-Atlantic division caused by the Iraqi war, which had a negative impact on the Euro-Mediterranean Association.

The conference "Barcelona+10", held in 2005, was organised to assess the achievements of the Barcelona Process, as well as to review and relaunch it. It cannot be denied that it was a relative failure owing to the British government's lack of involvement and the absence of high-level representatives from the Arab countries.

Lately, the French President's proposal of the Union for the Mediterranean, which was initially in a relatively rough draft form, did not win the approval of Zapatero's Spanish government, but it proved to be the turning point the European Union needed in order to relaunch Euro-Mediterranean relations. The designation of Barcelona as the headquarters of the Union for the Mediterranean-Barcelona Process has granted Spain a leadership that it should make full use of.

Likewise, it is undeniable that Mediterranean policy (both Spain's and the European Union's) is very much determined by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Traditionally, Spain's political leaders have favoured the Palestinian cause. In 1948, Israel applied for international recognition as a state, except to Germany and Spain. It was only after 1956 that Israel attempted to improve its contacts with Spain, though it did not meet with a warm welcome. Relations did not become officially established until Spain began negotiating its membership of the EEC.

For some years, Spain has attempted to 'sell' its good relations with the Arab world, but the basic orientation behind its ideas was to conceive of the Palestinian problem as a political one. Spain was one of the countries that backed the UN resolutions 242, 142 and 338. It should also be remembered, by way of example, that Adolfo Suarez received Yasser Arafat on a visit in 1979.

However, the "European" dimension of relations between EU countries with Israel and the Palestinians led to Spain's position tending towards a progressive balance between Israel and the Palestinians.

The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference opened up a new era in Spanish policy toward the region. It represented a first step toward a global approach to Mediterranean policy, and it took place in a climate that was more propitious toward dialogue between the Arab nations and Israel.

The PP governments maintained this balance, perhaps with a stance that was more pro-Israeli or less pro-Palestinian, but in any case, always in a more low-key manner. During Spain's presidency of the EU in the first half of 2002, with the conflict caused by the second *intifada* and the creation of the Quartet (which had its first meeting in Madrid) the Aznar government became more actively involved. Spain's desire to become a necessary reference point in the negotiation process was brought to an end by the PP government's support for the Iraqi War, which made it impossible for the country to act as an interlocutor between the Arab world.

Zapatero's election victory in 2004 and his prompt decision to withdraw Spanish troops deployed in Iraq added consistency to his intention to exert an active role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Proof of this was his appointment of Miguel Ángel Moratinos as minister of foreign affairs – a politician with a vast amount of experience in the region. Furthermore, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's government has attempted to use its good relations with Syria to enable it to play an active role in the negotiation processes, but Spain's non-existent relations with the USA hindered this

objective. However, Spain did play an active role in the resolution of the war in Lebanon, taking a more belligerent stance toward Israel than other European states did, and with the deployment of a notable contingent of 1,100 troops as part of the FINUL forces.

Another of the issues that has indisputably influenced Spain's Mediterranean policy is Turkey's possible membership of the European Union. Surprisingly, the PSOE and the PP have held quite similar views on this subject. Aznar's governments allied themselves with the British stance that favoured Turkey's declaration as a candidate nation in 2002. Bush and Blair placed great importance on this declaration and on the opening of negotiations, while Aznar (who always linked his political stances with those of the countries that understood and understand Europe as a great market instead of viewing it as a process of peace and union that uses its trading dimension as an instrument and not as an end in itself) supported pro-American stances in favour of Turkey. However, the Rodríguez Zapatero governments, inevitably driven by ideas and policies linked with multiculturality, the Mediterranean, coexistence between Western Europe and more moderate Islamism (or with a modern appearance) declared themselves to be in favour of Turkey's incorporation as a preferential member, in addition to consolidating the Alliance of Civilisations project, as a result of which Spain has continued to support Turkey as a future member of the European Union.

"The shifting of the axis of world power from the Atlantic to the Pacific requires greater involvement by Spanish foreign policy in the region"

This agreement of opinions between the two main Spanish parties, given that it is based on reasons that are very different and even opposing, does not mean in any way that Turkey's presence as a member of the Union has generated a widespread consensus in Spanish society. Neither of the two parties has attempted to establish a position that would be widely shared by our society as a whole. For example, the PP could have defended (in a completely coherent manner) the opposite stance; that is to say, opposition to Turkey's membership in accordance with the geographical definition of Europe, or owing to the fact that Turkish society possesses a different religious mould. Likewise, in spite of its veneer of multiculturality, the PSOE could also have held a different (i.e. harsher) stance toward Turkey's candidacy if it had focused on the predominant role the Turkish military has played with respect to the defence of the Turkish constitution, or the lack of freedoms among certain ethnic minorities living in this state.

In any case, it is legitimate to claim that Turkey does not meet the minimum requirements to be able to form part of the European Union; I also believe that a sense of political responsibility exists on an international level that should be respected above all else. Therefore, I believe that if the Council of Europe decided to open negotiations with the Turkish State on the subject of joining the European Union, it would not then be coherent to interrupt these negotiations for unconnected reasons. However, these negotiations must be carried out with the same zeal and rigor as is used with other states, and it remains to be seen whether the necessary agreement is reached or not. For now, we cannot slam the door on a state such as Turkey which, furthermore, is a preferential and strategic ally of the European Union in the western Mediterranean. It is also clear that, at that time, nobody defended with due force and conviction the possibility of reaching a special preferential agreement with Turkey, one suitable for incorporating the Turkish state into the Single Market, and even into the Economic and Monetary Union, without the need to integrate it into the nucleus of EU Member States; that is to say, by sidestepping political integration. Nevertheless, this is all history and what we have to do now is to look to the future with close attention.

Relations between Spain and Morocco have also experienced notable fluctuations in recent years. The "*Marcha Verde*" in 1975 signified the beginning of the current stage of relations between Morocco and Spain. Hassan II took advantage of the Spanish government's weakness in the last days of the dictatorship and annexed the Western Sahara, an act that still represents an unresolved problem today.

Since then, Morocco's relations with the successive Spanish governments have all too often been characterised by the existence of pressure aimed at creating tension, especially concerning the issues of agreements on fishing and migration flows. Nevertheless, in 1991, following a proposal by Felipe González's government, the two countries signed a friendship agreement through which the Spanish side aimed to create closer cultural, political and especially economic links so as to prevent Morocco's recurring pressures.

In recent years, Spanish investment in Morocco has been significant and increasing, but the two societies continue to know little about each other.

José María Aznar's governments cooled relations with Morocco and even reached extremely tense moments, particularly during the Perejil island episode. Under Rodríguez Zapatero there has been an apparent improvement in relations, and to date no episodes of great tension have been experienced.

During the past 20 years, in spite of the efforts made, there is still a mutual distrust, while real democracy has not made sufficient progress in the Kingdom of Morocco. Among the main issues that cloud relations between the two states, it is obvious that we must mention Morocco's permanent claim for sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla and the conflict in the Western Sahara – which does not only cloud relations between Spain and Morocco, it also conditions political dialogue and relations throughout the Maghreb region.

Without a solution to the Saharaui conflict, there cannot be an improvement in relations between Morocco and Algeria, and this will result in greater difficulty for the effective integration of the Maghreb region (Arab Maghreb Union), as well as blocking the progress of the Euro-Mediterranean process.

Spain, with its undeniable historical responsibilities in this conflict, must play an active role in its resolution. Historically speaking, Spanish governments have tended to support the Saharaui people's right to self-determination, in conjunction with Algeria, while Moroccan ambitions have been backed by France. Unquestionably this is a conflict that has become deeply entrenched, and which the countless negotiation processes embarked upon have not been able to resolve. Spain has supported the initiatives adopted by the United Nations, but Morocco continues to reject any process that might lead to loss of sovereignty over Saharaui territory. The solution traditionally proposed by different Spanish governments is based on a broad autonomy for the Saharan territory, though this, however, is not acceptable to the Saharauis.

Latin America

Beyond all the clichés, Spain's important historical relations with Latin America make this region an indisputable priority for any Spanish foreign policy. The close cultural, economic and political links between Spain and Latin America have catapulted Spain into the position of being a global point of reference.

Ibero-American policy underwent major developments under the Felipe González governments, and except for in certain particular cases such as that of Cuba, the advent of the PP governments did not make any great changes to the Ibero-American policies of Spanish diplomacy. Another point that should be stressed (with the exception of any noisy fleeting incidents) is the role played by King Juan Carlos in Spain's relations with Latin America, a role that was generally accepted and respected in those countries.

Spain has also succeeded in disseminating the success of our political transition, as a result of which this process has been adopted on numerous occasions as the basis for development and democratic consolidation in Latin America. All of this has enabled Spain to play a markedly active role in both conflict resolution and the promotion of democracy, especially in Central America, not to mention the significant role it has played in the Southern Cone, specifically in Chile.

Spain's important role has been strengthened further by the significant investment that has been made in the region, a factor that has enabled progress in Spanish "soft power", to the extent that the country has now become (as I mentioned previously) an international point of reference with respect to Latin America. Nevertheless, this investment presence has also been perceived as a second colonisation, especially when, in the privatisation processes carried out by most of the Latin American countries, it has been the old Spanish state monopolies that have taken control of the public state services companies.

Relations between Spain and the region's states have been favoured by the consolidation of the Ibero-American Community of Nations, born out of the 1991 Guadalajara Summit, and which has laid the foundations for relations between Ibero-American countries, especially after the second summit, in Madrid in 1992, an event that had an added importance since it was the occasion of the 5th Centenary.

For some years, these summits have helped Spain to maintain its position of leadership in the region. In fact, Spain is the main champion of the summits. The 15th Summit in Salamanca in 2005 gave a great boost to this series of meetings through the creation of the Ibero-American General Secretariat and the development of specific action plans.

All of the above shows that Spain is, and should continue to act as a bridge between Latin America and the European Union, a situation that is not only beneficial for the countries of the region, but which also enables Spain to gain greater influence within the European Union.

In this context, I should also mention Spain's foreign policy on Cuba, which is notably conditioned by our links with the European Union and the USA, and which has also been an internal sticking point in our own country. In Felipe González's time, our policy on Cuba was characterised by a tendency towards a balance between criticism of the system and dialogue to encourage the transition to a democratic regime. This balance was broken by the stance of José María Aznar's government, just another example of the "law of the pendulum" that all too often characterises Spain's foreign policy with each change of government. Even so, the notable interests that Spain currently possesses in Cuba oblige the country to maintain an active role and leadership in any negotiation regarding the political development of the island.

Asia and Africa

In spite of the increasing influence of the different countries in the continent of Asia, the truth is that Spanish diplomacy has never played an outstanding role in this region. The nonexistence of political, economic and cultural relations, and the focusing of priorities toward Latin America and the Mediterranean have, logically, not favoured a foreign policy toward the Far East.

But China and India's growing importance in the world economy mean that we can expect a change in this scenario. The shifting of the axis of world power from the Atlantic to the Pacific requires greater

involvement by Spanish foreign policy in the region, especially in the sphere of economic exchange. This trend was already perceived by José María Aznar's governments, which led to the passing of the first Asia Plan in the year 2000, with the aim of coordinating our country's different actions in the region, especially with respect to the area of the economy, which was defined as "the last frontier of our diplomacy". This policy has been followed by the current government in the form of the 2005 Asia Action Plan which, in addition to the previous objectives, also places emphasis on issues of cooperation and international security.

Meanwhile, the African continent continues to be the great forgotten space, not only by Spain but by the whole world. It was an area of key importance for the great powers in the 19th and 20th centuries, and it seems that it will continue to be so with the influence that China plans to exert on the continent. In recent times, Spain has activated relations with certain African states, especially with Senegal, so as to be able to control the flow of immigration from sub-Saharan countries. Policies of development and economic support to enable these countries to develop themselves are the best way of halting the illegal immigration that flows into our country. However, Spain's actions in Africa have, since 2006 also acquired greater coordination thanks to the Africa Plan, which has the objective of seeking greater political and institutional presence in the region, coordinating with countries of origin of migration flows and establishing peace and security on the continent. In recent months, security and protection of maritime traffic has involved the presence of the Spanish Navy, together with that of other countries to combat the piracy based on the coast of Somalia.

"Hosting the EU presidency should represent an opportunity for this government –and for Spain– to reincorporate itself into the hard nucleus of the European construction"

Spain's EU presidency in 2010

Following this not exhaustive summary of Spain's foreign policy over the past 20 years, this article would not be complete without a few comments regarding Spain's upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union during the first half of 2010.

As with the last Spanish presidency, in 2002, this period falls exactly in the middle of the Spanish legislature, a fact that should enable the government to dedicate all its efforts to ensuring that it will be a resounding success for Spain and Europe. A very far cry, therefore, from the 1995 presidency, which took place just before the elections that brought José Maria Aznar to La Moncloa, and was only made possible thanks to the support provided by Convergència i Unió and the Basque Nationalist Party to Felipe González's government, by that time in its death throes. This might only seem a tiny detail, but in my opinion it does have an importance.

However, let us get to the heart of the matter: what focus should Spain give this presidency? To begin with, I must mention that it will be the first time in history that the presidency has been implemented as a team effort, given that together with Spain, Belgium and Hungary will also have the responsibility of presiding over the European Union between 1 January 2010 and 30 June 2011, though Spain will head the presidency during the first six months of 2010.

Secondly, a presidency of this nature (triad) should avoid an overly national style (examples of which we have seen in the past), and instead promote particularly European, transversal priorities. Each state will, of course, try to place issues that it considers priorities on the agenda, but a presidency lasting 18 months necessarily obliges the countries involved to give a coherence to the whole, so as to prevent something that is merely a national priority from being turned into a European one.

In light of these clarifications, the guidelines for action for the Spanish presidency of the European Union in 2010 that were approved by the prime minister's cabinet on 23 January 2009 showed the priority areas with which we will all, almost necessarily be in agreement, as they are objectively European areas; issues that are on the agenda of most Member States, as well as of the European Commission itself.

In any case, a quick scan of these guidelines reveals the lack of importance that is paid to Mediterranean policies. There must be reasons for this that I still cannot fathom, and we have time enough ahead of us to correct what appears to be an important omission. Mention is made, admittedly, of the Mediterranean, but only to point out that the biannual European Union Summit for the Mediterranean will be held in the first half of 2010. Not one single mention of a political priority; the event is presented with the same emphasis that the document gives to different summits such as those between the European Union and the US, the European Union and Latin America, and the European Union and the Caribbean. With one clarification (which I believe to be important) – the objective, in relation to the summits with the United States, of strengthening the political space and Euro-American cooperation, on one hand, and on the other, developing and consolidating the Trans-Atlantic Partnership for the Millennium Goals.

Having said that, the fact is that the guidelines (as have I mentioned previously) are generally speaking commonplaces that will not meet with much disagreement. To add weigh to this theory, we merely have to make a brief review of some of these priorities: strengthening social Europe, promoting the Europeist spirit, bringing the Union closer to European citizens, applying the Lisbon Treaty once it comes into force, guaranteeing energy security in the EU, continuing

the fight against climate change, ensuring that Europe speaks with one voice on the international stage, etc.

However, beneath these guidelines lie issues that are going to be priorities for the coming years, and that is why they are worthy of mention. Between 2010 and 2012 the European Union should revise its major policies, such as those of the Social Agenda, the 2010-2012 Energy Plan, the execution plan for the Climate Change Package that is to be agreed in Copenhagen in December 2009, the economic strategy subsequent to the Lisbon Strategy and the 2010-2014 stage of the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice.

All these issues must be put forward by the Spanish presidency, in close cooperation with Belgium and Hungary, without diminishing the importance of the collaboration that it must maintain with Sweden (which will head the presidency in the second half of 2009) and with those great actors of the European Union, France and Germany.

In this respect, and to bring my thoughts to a close, Spain should also focus the period of its presidency as a time in which to regain the leadership of the process of European integration, an area from which we have been distanced since the legitimate but autistic policies on the European process promoted by José Maria Aznar's second government and the empty policies that Rodríguez Zapatero's first government implemented in an intermittent manner.

Hosting the presidency should represent an opportunity for this government – and for Spain – to reincorporate itself into the hard nucleus of the process of European construction, which Spain should never have left. And there's the rub: the Spanish presidency will be a success if, from June 2010 onwards (or from June 2011 if we include the tripartite presidency) the Spanish government is never again excluded from any European conclave in the form of a *petit comité*, which is what has occurred in recent years. And it bears repeating to say that if Spain once again forms part of the hard nucleus of the European Union, this will be the sign that the presidency has been a success, that it has been implemented with wisdom and firmness, that it has succeeded in becoming a reference point within the Council of Europe, that Spain has succeeded in skilfully combining (legitimate) national interests with European interests, with the interests in the process of European construction that some of us would like to be much more political than they are at present.

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

World map of human development.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

World map of human development



High Human Development

1 Iceland
2 Norway
3 Australia
4 Canada
5 Ireland
6 Sweden
7 Switzerland
8 Japan
9 Netherlands
10 France
11 Finland
12 United States
13 Spain
14 Denmark
15 Austria
16 United Kingdom
17 Belgium
18 Luxembourg
19 New Zealand
20 Italy
21 Hong Kong
22 Germany
23 Israel
24 Greece
25 Singapore
26 Korea (Republic of)
27 Slovenia
28 Cyprus
29 Portugal
30 Brunei
31 Barbados
32 Czech Republic
33 Kuwait
34 Malta
35 Qatar
36 Hungary
37 Poland
38 Argentina
39 United Arab Emirates
40 Chile
41 Bahrain
42 Slovakia
43 Lithuania
44 Estonia
45 Latvia
46 Uruguay
47 Croatia
48 Costa Rica
49 Bahamas
50 Seychelles
51 Cuba
52 Mexico
53 Bulgaria
54 Saint Kitt's and Nevis
55 Tonga
56 Libya
57 Antigua and Barbuda
58 Oman
59 Trinidad and Tobago
60 Romania
61 Saudi Arabia
62 Panama
63 Malaysia
64 Belarus
65 Mauritius
66 Bosnia and Herzegovina
67 Russian Federation
68 Albania
69 Macedonia (TFYR)
70 Brazil



Medium Human Development

71 Dominica
72 Saint Lucia
73 Kazakhstan
74 Venezuela
75 Colombia
76 Ukraine
77 Samoa
78 Thailand
79 Dominican Republic
80 Belize
81 China
82 Grenada
83 Armenia
84 Turkey
85 Suriname
86 Jordan
87 Peru
88 Lebanon
89 Ecuador
90 Philippines
91 Tunisia
92 Fiji
93 S. V. and the Grenadines
94 Iran
95 Paraguay
96 Georgia
97 Guyana
98 Azerbaijan
99 Sri Lanka
100 Maldives
101 Jamaica
102 Cape Verde
103 El Salvador
104 Algeria
105 Viet Nam
106 Palestina
107 Indonesia
108 Syria
109 Turkmenistan
110 Nicaragua
111 Moldova
112 Egypt
113 Uzbekistan
114 Mongolia
115 Honduras
116 Kyrgyzstan
117 Bolivia
118 Guatemala
119 Gabon
120 Vanuatu
121 South Africa
122 Tajikistan
123 Sao Tome and Principe
124 Botswana
125 Namibia
126 Morocco
127 Equatorial Guinea
128 India
129 Solomon Islands
130 Lao People's Dem. Rep.
131 Cambodia
132 Myanmar
133 Bhutan
134 Comoros
135 Ghana
136 Pakistan
137 Mauritania
138 Lesotho
139 Congo
140 Bangladesh
141 Swaziland
142 Nepal
143 Madagascar
144 Cameroon
145 Papua New Guinea
146 Haiti
147 Sudan
148 Kenya
149 Djibouti
150 Timor-Leste
151 Zimbabwe
152 Togo
153 Yemen
154 Uganda
155 Gambia

Low Human Development

156 Senegal
157 Eritrea
158 Nigeria
159 Tanzania
160 Guinea
161 Rwanda
162 Angola
163 Benin
164 Malawi
165 Zambia
166 Ivory Coast
167 Burundi
168 Dem. Rep. of the Congo
169 Ethiopia
170 Chad
171 Central African Republic
172 Mozambique
173 Mali
174 Niger
175 Guinea-Bissau
176 Burkina Faso
177 Sierra Leone

World map of GDP per capita ($ PPP)



> 30,000

1 Luxembourg
2 Norway
3 Kuwait
4 Brunei
5 Singapore
6 United States
7 Hong Kong
8 Switzerland
9 Netherlands
10 Austria
11 Ireland
12 Denmark
13 Sweden
14 Canada
15 Finland
16 Belgium
17 Japan
18 United Kingdom
19 Bahrain
20 Island
21 Germany
22 France
23 Australia
24 Greece
25 Spain

20,000 - 30,000

26 Italy
27 Slovenia
28 Cyprus
29 New Zealand
30 Israel
31 Korea, Rep.
32 Saudi Arabia
33 Trinidad and Tobago
34 Czech Rep.
35 Ecuatorial Guinea
36 Malta
37 Portugal

10,000 - 20,000

38 Oman
39 Estonia
40 Slovakia
41 Antigua and Barbuda
42 Hungary
43 Lithuania
44 Latvia
45 Barbados
46 Poland
47 Seychelles
48 Croatia
49 Libya
50 Russian Federation
51 Malaysia
52aint Kitt's and Nevis
53 Gabon
54 Argentina
55 Chile
56 Mexico
57 Botswana
58 Turkey
59 Venezuela
60 Mauritius
61 Bulgary
62 Uruguay
63 Romania
64 Iran
65 Belarus
66 Costa Rica
67 Panama
68 Serbia
69 Lebanon

5,000 - 10,000

70 Kazakhstan
71 South Africa
72 Saint Lucia
73 Brazil
74 Macedonia (TFYR)
75 Thailand
76 Algeria
77 Suriname
78 Dominica
79 Bosnia and Herzegovina
80 Peru
81 S. Vincent and the Grenadines
82 Tunisia
83 Ecuador
84 Grenada
85 Ucraine
86 Colombia
87 Albania
88 Azerbaijan
89 Dominican Republic
90 Jamaica
91 Belize
92 Armenia
93 El Salvador



94 Egypt
95 China
96 Jordan
97 Namibia
98 Maldivas

3,000 - 5,000

99 Bhutan
100 Swaziland
101 Georgia
102 Guatemala
103 Angola
104 Paraguay
105 Fiji
106 Syria
107 Turkmenistan
108 Sri Lanka
109 Bolivia
110 Morocco
111 Samoa
112 Philippines
113 Tonga
114 Honduras
115 Indonesia
116 Vanuatu
117 Mongolia
118 Timor-Leste

1,000 - 3,000

119 Cape Verde
120 Moldova
121 Guyana
122 Congo
123 India
124 Pakistan
125 Viet Nam
126 Nicaragua
127 Uzbekistan
128 Djibouti
129 Yemen
130 Cameroon
131 Mauritania
132 Kyrgyzstan
133 Laos
134 Lesotho
135 Sudan
136 Papua New Guinea
137 Nigeria
138 Tajikistan
139 Cambodia
140 Solomon Islands
141 Senegal
142 Sao Tome and Principe
143 Côte d'Ivoire
144 Kenya
145 Bangladesh
146 Ghana
147 Benin
148 Chad
149 Zambia
150 Tanzania
151 Comoros
152 Haiti
153 Gambia
154 Burkina Faso
155 Guinea
156 Mali
157 Nepal

> 1,000

158 Madagascar
159 Uganda
160 Rwanda
161 Togo
162 Ethiopia
163 Malawi
164 Central African Republic
165 Mozambique
166 Sierra Leone
167 Niger
168 Eritrea
169 Guinea-Bissau
170 Burundi
171 Dem. Rep. of the Congo
172 Liberia

NO DATA

Afghanistan
Bahamas
Democratic Republic of Korea
Cuba
United Arab Emirates
Iraq
Montenegro
Myanmar
Palestina
Qatar
Somalia
Zimbabwe



> 5.4 Global hectares per person

United Arab Emirates
United States
Kuwait
Denmark
Australia
New Zealand
Canada
Norway
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
Uruguay

3.6 - 5.4 Global hectares per person

Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Finland
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Switzerland
France
Japan
Israel
Italy
Oman
Macedonia (TFYR)
Slovenia
Portugal
Libya
Germany
Singapore
Netherlands
Poland
Belarus
Turkmenistan
Korea (Republic of)
Russian Federation
Namibia
Botswana

1.8 - 3.5 Global hectares per person

Hungary
Latvia
Mongolia
Kazakhstan
Mexico
Slovakia
Croatia
Lithuania
Panama
Paraguay
Lebanon
Chile
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Romania
Venezuela
Bulgaria
Iran
Turkey
Ukraine
Saudi Arabia
Serbia and Montenegro
Argentina
Brazil
Malaysia
Sudan
Costa Rica
Mauritius
Albania
Azerbaijan
Ecuador
Bolivia
China
Syria
South Africa
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Burkina Faso
Nicaragua
Mauritania
Colombia
Cuba
Honduras
Tunisia
Uzbekistan

0.9 - 1.7 Global hectares per person

Argelia
Chad
Egypt
Jordan
Papua New Guinea
Central African Republic



Democratic Republic of Korea
El Salvador
Mali
Niger
Peru
Dominican Republic
Ghana
Guatemala
Armenia
Ethiopia
Senegal
Somalia
Uganda
Cameroon
Gabon
Guinea
Iraq
Nigeria
Vietnam
Gambia
Moldova
Eritrea
Georgia
Jamaica
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Lesotho
Madagascar
Morocco
Myanmar
Tanzania
Zimbabwe
Benin
Bhutan
Sri Lanka
Angola
Cambodia
Côte d'Ivoire
Philippines
Guinea-Bissau
India
Indonesia
Liberia
Mozambique
Yemen

< 0.9 Global hectares per person

Burundi
Nepal
Pakistan
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Togo
Zambia
Swaziland
Tajikistan
Bangladesh
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Afghanistan
Ivory Coast
Congo
Haiti
Malawi

No Data

Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas
Bahrein
Barbados
Belize
Brunei
Cape Verde
Cyprus
Comoros
Djibouti
Dominica
Fiji
Grenada
Equatorial Guinea
Guyana
Hong Kong
Iceland
Luxembourg
Maldives
Malta
Palestina
Qatar
Solomon Islands
Samoa
Saint Kitts and nevis
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Saint Lucia
Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles
Suriname
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Vanuatu

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

World conflicts map.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

World conflicts map



- Regional conflict
- Inter-State conflict / Civil war
- Political violence / Terrorism
- Repression / Coup d'état / Social instability
- Religious, national or ethnic minorities
- Peace talks
- Nuclear power signatories of the NPT (TNP)
- Other Nuclear powers



UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 2008

	UNSC RESOLUTION	TROOPS
UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	1528 (2004)	9,190
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	186 (1964)	927
UNOMIG (Georgia)	858 (1993)	156
MINUSTAH (Haiti)	1542 (2004)	9,089
UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan)	47 (1948)	44
UNMIK (Kosovo)	1244 (1999)	863
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	425/426 (1978) & 1701 (2006)	12,435
UNMIL (Liberia)	1509 (2003)	11,853
UNDOF (Middle East - Golan Heights)	350 (1974)	1,039
UNTSO (Middle East)	50 (1949)	151
MINURCAT (Central Africa Rep. and Chad)	1778 (2007)	279
MONUC (DR of Congo)	1291 (2000)	18,422
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	690 (1991)	223
UNMIS (Sudan)	1590 (2005)	10,025
UNAMID (Sudan-Darfur)	1769 (2007)	15,136
UNMIT (Timor-Leste)	1704 (2006)	1,550

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Office (Data: 31.12.2008). Produced by: CIDOB

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Map of the of the Official Development Aid of OECD.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

Map of the of the Official Development Aid of OECD. Flows by regions 2007 (in million dollars)



Source: *Development Co-operation Report, OECD 2009*. Produced by: CIDOB

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

ESDP: Peacekeeping missions of the EU Member States.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

ESDP: Peacekeeping missions of the EU Member States



1. EU Peacekeeping missions: EUMM (Georgia), EUFOR (Chad/DRC), EUPOL (DRC), EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories), EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories), EUPOL Afghanistan, EUFOR-Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina), EUPM (Bosnia-Herzegovina).
2. UN Peacekeeping missions: MINURCAT (Chad and central Africa Rep.), UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia), MONUC (DRC), MINURSO (Western Sahara), UNMIS (Sudan), ANAMID (Sudan-Darfur), UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNSTO (Middle East), UNDOF (Golan Heights: Syria and Israel), UNMOGIP (India and Pakistan), UNMIN (Nepal), UNMIT (Timor-Leste), UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNOMIG (Georgia), UNMIK (Kosovo), MINUSTAH (Haiti).
3. NATO Peacekeeping missions: ISAF (Afghanistan), KFOR (Kosovo).

Sources:
www.consilium.europa.eu
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
www.nato.int
www.operationspaix.net

Produced by: CIDOB. Data from December 2008

I. EU MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 2008 (Troops in Mission)

	Troops in UE Peacekeeping Missions									Troops in NATO Peacekeeping Missions		
	EUMM (Georgia)	EUFOR (Chad/RDC)	EUPOL (R. D.C)	EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)	EU BAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories)	EUPOL Afghanistan	EUFOR-Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina)	EUPM (Bosnia-Herzegovina)	TOTAL EU	ISAF (Afghanistan)	KFOR (Kosovo)	TOTAL NATO
AUSTRIA	5	163		2			104	3	**277**	1	630	**631**
BELGIUM	2	67	4	2	3			4	**82**	410	197	**607**
BULGARIA	5	2					117	4	**128**	465	51	**516**
CYPRUS		2						1	**3**			**0**
CZECH REPUBLIC	5	2		3		2		5	**17**	415	473	**888**
DENMARK	10			2		12		2	**26**	700	303	**1,003**
ESTONIA	3			2		1	2	1	**9**	130	28	**158**
FINLAND	15	63	1	3	2	3	43	6	**136**	110	416	**526**
FRANCE	46	1,661	14	2	5	1	89	18	**1,836**	2,890	1,952	**4,842**
GERMANY	27	4	1	5	2	31	135	19	**224**	3,405	2,249	**5,654**
GREECE	11	26		1			45	1	**84**	140	630	**770**
HUNGARY	4	3		1	1	3	162	3	**177**	240	317	**557**
IRELAND	5	446			1		54	7	**513**	7	285	**292**
ITALY	37	99	4	2	11	12	287	18	**470**	2,350	2,161	**4,511**
LATVIA	3						2	1	**6**	70	19	**89**
LITHUANIA	12	2				2	1		**17**	200	34	**234**
LUXEMBOURG	2	2			1		1		**6**	9	23	**32**
MALTA	2							1	**3**			**0**
NETHERLANDS	10	75		1	1	3	72	8	**170**	1,770	6	**1,776**
POLAND	29	394				3	200		**626**	1,590	285	**1,875**
PORTUGAL	1	2	10				53	1	**67**	40	253	**293**
ROMANIA	20	2	1		1	5	57	10	**96**	770	150	**920**
SLOVAKIA	1	1					40	5	**47**	120	150	**270**
SLOVENIA		15					30	4	**49**	70	353	**423**
SPAIN	11	85	1	2	2	9	309	7	**426**	780	636	**1,416**
SWEDEN	29	8	2	8	4	4		3	**58**	290	255	**545**
UNITED KINGDOM	24	5		3	2	14	10	14	**72**	8,910	164	**9,074**
TOTAL TROOPS	**319**	**3,129**	**38**	**39**	**36**	**105**	**1,813**	**146**	**5,625**	**25,882**	**12,020**	**37,902**

Sources:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN

http://www.nato.int/

http://www.operationspaix.net/

Produced by: CIDOB

Data from December 2008

Troops in UN Peacekeeping Missions

	MINURCAT (Chad and Central Africa Rep)	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	UNMIL (Liberia)	MONUC (Chad and Central Africa Rep)	MINURSO (Western Sahara)	UNMIS (Sudan)	UNAMID (Sudan-Darfur)	FINUL (Lebanon)	UNSTO (Golan H., ,Israel & Syria)	UNDOF (Golan Heights, Israel & Syria)	UNMOGIP (India & Pakistan)	UNMIN (Nepal)	UNMIT (Timor-Leste)	UNFICYP (Cyprus)	UNOMIG (Georgia)	UNMIK (Kosovo)	MINUSTAH (Haiti)	TOTAL UN
AUSTRIA					2				6	384				4	2	3		**401**
BELGIUM			7		4		329	2									342	
BULGARIA			2													9		**11**
CYPRUS							2										2	
CZECH REPUBLIC			5	3											7	6		**21**
DENMARK			2	2		15			10		4				5	3		**41**
ESTONIA									2									**2**
FINLAND			2			1	7		13		5					1		**29**
FRANCE	18	193	1	14	14		12	1,867	3						3	12	61	**2,198**
GERMANY			5			44	5	221							16	35		**326**
GREECE					1	1		46							4	2		**54**
HUNGARY					7			3						84	7	2		**103**
IRELAND		2		3	3			8	12					19		4		**51**
ITALY					5		1	2,446	8		7			4		22	4	**2,497**
LATVIA																		**0**
LITHUANIA															2	1		**3**
LUXEMBOURG																		**0**
MALTA																		**0**
NETHERLANDS						24	1		11					7				**43**
POLAND	1	2	5	3	1	2		492		337					7	2		**852**
PORTUGAL	5							144					192			1		**342**
ROMANIA		7	3	36		14						5	4		2	11	23	**105**
SLOVAKIA									3					196				**199**
SLOVENIA								14	3							6		**23**
SPAIN	2			2				1,136					9			16	37	**1,202**
SWEDEN			21	10		15	6		7		7	2	4		5	3		**80**
UNITED KINGDOM			3	5		3	6							273	5	1		**296**
TOTAL TROOPS 10	**26**	**204**	**49**	**85**	**33**	**123**	**38**	**6,708**	**80**	**721**	**23**	**7**	**209**	**587**	**65**	**140**	**125**	**9,223**

Sources:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
http://www.operationspaix.net/
Produced by: CIDOB

Data from December 2008

II. TOTAL NUMBER OF EU TROOPS IN PACEKEEPKING MISSIONS

Organization	Troops	%
EU FLAG	5,625	10.66
UN FLAG	9,223	17.48
NATO FLAG	37,902	71.85
TOTAL	**52,750**	**100.00**



III. EU MEMBER STATES WITH HIGHEST NUMBER OF TROOPS IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



IV. PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS WITH MAJOR NUMBER OF TROOPS OF EU MEMBER STATES



CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

The European Union's priorities for the area of immigration and asylum in 2008.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

The European Union's priorities for the area of immigration and asylum in 2008

In 2008, the European Union's agenda for immigration was marked by the commencement of debates over the policy orientations that will be added to The Hague Programme, the European plan adopted in November 2004, and which included 10 priorities for strengthening the areas of freedom, security and justice in the European Union for a five-year period – a period which, therefore, concludes in 2009.

In June, the European Commission defined its position by presenting a Communication titled "A Common Migration Policy for Europe. Principles, Actions and Tools". This paper highlighted the elements of which a common migration policy for the countries of the Union should be comprised[1]. Accepting that immigration is a phenomenon that is not going to decrease in the years to come, and that it must be managed in an efficient, coordinated manner by the European Union's Member States, the Commission proposes 10 principles that redefine the Common Immigration Policy, and which are organised around three central themes: prosperity, solidarity and security.

With respect to prosperity, the Commission acknowledges the importance of encouraging legal immigration, owing to its contribution to the Union's socioeconomic development. Thus, it stresses the need, firstly, to establish clear, fair regulations for the entry and stay of citizens from third countries; secondly, to improve the adjustment between flows of economic immigrants and the labour needs of EU countries (by carrying out an assessment with a view to 2020 and drawing up "immigration profiles" for countries, for example); thirdly, to increase efforts in the area of integration. With respect to solidarity, the Commission insists on the need to strengthen coordination between Member States and third countries, particularly by encouraging opportunities to link migration with development. Finally, with respect to the subject of security, the Commission has reiterated the importance of combating irregular immigration. Together with proposals for strengthening integrated border controls – a coherent plan for combating the trade in human beings and for introducing sustainable, effective return policies – it presents a common visa policy with a system of differentiated controls based on risk evaluation and a broad exchange of information between Member States.

The Council of Europe, meanwhile, acknowledged in late 2007 that developing a Common Immigration Policy to complement Member States' policies was a key priority for the European Union. In light of this statement, during the French presidency of the Union in the second half of 2008, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was submitted. Formally approved by the Council on 16 October, the Pact accepted the Global Approach to Migration adopted in 2005, and represented the adoption of five fundamental commitments that would be translated into concrete actions within the framework of the Stockholm Programme, which would succeed The Hague Programme. Including some of the Commission's recommendations, the Pact's five main tenets focus on organising legal immigration while bearing in mind the priorities, needs and receiving capacity of Member States; they also focus on fostering integration, combating irregular immigration, guaranteeing return to countries of origin or transit countries, strengthening the effectiveness of border controls, building a Europe of Asylum, and creating a global collaboration with countries of origin and transit that fosters synergies between migration and development[2].

The Pact includes a series of new features, one of the most important being the commitment to cease implementing mass regularisations. According to the agreement, EU countries should "limit themselves to case-by-case regularisations and not general ones, in the framework of national legislation, for humanitarian or economic reasons". Likewise, the Pact promotes an annual debate on immigration and asylum policies, with quantifiable data; furthermore, in accordance with previous Commission communications, the Pact promotes the establishing of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Unlike the approach of the Commission, which submitted two communications in which the respective priorities were established on immigration and asylum (see the next section on asylum policy), the European Pact included, once again, two phenomena of differing legal natures.

Discussions over the Pact were not without controversy, even though the French presidency worked hard to obtain a text that would achieve the greatest possible consensus. Thus, Nicolas Sarkozy's government, at Spain's request, withdrew the requirement for an integration contract, as well as modifying the reference to learning the country's language as an element of integration, something that has gone from being an obligation for immigrants to the responsibility of the State. Following its adoption by the EU's 27 States, critics have noted that the Pact, rather than representing a common EU policy, is a collection of common commitments. Human rights groups have also questioned the establishing of the principle of "chosen immigration", which thereby reduces immigration to labour needs; such groups have also questioned the hardening of attitudes particularly represented by the expulsion of irregular immigrants.

The perception that Europe's migration policy was being given a more restrictive nature was strengthened by the enactment, in late 2008, of the Return Directive[3], passed after three years of negotiation and due to be introduced in 2010. In practice, this regulation concentrates on the conditions for expelling immigrants in a situation of administrative irregularity. The Directive promotes "voluntary return" (during a period of 7 to 30 days after having received the order to leave the country); it also establishes common rules for the return of irregular immigrants and defines certain minimum standards for temporary retention. On this latter point, and in an attempt to make the criteria uniform, the directive establishes, as a common criterion, a maximum period of five years' prohibition of re-entry into EU territory for anyone expelled for having been in an irregular situation. Furthermore, the Directive limits the retention time for people who must be "returned" to their countries of origin to a maximum period of six months (extendable to a further 12 in specific cases). Critics who condemn the harshness of this measure compare it with other assessments that they consider to be more liberal, given that many EU countries do not have maximum retention periods[4]. The debate on the Directive was specifically rooted in the fact that, for the Commission, the Directive represented a guarantee of the rights of immigrants in an irregular situation, while different groups in the European Parliament and associations for the defence of human rights claimed that the regulation does not grant suitable protection for immigrants' human rights, and criminalises people who have not committed any crime and who will be subjected to the deprivation of their freedom. Specifically, one of the most-questioned points was the one that allows states to organise expulsions through an act "of administrative or legal nature"[5].

In a vote that was difficult for some parliamentary parties, the European Parliament (thanks to the co-decision procedure) validated the proposed Directive in the same form as the European Council had submitted it. With 662 votes cast, 369 were in favour of the text (the European Popular Party and the Liberal Party voted in favour, as well as much of the European socialists), while 197 were against it (the Greens and United Left), and 106 spoiled their ballot papers.

The return directive highlighted the importance of including dialogue on immigration in the European Union's relations with third countries, as many voiced their criticism of this legal initiative. The new law produced great mistrust among Latin American countries, as became clear from the declarations of several of their main political leaders[6] and in the framework of regional forums such as Mercosur and the Organization of American States (OAS), where the EU was criticised over its lack of information and consultation, as well as for the long periods of administrative detention and the use of concepts such as "legal and illegal migration".

In the framework of external border management, during the course of 2008 several European initiatives have been carried out. On one hand, the Commission submitted an evaluation report on the activities of the European Agency for External Border Control (Frontex) between 2005 and 2007, which included an analysis of the 33 operations carried out during that period. In these operations, which were implemented at terrestrial, maritime and air borders, Frontex intercepted (or denied entry to) more than 53,000 people, detected more than 2,900 false travel documents and arrested 58 people for promoting illegal immigration[7]. In a parallel sense, the Commission offered a series of recommendations for the future development of Frontex, and which included guaranteeing the availability of technical equipment, creating a specialised delegation for the control of maritime borders in Southern Europe and strengthening technical cooperation with third countries through experimental projects.

Meanwhile (though along the same lines), the Commission presented the general framework for the development of a European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur)[8], which would initially focus on the EU's southern and eastern external borders. The system would comply with the objective of increasing surveillance of the Union's borders to reduce the flow of irregular immigrants, prevent cross-border crime and increase the capacity for the search and rescue of people requiring international protection.

Finally, the Commission also carried out an examination of the challenges to safeguarding the Schengen tradition. Based on a critical assessment of the current visa system (which, owing to the way it is focused, does not permit any differentiation between "categories" of travellers) certain measures were proposed aimed at facilitating border crossings for "bona fide travellers" – citizens from "low-risk" third countries who would be granted the status of "registered travellers". The Commission also proposed introducing a system of recording entries and departures (to control those who overstay their visas) in addition to promoting an electronic system of travel authorisation.

In accordance with the promotion of new channels of entry for regular migration, discussions were held at several ministerial meetings during 2008 on the initiative to encourage highly-skilled immigration in the European Union by means of what is known as a "Blue Card". The initiative, which seeks to increase the European Union's competitiveness, forms part of the same package of measures that European Council will have to approve during the course of 2009, a package that also includes the directive that establishes harsh penalties for businessmen hiring irregular immigrants.

ASYLUM POLICY

On the subject of asylum, in June the Commission issued a Communication entitled the Policy Plan on Asylum: an Integrated Approach to Protection across the EU[9], which focused on the main difficulties that had emerged to date in creating a European Common Asylum System. On one hand, it highlights the discretional nature of Member States as a possible obstacle to the harmonisation process, and points out that the lack of a common procedure affects efficiency and fairness in decision-making. On the other hand, it points out that the measures against irregular immigration may hinder asylum seekers' access to the European Union's protection system, though it also notes the possibility that economic immigrants trying to enter Europe abuse the asylum system.

In the Communication, the Commission stresses that

progress must be made toward achieving common practices that will enable greater coherence, and thus the body proposes a strategy aimed at improving the quality and harmonisation of protection regulations in this sphere, promoting genuine practical cooperation and encouraging responsibility and solidarity, especially with those Member States that, owing to their geographical situation, face greater pressure on their asylum systems.

The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum reiterates the desire to carry on with the creation of a common European asylum system, to avoid problems such as growing divergences between Member States in aspects such as the recognition of applications deriving from one single country. As the text of the Pact puts it, "The European Council welcomes the progress achieved in recent years as a result of the implementation of common minimum standards with a view to introducing the Common European Asylum System. It observes, however, that considerable disparities remain between one Member State and another concerning the grant of protection and the forms that protection takes. While reiterating that the grant of protection and refugee status is the responsibility of each Member State, the European Council considers that the time has come to take new initiatives to complete the establishment of a Common European Asylum System, provided for in the Hague programme, and thus to offer a higher degree of protection, as proposed by the Commission in its asylum action plan."[10].

In this respect, the Pact highlights four priority actions to be carried out in the area of asylum policy: the creation of a European support office (for the exchange of information and administrative cooperation on asylum issues), the establishing of a single asylum system by 2012 with minimum standards for the protection of refugees and subsidiary protection, the establishing of mechanisms for managing "mass flows" of asylum seekers and guaranteeing solidarity between Member States and, fourthly, strengthening cooperation with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and establishing resettlement programmes. The training of personnel on external borders on issues of fundamental rights also highlights the of the European Union concern with establishing a Common European Asylum System that will correct the existing disparities between Member States. In the words of António Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Common European Asylum System could "serve as an example for the whole world" if it truly guarantees protection for refugees, though in order to achieve this, the existing disparities in practice between Member States must be corrected[11].

Notes

1. Communication COM (2008) 359 of 17 June 2008. "A common migration policy for Europe". Principles, measures and instruments.

2. "European Pact on Immigration and Asylum", No. 13189/08 ASIM 68, 24 September 2008.

3. Directive 2008/115/CE of 16 December 2008 relating to "Common rules and procedures in Member States for the return of third country nationals in an irregular situation".

4. Each country can continue to set the time period below the maximums established in the Directive. In the case of Spain, the limit for the period of retention is 40 days. The reform bill for the Immigration Law presented in December 2008 proposes extending this period to 60 days.

5. Directive 2008/115/CE, article 8, third paragraph.

6. Evo Morales, President of Bolivia, called it a "shameful directive".

7. COM (2008) 67 of 13 February 2008. "Report on the assessment and future development" of the FRONTEX Agency.

8. COM (2008) 68 of 13 February 2008. "Examination of the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur)".

9. COM (2008) 360 of 17 June 2008. "Asylum Policy Plan: a comprehensive approach to protection throughout the EU".

10. Point IV. "Building a Europe of Asylum. European Pact on Immigration and Asylum", Document no. 13189/08 ASIM 68, 24 September 2008. p.11.

11. "UNHCR asks the States of the European Union to build "A Europe of Asylum". Press release. UNHCR, 15 September 2008.

I. NET MIGRATION IN THE EU MEMBER STATES IN 2008*



* Net migration is the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants.
Source: Eurostat

Produced by: CIDOB

II. ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN THE EU BY MAIN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN IN 2008

Zone	Total asylum applications	%
Iraq	26,195	12.9
Russian Federation	16,753	8.3
Somalia	12,872	6.3
Serbia	12,012	5.9
Afghanistan	10,927	5.4
Pakistan	10,764	5.3
Iran	5,797	2.9
China	3,922	1.9
Eritrea	3,846	1.9

Source: UNHCR

Produced by: CIDOB

III. ASYLUM APPLICANTS IN THE EU IN 2008

Country	Total of asylum applications submitted	Citizenships of the main groups of asylum applicants									Total decisions over applications[1]	Total % positive decision[2]
		First group			Second group			Third group				
		Country	Applications	%	Country	Applications	%	Country	Applications	%		
AUSTRIA	12,750	Russia	3,445	27	Serbia	1,700	13	Afghanistan	1,345	11	1,085	61.7
BELGIUM	15,940	Russia	2,765	17	Serbia	1,625	11	Iraq	1,180	7	13,095	22.8
BULGARIA	745	Irak	350	47	Armenia	70	9	Stateless	65	9	670	44.0
CYPRUS	3,450	Syria	935	27	Sri Lanka	400	12	India	230	7		
CZECH REPUBLIC	1,650	Ukraine	320	19	Turkey	250	15	Mongolia	195	12	1,555	22.5
DENMARK	2,375	Iraq	560	24	Afghanistan	415	18	Iran	195	8		
ESTONIA	15	Belarus	5	33	Russia	5	33	Others	5	33	15	33.3
FINLAND	3,770	Iraq	1,195	32	Somalia	1,125	30	Afghanistan	230	6	1,675	39.1
FRANCE	41,845	Russia	3,730	9	Serbia	3,425	8	Mali	3,365	8	31,765	16.2
GERMANY	26,945	Iraq	8,155	30	Serbia	2,250	8	Turkey	1,775	7	20,215	43.3
GREECE	19,885	Pakistan	6,915	35	Afghanistan	2,258	11	Georgia	2,240	11	29,460	1.3
HUNGARY	3,175	Serbia	1,640	52	Pakistan	245	8	Somalia	205	6	910	43.4
IRELAND	3,865	Nigeria	1,010	26	Pakistan	235	6	Iraq	205	5	4,790	30.6
ITALY		Nigeria			Somalia			Côte d'Ivoire				
LATVIA	55	Georgia	15	27	Afghanistan	10	18	Russia	5	9	15	33.3
LITHUANIA	520	Russia	400	77	Afghanisthan	15	3	Belarus	15	3	115	60.8
LUXEMBOURG	455	Serbia	220	48	Bosnia-Herzegovina	30	7	Iraq	30	7	485	38.1
MALTA	2,605	Somalia	1,080	41	Ivory Coast	260	10	Nigeria	220	8	2,685	52.5
NETHERLANDS	15,255	Iraq	5,310	35	Somalia	3,960	26	Afghanistan	705	5	10,925	51.9
POLAND	8,515	Russia	7,760	91	Georgia	70	1	Iraq	70	1	4,245	65.2
PORTUGAL	155	Colombia	25	16	Sri Lanka	25	16	D.R. Congo	20	13	105	66.6
ROMANIA	1,180	Pakistan	255	22	Iraq	175	15	Bangladesh	175	15	675	16.3
SLOVAKIA	905	Georgia	120	13	Moldova	115	13	Pakistan	110	12	370	24.3
SLOVENIA	260	Serbia	80	31	Turkey	75	29	Bosnia-Herzegovina	15	6	160	3.1
SPAIN	4,440	Nigeria	795	18	Colombia	750	17	Côte d'Ivoire	490	11	4,325	4.9
SWEDEN	24,875	Iraq	6,325	25	Somalia	3,410	14	Serbia	2,035	8	29,545	26.5
UNITED KINGDOM	30,545										23,665	29.9
TOTAL EU-27	**226,175**										**182,550**	**25.5**

1. Firts instance decisions.
2. Percentage of accepted applications over decisions firts instance decisions.
3. Italy does not have total figures, nevertheless it is included the three main nationalities. For United Kingdom only appears the figure of submitted applications and the decisions over them.

Source: Eurostat

Produced by: CIDOB

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

The Kyoto Protocol in the EU in 2006.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

The Kyoto Protocol in the EU in 2006



Deviation from Kyoto Protocol commitments. Looking ahead to the next Copenhagen UN summit to be held in December 2009 to replace Kyoto Protocol after 2012, the analysis of the Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-27 in 2006 shows that the whole Union continued to fulfil its commitment to Kyoto (-2.5 %), significantly reducing its deviation compared to 2005 emissions (-1.9 %). Regarding the EU-15, the promoter of the agreement in 1997 and responsible for 80 % of emissions in the EU, all of these countries continue to deviate considerably from their target (+5.8 %, for 6.8 % in 2005). EU-15 countries continue to show figures very similar to 2005, presenting again an east-west division with a backbone of offending countries including Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Austria and Italy, whereas the United Kingdom and France have fulfilled their commitment to Kyoto. Greece is also added to the latter group. The "energetic islands" continue to show emissions above the Protocol: Ireland (+10.7 %); Spain (+30.2 %) and Portugal (+9.3 %), though they have all improved their figures compared to 2005. Finally, the countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007 have achieved the Kyoto Protocol, if we except Slovenia and Bulgaria.

Sources
European Environment Agency (2007). "Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2006 and inventory report 2008" Technical report No 6/200
Produced by: CIDOB

I. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN EU MEMBER STATES (2006)

Country	Greenhouse gas emissions in CO_2 (million tonnes)	Kyoto Protocol Target 2012[1]	Deviation from Kyoto target (%)	Emissions by GDP (tonnesCO_2 /Thousand euros)[2]	Emissions per capita (tonnes CO /cap)[3]	EU assigned emissions under Kyoto Protocol 2012 %	GDP of UE[4] %	Population of EU %
AUSTRIA	91.1	68.68	32.6	354.1	11.0	1.3	2.2	1.7
BELGIUM	137.0	135.87	0.8	430.5	13.0	2.6	2.7	2.1
BULGARIA	71.3	68.9	3.5	2,825.1	9.2	1.3	0.2	1.6
CYPRUS	10.0	No target	No target	681.5	13.1	No target	0.1	0.2
CZECH REPUBLIC	148.2	180.58	-17.9	1,306.2	14.5	3.4	1.0	2.1
DENMARK	70.5	54.77	28.7	322.9	13.0	1.0	1.9	1.1
ESTONIA	18.9	39.23	-51.8	1,442.3	14.1	0.7	0.1	0.3
FINLAND	80.3	71.1	12.9	480.8	15.3	1.3	1.4	1.1
FRANCE	541.3	567.09	-4.5	299.5	8.6	10.8	15.5	12.8
GERMANY	1,004.8	971.67	3.4	432.8	12.2	18.4	19.9	16.7
GREECE	133.1	138.82	-4.1	624.3	12.0	2.6	1.8	2.3
HUNGARY	78.6	114.89	-31.6	873.3	7.8	2.2	0.8	2.0
IRELAND	69.8	63.03	10.7	393.7	16.6	1.2	1.5	0.9
ITALY	567.9	485.83	16.9	382.3	9.7	9.2	12.7	11.9
LATVIA	11.6	23.82	-51.3	722.9	5.1	0.5	0.1	0.5
LITHUANIA	23.2	46.86	-50.5	967.5	6.8	0.9	0.2	0.7
LUXEMBOURG	13.3	9.14	45.5	392.1	28.4	0.2	0.3	0.1
MALTA	3.2	No target	No target	626.3	7.9	No target	0.0	0.1
NETHERLANDS	207.5	201.45	3.0	384.3	12.7	3.8	4.6	3.3
POLAND	400.5	531.34	-24.6	1,471.9	10.5	10.1	2.3	7.7
PORTUGAL	83.2	76.15	9.3	535.2	7.9	1.4	1.3	2.1
ROMANIA	156.7	259.9	-39.7	1,603.1	7.3	4.9	0.8	4.4
SLOVAKIA	48.9	67.36	-27.4	1,097.2	9.1	1.3	0.4	1.1
SLOVENIA	20.6	18.6	10.8	664.2	10.3	0.4	0.3	0.4
SPAIN	433.3	332.79	30,2	441.1	9.9	6.3	8,4	8.9
SWEDEN	65.7	75.35	-12.8	209.6	7.3	1.4	2.7	1.8
UNITED KINGDOM	652.3	671.9	-2.9	336.4	10.8	12.7	16.6	12.3
UE-15	4,151.1	3,923.64	5.8	379.8	13.1	74.4	93.6	64.5
UE-27	**5,142.8**	**5,275.12**	**-2.5**	**440.4**	**10.4**	**100**	**100**	**100**

1. The base year for EU-15 carbon dioxide (CO_2), methane (CH_4) and nitrous oxide (N_2O) is 1990. For fluorinated gases the 12 1995 EU member states agreed on 1995 as base year, except for Austria, France and Italy, which chose 1990. EU-15 emissions include those coming from deforestation only in the case of Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom. Even though there is no target for EU-27, it includes the total figure.
2. Emission in tonnes C02 equivalent to €1.000 Euros of GDP (base year 2006). 3. Emission per capita in tonnes CO_2 equivalents.
4. Aiming to connect environmental with socioeconomic indicators, GDP and population percentage of each EU member state of total EU in 2006 are presented.

Sources: European Environment Agency (2007). "Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2006 and inventory report 2008". *Technical report* No 6/2008.
Eurostat 2006 (Population and GDP)
Produced by: CIDOB

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

The EU's budget flows in 2007.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

The EU's budget flows in 2007

In 2007, the total amount of expenditure executed and charged to the EU budget totalled euros113.953 million, of which euros 105.324 million corresponded to expenses shared between the Member States. This means that 92.4% of expenditure implemented had a final destination that can be allocated to one of the EU countries. Of the remaining sum, which represents 7.6% of total expenditure, the majority was employed for programmes that have third countries outside the EU as their final destination. with a sum that totalled euros 5.141 million and which represents 4.5% of total expenditure; that leaves euros 3.488 million which, owing to the nature of the sum, cannot be attributed to any specific country.

The budget for 2007 has incorporated several significant changes in the European Union, beginning with the new pluri-annual funding framework that covers the period 2007-2013, and which is the first to have been approved by the European Union after enlargement to 27 members. Also, a new generation of EU programmes have been implemented, and certain changes have taken place in the structure of the budget funding system, in order to set priorities and facilitate transparency in the allocation of resources. In the new analytical cost structure, six rubrics have been established with new chapter titles to reflect new EU priorities: sustainable growth; management and conservation of natural resources; citizenship, freedom, security and justice; the EU as a world society; administration; and compensation for countries that have most recently joined the EU. Finally, since January 2007 two new members have been added – Bulgaria and Rumania – which in the coming years will be slowly included into the EU's budget structure.

1.1 2007 EU BUDGET BY HEADING

	Million euros	%
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH	**42,481**	**40.3**
Competitiveness for growth and employment	5,536	5.3
Cohesion for growth and employment	36,945	35.1
PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES	**53,854**	**51.1**
CITIZENSHIP. FREEDOM SECURITY AND JUSTICE	**980**	**0.9**
EU AS A GLOBAL PLAYER	**1,452**	**1.4**
ADMINISTRATION	**6,112**	**5.8**
PRE-ACCESSION AND COMPENSATIONS	**445**	**0.4**
TOTAL EXPENDITURE PER SECTORS	**105,324**	**100**

Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report
Produced by: CIDOB

I. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES BETWEEN EU MEMBER STATES

In the new sectorial classification, two very significant items exist, and which in 2007 made up 91% of the total. One is comprised of all the expenditure destined for the conservation and management of natural resources (51.1%), of which more than three quarters is allocated as aid for the production of the Common Agricultural Policy, while almost one fifth is used in rural development funds. The other item corresponds to the block of expenses allocated to boost sustainable development (40.3%), which includes payments to cover the objectives of convergence and cohesion funds, the total of which reaches three-quarters of this rubric, after which there is a fifth part for regional funds, for improving competitiveness and employment.

With respect to distribution of expenditure per country in 2007, using a first approach – classification in accordance with absolute figures – in first place there is France, with 13.2%, followed by Spain (12.1%), Germany (11.9%), Italy (10.7%), Greece (8%), Poland (7.4%) and the United Kingdom (7%). This means that expenses are highly concentrated (70%) between seven countries, which are the largest and the most populated, with the exception of Greece.

After that, there is another analytical approach, linked with wealth levels, which is calculated by listing the expenditure in proportion to the Gross National Income (GNI) of each country. In this way, other results are obtained that explain better the effects of the territorial rebalancing and social cohesion that is the aim of the redistribution of EU expenditure. If we rule out the case of Luxembourg (which heads the ranking owing to the extraordinary impact of administrative expenditure on the economy of a country that is prosperous but very small), in the first block of beneficiaries there are nine countries in which the impact of expenditure received is higher than 2% of their GNI. Notable examples of this are Lithuania, with a ratio of 3.88%, followed by Greece (3.77%), Latvia (3.52%), Poland (2.65%), Hungary (2.60%), Estonia (2.57%), Portugal (2.49%), Bulgaria (2.07%) and Slovakia

1.2 ALLOCATION OF 2007 EU EXPENDITURE BY MEMBER STATE 2007

	Million euros	%
AUSTRIA	1,598	1.5
BELGIUM	5,679	5.4
BULGARIA	592	0.6
CYPRUS	127	0.1
CZECH REPUBLIC	1,721	1.6
DENMARK	1,449	1.4
ESTONIA	377	0.4
FINLAND	1,423	1.4
FRANCE	13,897	13.2
GERMANY	12,484	11.9
GREECE	8,429	8.0
HUNGARY	2,428	2.3
IRELAND	2,167	2.1
ITALY	11,315	10.7
LATVIA	675	0.6
LITHUANIA	1,044	1.0
LUXEMBOURG	1,281	1.2
MALTA	89	0.1
NETHERLANDS	1,916	1.8
POLAND	7,786	7.4
PORTUGAL	3,904	3.7
ROMANIA	1,602	1.5
SLOVAKIA	1,083	1.0
SLOVENIA	390	0.4
SPAIN	12,796	12.1
SWEDEN	1,659	1.6
UNITED KINGDOM	7,413	7.0
TOTAL ALLOCATION EXPENDITURE BY COUNTRIES	**105,325**	**100.0**

Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report
Produced by: CIDOB

(2.04%). In second place there is a group of seven countries that could be considered to be of average income, to which the EU expenditure received represent between 1.19% and 1.71% of their GNI. Finally. there is a group of 10 countries with higher income levels with respect to the EU average, and therefore the sum of expenditure that they received represents quite a lot less proportionally for their economies: between 0.34% and 0.84% of their GNI.

A third analytical approach is obtained by listing the distribution of expenditure per country with the sectorial data, especially the two large chapter headings (natural resources and sustainable growth), where a diverse impact can be appreciated that explains the different ways in which Member States benefit from EU expenditure. With respect to expenditure for sustainable growth, the main recipient in 2007 was Spain (13.48%), followed by Germany (12.19%), Italy (11.98%), Greece (11.15%), Poland (10.20%), France (7.46%), the United Kingdom (7.05%), and Portugal (6.03%), these eight countries together totalling 80% of this chapter of expenditure. As for expenditure destined for the management and conservation of natural resources, a higher concentration of three-quarters of the chapter headings can also be observed between seven countries, headed by France (19.24%), and followed in high positions by Spain (12.95%), Germany (12.82%) and Italy (10.98%).

Finally, the fourth approach shows the impact that the internal structure of sectorial distribution of the main cost chapters has on each country, and which throws up some further revealing results. On one hand there is the case of 11 countries where we can appreciate a greater level of approximation to a relative balance (Germany, Spain, Greece, Italy, the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic). After that there is a second group with a more predominant tendency to receive expenditure linked with sustainable growth (Portugal, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Malta), while a third shows greater impact of expenditure destined for the management and conservation of natural resources (Sweden, the Netherlands,

Distribution of expenditure per country (%)



Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report
Produced by: CIDOB

1.3 ALLOCATION OF 2007 EU EXPENDITURE BY MEMBER STATE
(% GNI)



Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

Ireland, France, Finland, Denmark and Austria), Belgium and Luxembourg represent a separate case, given that they are two countries that have a strong presence in the headquarters of EU organisms, and therefore attract a considerable amount of administrative expenditure. Finally, Bulgaria and Rumania are two exceptional cases owing to their recent membership, and therefore they are widely compensated with the funds allocated to that end.

1.4 ALLOCATION OF 2007 EU EXPENDITURE ON SUSTAINABLE GROWTH BY MEMBER STATES (%)



Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

1.5 ALLOCATION OF 2007 EU EXPENDITURE ON NATURAL RESOURCES BY MEMBER STATES (%)



Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

1.6 2007 EU EXPENDITURE BY HEADING AND BY MEMBER STATE (%)



Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

II. OUTLAY PROVIDED BY EACH MEMBER STATE TO THE TOTAL OF THE EU'S RESOURCES

The EU budget is classified within a pluri-annual funding framework that has traditionally been governed by two general principles that determine its results. One is balance, given that deficit is not considered, while the other is limitation of resources to a specific level, which has been established that it may not exceed 1.24% of the European global GNI. In 2007 the global total of the outlay implemented by Member States to the total of EU resources stood at euros109.986 million, a sum that represents approximately 0.9% of the GNI of all 27 EU countries.

Of the three large chapters into which the raising of the EU's own funds is divided, the first is made up of what are called 'traditionals' (agricultural rights, the price of sugar and other agricultural products, and customs rights), which are considered owing to the nature of their origin common, and thus the role of the States would be reduced to a mere channelling towards the EU coffers, which is why these outlays have been less questioned. In 2007 these resources totalled euros16.573 million, approximately 15% of total income.

After that, there are the two chapters of EU resources based on levels of production and wealth – the ones that fundamentally feed the EU budget and are known under the term of "national contribution". Because of all this, they are a frequent source of argument owing to the difference in effort that this signifies for each country. The most important resource, which for 2007 represents euros 73.915 million (67.2% of the total), is calculated by applying a uniform rate to the GNI of each Member State. And the other, which during this year has represented a contribution of euros19.441 million (17.68% of income), consists of the application of a rate that is harmonised with the VAT tax base in each country. Finally, in accordance with criteria agreed in 1985 to correct what is considered to be excess contribution by the United Kingdom to the EU budget, the final total of the national quotas is completed with a restitution to said country defrayed through distribution between the other Member States. In 2007 the value of this chapter totalled euros5.189 million.

In this context of the distribution of burdens, the data for 2007 show that the main contributor to the total of all the EU's own resources continues to be Germany, with an outlay of 19.7%, followed by France (15.4%), Italy (12.8%), the United Kingdom (12.2%) and Spain (8.9%). Thus, the contribution of the five countries that combine the greatest land area, population and relative economic capacity represents almost 70% of the total of EU income. They are followed by two countries that are smaller but with great economic potential, but which have an intermediate participation: the Netherlands (5.7%) and Belgium (4%). In third place there are five countries with different categories (Greece, Sweden, Poland, Denmark and Austria) which have a lower contribution, between 2% and 3%. Finally, we have the remaining 15 countries, of which 11 are Member States. which contribute with proportions below 1.5%.

2. REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE BY MEMBER STATE 2007

	Million euros	%
AUSTRIA	2,218	2.0
BELGIUM	4,372	4.0
BULGARIA	291	0.3
CYPRUS	170	0.2
CZECH REPUBLIC	1,167	1.1
DENMARK	2,219	2.0
ESTONIA	177	0.2
FINLAND	1,629	1.5
FRANCE	16,989	15.4
GERMANY	21,710	19.7
GREECE	3,020	2.7
HUNGARY	870	0.8
IRELAND	1,586	1.4
ITALY	14,024	12.8
LATVIA	199	0.2
LITHUANIA	271	0.2
LUXEMBOURG	296	0.3
MALTA	57	0.1
NETHERLANDS	6,303	5.7
POLAND	2,809	2.6
PORTUGAL	1,460	1.3
ROMANIA	1,089	1.0
SLOVAKIA	519	0.5
SLOVENIA	359	0.3
SPAIN	9,838	8.9
SWEDEN	2,915	2.7
UNITED KINGDOM	13,429	12.2
TOTAL EXPENDITURE*	**109,986**	**100.00**

*Including the correction of budgetary imbalances in favour of the United Kingdom
Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report
Produced by: CIDOB

However, if we make the observation from the perspective of the contributive effort that each country makes in proportion to its GNI, then the data reveal another perspective. From this perspective, in 2007 the first place was occupied by Greece, with a contribution of 1.35%, followed by Belgium (1.31%), Estonia (1.21%) and Cyprus (1.13%). After that there is a group of 10 countries which contribute with an amount that is around 1%, while the remaining 13 countries are contributing less than 0.96% of their GNI.

2.1 REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE BY MEMBER STATE 2007 (%)*



*Including the correction of budgetary imbalances in favour of the United Kingdom
Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

2.2 REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE BY MEMBER STATE 2007
(% GDP)



Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

III. BUDGET BALANCES OPERATING BETWEEN THE EU MEMBER STATES

Using the results from some of the transactions from the previous sections, those responsible for the budget in the European Commission have established a method for estimating the difference between the outlays contributed (in accordance with the term known as 'national contribution'; that is to say, without bearing in mind the traditional own resources considered) and the amounts of operating expenditure received by each Member State (excluding administrative expenditure), in this way, attempting to reach an estimate of the budget balances operating between the EU countries. The sample is no more than a mere accounting exercise

that enables us to make certain considerations concerning the budget balances between the Member States, and has not been implemented with the aim of questioning the wisdom or effectiveness of the EU's budget policies and their effects on EU countries.

Using the data for 2007, we obtain balances that show some of the results from the impact of budget flows between Member States, where there is a group of 15 net beneficiaries and another of 12 net contributors. In the first place, in the group of net beneficiaries in absolute terms, there are five particularly fortunate countries (Greece, Poland, Spain, Portugal and Hungary), which obtained favourable net results ranging from euros 1.600 million (in the case of Hungary) to euros 5.400 million (Greece). Among the 10 remaining beneficiaries, apart from Ireland, all the others are recent members of the EU. As for the group of net contributors, a great disparity can also be observed, including some extreme situations, Firstly, and once again, the extraordinary contribution of Germany in absolute terms is highlighted, with a net contribution that is quite a lot higher than those of other countries. After Germany come France, Italy and the United Kingdom, which are three important cases among the largest, most populated and prosperous countries that obtained a return sum in the budget flows, and which helps them to achieve balances that are more even, while the Netherlands makes a contribution that is comparatively more burdensome than other major EU partners. This combination of unique situations between the net contributors has been a permanent source of dispute among Member States in recent years.

3. BUDGETARY OPERATIVE BALANCES BY MEMBER STATES 2007*

	Million euros	% over GDP
AUSTRIA	-563.7	-0.21
BELGIUM	-868.9	-0.26
BULGARIA	335.0	1.17
CYPRUS	-10.5	-0.07
CZECH REPUBLIC	656.4	0.55
DENMARK	-604.9	-0.26
ESTONIA	226.2	1.54
FINLAND	-172.0	-0.10
FRANCE	-3,001.5	-0.16
GERMANY	-7,420.2	-0.30
GREECE	5,436.4	2.43
HUNGARY	1,605.7	1.72
IRELAND	671.8	0.42
ITALY	-2,016.8	-0.13
LATVIA	488.7	2.55
LITHUANIA	793.1	2.95
LUXEMBOURG	-114.9	-0.40
MALTA	28.1	0.54
NETHERLANDS	-2,865.5	-0.50
POLAND	5,135.7	1.75
PORTUGAL	2,474.0	1.58
ROMANIA	595.6	0.51
SLOVAKIA	617.7	1.17
SLOVENIA	88.5	0.27
SPAIN	3,649.5	0.36
SWEDEN	-995.5	-0.29
UNITED KINGDOM	-4,168.2	-0.21

* Including the correction of budgetary imbalances in favour of the United Kingdom and the british compensation

Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report
Produced by: CIDOB

In contrast, if we bear in mind the differences between Member States in terms of income and population size, these budget balances have another impact depending on whether they are considered in relation to GNI or with respect to sums per inhabitant. In this sense, in 2007, the main net beneficiary with respect to its economic capacity is Lithuania, which achieved a result of 2.95% of its GNI. This is followed in terms of importance by Latvia (2.55%), Greece (2.43%) and, a little further behind, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Portugal, Hungary and Poland, which obtained a net balance ranging from 1.17% to 1.75%. Finally, there is a group of beneficiary countries with a lower result, between 0.27% and 0.55% of their GNI. As for positive balances per inhabitant, the country that obtains the best result is Greece, with euros 487, followed by Portugal and Lithuania, with euros 233 each, and Latvia (euros 212). After that there is a group of five countries that have a net balance ranging from euros 114 per inhabitant (Slovakia) and euros169 (Estonia), which are in turn followed by the six remaining beneficiaries, with amounts lower than euros100 per inhabitant.

With respect to the situation of net contributor states in comparison with their income levels, once again we have The Netherlands as the solitary leader of the list, with a proportion of 0.50% of its GNI, followed by Luxembourg (0.40%), Germany (0.30%) and Sweden (0.29%), while Belgium and Denmark both have 0.26%. For the six remaining net contributors. the proportions are lower, ranging from 0.07% to 0.21% of their GNI. If we compare the net contribution per inhabitant between these same countries, we find in first place Luxembourg (euros 241). followed by The Netherlands (euros175), Denmark (euros 111) and Sweden (euros 109), After that come Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Austria, which provide between euros68 and euros 90 per inhabitant, while the sums provided by the four remaining net contributors are below euros50 per inhabitant.

In short, both from a perspective of income and from one of population, we can appreciate a continuity in the profiles of net beneficiaries and net contributors, even though certain variations have taken place over the past two years owing to the progressive incorporation of the new Member States, while a trend can also be observed in which the margins between the upper and lower rankings are becoming narrower.

3.1 BUDGETARY OPERATIVE BALANCES BY MEMBER STATES 2007* (Million euros)



* Including the correction of budgetary imbalances in favour of the United Kingdom and the British compensation.
Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

3.2 BUDGETARY OPERATIVE BALANCES AMONG MEMBER STATES 2007
(% GDP)



Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

3.3 BUDGETARY OPERATIVE BALANCES AMONG MEMBER STATES 2007 (EUR/per cap)



Source: European Commission EU Budget 2007-Financial Report

Produced by: CIDOB

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

United States: Country Profile.

Bruce W. Jentleson

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

The United States, country profile

Bruce W. Jentleson,
Professor of Public Policy
and Political Science.Terry Sanford Institute
of Public Policy, Duke University

Back in 2004 a largely unknown Illinois state senator running for the U.S. Senate delivered the keynote speech at the Democratic Party's national convention. Convention keynote speeches are rarely remembered much after the next day's news cycle. Not so this one. The speech electrified the convention hall. It energized the millions of television viewers. The speech-maker went on to win the Senate seat. Much more than that, he catapulted to national stature. His name was Barack Obama.

Four years later he was President Barack Obama. One of the most meteoric rises in American history --- and, as the first African-American President, among the most momentous.

2008 was a momentous year in another respect, and this one much less positive. The American economy crashed like it had not done since the Great Depression of the 1930s. While other countries did have economic problems of their own making (Spain, being one example), it was the American crash that was widely seen as the principal source of the global economic crisis.

This came on top of a very full U.S. policy agenda both at home and abroad. The domestic agenda included a health care system that cost too much money and covered too few people, failing public educational systems, environmental and energy policies much more part of the global warming problem than solution, crumbling infrastructure and lagging public transportation systems, controversies over immigration, and numerous other major issues. The foreign policy agenda was at least as broad and pressing: two wars (Iraq, Afghanistan), Middle East peace, Europe and NATO, Russia, China, global AIDS, global environment, Darfur, terrorism, the WTO Doha Round in collapse, and much more.

In the first main section the focus is on the 2008 election. We then turn to three other key topics: the U.S. domestic policy agenda; immigration and the changing profile of the American people; and the Bush policy and the challenges and opportunities left for the Obama Administration.

The 2008 election

In March 2007, while in Spain as a Fulbright Senior Research Fellow, I gave a talk in Barcelona hosted by *La Vanguardia* on American foreign policy and the 2008 election. Most of the questions reflected the sense that the two U.S. presidential candidates would end up being Hillary Clinton as the Democrat and Rudolph Giuliani, former mayor of New York City and 9/11 fame, as the Republican. Giuliani did very poorly in the Republican primaries and Senator John McCain (Arizona), who had fallen way behind, came back to win the Republican nomination. What really bucked the conventional wisdom was Barack Obama's victory over Hillary Clinton. Both at home and abroad one heard three main reasons why he "could not win". He was inexperienced, having been in Congress barely two years and with no prior national policy and political experience, most especially in foreign affairs. He was running against Hillary Clinton, Senator from New York and former First Lady, who had a formidable political organization and fundraising network. And he was African-American.

Barack Obama won the presidency with 52.9% of the total popular vote (69.4 million votes) compared to 45.7% for John McCain (59.9 million). This was the largest margin of victory in the popular vote since Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984.

Obama's electoral college margin, 365-173, was even larger than his popular vote margin. While the popular vote matters, it's the electoral college vote that is decisive. Each state gets a total number of electoral college votes equal to the size of its congressional delegation; i.e. the number of members of the House of Representatives, which varies by state population, plus the two senators all states get, plus three electoral college votes for the District of Columbia, the city of Washington, totaling 538 electoral college votes. Whoever wins the most popular votes in each state gets all of that

state's electoral college votes. While it is rare in American history for a candidate to win the popular vote but lose the electoral college vote, this is what happened in the Bush-Gore 2000 election. Al Gore won the popular vote by 543,895 votes. But George Bush narrowly won the electoral college – and this was only after the Supreme Court intervened and ruled on Bush's behalf in deciding the disputed vote count in Florida over a month after election day.

Nine states that had voted for Bush in 2004, when he defeated Massachusetts Senator John F. Kerry, voted for Obama in 2008. These were in the South (Virginia, Florida, North Carolina), Midwest (Ohio, Iowa, Indiana) and West (Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada). No state that had voted Democratic in 2004 voted Republican in 2008.

Voting rates in U.S. elections tend to be lower than in many other democracies. The high points were between 1952 and 1968 when 59% and 63% of the voting age population participated. Since then the rate had fallen, as low as 49% in 1996. In 2008 the rate was up to 56.8%, the highest in 40 years.

"The United States has the highest income inequality among developed nations"

Much of the increase was among young voters (18-25 years old), for whom turnout had been 41% in 2000, 48% in 2004 and close to 53% in 2008. Among voters in this age group, Obama won 66-32%. He won by smaller margins among 30-44 year olds (52-46%) and 45-64 year olds (50-49%), and lost among those over 65 (45-53%).

He lost narrowly among males (48-49%) but won among females (56-43%), who constituted 53% of voters. He lost among whites by a substantial margin (43-55%), but won 85% of the African-American vote, 67-31% among Hispanic-Americans and 62-35% among Asian-Americans.

Analyses of Obama's victory stress four main factors. One was organizational: Obama and his team devised a masterful political strategy. The state of Iowa holds the first party nomination contest (caucuses rather than the primaries that most states use). Even though it was a small state, Iowa gets huge media attention since it comes first. The Obama campaign was highly skilled at organizing --- Obama himself had been a community organizer in Chicago earlier in his career. They turned their supporters out and won by a substantial margin. The fact that Iowa had only a small African-American population helped counter the argument that an African-American couldn't win. Mastering the Internet and related new technologies also was a big part of their organizational success. The Obama campaign effectively used Facebook, YouTube and other social networking to organize and communicate with supporters as well as the new media.

Second was financial. The Obama campaign raised almost $750 million, breaking all fundraising records. While some of this was done the traditional way from large donors attending fundraising cocktail parties, much was done online and from smaller donors. Over 2.3 million people contributed to the Obama campaign. Even when this was only $25 or $50, with such huge numbers of donors it adds up. While other politicians had started to tap the Internet's fundraising capacity, the Obama campaign did it on an unprecedented scale.

Third were its ideas. Themes like "change" and "yes we can" powerfully tapped the mood of the country. Political scientists often study social movements that political leaders then seek to tap. The Obama campaign was a social movement in its own right. The desire for change and renewal was largely diffuse. Political analysts had some sense of it, but largely underestimated it. The Obama campaign tapped it, added to it and mobilized it into support for his candidacy in ways American politics had rarely seen. Some of this was Bush fatigue: Bush left office with the lowest presidential approval ratings ever recorded. Some was the excitement that Obama generated, his own appeal.

Fourth was the economy. The American economy had been having problems for awhile. Then in September, in the midst of the final laps of the presidential race, things went from bad to crisis. We discuss the issues more below. The point here is how the economic crisis helped Obama's candidacy both by reinforcing the general theme of change and by Obama coming across as much more knowledgeable and in touch than McCain. It also helped push aside the "culture wars" issues (e.g., abortion, same sex marriage) McCain and his vice presidential choice, Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska, kept trying to exploit.

When the results were in, Barack Obama spoke to tens of thousands of supporters gathered in Grant Park in Chicago as well as to millions watching on television, listening on the radio, and linking in on the Internet: "If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are possible; who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time; who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer." To those around the world, "from parliaments and palaces to those who are huddled around radios in the forgotten corners of our world -- our stories are singular, but our destiny is shared, and a new dawn of American leadership is at hand."[1]

But he also focused on the difficult work that lay ahead. "For even as we celebrate tonight, we know the

challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime." The two themes together, the historic achievement that the election manifested and the formidable challenges at home and globally, were a fitting combination as the Obama candidacy ended and the Obama presidency began.

The US domestic policy agenda

Problems in the U.S. economy had been evident for quite some time. The federal budget, which finally had been balanced during the Clinton Administration, was back in deficit throughout the Bush Administration. The trade deficit had surpassed -$700 billion in 2007. The dollar kept falling, going as low as $1 =€0.62 Euro in July 2008. But problems became a crisis starting in September 2008 amidst the bursting of the housing bubble and the collapse and near-collapse of major financial firms and corporate giants one after the other.

The numbers were staggering. GDP fell 6.2% in the last quarter of 2008. By early 2009 unemployment was over 8%, and climbing. In the month of February alone over 600,000 jobs were lost. Home prices fell in December 2008 at the fastest pace on record, pushing the value of single-family homes in 20 major metropolitan areas 18.5% lower than a year earlier. Millions of homeowners were losing their homes to foreclosures. The consumer confidence index, which had been around 90% at the end of 2007, was below 40% at the end of 208 (1985= 100). The Dow Jones index, the heartbeat of Wall Street, was down over 40% from its high.

Like so many crises this one did not come out of the blue. The trends were there to be seen; they just were ignored. The triple deficits run up during the Bush Administration – budget, trade and international investment – constituted "the worst financial deterioration in our history," as the esteemed Peter Peterson called it well before the late 2008 meltdown. Financing this torrent of red ink meant becoming the largest borrower in the world, becoming what *Financial Times* columnist Martin Wolf calls a "superpower on borrowed money" – and about which he asked "how long can it last?" Not much longer, as we all found out.[2]

America's technological edge was being challenged in one industry after another, and not just because of the strides being taken by other nations but as a consequence of self-inflicted problems like under-investment. The Business Roundtable tellingly used the term "atrophy" to express its concern about what had been happening to American scientific and technological superiority. The U.S. National Intelligence Council pointed to science and technology as the key uncertainty for whether the United States could remain the world's "single most important actor". The declining competitiveness of the American automotive industry, that which for a century was a driving economic engine and defining cultural symbol, was very evident before the 2008 bailout crisis. Even the high tech sector was showing signs of declining competitiveness. The $15 billion surplus in sectoral trade balance (1999) became a $44 billion deficit. Ranking for broadband internet access dropped from first to 16th. While Microsoft and Google may still be in a class of their own, overall only six of the world's top information technology companies are U.S.-based compared to 14 in Asia.

Such data are disturbing but shouldn't be surprising in light of underlying measures. The United States ranked 24th of 29 in math literacy among 15 year-olds; the same low ranking for problem solving skills. In 2004 the United States already was behind 16 countries in Asia and Europe on the proportion of college degrees in science and engineering. By 2006 it had fallen further to 32nd. In higher education over 50% of engineering Ph.D.s in U.S. universities were being earned by foreign nationals. No wonder 35% of 200 U.S.-based multinationals surveyed were planning to relocate at least some of their R&D facilities overseas, especially in India and China.

The deterioration of the nation's infrastructure not only was further hampering economic competitiveness but posed dangers to basic safety. One study found one-quarter of the bridges "structurally deficient or obsolete", drinking water and wastewater facilities in need of "extensive repair", and public transportation "unable to keep pace with growing demand".

The U.S. health care system also had fallen from its heralded status. It was spending more but getting less overall: #1 in health care as percentage of GDP but 22nd of 30 in life expectancy, according to OECD data. It was especially bad for children: 84th in the world for measles immunization, 89th for polio; 43rd in the world in infant mortality, including 11.5 babies dying per 1.000 live births before their first birthday in Washington, D.C., compared to 4.6 in Beijing.

A growing number of studies also were showing that social mobility in the United States was not what it once was, that only the United Kingdom and South Africa are showing less economic mobility from generation to generation, and that the United States has the highest income inequality among developed nations. The jobs created in the 2004-05 recovery paid 21% less than those lost in the 2001-03 recession. Median family income was falling. Poverty reached an all-time high. Child poverty went up five years in a row. Meanwhile the top 1% were garnering a larger share of national wealth. The wealthiest 300,000 take in almost as much as the bottom 150,000,000. For the federal minimum wage to have stayed proportional to executive compensation, it would have to be over $23/hour instead of under $6.

Most of the Bush economic and domestic policies were too little too late at best, fundamentally flawed at worst. President Bush came across to many as out of touch. Many corporate leaders appeared to still care more about their bonuses and perks such as private jets and lavish office decorations than the consequences of their mismanagement to their employees, stockholders and others.

This was the situation as the Obama Administration took office.

Immigration and the changing profile of the American people

The United States has been in the midst of the greatest surge of immigration since the early 20th century. One in five residents is now a recent immigrant or a close relative of one (Reynolds; Haaga, 2005 and Thompson, 2009) This actually is still less than the early 20th century when about one-third of the population hade been born in another country or to at least one foreign-born parent. That wave of immigration, drawn largely from Western and Eastern Europe and largely to American cities and manufacturing jobs of the industrial revolution, had profound impact on American politics and society. While often portrayed in history books as a harmonious "melting pot", in which residents were accepting and immigrants assimilating, there were plenty of controversies over jobs, discrimination and other contentious issuers. So too with this 21st century immigration wave, which has its own distinctive characteristics and its own major political and policy debates.

"The Bush foreign policy left the United States in a substantially weakened global position"

A major difference is in the identity of the immigrants. In the early 20th century close to 80% came from Western Europe and another 15% from Eastern Europe; only about 2% came from Latin America. By 1950 the percentages were about 50%, 25% and 8%, respectively. Now they are about 15% from Western Europe, 10% from Eastern Europe and 55% from Latin America. Another 25% hail from Asia and the Middle East. Overall Hispanics now constitute about 15% of the total U.S. population. Forecasts are that by 2050 the Hispanic population will nearly triple in absolute numbers and reach a 30% share of the total U.S. population.

All told, by 2023 the "minority" population (Hispanic, black, Native American, Asian, others) is expected to constitute a majority of the nation's children under 18; by 2039 a majority of working-age Americans; and by 2042 a majority of the overall population. States such as California and Texas already have "majority minorities".

One main area in which the impact is intense is education. Over the last decade the number of students who are in the process of learning English has grown by about 60%. Spanish is the native language of about 77% of these.[3] Moreover, this is not just concentrated in states like California and Texas. In North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia and other southern states the increases in Spanish-speaking students have been close to 200%.

Much of the political debate has centered on illegal immigration. Estimates put the number of illegal immigrants at 12 million. Should they be deported back to Mexico and the other countries from which they came? Should they be put on a path to citizenship? What rights do illegal immigrants have while these other issues are being worked out? Do they have civil rights protections? Should they receive health benefits? And how to reduce future illegal immigration? Efforts to answer these questions through new legislation failed in 2008.

Americans tend to "celebrate their immigrant past while being wary about recent immigrants," as Professor Daniel Tichenor, a leading authority on immigration, has put it.[4] As difficult as these issues have been in recent years, the economic crisis makes them all the more difficult and even volatile.

The Bush foreign policy and its legacies

Overall the Bush foreign policy left the United States in a substantially weakened global position. Public opinion polls showed how much America's reputation had fallen globally, At home as well Bush's foreign policy approval rating, over 80% back in the immediate posy-9/11 days, was below 30%. But it wasn't just a matter of opinions globally and nationally. It was the actual policy problems that filled the agenda: wars, crises, dangerous trends and new challenges that were, as New York Times reporter David Sanger titled his book, "the inheritance" that the Bush foreign policy was leaving its successor (Sanger, 2009).

The Iraq war has now lasted longer than U.S. involvement in World War II. The shift in strategy to "the surge" in 2007 did help stabilize Iraq. But doubts remained as to whether it would be sustainable either militarily or politically. Moreover, it could not undo the damage already done. Sanger captures these well:

The long-term costs of the Iraq war goes beyond the tragic loss of more than 4,000 of America's finest young men and women, the tens of thousands of Iraqis, countless casual-

ties, and the roughly $800 billion spent since the invasion. There were also huge opportunity costs. We squandered many opportunities to project American influence around the globe and lost the credibility we needed to rally the world to confront far more imminent threats to our security than Saddam Hussein's Iraq ever posed. (Sanger, 2009)

One of Barack Obama's main campaign pledges was to end the war in Iraq. Early in his presidency he modified his original 16-month timeline for getting American combat troops out of Iraq to 19 months. There was some criticism of this shift as well as of 50,000 forces that would remain for anti-terrorism, training and other limited but ongoing missions. Obama also pledged to shift from a military surge to a diplomatic surge, more actively engaging global and regional powers as well as the sectarian groups in Iraq.

The Bush Administration also left Afghanistan in a precarious situation. The Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai had grown weaker not stronger over time. The Taliban were resurgent. Al Qaeda was displaced but not decimated. About half of Afghanistan's gross domestic product is coming from opium poppy growing and the narcotics trade, with some of the blame tracing back to Afghan government corruption. Controversies over civilian casualties increased. Here too a so-called victory had been short-lived, and the Bush policy needed major overhaul. Indeed the failures had spread to now include Pakistan where despite the embrace of and aid to military dictator Pervez Musharraf al Qaeda had found a safe haven and internal instability was rampant.

The broader Middle East was also in bad shape. The Bush Administration ignored two main lessons of the Arab-Israeli conflict: (1) As hard as peace is today, it is that much harder tomorrow; (2) While the United States cannot impose peace on the parties, the main way progress has been made over the past 30-40 years has been when the U.S. plays an active role as peace broker. The Bush Administration heralded its Annapolis conference in late 2007 as a renewed peace process, but it was more "drive-by diplomacy" than sustained and priority effort. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict grew worse, culminating in the December 2008 Gaza war. Efforts to isolate Syria had little impact. Relations with Iran grew ever worse amidst tensions over Iran's nuclear program, its support for Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and its President's extreme rhetoric about Israel and the United States.

These and other issues impacted U.S.-European relations. That the Alliance survived Iraq was not a given, and was telling in its own right. The outpouring of enthusiasm and excitement that greeted Barack Obama's electoral victory, and all that it manifested historically and culturally as well as for foreign policy, was extraordinary. All this was quite understandable – politically, social psychologically, emotionally. Strategically, though, this should not yet be taken too far in considering the future of the Atlantic Alliance. Much will be better, much will be well – but much will remain to be worked through. Issues of "the logic and character of the Atlantic political order and its future," as one group of scholars write in *The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order,* run deeper than just who is the American President. Indeed whether we are *Growing Apart?* is a matter not just of the particulars of the foreign policy agenda but of social forces and other dynamic within our political systems and overall societies.[5]

Three main sets of issues dominate U.S.-European relations. One is the future of NATO and relations with Russia. As NATO expansion came up to Ukraine and Georgia, it was an even more contentious issue with Russia than prior expansions. Proponents of NATO expansion in both the United States and Europe saw the Russia-Georgia war as evidence that Russia remains expansionist and aggressive, putting NATO's credibility even more at stake. If it did not go ahead with expansion. No, NATO expansion opponents contend, expansion did not strengthen deterrence so much as provoke Russia. Russia expressed its concerns all along, and now that it has recovered economically and the issues are hitting closer to home what we are seeing is less a shift than a culmination in what had been building all along as NATO expanded. Overall relations with Russia entail other issues as well including human rights, energy security, Kosovo independence, missile shield deployments, and the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Getting on a more balanced course will take both collaborative Alliance initiatives and national but coordinated ones from Washington and European capitals – and, of course, from Moscow.

Afghanistan is another major issue in U.S.-European relations. The war/peace operations there have been bringing out serious intra-alliance differences over commitment and strategy. Polls show similar views in Europe and America on some dimensions of the mission – e.g., 73% of Americans and 79% of Europeans in favor of providing security for economic reconstruction projects, 76% and 68% for assisting training of Afghan police and military forces, 70% and 76% on anti-narcotics. But on conducting combat operations support diverged between 67% of Americans and 43% Europeans ("Transatlantic…", 2008).

The other major issue is the global economic crisis. While Europe is far from blameless, American policies and markets were the principal causes. It thus is not unreasonable for Europeans and others to argue for greater U.S. sharing of the burdens of adjustment. At the same time Europe has its own problems even har-

monizing economic policies within the EU. The Bush Administration did host a G-20 meeting in November, but this was more of a photo op than a serious effort at global coordination.

Turning to China, the Bush foreign policy got off to a bumpy start but ended up with a better record. Its original view stressed China as more of a strategic competitor to be contained than a potential strategic partner to be engaged. Issues such as trade, Taiwan, human rights and military competition did continue to cause tensions. But overall they were effectively managed. There was increasing recognition that as a Princeton University study put it, "the shifting distribution of power ion Asia is one of the largest, if not the largest, geopolitical events confronting the United States . . . Although this power shift has many components it is largely defined by the rise of China" (Fukuyama; Ikenberry, 2005). Efforts were made to reassure traditional allies such as Japan that improved relations with China would not negatively affect them. Indeed Japan and others in East Asia pursued their own relations with China both bilaterally and within regional organizations. There also was increased recognition that China needed to be more effectively engaged on global issues such as Iran and Darfur.

"Three main sets of issues dominate US-European relations: The future of NATO and relations with Russia, Afghanistan, and the global economic crisis"

In Africa the Bush Administration did more than some others on Darfur but still too little too late. It invoked the term genocide when others would not. It supported various UN Security Council resolutions authorizing a peacekeeping force. But it never gave the issue the prominence or brought to bear the pressure that would have reflected a genuine U.S. priority. The Bush Administration played some role in resolving the elections crisis in Kenya in late 2008, but most of the credit went to the UN and former Secretary-General Kofi Annan for effective diplomacy. On global AIDS, an issue that particularly affects Africa, the Bush policy got credit for significantly increasing U.S. funding, but with criticism for attaching restrictive conditions such as stressing abstinence education.

Relations with Latin America were in bad shape on a number of fronts. With Mexico, immigration had become an even bigger controversy. So too was the drug trade for which the United States blamed Mexico for corruption and poor law enforcement while Mexico pointed to the demand for drugs as well as the supply of guns both coming from the U.S. side of the Rio Grande. While there was decreasing support for Venezuelan caudillo Hugo Chavez in the rest of Latin America, many saw the Bush efforts to overthrow and demonize him as strengthening more than weakening him. The stubborn refusal to even begin to explore relations with Cuba was widely seen as frozen in the past.

More broadly the Bush Administration left behind a reputation of being ideologically opposed to multilateralism. Even before Iraq it had established an in-your-face approach to global diplomacy --- pronouncing the Kyoto treaty "dead on arrival", writing off international law as "deeply and perhaps irrevocably flawed", repeatedly castigating the United Nations. "Has George Bush ever met a treaty that he liked?," the *Economist* editorialized. "It is hard to avoid the suspicion that it is the very idea of multilateral cooperation that Mr. Bush objects to" (Jentleson, 2007). While on some issues the Bush approach has tempered in its final years, it had not repaired the breach. On the global environment the United States was still seen as the laggard not the leader. On the Doha Round World Trade Organization (WTO) trade talks, while not alone in sharing the blame for the deadlock it also could not claim much leadership. It stayed outside new institutions like the International Criminal Court even as they got up and running. To be sure, multilateral institutions need to do much better. But it is one thing to constructively criticize and seek to improve, quite another to appear to take solace in their failings.

Even after eight years of the Bush foreign policy, most of the world still held to the view that international peace and prosperity are most likely to be achieved if the United States plays a significant and constructive leadership role. Developing and pursuing policies consistent with this global role was the challenge facing President Barack Obama as he came to office.

Combined with the economic crisis, the rest of the domestic agenda, and the societal and cultural dynamics of immigration, one could see the truth in Obama's Grant Park election night speech, that "the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime."

Notes

1. Transcript: Obama's Acceptance Speech," November 4, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/ynews_pl135

2. These and other quotes and statistics in paragraphs that follow drawn from Bruce W. Jentleson, Inner Strength: U.S. Economic Competitiveness and the Lessons of Tonya Harding," *The Globalist,* August 6, 2007, www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=6364

3. The next largest is Vietnamese at 2-3%.

4. Daniel Tichenor, "Immigration and Ethnic Minorities," presentation at conference on "The Obama Presidency: From Hope to Achievement," University of Quebec at Montreal, March 5, 2009.

5. Books cited are Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds., *The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), and Jeffrey Kopstein and Sven Steinmo, eds., *Growing Apart? America and Europe in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge University Press, 2008). For further discussion see Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Atlantic Alliance in a Post-American World," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, March 2009.

Bibliography

FUKUYAMA, Francis; IKENBERRY, G. John (2005). *Report of the Working Group on Grand Strategic Choices* [on line]. The Princeton Project on National Security, September 2005, pp. 3, 14-15. www.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/GSC.pdf [Checked on: 04.14.09]

JENTLESON, Bruce W. (2007). "America's Global Role After Bush," *Survival*. Nº 49 (September 2007), pp. 179-200.

REYNOLDS, Farley; HAAGA, John, (eds.) (2005). *The American People: Census 2000*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005. XIV, 456 p. ISBN 0871542730

SANGER, David E. (2009). *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*. New York: Harmony Books, 2009. XXIX, 498 p. ISBN 0307407926

THOMPSON, Ginger (2009). "Where education and assimilation collide" [on line]. *The New York times*. 15 March 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/us/15immig.html?partner=rss. [Checked on: 04.14.09]

Transatlantic Trends [on line]: *immigration: key findings 2008* (2008). [Washington, D.C.]: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, [2008]. www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/TTI_2008_Final.pdf. [Checked on: 04.19.09]

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

U.S.-Spain Relations from the Perspective of 2009.

Adrian A. Basora

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org www.cidob.org

US-Spain relations from the perspective of 2009

Ambassador Adrian A. Basora,
Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on Democratic Transitions at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia[1]

The advent of the Obama Administration in Washington on January 20, 2008 was greeted with widespread enthusiasm in Spain, with many commentators on both sides of the Atlantic suggesting a new era of closer bilateral relations. Others have warned, however, that these high expectations could easily be disappointed, given the asymmetry between U.S. needs and Spanish inclinations.

In this author's judgment, there is in fact considerable potential for closer relations. This might be dismissed as the natural bias of a former American diplomat who has served with pleasure in Spain. However, the author personally experienced one of the more difficult stretches in U.S.-Spanish relations and is fully aware that harmony in the relationship is by no means preordained. One has only to recall the recent dramatic low point in 2004, when Prime Minister Rodriquez Zapatero abruptly pulled all Spanish troops out of Iraq – to an extremely frigid reaction in Washington. This contrasted sharply with the euphoria of 2003, when Prime Minister Aznar joined with President Bush and Prime Minister Blair at the Azores Summit to launch the "Coalition of the Willing" and Spain dispatched 1,300 peacekeeping troops to Iraq.

These are by no means the only major oscillations in U.S.-Spain relations in recent decades. Given the role of the *Annuario CIDOB* as an important reference work for understanding Spain's overall international relations, this article will examine the bilateral relationship not only from the vantage point of recent history, but also from a longer-term perspective, so as to assess the potential for growth, or for regression, in the foreseeable future. We will start with a brief look at a few of the "legacy issues" that affect relations between Washington and Madrid and the two societies more broadly.

Divergent histories and a period of enmity

From the perspective of many Spaniards, the relationship with what is now the United States began in 1513 when Juan Ponce de Leon landed in Florida and claimed the territory for the Spanish crown. Saint Augustine was founded in 1565, 55 years before the first British colonial settlement. For most Americans, however, the first four centuries of the relationship are part of a distant past that is generally given limited attention. There is little recognition of fact that Spain supported the American colonists in their war of independence – albeit based on alliance with France and enmity for Great Britain, rather than any enthusiasm for republican democracy. Also forgotten is that Spain was among the first European powers to establish diplomatic relations with the United States (in 1785), and it facilitated America's westward expansion by "gracefully" ceding vast territories west of the Mississippi via the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819.

In contrast, what many Americans do retain from their high school history is a largely negative image of 19th century Spain as a declining monarchy and an unwelcome colonial power. U.S. textbooks highlight the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which declared that European powers like Spain were not welcome in the Western Hemisphere. They also stress Spain's quick defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, after the U.S. press whipped up jingoist sentiment against Spain's "tyrannical" presence in Cuba and Puerto Rico. During the first part of the 20th century, most Americans thought of Spain as a reactionary, not very relevant power in which the United States no longer had much interest. For Spain, however, the U.S. loomed large as the only country with which it had fought a recent war – a war that stripped away the last vestiges of a once-glorious Latin American empire.

The next events of major consequence in shaping American attitudes towards Spain centered on the Spanish Civil War and relations with the Franco regime. President Franklin Roosevelt publicly condemned General Franco's uprising against the Republican government (1936-39). Despite official U.S. neutrality, most Americans were inclined against Franco

and what they saw as the anti-democratic forces he represented. This led to the formation of the "Lincoln Brigade," in which individual American volunteers fought on the Republican side. Negative images of Franco's Spain took hold through the press and contemporary literature. Books like *Farewell to Catalonia* and, above all, Ernest Hemmingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* vividly depicted the Civil War from a Spanish Republican perspective.

With Hitler's ascendance in Europe and U.S. engagement in World War II, Franco's de facto tilt towards the Axis powers further damaged Spain's image. This culminated in 1946 with the principal victorious powers – the United States, Great Britain and France – signing the Tripartite Declaration saying there would be "no full and cordial association [with Spain] as long as Franco rules" (Chislett, 2006). Spain was initially excluded from the United Nations, just as it was barred from the Marshall Plan when it was launched in 1948. As of 1950, the Franco regime was cast into the role of a pariah and most Americans saw it as a poor, backward country of little interest or promise.

The beginnings of change

"Spain will have a clear incentive to cultivate a positive relationship with Washington and with other centers of political and cultural influence in the U.S."

During the 1950's and 1960's, these negative American perspectives on Spain gradually began to change. The Cold War became the primary prism through which Americans viewed the world. Faced with an increasingly powerful and aggressive Soviet Union, Washington geared up for a potential military confrontation. American sea and air power were essential to Western defenses, and they required secure bases in Europe as far away as possible from NATO's eastern front. The Spanish base at Rota was the perfect location from which to project naval power into the Mediterranean, and the air bases at Moron, Zaragoza and Torrejón (just outside Madrid) had outstanding potential as rear-echelon bases and training and staging facilities for the U.S. Air Force. Spain's potential as a basing country thus quickly became a dominant consideration in Washington's relationship with Madrid.

By 1953, negotiations for a U.S.-Spanish basing agreement had been completed. The "Pact of Madrid," granted American forces use of these four bases in exchange for significant economic assistance – and implicit acknowledgement of the Franco regime's durability. In 1955, the U.S. supported Spain's admission to the U.N., despite the continuing reluctance of the U.K. and France. This warming of relations between Washington and Madrid culminated in an official visit by President Dwight Eisenhower to Spain in 1959. For American public opinion, the visit by "Ike" bestowed Spain with an aura of normalcy, despite its dictatorial government. But for anti-Franco forces in Spain, and particularly for the political left, the Eisenhower visit and the ongoing base agreements became major focal points for enduring anti-Americanism.

At the same time, however, parallel developments on the economic front were beginning to draw the two countries gradually closer. Whereas Madrid had been kept out of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940's, from 1953 to 1961 Spain became the third-largest recipient of U.S. economic assistance, thanks to the base agreements. This assistance, combined with Spain's gradual economic recovery and the perception of political stability reinforced by the Madrid Pact, made Spain an increasingly attractive location for U.S. business investment. The trend accelerated significantly after1959, when Spain adopted a U.S.-backed IMF economic stabilization and liberalization plan. By 1966, U.S. firms accounted for 79.5% of total FDI, and had begun to contribute significantly to Spain's economic recovery and rapidly increasing exports (Chislett, 2005). More Americans got to know Spain, including tens of thousands of retirees seeking its sunny climate and low cost of living. U.S. public opinion thus continued to evolve in a more positive direction.

The bumpy road to normal relations

The great majority of Americans welcomed the end of the Franco regime in 1975 and the rapid consolidation of democracy that followed. The U.S. moved promptly towards establishing normal bilateral working relationships with Spain's initial post-Franco governments, patterned on those with other democratic European allies. Washington also helped to ensure that Spain was promptly invited to join NATO and generally welcomed as a full-fledged member of the trans-Atlantic community. In 1976, the U.S. and Spain signed a Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation symbolizing a commitment to a full-fledged bilateral alliance and further accelerating educational, professional and cultural exchanges. U.S. investment in Spain also continued to grow. In sum, by 1980, relations seemed to be blossoming.

There was a significant setback in February 1981, however, when a group of Guardia Civil officers entered the Spanish parliament in an attempted coup. Rather than coming out unambiguously in support of Spain's new democracy, the then U.S. Secretary of State General Alexander Haig initially called the attempt "an internal matter." Although Washington subsequently made clear its condemnation of the coup and

its full support of democracy, Haig's much-publicized gaffe reinforced pre-existing beliefs on the Spanish left regarding U.S. intentions. Given that the Socialist party (PSOE) would win the next year's parliamentary elections, this incident significantly delayed the full normalization of U.S.-Spanish relations, perhaps by as much as a decade.

The triumph of the PSOE in 1982 thus opened a difficult new phase in bilateral relations. The new Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, had been formed as a political leader during the Franco years, at a time when the U.S. Embassy was having little to do with the opposition underground. Alfonso Guerra, initially Gonzalez's second in command, was an avowed admirer of Che Guevara, with all of the romantic anti-American symbolism that this implied. Both Gonzalez and Guerra shared an initial distrust of the U.S. based on suspicion that Washington's interest in Spain's military bases might override its commitment to their country's fledgling democracy. Washington, for its part, was wary of the new government because the PSOE had campaigned against Spanish membership in NATO and favored a sharp reduction in U.S. military presence at Spain's bases. The 1982 elections thus ushered in a period of significant bilateral tensions.

Once in power, however, the Gonzalez government began to see that its ambition to become an influential member of the European Union and of other Western "clubs," and to develop into an advanced industrial economy, would be better served by Spain's remaining inside NATO. Gonzalez thus called for a referendum that reversed the previous PSOE position against NATO membership. However, the political "bargain" through which Gonzalez won the referendum (with 52.5% vs. 39.8% of the vote) included an explicit pledge to drastically reduce the U.S. military presence at Spanish bases. Politically, these reductions, and particularly the removal of the F-16 fighter wing at Torrejón right outside of Madrid, took on critical importance for the Gonzalez government. For the U.S., however, the Cold War was still unresolved, and Washington was determined not to cede.

The ensuing negotiations for the renewal of U.S. basing rights in Spain were prolonged and difficult, dragging on throughout much of 1986-88. The Gonzalez government was determined to hold firmly to its campaign pledge for a dramatic reduction in U.S. forces, particularly at Torrejón. But Washington was strongly committed to retaining military assets invaluable to NATO's leverage in a Cold War that still seemed far from over. Ultimately, Spain's manifest determination to invoke its sovereign rights – which included a threat to end the base agreement entirely if satisfactory terms could not be reached – forced the U.S. side to give up far more than it had hoped. This included removal of the highly strategic F-16 wing stationed at Torrejón. The Spanish proposed a face-saving timetable for this and other withdrawals, which made it a bit easier for the American side to accept them without severe damage to the bilateral relationship.

Although the base negotiations were often tense, with Spanish frustration and impatience at times leaking into the press, a mature dialog did develop at senior levels in the course of time. This laid the groundwork for the beginnings of better understanding and trust between top U.S officials on the one hand, and Prime Minister Gonzalez and his key ministers and advisers on the other. This increased trust, in turn, set the stage for important breakthroughs during years that followed the historic base agreement.

Spain becomes a normal ally

The 1988 base agreement removed a critical source of discord in the U.S.-Spain relationship by eliminating what the Spanish left had seen since the early 1950's as a major grievance. The next year, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the entire context of the relationship began to change. Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* sharply reduced the threat of military confrontation and the Cold War mentality that it had created. The military aspects of NATO began to seem less overriding, and Spain and the U.S. were in agreement as to the eastward expansion of what seemed an increasingly political alliance.

In 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threatened to annex the northern oil fields of Saudi Arabia. In response, U.S. President George H.W. Bush declared that the invasion "would not stand" and secured both a UN mandate and a European consensus in favor of military action to push Saddam's armies out of Kuwait. After a series of direct communications between the White House and the Prime Minister's office, Gonzalez agreed to grant the U.S. unprecedented use of the bases in Spain as a transit point and logistical back-up for the massive movement of American troops and equipment to the Gulf region in preparation for war. Spain also contributed forces to the combined military effort to liberate Kuwait. All of this would previously have been unthinkable, given Spain's long-standing policy of developing close relations with the Arab states and of thus prohibiting the use of its bases for U.S. military operations in the Middle East. From the viewpoint of Washington, Spain was proving to be very much "a friend in need."

An important additional factor in bringing Washington and Madrid closer during this period was the personal chemistry and open communication between the first President Bush and Prime Minister Gonzalez. This started with a Bush invitation for Gonzalez to visit the White House in October 1989, a visit that not only

attracted considerable positive media attention but also proved successful in terms of personal relations. Thus, when the Persian Gulf crisis erupted in the summer of 1990, the groundwork had already been laid for highly productive direct telephone contacts between the two leaders to discuss an urgent common response.

At the same time, the Spanish economy was prospering and providing a hospitable environment for U.S. business investment; and leading Spanish firms were beginning to invest in the U.S. Also, Spanish was becoming by far the predominant foreign language taught in the U.S., thanks partly to heavy Hispanic immigration and to growing trade with Latin America. With increased travel and other exchanges, many more Americans were becoming familiar with a rapidly modernizing democratic Spain. Thus by 1996, at the end of Felipe Gonzalez' 13 years in office, most Americans viewed Spain as a "normal" European ally, and this view was reciprocated from the Spanish perspective.

The *Special Relationship* and its seemingly abrupt ending

"The U.S. economy can only benefit from the involvement of leading-edge Spanish firms in areas of the U.S. economy that require new investment and new technologies"

When José Maria Aznar became Prime Minister in 1996, he quickly set out to build further upon an already strong relationship. His interest was reciprocated by the Clinton Administration, which led to a further deepening of cooperation symbolized by the signing of a "Joint Political Declaration" in January 2001, one of the last high-profile actions of the Clinton Administration. With the inauguration of the George W. Bush Administration just a few days later, Aznar found an even more enthusiastic U.S. partner who largely shared his ideological inclinations.

The U.S.-Spain official relationship quickly blossomed into one of the warmest and most intense that Washington had with any European ally other than the U.K. President Bush paid Aznar the honor of making Spain the first stop on his initial trip to Europe in June 2001. When Al-Qaeda carried out its massive terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, Aznar was among the first European leaders to step forward in active solidarity, and he translated that solidarity into strong Spanish support for the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Throughout the Aznar-Bush period, cooperation continued to grow on a wide variety of issues of common concern, including counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics and intelligence sharing. As of February 2004, a historian looking back at the previous eight years could credibly have said that the Aznar government had brought the U.S.-Spain alliance to its most intense point in history.

Then came the Atocha bombing on March 11, 2004, followed by parliamentary elections three days later. Prime Minister Rodriquez Zapatero and the PSOE were swept into office. In keeping with his campaign pledge – and a Spanish public opinion that was strongly set against the war – Zapatero abruptly withdrew all Spanish forces from Iraq. This dealt a severe blow to the Bush Administration's "Coalition of the Willing" and suddenly turned bilateral relations frigid, at least at the presidential level. Zapatero became the only major European leader not invited for an individual visit to the "Bush 43" White House, and Spain's reputation as a reliable ally was damaged at least in more hawkish U.S. political circles.

Aznar's attempt to build a "Special Relationship" thus seemed to end with a crash. U.S-Spanish relations had suddenly reached a low point after decades of progress. Beyond the headlines and below the presidential level, however, major portions of the bilateral relationship were in fact preserved. Foreign Minister Moratinos met regularly with Secretary of State Rice, who visited Spain in 2007. Cooperation between other U.S. departments and the corresponding Spanish ministries continued, as did cultural and educational exchanges and business investment. Very importantly, Spanish direct investment in the U.S. accelerated dramatically, jumping from $5 billion in 2000 to $26.6 billion in 2007, thus putting Spain well ahead of Italy and numerous other European allies.

After the re-election of the PSOE in March, 2008 – and well before the arrival of the Obama Administration – the Zapatero government began systematically to try to open "a new chapter" in bilateral relations via a series of high-level visits and other initiatives. And, since the inauguration of President Obama in January 2009, Prime Minister Zapatero has made it clear that he sees considerable common ground with the new U.S. leader, both personally and ideologically. The question is thus whether the new personalities at the top, combined with the unprecedented challenges facing both countries, will lead to a new period of close and fruitful relations.

Prospects for the U.S.-Spain relationship

Although U.S.-Spanish bilateral relations have seen significant pendulum swings even in the recent past, the extent of this oscillation has been diminishing over the longer term. The relationship has been moving gradually towards a positive middle ground that should be eminently sustainable, assuming capable leadership on both sides.

Spain is committed to continuing to build its role as a respected and influential member of the trans-Atlantic community and of other international groupings in which the United States plays a leading role. Spain has also in recent decades carved out an increasingly important economic and political role in Latin America. Despite the daunting challenges that it currently faces, the U.S. will almost certainly continue to play a major role globally, in Europe and in Latin America. On the likely assumption that Spain will continue to pursue a foreign policy along its current lines, it will have a clear incentive to cultivate a positive relationship with Washington and with other centers of political and cultural influence in the U.S. Culturally, the increasing importance of Spanish as a second language and the fast-growing Hispanic population offers new opportunities to interest Americans in Spain. There is also considerable potential for growth on the economic front, as major Spanish corporations such as Banco Santander and BBVA have begun to demonstrate in banking, and others in the fields of highway and other infrastructure construction and renewable energy.[3]

From the viewpoint of American interests, there are strong reciprocal reasons to continue working to deepen the relationship. The U.S. economy can only benefit from the involvement of leading-edge Spanish firms in areas of the U.S. economy that require new investment and new technologies. In geopolitical terms, Spain remains strategically placed as an overall gateway to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Even though the specific military considerations that proved so powerful during the Cold War have become a less dominant factor, the bases at Rota and Moron continue to provide invaluable logistical support for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Spain is also one of the few countries in the Europe Union with a growing population and a dynamic interest in other regions of the world. In terms of U.S. interests in Europe, in Latin America and globally, therefore, continuing to build a strong relationship with a democratic and increasingly outward-looking Spain continues to have major advantages.

After the aborted Aznar-Bush experiment in attempting to build something akin to the British-U.S. "special relationship," it would be imprudent for leaders either in Washington or Madrid to try to recreate as close embrace anytime soon. Any major movement in this direction would require a considerable change in Spanish public opinion, which is currently considerably more pacifist and "welfare-state"-oriented than American opinion. On the other hand, the negative bilateral issues of the past have long since buried, and a solid level of confidence and wide-ranging interactions have now been established between these two democracies that face many similar challenges. There is thus no intrinsic reason why Spain and the United States should revert to the tensions that have at times characterized relations in the past. In sum, with enlightened leadership from the top in both Washington and Madrid, plus the skilful use of diplomacy at all levels when inevitable differences do arise, the U.S.-Spanish relationship should indeed prosper rather than decline over the coming decade and beyond.

Notes

1. During his prior diplomatic career he had several postings in Europe and Latin America, including an assignment in Madrid in 1986-1989 as Deputy Chief of Mission and Deputy U.S. Base Negotiator, and subsequently as Chargé d'Affaires. He then served as Director for European Affairs at the White House/National Security Council 1989-1991, where his responsibilities included Spain.

2. The author has drawn heavily on this excellent work as well as its even more comprehensive antecedent, "Spain and the United States: the Quest for Mutual Rediscovery."

3. See the previously cited works by William Chislett for an extensive discussion of recent trends in Spanish investment in the U.S., and of the participation of Spanish firms in highway building, renewable energy and other important areas of U.S. infrastructure development.

Bibliography

CHISLETT, William (2006). "Spain and the United States [on line]: So Close Yet So Far." Working Paper (Real Instituto Elcano) 23/2006, p. 3. www.www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_es/Zonas_es/EEUU-Dialogo+Trasatlantico/DT23-2006. [Checked on: 04.15.09]

CHISLETT, William(2005). *Spain and the United States: The Quest for Mutual Rediscovery* [on line].[Madrid]: Real Instituto Elcano, 2005. p. 27
www.www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/libros/ChislettEsp-EEUU-ingles.pdf . [Checked on: 04.20.09]

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Spanish-US relations at the crossroads.

Charles Powell

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

Spanish-US relations at the crossroads

Charles Powell,
Deputy Director of Research and Analysis at the Elcano Royal Institute

Spain's relations with the world's superpower reached an interesting juncture following Barack Obama's election as President of the United States in November 2008 and his inauguration in January 2009. Both the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and much of Spanish public opinion celebrated his electoral victory with joy and hope, all taking it for granted that it would signal the end of the discord with George W. Bush's Administration following the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq in 2004. Influenced perhaps by electoral-campaign euphoria, some Spanish analysts saw in Obama's victory the possibility of forging a special relationship between the US leader and his Spanish counterpart on the basis of their supposed ideological affinities, which they believed could even give rise to the development of a shared 'Zapatobama' agenda (Palacio & Solana, 2008). However, the enormous expectations aroused by Obama's victory –in Spain and elsewhere in Europe– appear to ignore both the magnitude of the challenges to be faced by the new US government and the weight of certain principles, interests and priorities that have traditionally endowed US foreign policy with a large dose of continuity. While it is to be expected that Obama's election will bring about a substantial improvement in bilateral political relations, it is rather more doubtful whether Spain will succeed in taking advantage of the opportunity to become a true strategic partner of the US.

Waiting for the American friend

The interminable campaign that led to the presidential elections in November 2008 aroused an unprecedented interest in Spain. This was due, first, to Bush's significant lack of popularity among Spanish public opinion and to the widely-shared perception that the US urgently required a change of political direction that would benefit not only those able to vote in the elections, but also humanity in general. To this should be added the young Democratic candidate's unquestionably fresh and attractive image and the sympathy some of his election pledges aroused in Spanish public opinion. As if that were not enough, for the first time in history Spain made a –fleeting– appearance in the presidential election campaign. While the Republican candidate John McCain had given an interview in spring 2008 in which he seemed willing to mend US relations with Spain if he won the election, at an unfortunate radio interview in Miami in September 2008 he was evasive when asked if he would receive Rodríguez Zapatero at the White House, possibly because he was unable to correctly identify the person in question (Caño, 2008; Abend, 2008). His opponent took good note and, in a televised debate a few days later, Obama chided McCain for his hesitation over whether to receive the Prime Minister of a NATO member-state and, therefore, an ally of the US.

As expected, Obama's victory was very favourably received by Spanish society as a whole. According to a study published by the Elcano Royal Institute in December 2008, 91% of those polled considered it 'positive' or 'very positive', while only 5% said the outcome was 'negative' or 'very negative' (Barómetro..., 2009). Those who showed the greatest satisfaction were PSOE voters, although they were followed not far behind by PP supporters. Furthermore, a large majority considered that Obama's election would have significant consequences for US foreign policy: 71% claimed the changes would be 'very' or 'quite important', compared with 22% who believed they would be 'not very important' or 'not at all important'. In this respect, ideological preferences proved to be the more decisive: while 81% of PSOE voters expected significant changes to take place, only 69% of PP supporters shared this view. When asked about the consequences for US foreign policy of Obama's presence in the White House, 58% of those polled mentioned the closing of Guantánamo prison, 47% the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, 36% a change in policy regarding the fight against global terrorism, 33% the lifting of the Cuban blockade and 22% the dismantling of the missile shield in Eastern Europe.

Beyond these general assessments, 72% of those polled considered Obama's election 'beneficial' or 'very beneficial' for Spain, while 21% expressed indifference and only 1% claimed it would be damaging. Once again, the

proportion of those who believed that the election of the new President would be positive for Spain was slightly higher among PSOE than PP supporters. Furthermore, 62% of those polled said that Obama's election would bring changes to Spain's foreign policy, compared with 26% who rejected the possibility and 12% who 'didn't know'. When it came to identifying the possible nature of these changes, the most likely was considered to be an enhanced Spanish presence and visibility in the US, an option mentioned by 52% of those polled. This was followed by the possibility that Spain would increase its involvement in NATO (35%), send more troops to Afghanistan (31%) and support Turkey's entry to the EU (25%). In contrast, the least likely option was that Spain would move closer to the US while distancing itself from the EU (13%). Despite the importance attributed to the impact of Obama's election on Spanish foreign policy, only 35% of those polled believed that Obama's relationship with Rodríguez Zapatero would become as close as that between Aznar and Bush, something that was doubted by 58% of those polled, while a massive 58% believed that it would be good for this to happen, compared with 34% who believed the opposite. Oddly enough, it was the PP's voters who were most in favour of Rodríguez Zapatero and Obama developing a relationship as close as that of their predecessors. Finally, it is important to stress the notable impact the 'Obama factor' had on the perceptions of Spaniards: in June 2008, 54% said that their view of the US was 'favourable' or 'slightly favourable', while 42% said their view of the country was 'not very favourable' or 'not at all favourable'; six months later these figures had changed to 65% and 30%, respectively. In sum, Obama's election seems to have erased at a stroke much of Spanish public opinion's supposed anti-Americanism, and confirms once again the damage inflicted by some of the Bush Administration's policies on the US image abroad.

"Although the Obama government might be more multilateralist, it can also become more demanding"

The economic dimension

The media's tendency to personalise international relations means that the importance of a good rapport between top-level political leaders (or its lack) is often exaggerated. In a context that is increasingly globalised, the fabric of institutional, economic, social and cultural relations between two old allies is so vast and dense that it does not improve or deteriorate from one day to the next as a result of transient political circumstance. In this particular case, there has been a tendency to exaggerate both the benefits accrued from the rapport between Bush and Aznar and the cost of the confrontation between their successors; hence, some caution is advisable when analysing the future development of the bilateral relation.

From a Spanish perspective, bilateral relations are based on solid economic foundations. Until the 1980s, the US was Spain's main foreign investor, although its importance decreased considerably following Spain's entry into what was then the European Community. Despite this, in 2005 and 2006 the US continued to be the fourth-largest immediate provider of gross foreign investment in Spain, although by 2007 it had dropped to ninth place. What is truly novel, however (although the volumes involved are much smaller), is that in recent years Spanish investment in the US has increased very significantly, to the extent that in 2005 and 2006 the US was the second most important destination for Spanish gross investment, falling to third place in 2007 (this is why, to a great extent, the 'Third Elcano Report on opportunities and strategic risks for the Spanish economy' defined the US for the first time as a 'fundamental partner' for Spain) (Isbell & Arahuetes, 2007). Additionally, the US can also be considered an important trading partner: from 2005 to 2007 it was the seventh-largest provider of imports to Spain and between the seventh and eighth largest purchaser of Spanish exports.

Could Obama's incumbency at the White House contribute to intensifying this already significant bilateral economic relationship? Paradoxically, the serious financial and economic crisis that broke out in 2008 could offer some Spanish companies attractive business opportunities in the US. The economic stimulus plan approved by the US Congress in February 2009 was very positively received in Spain, since it envisaged spending over US$300 billion on sectors such as renewable energy (essentially wind and solar power), large infrastructures, water treatment and health and educational technologies, in all of which Spain is a leader in business terms. This was partly acknowledged by Obama himself in January 2009, shortly before he took office, in a speech that referred in glowing terms to countries such as Spain, that had had the foresight to invest in the development of renewable energies, at the same time as he announced that he would double the amount of this type of energy produced in the US over the next three years. But beyond bilateral economic relations, there are some who yearn for more far-reaching cooperation in the global fight against climate change and the development of renewable energies. It should not be forgotten that in June 2008 Rodríguez Zapatero proposed creating an International Agency of Renewable Energies, a project that would hardly be viable without active US participation (Palacio & Solana, 2008). However, it should also be borne in mind that such an initiative would force Spain (which is a long way from fulfilling the Kyoto objectives, to be reviewed in Copenhagen in December 2009) to make greater efforts in this field.

A more demanding ally?

From the Spanish perspective, another priority area for bilateral cooperation is security. Relations between the two countries in this field are currently ruled by the Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in December 1988 and updated in April 2002. The agreement is up for renewal in February 2011, an opportunity that Spain could exploit to definitively put behind it a necessarily asymmetrical relationship that emerged from the 1953 agreement, by which Spanish bases that stationed US forces were fully incorporated into NATO's structure and planning (Palacio, 2008). As seen in the Iraq War (and the 1991 Gulf War), although the Rota Air-Sea Base in Cádiz played a crucial role in the deployment of US forces in the Middle East, Spain was unable to either control or profit satisfactorily from its use. In this respect, it has gone relatively unnoticed that, despite the impaired bilateral relations because of Spain's troop withdrawal from Iraq, since 2004 the Rodríguez Zapatero governments have proved to be very accommodating about US use of the bases.

At the time Obama took office, Spain was participating jointly with the US in three overseas missions: Operation Active Endeavour (NATO), the Peacekeeping Force for Kosovo (KFOR, NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF, NATO). The first of these, set up in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001, was deployed in the Mediterranean to prevent terrorist attacks such as the one on USS Cole in October 2000. The second was established in Kosovo in 1999 in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1.244 with the aim of ending the fratricidal conflict between the country's Serbian and Albanian populations. The unilateral declaration of independence announced by Kosovo in February 2008, largely backed and encouraged by Washington, was not recognised by Madrid, which considered it contrary to international law. This led to serious doubts on the continuity of Spain's contribution to KFOR, confirmed in mid-March 2009 when the Spanish Minister of Defence announced –wholly unexpectedly and without having previously informed the country's NATO allies– the withdrawal before the end of the summer of the 620 Spanish troops deployed in Kosovo. Spain's decision caused consternation (and no little irritation) in both NATO and Washington, where it also brought back memories of the withdrawal from Iraq, despite the very different circumstances.

This first instance of friction between the Rodríguez Zapatero government and the US Administration only confirmed what many analysts had feared: although the Obama government might be more multilateralist and respectful in its relations with its European allies than its predecessor, it can also become more demanding. This is particularly true with respect to Afghanistan, where Spain has contributed to the ISAF missions since 2002 and where 778 Spanish troops are currently deployed. Despite the economic and logistical efforts involved for a country such as Spain, the US military authorities have expressed increasing irritation at the lack of European (and Spanish) willingness to raise troop numbers and especially at the proliferation of national provisos that seriously limit their capacity to engage militarily with Taliban insurgents. As a result, it is likely that the Spanish government will be forced to increase its military presence in Afghanistan in order to pacify Washington, especially if troops are finally withdrawn from Kosovo.

Strategic partners?

Beyond their common interest in renewable energies and the fight against climate change, it is not easy to identify any important policies in which Spain and the US could promote truly ambitious joint initiatives. Admittedly, Obama has shown more interest than his predecessor in the 'Alliance of Civilisations' launched by Rodríguez Zapatero in November 2004, even though –contrary to initial forecasts– he did not finally participate in the second forum held in Istanbul in April 2009. Obama's support for the 'Alliance' is fully in line with his desire to create closer links with the Muslim world, and it could give a greater visibility and credibility to Spain's efforts to become an important interlocutor for countries with mainly Muslim populations. However, the 'Alliance' has run into a number of difficulties since its inception and, beyond the doubts that many harbour over its ideological underpinning, its lack of material resources makes it a public diplomacy initiative with only a limited impact.

In theory, another objective that could bring the two countries together is the desire to improve the functioning of global economic and political institutions, whose record leaves much to be desired and which could perhaps be facilitated by inviting Spain to attend the G-20 summits. More specifically, the Bank of Spain's successful regulation of the Spanish financial system has aroused considerable interest in US economic circles. However, there are significant differences in this regard between Spain and the US. While for the former the gravity of the current international financial and economic crisis is such that it requires the reformulation of existing international institutions to increase their regulatory capacity, the latter considers that regulation is primarily a national affair and favours neither the creation of new organisations nor the excessive strengthening of existing ones. Meanwhile, given the Spanish economy's relatively modest size and its full insertion in the EU, Spain would find it difficult to take initiatives in this sphere separately from its main European partners.

Despite this, Spain has not relinquished the idea of playing a leading role in EU-US relations. The new EU-US Transatlantic Agenda was signed in December 1995 during Spain's Presidency of the Union, and the Spanish government aims to take advantage of the Presidency it will again be holding in the first half of 2010 to approve a Renewed Transatlantic Agenda, the specific content of which is as yet unknown. Furthermore, the EU-US summit to be held in Madrid in the spring of 2010 should allow Rodríguez Zapatero to act as host to Obama under the gaze of international public opinion.

The part of the world in which the two countries can cooperate more closely is probably Latin America. Although they are still the two largest investors in the region, they have both seen their influence decline due to, among other reasons, the increasing presence of China and even of the Russian Federation. In principle, this means that there are new incentives for a greater bilateral cooperation, despite Spain's economic presence in Latin America not having always been viewed favourably by the US. Spain must focus its efforts on attempting to convince Washington of the need to promote policies aimed at strengthening the governments that have succeeded in combining economic growth and social equality (such as Brazil and Chile), which might help to counteract the threat posed by the growing influence of other governments that have opted for populist, authoritarian models (such as Venezuela and Bolivia). Finally, the easing of the embargo on Cuba decreed by Obama in March 2009, although modest, might augur a gradual convergence of the two countries' policies towards the island.

"Over the medium and long-term, the bilateral relationship will depend more on the links between the two countries' civil societies than on the personal relations between their respective political leaders"

The election of Obama unquestionably offers Spain an opportunity to re-launch its bilateral relations with the US and thereby overcome the political logjam in place since 2004. Nevertheless, in addition to entrusting the relationship's future to the rapport between the US President and his Spanish counterpart, on the basis of a presumed ideological complicity, over the medium and long terms Spain must attempt to increase and improve its presence in the US through more conventional methods. It is clearly insufficient, for instance, that in early 2009 Spain should have only 20 diplomats in the US, eight in the embassy in Washington and the rest in the 10 Spanish consulates throughout the country. Neither does it seem reasonable that, given the importance habitually attributed to the 45 million Hispanics in the US, the Cervantes Institute should only have four centres operating in the country (in Albuquerque, Chicago, New York and Seattle). In sum, over the medium and long terms, the strength of the bilateral relationship will depend to a greater extent on the richness and consistency of the network of links that are forged between the two countries' civil societies than on the personal relations that might develop between their respective political leaders.

Bibliography

ABEND, Lisa (2008). 'The Pain in Spain Falls mainly on McCain' [online]. Time. September 18, 2008, <<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1842156,00.html>>. [Viewed: 24.03.09].

Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE) [online]: 19ª oleada: resultados de diciembre de 2008. (2009). Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2009. 77 p. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_es/Barometro/Oleada19 <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_es/Barometro/Oleada19>>. [Viewed: 24.03.09]

CAÑO, Antonio (2008). 'Con España hay que mirar hacia adelante' [online]. El País. 06/04/2008. <<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Espana/hay/mirar/adelante/elpepuint/20080406elpepiint_2/Tes>>. [Viewed: 24.03.09].

ISBELL, Paul; ARAHUETES, Alfredo (2007). 'III Índice Elcano de oportunidades y riesgos estratégicos para la economía española: una perspectiva comparada con Brasil, Estados Unidos y Alemania', [online]. Informes Elcano. nº.10, December, 2007. 145 p. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/InformesElcano/Informe_Elcano_10_III_Indice.pdf, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/InformesElcano/Informe_Elcano_10_III_Indice.pdf>>. [Viewed: 24.03.09].

PALACIO, Vicente (2008). 'Los puentes del Potomac' [online]. El País. 14/05/2008. <<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/puentes/Potomac/elpepiopi/20080514elpepiopi_12/Tes>>. [Viewed: 24.03.09].

PALACIO, Vicente; SOLANA Miguel (2008). 'Obama: el día después' [online] Memorando OPEX. nº 105/2008. 6p. <http://www.falternativas.org/opex/documentos-opex/memorandos/memorando-opex-n1-105-2008-obama-el-dia-despues <http://www.falternativas.org/opex/documentos-opex/memorandos/memorando-opex-n1-105-2008-obama-el-dia-despues>>. [Viewed: 24.03.09].

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Political system and structure of the State.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

Political system and structure of the State

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES

The electoral system of the United States is defined by a federalism that prioritises the autonomy of the states as being prior powers to the national political system.

Generally speaking, it can be defined as a majority or "winner takes all" system, uninominal and indirect, given that the "Electoral Colleges" qualify the voters' apparently direct votes. These characteristics derive from the Founding Fathers' desire for limited democracy, as they distrusted the idea of "the people"[1] being the only ones responsible for the political elite. Some of these limits have been eliminated through the six Constitutional amendments[2] that reformed the electoral system.

However, the different elections have their own specific features depending on the different states, which have their laws regarding state elections.

In 1804, the 12th amendment (the first amendment to the electoral system as defined in the Constitution by the Founding Fathers) changed the way in which the vice-president was elected. Previously, this post had fallen to the second-most voted candidate in the Electoral College, but under this system, the vice-president always turned out to be the president's opponent.

Presidential election

The USA's presidential political system separates presidential elections from parliamentary elections, unlike parliamentary systems, in which the parliamentary majority swears in its president.

Presidential elections are held every four years through indirect vote, by means of Electoral Colleges. The Founding Fathers created Electoral Colleges as an elitist control mechanism; in the event that voters made "a bad choice", the members of the Electoral Colleges could choose another president. This mechanism now has little more than anecdotal importance in the US system, rather than being a real mechanism to counter the power of the people.

The Constitution allocates each state a total number of electors that is equal to the total number of their representatives in both houses of the Congress (the House of Representatives and the Senate).

Even though they vote for the name of a candidate for the White House (as in a direct election), voters are in fact voting for the slate of electors who have promised their support for the candidate in a subsequent election at state level.

The distortions generated by the majority system are even greater in the United States, as the presidential elections are counted state by state. In practical terms, it can turn out that there is a notable difference between the popular vote and the person who finally becomes president.

Nomination of candidates for the presidency

The primacy of state power is especially important in the process of choosing candidates for the presidency. Each party, at a state level, has the power and the autonomy to choose the delegates that will participate in the party's national convention, where both parties' presidential candidates are nominated.

Though no legislation exists (neither state nor federal) to regulate the way in which the candidates are chosen, there are only two processes to this end: caucuses and primary elections.

Caucuses are made up of committees of party activists[3] at a local and state level. These caucuses meet up at the beginning of an electoral year and choose the delegates that will represent their state at the national convention which will designate the nominee. This method of selection is more opaque and circumscribed to party activists, and can therefore turn out to be more distanced from society than the open primary elections.

Owing to progressive reforms and a few cases of corruption owing to the opaqueness of the caucus processes, many states have changed their of selection method for choosing candidates for primary elections. In some states, only party activists may participate, while in others (after previously having registered), citizens can participate in primary elections at a state level. Both primary elections and presidential elections function by indirect choice; voting serves to choose mediators – people who have promised to support a specific candidate for nomination.

In order for a candidate to be nominated for the primary elections, he or she must obtain the backing of the majority of delegates at the national convention.

The Republican Party uses the majority or "winner takes all" system, so that during the process of primary elections (which last for several months), the favorite can quickly be determined ahead of the others.

The Democratic Party uses the proportional system, which means that the primary election process is usually longer and more competitive.

One singular feature of the Democratic Party is that 20% of national convention delegates do not have their vote bound to any one candidate. They are the party's political elite, congressmen and state leaders; they are known as "superdelegates", and have the freedom to choose the best candidate for nomination. Sometimes, when the process is particularly neck-and-neck, they sometimes publicly speak out in favor of one or the other before the national convention.

Elections for Congress

House of Representatives

The 435 members of the House of Representatives are elected directly for a mandate of two years from uninominal districts by majority vote.

Senate

The Senate is the nation's house of representation; every state has two senators, independently of the number of inhabitants, as a result of which the house has a total of 100 seats. Senators are directly elected for a mandate of six years, with a third of the house renewed every two years.

Registration and voting

The US electoral system requires that voters register previously in order to be able to participate on polling day. This requirement obstructs access to the vote for people of limited education or those who are not interested in politics. To remedy this problem, some states have allowed citizens to register through the same process as driving licenses are registered, or even allowed them to register on polling day. However, none of the measures adopted seem to have increased the level of political participation.

Other factors that appear to cause high rates of abstention include the majority system (which makes it difficult to create new political parties or new majorities), the system of Electoral Colleges (which is not always understood by the electorate) and the great amount of opinion polls to which US citizens are subjected.

Funding

There has been an exponential increase in electoral campaign budgets in United States. Campaign teams use much of the human and technological resources for gathering private funds, despite the possibility of public funding.

Historically speaking, candidates have rejected public funding for financing their campaigns, as if they accept they would also be subjected to a legal limit on the amount for funding the campaign. In the event that campaigns are financed with exclusively private money, these legal limits do not apply.

Up until 2003, individuals or pressure groups could donate unlimited amounts of money to parties for campaigning; this money is known as "soft money", but it was banned following a Supreme Court ruling which endorsed the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which basically prohibited soft money and all party advertising or non-specific advertising for candidates by pressure groups 30 days before a primary election and 60 days in the case of a general election.

Despite this law, fund-raising in past primary and presidential elections has reached historic levels, and soft money continues to be one of the foundations of fund-raising.

THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States Congress is the repository of legislative power, and is the organ of federal integration *par excellence*. It is a two-house organ, comprised of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The two houses respectively constitute the two ways of organising political representation: territorial or federative (the Senate), and based on the people (the House of Representatives). The two houses are interlinked in such a way that the Constitution (in article I, section V, 4) prohibits the suspension of the sessions of either house for more than three days without the other's consent. Likewise, each house has an absolute veto over all laws passed by the other.

The application of the principle of separation of powers in the US system establishes a relative functional independence between the legislative and executive bodies. In this way, the president does not have the power to dissolve the houses, either.

The legislative function requires a high degree of cooperation between organs that are strictly separated by the Constitution: the president and Congress.

Apart from legislation, Congress has another series of powers attributed to it that are not strictly legislative:

- Commencing, when necessary, the process of impeachment (which members of Congress are free from).
- In the event of a tie in the presidential electors' vote to choose the president, this house is responsible for choosing the president out of the five candidates who received the most votes.

The Senate's non-legislative functions include the following:

- In the event of a tie in the presidential electors' vote to choose the president, this house is responsible for choosing the vice-president (who, furthermore, is president of the Senate).
- It serves as the court for impeachment trials. If the accused is the current president of the United States, the presidency of the Senate will be held by the president of the Supreme Court.
- The Senate ratifies treaties established by the government, for which it needs a two-thirds majority of Senate members.
- The house confirms the appointments of the high-ranking government officials chosen by the president, for which it needs a simple majority.

With respect to their legislative function, both houses are the same, with the consent of both required to pass all laws. Any bill of law may be submitted to either of the two houses, with the exception of tax laws, which must first be submitted to the House of Representatives.

Members of Congress are not subject to any formal discipline, with the exception of the House Rules. Congress is comprised of 535 members appointed by popular vote, and who are only responsible for the electoral areas that have voted for them. Thus, owing to the absence of any party discipline to make Congressmen's attitudes and behavior uniform, the various interests (agricultural, industrial, exports, etc.) find many channels of penetration and influence in legislative decisions, thereby generating a wide diversity of points of view on the same issue.

The House of Representatives

The House of Representatives has 435 members and corresponds to the principle of the representation of the people before Congress. The requirement for representatives to be residents in the district for which they are elected and the shortness of the period make the representative's mandate one that is almost imperative. The interests of the district for which a representative has been elected must be clearly championed by same if he or she aims to be re-elected at the next elections. The interest in defending local issues which

characterises the work and activity of members of the House Representatives in Congress helps to make the rationalising function of political parties impossible in the houses.

The most important post is the speaker, who is appointed by the majority party. When candidates vote for a speaker, party discipline is usually fairly well observed. The speaker exercises the function of political leader of his or her parliamentary party.

The House of Representatives has 22 permanent commissions, each of which has members numbering from nine to 51. The presidency of the different commissions is held by the majority party, and this is the strongest instrument for consolidating the influence that parliamentary parties have over the composition of the most important commissions.

The Senate

The Senate is comprised of two senators for each state, elected for six years in rotational elections held every two years, at which one-third of Senate members are renewed each time. The Senate incorporates the principle of territorial representation; it is the states that are represented in this house, a representative equality in which the essence of the federative principle resides.

The partial renovation of one-third of the Senate every two years aims to guarantee the continuity of the representative institution above the fluctuations of the electorate.

The president of the Senate is, according to the Constitution, the vice-president of the Government, though his/her powers have a rather symbolic nature, given that he/she may not appoint commissions and can only vote in the event of a tie. All of this means that the presidency of the Senate has a secondary function.

The Senate is the house through which the legislative limits the executive's capacity for action. Thus, for example, a senatorial control exists over presidential appointments, though this control is a mere cautionary measure for preventing the president from appointing family members or personal friends to high-ranking public positions.

The Senate also has the legal authority to ratify treaties. Treaty amendments are voted in by simple Senate majority and oblige the president not to ratify the treaty or to renegotiate it with the other party, including the amendments.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The US political system was conceived without political parties. Europe's experiences of revolution, the consequence of confrontation between different factions, led the founding fathers to avoid a multiparty system that might ruin the peace achieved through the founding agreement. The only existing party was the Federalist Party.

However, it did not take long for different stances to appear in the public sphere. The first disagreements were over Hamilton's economic policy and the debate (which continues today) over the powers of national government. These disagreements led to the creation of the Antifederalist or Democrat-Republican Party, which grouped together those who prioritised state power above national power, and those not in favor of Hamilton's policy.

Thus it was that in the 1790s, the foundations were laid for the two existing parties and the two-party system, as promoted by the electoral law included in the Constitution.

The Democratic Party

Today's Democratic Party dates back to the 1830s. Given the US political arena, which is characterised by the catch-all two-party system, state decentralisation and the great differences between the North and the South, it is hard to ideologically define the parties using European parameters. One can conclude that the Democratic Party has historically been the party that has fought for civil rights and social justice, while continuing to be a liberal party. It is often erroneously compared with European progressive parties.

The Republican Party

Today's Republican Party dates back to the late 1850s. To give the party an ideological definition, one could highlight the common features in most of the states – respect for and upholding of conservative Christian values, and a desire for state intervention in society and the economy to be minimised.

Territorial levels

The two main parties in the United States are organised in a territorial manner throughout the country.

The first level is the precinct or district. Historically, the parties in the district were the facilitators of the area's social life, providing services to the community. These contributions to society helped them to attract voters. Nowadays, these social actions have given way to electoral specialisation in grass-roots strategies.

The next level is the county. Each party has some 300 county groupings throughout the United States. The main functions of this level include trying to help voters to register, encouraging participation, coordinating campaigns that affect their territorial area and, finally, recruitment – finding good candidates for the various electoral competitions. They also lend their support to candidates for local elections, or local candidates running for state posts.

The state level is the most important of all levels in terms of functions and power, and its deciding organ is the State Committee.

At present, the two parties have state committees in all 50 states, chosen through the legislation of each state. In 27 states, the law decrees that the members of the state committee be chosen by the local committee, or by members delegated by the state or precinct, or by county conventions. In 14 other states, the law decrees that the parties should decide on their selection process. In the nine remaining states, the law guarantees voters the right to choose state committees in primary elections.

The state committee has different tasks, which include acting as the link between the lower administrative levels and the national administration, obtaining updated electoral information, giving support to candidates at lower levels and organising opinion polls to sound out the major electoral issues. In addition to recruitment (a task that is carried out

by all the lower levels), the state committee is responsible for decruitment, which consists of discouragement by party officials to obtain a nomination; without this approval[4] it is hard to obtain a candidacy.

All these tasks are carried out by a permanent professional staff funded by the increasingly large budgets that show the growing importance of the state committee.

National level

At a national level, the parties do not have any major structure, both reducing their organisation to the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC). These bodies concentrate their energies on organising, coordinating and directing campaigns at a federal level.

The DNC was created in 1848 and the RNC in 1856. Their creation within the two most important parties in the United States represented the definitive step towards the organisation of the parties at a federal level, while always bearing in mind the importance of the state level.

Each national committee is made up of representatives from several states. The RNC is governed by the principle of equality, with three representatives from each state: a national committeeman, a national committeewoman and a state party chair.

The composition of the DNC is more complex: it has a national committeeman, a national committeewoman, a state chair, the official of the opposite gender with the highest ranking in each state, while 200 more members are allocated to each state in accordance with the criteria of population and Democratic vote in past elections. Others are added *ex oficio* as a result of the posts that they hold – the DNC officials, 3 governors (including a representative from the Democratic Governors' Association), the party leaders in the Congress and the Senate and an additional member from each house, representatives from the Young Democrats, the National Federation of Democratic Women and Democratic Majors, county officials and state legislators and up to 20 other high-ranking officials from underrepresented groups.

Both national committees meet up only twice a year, owing to their inoperative size; for day-to-day matters, each has an executive organisation: the Republicans have the Executive Council, and the Democrats the Executive Committee.

THE MOST IMPORTANT ELECTIONS OF THE PAST CENTURY

Looking back over the US electoral map during the past 100 years, we can see that there were six elections that were important in terms of the country's political, economic and social context, as well as for the results produced by the ballot box.

The 1932 elections: Franklin D. Roosevelt against Herbert Hoover.

Ever since the clear victory the Democratic candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt won in 1932 over the candidate and Republican President Herbert Hoover, the US electoral map has never been so overwhelmingly painted blue.

The country was mired in the economic Great Depression and the 1929 Wall Street crash had occurred not long before. This victory by the candidate Delano Roosevelt in almost all the states of the Union except for six led to the economic rebirth of the country during the course of his three consecutive terms of office.

The 1960 elections: John F. Kennedy against Richard Nixon.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the Democratic candidate won an electoral battle that has gone down in history as being the first in which the medium of television was decisive, while electoral marketing gained a particular importance. After this election the mass media and electoral and party marketing were increasingly used to the point that they achieved the huge importance they have today. The two candidates participated in the first face-to-face televised debate, in which John F. Kennedy emerged from the experience with flying colours.

The 1980 elections: James Carter against Ronald Reagan.

The Democrat and President Jimmy Carter came up against his Republican opponent Ronald Reagan in an electoral campaign overshadowed by the Iran hostage crisis. The Republican candidate won outright against a doubtful President Carter, who was also incapable of dealing with the economic crisis that was plaguing the USA. The candidate Reagan appealed for optimism, and revived hope and trust among his fellow citizens.

The 1992 elections: William J. Clinton against George Bush.

After 12 years of Republican dominance, the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton won the elections against his Republican rival, the candidate and President George Bush. Although the Republican candidate won the Gulf War during his term of office and witnessed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, he was surprised by Clinton's campaign, which was based on the economic re-launching of the country.

The 2000 elections: George W. Bush against Albert Gore.

After eight years of Clinton's presidency, his vice-president Al Gore decided to embark on an electoral campaign in opposition to the Republican candidate George W. Bush, ex-governor of Texas and son of ex-president Bush.

After an electoral recount that lasted more than a month in the state of Florida, the Supreme Court declared the winner to be the Republican candidate. The controversy behind the long electoral recount was caused by the electoral cards that voters had to use to vote. Though the Democratic candidate won the electoral ballot, George W. Bush achieved victory with a tiny margin of five delegates.

The 2008 elections: Barack H. Obama against John McCain.

The most recent electoral race, which took place last year, will go down in history for having been the one that brought the first African-American to the White House. Today's President Obama, who was a senator during the campaign, beat his Republican opponent by a clear margin.

Elections 1932: Franklin D. Roosevelt vs Herbert Hoover



VOTER TURNOUT **52.4%**

Roosevelt **472**
Hoover **59**

Elections 1960: John F. Kennedy vs Richard Nixon



VOTER TURNOUT **63%**

Kennedy **303**
Nixon **219**
Harry Byrd **15**

1980 elections: Ronald Reagan vs James Carter



VOTER TURNOUT **52.5%**

Reagan **489**
Carter **49**

1992 elections: William J. Clinton vs George Bush



VOTER TURNOUT **55.1%**

Clinton **370**
Bush **168**

2000 elections: George W. Bush vs Albert Gore



VOTER TURNOUT **51.3%**

Bush **271**
Gore **266**

2008 elections: Barack H. Obama vs John McCain



VOTER TURNOUT **56.8%**

Obama **365**
McCain **173**

DEMOCRATIC PARTY
REPUBLICAN PARTY

Figures in each state indicates its number of delegates

Source: Federal Election Commission, U.S. Electoral College
Produced by: CIDOB

Obama won against all predictions with a brilliant campaign based on the Internet which, among its other advantages, helped him to bring together thousands of volunteers.

Becoming the first African-American president in a country in which Dr. Luther King Jr. was assassinated only 40 years ago, when racial segregation was spread throughout the country, represents a landmark in itself.

Marc Pérez Serra
Head of Communication at the CIDOB Foundation

NOTES

1. Evolution of the right to vote in the US

Year	With right to vote	Without right to vote
1820	All white males on the census	Blacks, women, minors under 21
1870	All males on the census	Women, minors under 21
1920	Everyone over 21 years of age	Minors under 21
1971	Everyone over 18 years of age	Minors under 18

2. Amendments: 12th in 1804, 20th in 1933, 22nd in 1951, 17th in 1920, 24th in 1964 and 26th in 1971.

3. The "party member" does not exist as such; people belong to a party when they feel themselves to be a participator in it, and take part in its activities.

4. Endorsement by the party elite is a determining factor for a candidate, given that this kind of primary usually has a very low turnout.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DE CUETO, Carlos; DURÁN, Marién (eds) (2008). *Regímenes políticos contemporáneos. Entre el inmovilismo y cambio*. Editorial Comares. 2008

FERRANDO BADÍA, Juan (Coord.) (1995). *Regímenes políticos actuales*. Editorial Tecnos. 1995

HAGUE Rod; HARROP, Martin (2004). *Comparative Government and Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan. 2004

MAISEL Sandy; BREWER Mark. D. (2008). *Parties and elections in America. The Electoral process*. 5th edition. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2008

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Biographies of the political leaders of the Obama administration.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

Biographies of the political leaders of the Obama administration

BARACK H. OBAMA

President of the United States since January 2009

The election of the new president of the United States of America, Barack Obama, was unquestionably one of the most politically lively episodes of recent decades, and not only within the United States, but throughout the rest of the world. In the US, in just four years, Obama has gone from holding an Illinois seat in the Senate to residing in the White House. As regards international public opinion, in just a few months, he went from being a complete unknown to representing the values of change, hope and a break with the eight years of the Bush Administration. During the 2008 electoral campaign, his seductive, reformist discourse, which was highly critical of his predecessor in the White House, made a deep impression on millions of people and political leaders all around the world, to the point that his electoral victory became a social phenomenon that resounded far beyond Washington.

Barack Hussein Obama was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, on 4 August 1961; his father was born and grew up in Kenya, while his mother was originally from Kansas. After a childhood spent in Hawaii, the United States and Indonesia, the young Barack returned to Honolulu in 1971, where he was brought up by his maternal grandparents. In 1981 he enrolled at Columbia College, University of Columbia, New York, where he studied political science and international relations, graduating in 1983. Two years later, following numerous experiences working for various non-profitmaking reformist organisations, Obama moved to Chicago where he worked for the NGO The Developing Communities Project; he also headed a social solidarity project in the working-class neighbourhood of Roseland. After this experience, he went back to university, to the prestigious Harvard Law School in Massachussets, where he was studied to become a Doctor of Jurisprudence in 1991. This paved the way for him to become the first African-American president of the prestigious publication the *Harvard Law Review*. In 1992, back in Chicago, he organised the Illinois Project Vote, a political awareness campaign aimed at the state's African-American community. One year later he began working as a Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Chicago, and as a lawyer specialised in civil rights issues.

He entered the world of active politics in November 1996, when he obtained a seat in the upper house of the Illinois General Assembly, and which he held until 2004. During this period, in March 2000 he competed in the Democratic primaries in Illinois for the US Congress House of Representatives, but he was soundly beaten in the elections by Bobby Rush. Re-elected in the 2003 Springfield legislative elections, Obama was appointed Chairman of the Health and Human Services Committee, and succeeded in setting in motion legislation concerning social protection. In 2003 he publicly declared himself to be against the intentions of then President George W. Bush to embark on military intervention in Iraq. In January of that same year, Barack Obama presented his candidacy to the US Senate, and in March 2004 he won the Democratic Party's primary elections, smashing all the poll predictions. That July, he delivered the keynote address at the Democratic National Convention, and four months later (while his fellow democrat John Kerry lost the presidential elections to George W. Bush, who commenced his second term of office) Obama won his seat in the Senate with 70% of the vote, and was sworn in as the fifth African-American senator in US history.

As a representative of the Democrat minority in the 109th US Congress, Obama worked on matters such as the promotion and drafting of projects and legislative amendments concerning transparency in public management and the administration of federal funds, and to the reduction of conventional weapons. In January 2007, he tabled the Iraq War De-Escalation Act, a legislative proposal that was never debated, aimed at the withdrawal of troops from Iraq in March 2008. At the 110th Congress, he sponsored legislation concerning pressure groups and electoral fraud, global warming, nuclear terrorism and care of military personnel returning to the USA from military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a senator in both terms of office, he was a member of the senatorial committees for foreign relations, the environment and public works, veterans' affairs, health, education, labour and pensions, and homeland security and governmental affairs.

Barack Obama announced his candidacy for the US presidency in February 2007 when he declared his intention to present himself for the Democratic primaries for the November 2008 presidential elections; he was the candidate who was *a priori* less experienced than the other three participants: John Edwards, candidate for the vice-presidency with John Kerry in 2004; Bill Richardson, Secretary for Energy in the last Democrat Administration, and particularly Hillary Clinton, senator for New York since 2001 and ex-First Lady. After a series of hard-fought primaries finally disputed with Hillary Clinton, Obama's messages of hope ("Yes we can") and change ("Change we can believe in") made a profound impact on Democratic sympathisers, and he was elected presidential candidate in late 2008. In the book *Change We Can Believe In: Barack Obama's Plan to Renew America's Promise*, published in September 2008, Obama offers a plan focused on America's economy and leadership. The pillars of the young Illinois senator's policy are: an economy based on

saving and investment, a new educational model, health care reform, energy reform and a new ethics and transparency in public administration.

In November 2008, Barack H. Obama won the presidency of the United States after beating (with 52.8% of the popular vote) the Republican candidates John McCain, who obtained 45.9% of the vote. On 20 January he was sworn in as the 44th US President, and the first African-American to achieve the post.

In view of the deep recession that the United States is experiencing, the main decisions of the initial months concerned the economy, with the introduction of a public investment plan and tax deductions to encourage economic activity, new measures to rescue the financial system and to avoid the bankruptcy of the automobile industry. Work has also been done on the fight against climate change, educational and health reform has been commenced, and medical research into stem cells has been authorised. As for foreign policy, his first decisions were to close Guantanamo detention centre over the course of a year and to ban the use of interrogation techniques that constitute torture and other bad treatment (supposedly practiced by the CIA). The last decision in this area was to publish the official documents (until now secret) on torture carried out under the previous government of George W. Bush.

In his first months in the White House, Obama has had meetings – either one-to-one or in groups – with over 50 world leaders, and has championed a foreign policy oriented toward negotiated military denuclearization, greater multilaterality and dialogue with countries such as Cuba, Venezuela and Iran. The new president has announced a timeframe for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, and the adoption of a new strategy in Afghanistan.

The latest opinion polls, carried out by the agency Associated Press or Real Clear Politics, granted Obama an approval rating of over 60%, making him one of the most popular presidents in history during the first 100 days of his term of office.

MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CABINET

JOSEPH R. BIDEN

Vice President of the United States

Joseph Robinette Biden was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, on 20 November 1942. In 1953 his family moved to Claymont, Delaware, where he graduated from the University of Delaware in 1965. He later enrolled at the Faculty of Law at the University of Syracuse, graduating in 1968 and, one year later, was admitted to the Delaware Bar. He served on New Castle County Council between 1970 and 1972, and at the age of 29 he began a long political career, after obtaining a seat for Delaware in the US Senate. His unexpected election to the post came in 1972, when he beat the popular Republican senator J. Caleb Boggs, in an election in which Nixon won a resounding victory over the Democrat George McGovern.

Biden went on to be re-elected on five consecutive occasions, in 1978, 1984, 1990, 1996 and 2002, while in June 1987 he even presented his candidacy for the presidency of the USA in Wilmington, Delaware, though he withdrew after being accused of plagiarism in a speech and for health reasons.

Joe Biden was president of the Senate Judiciary Committee between 1978 and 1995, a period in which he played a principal role in the promotion of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, also known as the Biden Crime Law, and in 1994 he authored the Violence Against Women Act.

He was also president of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations between 2001 and 2003, and once again from January 2007 onwards. During this period, in October 2002, he voted in favour of the resolution authorising the government to use force against Iraq. In 2006 Senator Biden, in collaboration with Leslie Gelb, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, proposed a plan for Iraq that championed a federal system inspired by the experience of Bosnia, and which would allow the USA to withdraw most of its troops. The plan was never carried out.

On 7 January 2007, Biden officially announced his candidacy for the presidency of the United States, withdrawing in January 2008 in view of the small chance he had of achieving the candidacy. In August of that year he was declared as candidate for the vice-presidency, together with Barack Obama. His long experience as a senator for the Democratic Party and his knowledge of US foreign relations are his strongest suits. In January 2009, Joe Biden was sworn in as vice-president of the United States, replacing Dick Cheney in the post.

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Secretary of State

Hillary Rodham Clinton was born in Chicago on 26 October 1947. After graduating from Wellesley College in 1969 and from Yale Law School where she was obtained a Doctorate in Jurisprudence in 1973, and where she also established a close relationship with Bill Clinton, the future US President. Once they had finished university, the young couple moved to Arkansas, the state of Clinton's birth, and where Hillary obtained a position as professor of criminal law at the University of Arkansas School of Law. It was in Arkansas that they both began long political careers that would lead them to the White House in 1992.

After wide experience in different areas of social service and championing causes linked with constitutional rights and civil liberties, in 1977 the young lawyer was appointed by Jimmy Carter to the board of directors of the Legal Services Corporation, a bipartisan private organisation of Congress, and which she later presided over for two years. In her position as First Lady of Arkansas for 12 years, after Bill won state governor elections in 1978, Hillary became president of the Arkansas Educational Standards Committee, and participated in a number of associations and organisations for the defence of children and large families.

When Bill Clinton reached the White House in 1992, Hillary became the First Lady and acted as a champion of national health system reform. She was appointed president of the task force for the system's reform, and she worked for causes

linked with childhood and families. A strong feminist and champion of abortion, she worked together with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to create the governmental initiative Vital Voices, which has now become an NGO network for promoting women's empowerment throughout the world. Another aspect of her time as First Lady was her firmness and support for her husband during the harassment to which he was subjected during his impeachment for perjury in the Lewinsky case.

In the year 2000, after Bill Clinton had completed his two terms of office in the White House, Hillary became the first First Lady to be elected to the US Senate, and the first woman to be elected in New York State. During her time in the Senate, she served on the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Health, Education, Labour and Pensions, the Committee on Environment and Public Works and the Budget Committee. She was also a member of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 2006 she was re-elected to the Senate, and in 2007 she began her campaign to become the Democratic candidate for the White House. Her long, gruelling political battle with Barack Obama in the first half of 2008 will be remembered as one of the finest examples of political debate in US recent history. Finally, in August 2008 – and after Hillary had denied the rumours over her possible entry onto Obama's ticket as his No. 2 – the Democratic primaries chose the senator from Illinois as their candidate for the White House. Hillary Clinton was sworn in as head of US foreign policy in January 2009, as the 67th Secretary of State, replacing Condoleezza Rice. Some of the foreign policy priorities the new Secretary of State announced are: achieving lasting peace in the Middle East (unquestionably through the creation of a Palestinian state), bringing an end to Al Qaeda's terrorism, the progressive withdrawal of troops from Iraq, intensifying cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism and the Taliban, preventing nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, strengthening cooperation with the Russian Federation, China and India, and bringing the fight against climate change, poverty and hunger to the foreground.

ROBERT M. GATES

Secretary of Defense

Linked with the Republican Party, but without any political affiliation, Robert Gates is the only member of the Bush Administration to have been included in Barack Obama's new team since the beginning of his mandate in January 2009.

After a long career in US intelligence and security systems, Robert Gates was appointed Defence Secretary in December 2006. For 27 years, Gates has served a total of six presidents, and with nine years' experience on the White House National Security Council, he has served four presidents.

Born in Kansas on 25 September 1943, Robert Michael Gates graduated in European History from the College of William and Mary, Virginia, and continued his studies at the University of Indiana, where he obtained a Masters in History in 1966. In that same year he began his career in the CIA. In 1974 he was awarded a Doctorate on the History of Russia and the USSR from the University of Georgetown, after which he joined the White House National Security Council. In 1979 he left the Executive Office of the President of the United States and returned to the CIA, as director of the Strategic Evaluation Center, Office of Strategic Research. In 1982 he became Deputy Director for Intelligence, and one year later he was appointed President of the National Intelligence Council (NIC). His career in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led him to become its Director General on two occasions: for a brief period in 1987, appointed by Reagan, and from 1991 to 1993, under the government of George Bush. Between these two periods, he directly served President Bush Sr. as Deputy Assistant for National Security (1989-1991). In 1993, with the arrival of Bill Clinton in the presidency, Gates brought an end to his commitment with the CIA and returned to his activity as an academic (President of the University of Texas in 2002) and as a private business adviser.

During the second term of office of George W. Bush, Gates formed part of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan Congress commission, and after the Democrats won a majority in both houses of Congress in the November 2006 elections, the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld led to Gates' appointment as the head of US defence policy. At that time, Gates represented the most moderate wing in the Bush Administration.

The excellent understanding between President Obama and Robert Gates on issues such as returning to a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy and US security, developing a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and on rejecting the use of force to put an end to Iran's nuclear threat have all been key elements in his continuity in the post of Defence Secretary.

As the head of the Pentagon, Gates will have to deal with some of the policies that have gained the greatest attention in world public opinion, such as the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the closing of the prison at Guantanamo, the fight against Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER

Secretary of the Treasury

In November 2008, President elect Barack Obama appointed Timothy Franz Geithner as the 75th Treasury Secretary of the United States, replacing Henry Paulson in the post.

Timothy Franz Geithner was born in Brooklyn, New York on 18 August 1961. He went to secondary school in Thailand, and during his childhood and teenage years, his family's constant changes of home took him to India, China, Japan and East Africa. He graduated from Dartmouth College in North Carolina in 1983, where he studied Governance and Asian Studies. Two years later, he obtained a Masters in International Economics and East Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. In 1988 he began work in the International Affairs Division of the US Treasury Department, where he held the posts of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Monetary and Financial Policy (1995-1996), Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs (1996-1997) and Assistant Secretary for International Affairs (1997-1998). From 1999 to 2001, he was Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, working under the Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers.

In 2002 Geithner left the Treasury to work on the Council on Foreign Relations as a senior researcher in the Department of International Economics, after which he moved to the IMF, where he was Director of the Policy Development and Review Department (2001-2003).

In November 2003, he was appointed as the 9th President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a post that he held until January 2009, together with that of Vice-Chairman and permanent member of the Federal Open Market Committee, the group responsible for formulating national monetary policy.

In March 2008 Geithner was directly involved in the administration of the sale of Bear Stearns, and he also collaborated to reach an agreement to save the American International Group (AIG) from bankruptcy. As Treasury official, he helped to manage many different international crises that took place in the 1990s in countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand.

Timothy Geithner is President of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems at the Bank for International Settlements of the Group of G-10, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and of the Group of Thirty.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.

Attorney General

Eric Himpton Holder Jr. was born in the Bronx, New York, on 21 January 1951. In 1973 he graduated from the University of Colombia in Law, and three years later he was awarded his doctorate.

From 1976 to 1988, Holder worked for the Justice Department as a lawyer in the section of Public Integrity, after which he was appointed by President Ronald Reagan as a judge at the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, in 1988. In 1993 President Bill Clinton appointed him as US Attorney for the District of Columbia. Four years later, Clinton once again appointed him as US Deputy Attorney General working under Janet Reno, a post in which he was confirmed unanimously by the Senate, making in the first African-American to hold such a high post in US Justice.

Following the victory of George W. Bush in 2001, Holder held the post of Attorney General on a temporary basis until John Ashcroft was ratified by the Senate. Later on he worked as a lawyer.

Known for his opposition to the death penalty, in 2008 Holder joined Obama's presidential campaign as a legal adviser.

On 18 November 2008 he was appointed as the future Attorney General of the United States, and in February 2009 Holder became the first African-American to head the Justice Department.

JANET A. NAPOLITANO

Secretary of Homeland Security

In November 2008 Napolitano joined the advisory board of the Obama-Biden Transition Project, and two months later, in January 2009, Napolitano became the first woman to be appointed Secretary of Homeland Security, a department that was created following the September 11 attacks; she replaced Michael Chertoff in the post.

Born in New York on 29 November 1957, Janet Ann Napolitano graduated from Santa Clara University in 1979, and four years later obtained her doctorate in jurisprudence from the University of Virginia School of Law, after which she began practising as a lawyer. After moving to Arizona in 1983, her career in public government began in 1993, when President Bill Clinton appointed Napolitano United States Attorney for the District of Arizona. In this post, she dealt with homeland terrorism issues, and participated in the investigation into the bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995, which caused the deaths of 168 people. In 1998 she was appointed Arizona Attorney General, and her mandate focused on issues of consumer protection and the general improvement of the application of the law. She continued in this post until 2002, when she was elected as Governor of Arizona with 46% of the vote, beating the Republican Jane Dee Hull, who took 45%.

Napolitano was one of the speakers at the 2004 Democratic Convention, at a time when her name was one of the ones that was being mooted as a possible candidate for the vice-presidency of the candidacy of John Kerry, who finally opted for John Edwards. In November 2005, the influential magazine *Time* named her as one of five best governors in the USA, and in the same year she also became vice-president of the National Governors Association, of which she became president in 2006. In this post her work was vitally important for the creation of the Public Security Forces Program and the Homeland Security Council.

That same year she was re-elected as Governor of Arizona, where she became a public authority on immigration-related issues, and set up one of the first country's domestic security strategies. Napolitano opened the first state centre against terrorism and she has been a pioneer in the coordination of tasks relating to domestic security on federal, state and local levels.

In 2006, her long career in public administration was acknowledged when she was awarded the Woodrow Wilson Prize for Public Service. In February 2006, Janet Napolitano was appointed by the White House to the project "8 in '08", comprised of a group of eight women politicians with a chance of participating in the 2008 presidential race.

SUSAN RICE

United States Ambassador to the United Nations

Susan Elizabeth Rice was chosen by President Obama to represent and strengthen US presence in the United Nations. Rice's past declarations have now acquired a new dimension, given that the new voice of the USA in United Nations has spoken out against the war in Iraq and has also spoken in favour of greater direct action in the African conflict in Darfur.

Born in Washington D.C. on 17 November 1964, Rice graduated in history from Stanford University in 1986, and in 1990 was awarded her doctorate in international relations from New College, Oxford.

During her long professional career, Rice has been foreign policy adviser for three candidates to the White House: Michael Dukakis in 1988, John Kerry in 2004 and Barack Obama in 2008.

In the 1990s, Rice worked for eight years in Bill Clinton's Administration, beginning at the National Security Council from 1993 to 1997, as Director for International Organisations and Peacekeeping between 1993 and 1995, and as Special Assistant to the president and Director for African Affairs between 1995 and 1997. In Bill Clinton's second term of office, he appointed her Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, a post she held from 1987 to 2001.

Following her experience in the Clinton Administration, Rice began work at the Brookings Institution as a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development Programme. Though her post does not have a ministerial level, it does have the status of cabinet-rank.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

RAHM I. EMANUEL

White House Chief of Staff

Rahm Israel Emanuel was born in Chicago on 29 November 1959. In 1981 he graduated from Sarah Lawrence College, and four years later obtained a Masters in Language and Communication from Northwestern University. During his student years, his early interest in politics led him to join David Robinson's campaign to become congressman for Chicago.

In 1984, Emanuel worked on Paul Simon's electoral campaign for the US Senate. In 1988 he was the National Director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and was a fund-raising adviser during Richard M. Delay's electoral campaign which led Delay to win the post of Mayor of Chicago one year later. In 1991, he came into contact with Bill Clinton during the electoral pre-campaign for the 1992 presidential elections; by that time, Emanuel was very successfully directing the campaign's funding committee. Following Clinton's victory in the presidential elections, Rahm Emanuel was appointed Policy Adviser and later on Senior Adviser to the President for Policy and Strategy, from 1996 to 1998. In 1998 he left the White House to work on the team of Wasserstein Perella on Wall Street, one of the main donors to the Democrats. Since then he has maintained good relations with Wall Street's financial elite. In the year 2000, Clinton appointed him to the Board of Directors of Freddie Mac, a post he left one year later on commencing his bid to become a congressman.

In November 2002, Emanuel was elected Congressman for the 5th District of Illinois, a post he held until gaining his current position as Chief of Staff of the White House. During this period, in 2006 Nancy Pelosi appointed him Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in the elections that returned power to the Democratic Party in the US Congress. After this victory he was elected Chairman of the Democratic Caucus. His active participation in the 2008 presidential elections began in April 2006, when he publicly declared his support for the candidacy of Hillary Clinton, though he changed his mind after discovering that his friend Barack Obama was also running for president. In June 2008, Emanuel finally went over to the camp of the Illinois Senator, whom he accompanied during the entire electoral campaign.

Rahm Emanuel was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the White House on 20 January 2009. Though this post does not have a ministerial level, it does have the status of cabinet-rank. Emanuel is an influential member of the group of congressmen the New Democratic Coalition, and is a personal friend of President Obama and the advisor David Axelrod.

JAMES L. JONES

National Security Advisor

Born in Kansas on 19 December 1943, James Logan Jones spent his youth and education in France, where he studied at the American School of Paris. On returning to the United States, he graduated in 1966 from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

In 1967 he was made Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps, and after completing his military training in Virginia, was sent to the front in Vietnam, where he was promoted to First Lieutenant one year later. After returning to the United States and obtaining the rank of Captain, he was posted to Okinawa, Japan. Back again in the US, he settled in Washington D.C., where he worked as liaison officer between the Marine Corps and United States Senate (1979-1984), during which time his superior was John McCain. In 1987, after attending the National War College, he began to work as an aide to the commandant of the Marine Corps. One year later he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. After the 1991 Gulf War, he served on the border between Iraq and Turkey, in an operation to provide emergency aid to the Kurdish population. In 1992 he was promoted to Brigadier General, and was made Deputy Director of the US European Command in Germany, from where he participated in humanitarian aid operations in Bosnia and Macedonia. In 1996 he was promoted to Lieutenant General, and one year later he was appointed Military Assistant to the Defence Secretary William Cohen.

James Jones was commandant of the Marine Corps from 1999 to 2003, to later become Commandant of the US European Command and Supreme Commander of NATO, under the US presidency of George W. Bush, a post that he held until 2006. One year later he moved to the reserve forces, from where he presided over the Independent Commission into the Security Forces in Iraq, a commission created by US Congress to investigate the capacities of the Iraqi army and police. In his report, presented to Congress in September 2007, Jones highlighted the existence of grave deficiencies in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi National Police.

Following the resignation of Robert Zoellick as Deputy Secretary of State, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offered Jones the post of number two the State Department, but Jones turned down the offer. In November 2007, Condoleezza Rice appointed him Head Special Envoy for Middle East Security.

In December 2008, President elect Obama appointed James Jones his National Security Adviser, a post for which he was sworn in a few weeks later, taking over from Stephen Hadley. Currently, Jones is also head of the Institute for 21st Century Energy, he is on the Board of Directors of Atlantic

Council of the United States and is also affiliated to the US Chamber of Commerce. Respected by both Democrats and by Republicans, Jones has a personal friendship with John McCain, and has an office in the White House, though he does not have a seat in the president's cabinet.

PETER R. ORSZAG

Director of the Office of Management and Budget of the White House

Born in Boston on 16 December 1968, Peter Richard Orszag held the post of Director of the Congressional Budget Office between January 2007 and December 2008, before Barack Obama appointed him as the new Chief of the Office of Management and Budget of the White House. During his mandate as head of the Congressional Budget Office, the agency broadened its influence to include areas such as climate change and medical care.

Orszag graduated in Economics from Princeton University in 1991, and obtained his doctorate from the London School of Economics in 1997. As an academic, he was Deputy Director of Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution.

During his career as an economist, Orszag was Senior Adviser on the Council of Economic Advisers to the president (1995-1996), and Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (1997-1998), both posts held during the Clinton Administration. Peter Orszag is the author and co-author of numerous publications on economics and social policy. Though his post does not have a ministerial level, it does have the status of cabinet-rank.

LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS

Director of the National Economic Council

Born in New Haven, Connecticut, on 30 November 1954, Lawrence Henry Summers – who already had eight years of experience in the Clinton Administration and a long academic history – is the economist Obama has chosen to direct the National Economic Council. With his widespread experience in public administration, Summers was a key member of Barack Obama's economic team in the Democratic campaign. Summers graduated in Economics in 1975, and in 1982 he was awarded his doctorate from Harvard University. He began teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and in 1983 joined the teaching staff at Harvard, at the age of only 28. Since then he has alternated teaching with his budding political career.

In 1982 and 1983 he formed part of the team to President Ronald Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers, and in 1988 he was an economic adviser for the campaign of Michael Dukakis, Democratic candidate for the presidency. In 1991 he left Harvard and began working at the World Bank, where he was Vice-President for Economic Affairs and Chief Economist for the bank until 1993. In this last post he was a member of the World Bank Loans Committee, in which he played a key role in the design of aid strategies for different countries.

In 1987 he was the first social scientist to receive the Allen T. Waterman Award from the National Science Foundation, and in 1983 he received the John Bates Clark Medal, awarded by the American Economic Association for his exceptional contribution to economic thought.

In April 1993, he began working for the Clinton Administration as Undersecretary for International Affairs of the Treasury, and in 1995 he was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, the No. 2 in the department after the Secretary Robert Rubin. In this post, Summers was responsible for matters of international policy, tax policy and the financial system. In 1999 Summers replaced Rubin as Treasury Secretary until George W. Bush's victory over Al Gore in January 2001. He then returned to academic life as President of Harvard University (2001-2006).

DAVID AXELROD

Senior Advisor to the President

A skilled and intelligent political strategist, David Axelrod has become one of the people closest to President Barack Obama as political adviser and head of the electoral campaign that led the senator for Illinois to the White House. Born in New York on 22 February 1955, Axelrod graduated from the University of Chicago in 1977. Some of the high points of his academic career include his post as Adjunct Professor of Communication Studies at Northwestern University, and his teaching work as Professor of Politics and Media at Harvard University, the University of Chicago and the University of Pennsylvania.

David Axelrod entered the world of politics in the 1984 elections, working as Communications Director for Senator Paul Simon. Prior to that he had worked eight years as a reporter on the *Chicago Tribune*, where he covered national, state and local politics.

Since 1988 Axelrod has been an adviser in the area of communications and politics, with a wide experience as communications strategist in more than 150 local, state and national campaigns. One of these was when he worked side-by-side with Harold Washington, the first African-American mayor of Chicago, for his re-election in 1987. Axelrod has also worked for the Democratic candidates John Edwards and Hillary Clinton.

His relations with Barack Obama date back to 1992, five years before the future president entered the General Assembly of Illinois. In 2004, after Obama had become senator for the state of Illinois, Axelrod had been of key importance in Obama's victory over six other Democratic candidates in the campaign to become senator in November of that same year. In 2006 he worked as chief political adviser to Rahm Emanuel, National Director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, for the elections to the House of Representatives in which the Democratic Party won 31 seats. In 2008 David Axelrod joined the Obama-Biden Transition Project for the presidential race to the White House.

Sources:
CIDOB Foundation Biographies of political leaders
BBC Obama's government team profiles

Produced by: CIDOB

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Historical chronology of the United States of America.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

Historical chronology of the United States of America

1497
John Cabot, Italian explorer and sailor, reaches Terra Nova on a mission commissioned by the king of England.

1513
Ponce de Leon, a Spanish conquistador, lands at Florida and explores much of the peninsula's coasts.

1565
The city of San Agustín (now Florida) was the first permanent Spanish and European settlement in North America. The Spaniards expanded southwards and towards the centre of the future country. The arrival of colonising settlers led to a decline in native populations (which initially totalled more than 2 million), particularly owing to the spread of diseases.

1570
The Iroquois League is founded by five Native American tribes from the south of lakes Ontario and Erie, and gains power during the 17th and 18th centuries, trading in furs with the British, and becoming their allies to fight against the French between 1754 and 1763.

1585
The English explorer Walter Raleigh founds the first British colony in Roanoke, North Carolina. A few years later, this first settlement would disappear.

1604
French colonists found a settlement on Mount Desert Island, Maine. The French later expanded from Quebec, following the Mississippi, down to the Gulf of Mexico in 1682.

1607
After two failed attempts in 1585 and 1587, the first permanent British settlement is set up in Jamestown, Virginia, headed by Captain Edward Wingfield.

1609
The Spanish found Santa Fe, in what is now New Mexico, as the northernmost capital of the colonial empire.

1619
The first slaves disembark on the coast of Jamestown, Virginia. This was the beginning of the arrival of the first black slaves from Africa into America. Hundreds of thousands of Africans were sold as slaves to work on the North American cotton, rice and tobacco plantations, especially in the southern colonies. In 1790, there were 700,000 slaves in the colony of Virginia.

1620
The Pilgrim Fathers and the English Puritans arrive on board the ship *Mayflower* and found the colony of Plymouth, Massachusetts. They are followed by other Puritan groups, and 13 colonies are set up, which are known as the cradle of the United States, between the Atlantic and the Appalachian mountain chain. There are also Dutch, German and Swedish settlements and scattered groups of Italians, Portuguese and Spaniards. After 1680, immigration of Scots and Irish would become the main source of immigration into the 13 colonies: Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Georgia.

1624
The Dutch found the colony of New Amsterdam, now New York.

1630
The Puritans found Boston in the colony of Massachusetts.

1643
The New England Confederation is constituted, based on the colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven.

1664
New Amsterdam passes into the hands of the British, and its name changes to New York.

1718
French settlers found New Orleans near the mouth of the Mississippi, in French Louisiana.

1763
British colonies reach a total population of one-and-a-half million, much higher than the 65,000 inhabitants of the French colonies or the 2,500 of the Spanish colonies above the Rio Grande. After the Seven Years' War with France (1756-1763), the British win and control Canada, the Great Lakes region and the territory to the east of the Mississippi River. The British government attempts to curb claims by settlers over land to the west of the river. The British government's new revenue policy (the Sugar Act, 1764; the Currency Act, 1764; the Quartering Act, 1765; the Stamp Act, 1765 and the Townshend Acts, 1767) accentuates the division between the metropolis and colonies.

1764
French Louisiana becomes part of Spain's colonial empire following the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, which ends to the Seven Years' War.

1769
16 July
With the founding of the San Diego de Alcalá mission, Spain begins its expansion along the California coast with the construction of a network of missions.

1770
5 March
The Boston Massacre: what began with people throwing snowballs at soldiers ends with the deaths of three Bostonians. The incident is used to demonstrate British cruelty and tyranny, and represents one of the main reasons why the British Parliament withdraws the Townshend Acts, except for tea.

1773
The Boston Tea Party: after the British government grants the monopoly over tea exports to the East India Company, the colonist traders form a common front against the British with the pro-independence movements.

1774
The British Parliament enacts a series of coercive laws, such as the deployment of British troops in Massachusetts and the closing of the port of Boston, threatening the city with ruin. This measure serves as a catalyst to turn the union of colonies against the metropolis; the First Continental Congress of Philadelphia is held in September-October and attended by the colonial representatives, who draw up a resolution stating that compliance with these laws is not required.

1775
After a clash between the British and settlers in Lexington, the Second Continental Congress meets, where members vote in favour of an armed uprising and the recruitment of militias. Colonel George Washington is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the American Revolutionary Forces. The publishing of the pamphlet *Common Sense*, which contrasts submission to the British throne with the right to liberty, helps to crystallise the idea of segregation.

1776
4 July
Thomas Jefferson, with the backing of Congress, proclaims the Declaration of Independence. A war breaks out with Great Britain that lasts until 1783, and America receives aid from France (with whom it has signed a Treaty of Alliance) partly thanks to the intervention of Benjamin Franklin, and partly to France's desire for revenge. Spain and the Netherlands also join the fight against Great Britain. Those loyal to the Crown are supported by the Iroquois Confederation and German mercenaries.

1777
The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union are approved, this is the first document of the United States government which draws up (albeit in an informal manner) a union between the 13 North American British colonies. The Confederation is constituted following the defeat of the British at the Battle of Yorktown in 1781.

1778
The Hawaiian Islands are discovered by Captain Cook, the British explorer and cartographer.

1781
The British general Cornwallis surrenders following the defeat by the colonies' troops in Yorktown.

Florida returns to Spanish control following the battle of Pensacola, in which the British troops are defeated.

1783
The Treaty of Paris. The British accept the independence of the colonies.

1787
17 September
In Philadelphia, the Founding Fathers draft the United States Constitution, which comes into force the next year and replaces the Articles of Confederation.

1789
At the first meeting of Congress, George Washington is unanimously elected the first president of the United States.

1791
The Bill of Rights comes into force, consisting of the first 10 amendments to the Constitution, which limits the federal government and guarantees the peoples' rights and liberty.

1797
The federalist John Adams is sworn in as the second president of the United States, after winning the elections against Thomas Jefferson in 1796; Jefferson becomes his vice-president.

1800
Washington D.C. is founded as the country's capital city. Until that time, Philadelphia was the city from which the country was governed.

1801
Thomas Jefferson is sworn in as president after defeating his predecessor in the elections in 1800, winning 73 electoral votes to Adams' 65.

1803
Napoleon forces Spain to return the territory of Louisiana to France. As a new war with Britain is imminent, and he needs to fill the treasury's coffers, Napoleon sells Louisiana to the United States for 60 million francs.

February
In the case Marbury vs. Madison, Supreme Court judge John Marshall establishes for the first time the right of the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of any law from Congress or from the state legislatures.

1808
The international slave trade is abolished, though slavery continues in many states in the south and the east.

1812-1814
President James Madison declares war on Britain owing to the effects of British restrictions on North American trade during the Napoleonic wars. The war ends with the Treaty of Ghent (1814) and represents a definitive break between the United States and Great Britain.

1819
Spain cedes Florida to the United States.

1820
The Missouri Compromise succeeds in freezing the conflict between those in favour of slavery and abolitionists, thereby allowing slavery to continue in the southern states.

1823
The Monroe Doctrine is declared by President James Monroe, by which the United States refuses to tolerate any future enlargement of European domains in America.

1829
Andrew Jackson becomes the seventh president of the United States. He gains widespread popular support and becomes the true founder of the Democratic Party. He was a champion of the spreading of suffrage and the suppression of the Electoral College. Jackson occupied the presidency until 1837, enabling the popular election of the president and vice-president.

1830
Congress passes the Indian Removal Act to move Indian tribes to the west of the Mississippi. During the 19th century, Indian resistance is overcome by mass immigration of Europeans spreading westwards.

1835
The French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville writes *Democracy in America*.

1836
Texas becomes independent from Mexico following the defeat of its president, General Antonio López de Santa Ana. In 1845, Texas joins the Union.

The 1840s
Frances Wright, a champion of women's rights, visits the United States. A movement in favour of women's rights is founded, led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton.

1846-1848
War breaks out with Mexico and ends with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, through which the United States acquires, for 15 million dollars, large expenses of Mexican land, including what are now the states of California and New Mexico, where a large number of settlers had made their homes.

1848
The discovery of gold in California leads to the first great migration of the population westwards. This migratory movement is repeated with new gold strikes in Nevada and Colorado (1858), Montana and Wyoming (the 1860s), and Dakota (the 1870s).

1852
Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is published, a novel that tells of the reality of slavery in the United States.

1854
The Republican Party is officially founded.

1856
For the first time in a US presidential election, three candidates have the chance to become president, breaking the bipartisan dynamic that had persisted since independence. The winner was the Democrat James Buchanan, who held the presidency until 1861.

1857
The Supreme Court's decision on the case Dred Scott vs. Stanford represents a pro-slavery stance.

1860
6 November
The Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln is elected president with 180 electoral votes as against the 123 votes of his rivals.

1861
Eleven southern pro-slavery states (South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee and North Carolina), progressively separate from the Union and form the Confederate States of America, led by Jefferson Davis.

12 April
The Civil War or War of Secession (1861-1865) breaks out between the Confederates and the northern states.

1862
20 May
The Homestead Act is passed, which enables applicants to obtain between 65 and 260 hectares of disused land outside the original 13 colonies. The aim is to liberalise the possession of land.

1863
President Lincoln makes public the Emancipation Proclamation, by which slaves are granted their freedom.
1 to 3 July
The Battle of Gettysburg takes place, in which the Union army wins an important victory over the Confederation.

1865

9 April

The southern general Robert E. Lee surrenders to the unionist general Ulysses S. Grant, bringing the war to an end.

15 April

Six days after the Confederate defeat, Lincoln is assassinated.

December

Congress ratifies the 13th amendment to the Constitution, by which slavery is abolished.

1867

The Reconstruction Act commences the process of rebuilding the country, though in some southern states new forms of racial discrimination begin to appear.

The United States purchases Alaska from Russia for 7.2 million dollars; in 1959 it becomes the 49th state of the Union.

1869

The transcontinental railway is opened, joining the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States.

1876

25-26 June

Led by Sitting Bull, the Sioux and Cheyenne tribes defeat US troops led by Colonel Custer at the Battle of Little Bighorn, Montana.

1877

Crazy Horse is killed and his people, the Oglala Sioux, are deported to Missouri.

1890

The Pan-American Union (now the Organisation of American States) is founded, with the aim of seeking peaceful solutions to disputes and consolidating economic links on the American continent.

29 December

The Sioux are defeated at Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Various laws are passed in an attempt to improve (Dawes Law, 1887) or protect (Indigenous Reorganisation Law, 1934) the lot of the autochthonous plains communities, but without success.

1898

July

Hawaii is annexed, to become the 50th state of the Union in 1959.

10 December

Following a short war against Spain, and through the Treaty of Paris, United States obtains Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines and Cuba.

1901

14 September

President William McKinley, who had held office since 1987, is assassinated. He is replaced by his vice-president, the Republican Theodore Roosevelt.

1903

16 June

Henry Ford founds the *Ford Motor Company*.

3 November

Following Panama's independence from Colombia, the new country cedes a strip of land 16 km wide to the United States to build a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Completed in 1914, the canal is administrated by the US until the end of 1999.

1905

The first International Workers of the World meeting is held in Chicago.

1909

12 February

A number of intellectuals found the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

1917

6 April

Following different attempts to stay out of the First World War, the United States intervenes in the conflict after declaring war on Germany, which had sunk several US ships during its campaign of attacking Allied vessels in the Atlantic.

1918

8 January

President Woodrow Wilson declares his 14 Points, which include innovative proposals such as the creation of a league of nations, the freedom of navigation, the reduction of obstacles to free trade and the reduction of armaments, as well as the right to decide of occupied nations.

October

A total of 1.75 million US soldiers are deployed in France during the final offensive against Germany.

The US Senate rejects the country's candidacy to become a member of the League of Nations, an organisation promoted by President Wilson. This represents a return to pre-First World War isolationism.

1820-1920

More than 36 million immigrants arrive in the United States, most of them disembarking on Ellis Island, the federal immigration centre of the port of New York. The First World War, the immigration restriction laws (1921 and 1924) and the impact of the Great Depression drastically reduce the flow of migration.

1920

The 18th amendment is passed, which paves the way for the Dry Law (1920-1933) which bans the manufacture, sale and transport of alcohol; and the 19th amendment, which gives women the right to vote.

1924

Congress gives indigenous peoples the right to citizenship.

1929-1933

On 24 October 1929, Black Thursday takes place: the collapse of the stock market on Wall Street unleashes an economic recession, the Great Depression, with the loss of 13 million jobs. Agriculture, which was affected during the 1920s by customs policies and the world production surplus, is badly hit.

1932

8 November

The Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt is elected president with 57.4% of the vote. He maintains the post until his death in 1945, becoming the only candidate to fight and win four presidential elections (1932, 1936, 1940 and 1944).

1933-1936

President Roosevelt launches a state intervention programme for the economy, the New Deal, with specific measures for banking and financing, unemployment, agriculture and industry. Among the different laws passed is the Social Security Law of 1935, through which a state-run payment system is created for the poor, unemployed and disabled.

1940

More than 2.5 million people emigrate from the plains states (Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming), blighted by drought, windstorms and dust storms and the ruin of their farms. Some 200,000 move to California.

1941

7 December

Japan's attack on the US fleet in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, causes the deaths of 2,388 soldiers, sailors and civilians, and brings to an end the isolationism and neutrality the US had shown toward the Second World War. The following day, the United States declares war on Japan, and three days later, Germany and Italy declare war on the United States.

1945

4-11 February

The Yalta Conference takes place between Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill and F.D. Roosevelt. They agree on the division of Germany, the intervention of the USSR in the war against Japan in the Pacific, and its participation in the future United Nations Organisation.

16 July

First atomic bomb tests held at Trinity Site, New Mexico.

16 July to 2 August

The Potsdam Conference is held between Joseph Stalin, Clement Atlee and Harry Truman (the US President following the death of F.D. Roosevelt on 12 April). New borders are agreed for Germany and Poland.

6 and 9 August

The United States drops two atom bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Over 100,000 people die in the nuclear attack. Japan surrenders six days later.

The end of the Second World War heralds the beginning of the Cold War with the USSR, in which once again the differences between the two nations are manifested, differences that had been set aside during the conflict against the Axis powers. The United States carries out a policy of containment against Soviet expansion.

24 October 1945

The United Nations Charter is ratified by 51 countries, including the United States, which consequently occupies a permanent position on the Security Council of the new United Nations Organisation, which replaces the failed League of Nations.

1946

4 July

The United States grants independence to the Philippines. Meanwhile, Guam and Puerto Rico acquire the status of protectorates.

1947

The Truman Doctrine commences, providing aid to countries that feel threatened by communism (initially Greece and Turkey).

1948

30 April

The United States and 20 other states on the American continent (many of whom are members of the Pan-American Organisation, created in 1890) sign the Charter of the Organisation of American States, the first step toward the creation of the OAS.

2 November

The winner of the presidential elections is President Harry S. Truman, with 49.6% of the popular vote, beating the Republican candidate Thomas E. Dewey.

The US government begins to implement the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of European economies (with aid totalling 13 billion dollars between 1948 and 1951) and to prevent Soviet influence on Western Europe's democracies.

1949

4 April

United States and 11 other countries found the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

1950-1953

The US Army intervenes in the Korean War against the troops of China and North Korea. The war ends with the Panmunjon armistice on 27 July 1953, which establishes the 38th parallel as the border between the two Koreas.

1950-1956

The period of McCarthyism – the "witch hunt" initiated by Senator Joseph McCarthy against suspected Communists. The first victims of the persecution were Hollywood actors, directors and scriptwriters, many of whom were forced to declare before the Un-American Activities Committee.

1951

1 September

The United States, Australia and New Zealand sign a military alliance agreement, the ANZUS, mainly as a result of the threat that the Korean War would spread throughout Asia.

1952

General Dwight D. Eisenhower presents himself as the Republican candidate for the presidential elections against the Democrat Adlai Stevenson, whom he defeats twice (1952 and 1956).

1954

Racial segregation in schools becomes unconstitutional and is declared illegal by the Supreme Court.

1955

1 December

The black population of Montgomery, Alabama begins a bus boycott due to segregation. The protest ends on 20 December 1956.

1957

5 January

The Eisenhower Doctrine is declared, by which the United States may opt to use armed force in response to an imminent attack on its allies. Furthermore, all countries opposing communism will receive different kinds of aid. The initiative represents a response to the political void left by the colonial empires of France and Great Britain, especially in the Middle East, and which is being taken advantage of by the USSR.

1960

8 November

Democrat candidate John Fitzgerald Kennedy is elected president following a narrow victory over the Republican Richard Nixon by 49.7% of the vote to 49.6%.

1961

April

Cuban exiles organised and funded by Washington fail in their attempt to invade Cuba, at the Bay of Pigs.

1962

7 February

The United States imposes an embargo on Cuba which takes the form of a commercial, economic and financial blockade on the Caribbean country. The embargo is made concrete in law in 1992 and 1995.

October

The Cuban missile crisis takes place, triggered by the US government's denouncement of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba. After ordering a blockade of the island and denouncing the USSR before the UN, days of great international tension pass in which there is a real threat that nuclear war may break out. The USSR withdraws its nuclear weapons from Cuba in exchange for the dismantling of US missiles in Turkey.

1963

28 August

A march on Washington that culminates with the speech that features the phrase "I have a dream…" by the reverend and African-American rights activist Martin Luther King, speaking before a crowd of 200,000 people. The event is organised by various civil rights, labour and religious groups under the slogan "work, justice and peace".

22 November

President Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas. Lyndon Johnson, the new president, achieves various legislative victories in favour of education and health and against poverty and social exclusion.

1964

2 July

The Civil Rights Law of 1964 legally bans discrimination for reasons of race, colour, religion or nationality.

3 November

In the 1964 elections, the Democrat Lyndon Johnson wins a crushing victory, with 61.1% of the popular vote against the Republican Barry Goldwater.

1964-1973

The United States intervenes in the Vietnam War, deploying a total of 500,000 troops. More than 50,000 Americans die in the conflict, and over 4.5 million Vietnamese.

1965

21 February

Malcolm X, a leader of the African-American community, is assassinated in the Audubon Ballroom in Manhattan, during a meeting of the Organisation of Afro-American Unity.

1966

30 June

Betty Friedan and 27 other professionals found the National Organisation of Women (NOW).

1967

More than 200,000 people demonstrate against the Vietnam War in San Francisco and New York.

1968

4 April

Martin Luther King is assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee. After his death, violent protests break out in more than 100 cities throughout the country.

5 November

Amid public opposition to the Vietnam War, Republican candidate Richard Nixon is elected president with 43.4% of the popular vote compared to the 42.7% of the Democrat Hubert Humphrey.

The American Indian Movement (AIM) is founded.

1969

20 July

The American Neil Armstrong becomes the first person to walk on the moon.

August

Woodstock Festival is held in New York, the symbol of the counterculture movement, pacifism and the hippy era.

The SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreements begin in Helsinki, Finland, between the United States and the Soviet Union. They continue until 1979, seeking to limit the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to curb the arms race.

1970

2 December

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is set up as an independent federal organisation.

1972

February

President Nixon pays an historic trip to the Peoples' Republic of China, where he has a meeting with Mao Tse Tung.

22 May

The Moscow Summit between Nixon and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The two leaders sign the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty (ABM) to limit the number of ABM systems used to defend themselves from missiles with nuclear warheads.

7 November

Nixon is re-elected with 60.7% of the popular vote and 520 of the 537 electoral votes, beating the Democrat George McGovern, who only succeeds in gaining more votes than the outgoing president in Massachusetts and Washington D.C.

1974

8 August

Nixon announces his resignation from the presidency over the Watergate scandal, which involves political espionage, bribery and the illegal use of funds. He is replaced by Gerald Ford.

1976

2 November

The Democrat Jimmy Carter is elected president after a close-run victory over President Gerald Ford.

1978

17 September

The Camp David agreement is signed between the Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, promoted by President Carter, which represents the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East. The agreement is achieved as part of the Carter Plan for the Middle East, which seeks a solution to the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries.

1979

The hostage crisis. In protest at the US government's refusal to hand over the ex-Shah of Persia to Iran, a group of radical students invade the US Embassy in Teheran and take 66 people hostage. The crisis lasts for 444 days, and has a negative impact on Carter's popularity, and dominates the presidential campaign of 1980. The hostages are freed on the first day of Ronald Reagan's presidency.

1980

4 November

The Republican Ronald Reagan is elected president with 50.7% of the votes compared with 41% of President Jimmy Carter. Reagan adopts an anti-Communist foreign policy (funding the Contra in Nicaragua with the profits made by the sale of arms to Iran; the invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983; the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe) and a tax reduction that leads the country into a major budget deficit.

1984

6 November

Ronald Reagan is re-elected, obtaining a historic victory with 58.8% of the vote and 525 of the 538 electoral votes available, beating the Democrat Walter Mondale, who was vice-president under Carter.

1986

28 January

The space shuttle *Challenger* explodes shortly after takeoff.

15 April

The US Army bombs Libya, after accusing the North African country of being behind the bombing of a discotheque in Germany that was frequented by American soldiers.

November

The Irangate scandal: it is revealed that the profits from sales of arms to Iran were used illegally to finance the Nicaraguan Contra forces.

1987

8 December

President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader Mijail Gorbachev sign the INF Treaty (*Intermediate-Range Nuclear*

Forces) which eliminates ballistic missiles as well as cruise, nuclear and conventional missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres.

1988

8 November

George H. W. Bush, vice-president under Reagan, is elected president with 53.4% of the votes compared with 45.6% of the Democrat candidate Michael Dukakis.

1989

December

US troops invade Panama, leading to the resignation of the Panamanian government and the arrest of the president, General Manuel Noriega, an ex-CIA informer who is accused of drug trafficking.

1991

January-February

The US Army intervenes in the war with Iraq to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, following the Iraqi invasion of the Emirate in summer 1990. What becomes known as the "Gulf War" ends with the retreat of the invading army from Kuwait.

31 July

Signing of the START I treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between the USA and the USSR; the treaty limits the numbers of different types of nuclear vehicles and warheads for the two countries.

1992

3 November

Bill Clinton of the Democratic Party is elected president with 43% of the popular vote, compared with 37.4% for President George Bush and 18.9% for the independent candidate Ross Perot.

5 December

US intervention in Somalia. Support from the incipient terrorist organisation Al Qaeda leads to the failure of the intervention.

1993

3 January

Signing of the START II treaty, between President George W.H. Bush and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and which bans the use of ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) with multiple warheads.

26 February

A car bomb in the underground car park of New York's World Trade Center causes the deaths of six people.

17 November

Congress passes the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which enables the creation of a free trade area between the United States, Canada and Mexico.

1994

The files are closed on various investigations into the financial dealings of the Clintons when the president was governor of Arkansas (the *Whitewater* controversy) and others involving sexual harassment.

8 November

The election results in a Republican majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives for the first time since 1955.

1995

1 January

As envisaged in the 1994 Marrakech Agreement, the World Trade Organisation is created, with 76 member states, including the United States, one of its main sponsors.

19 April

A bomb explodes in Oklahoma outside a governmental building, killing more than 160 people. The men responsible, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, had anti-governmental views and were attempting to avenge themselves for the action taken one year previously by state forces during the siege of Waco, which caused the deaths of 18 members of an ultra-religious sect.

1996

25 June

A bomb explodes in military barracks at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia. 19 US soldiers die in the attack.

5 November

Clinton is re-elected with 49.2% of the popular vote, defeating the Republican candidate Bob Dole, who only obtains 40.7%.

1998

7 August

Two bombs explode at the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, causing more than 200 deaths. The terrorist organisation Al Qaeda claims responsibility for the attacks.

1999

12 February

Clinton is absolved of perjury, thus ending his impeachment trial which began after he allegedly lied over his sexual relations with the intern Monica Lewinsky.

24 March

The United States actively intervenes in the NATO bombings of the Serbian army in Kosovo.

2000

7 November

The Republican George W. Bush is elected president in a hard-fought presidential election, beating the Democrat Al Gore, even though Gore had won nearly half a million votes more than Bush.

12 October
A vessel filled with explosives is launched against the destroyer *USS Cole* in Yemen, killing 17 US troops in the conflagration.

2001

11 September
Four commercial passenger airplanes are hijacked in the United States and used as suicide vehicles against different symbols of the country. Two of them crash into the World Trade Center in New York, one into the Pentagon in Washington DC and another in a field in Pennsylvania which did not reach its destination. The organisation Al Qaeda claims responsibility for the attacks, in which more than 3,000 people die, in what is the worst attack on the United States since the bombing of Pearl Harbour.

8 October
The United States embarks on a massive campaign against Afghanistan, and later on sends special troops to help the forces opposing the Taliban regime and to find Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda and the organiser of the 11 September attacks.

October
The Senate passes the Patriot Act, which gives the government greater powers to detain terrorist suspects, listen in on communications systems and tackle money laundering. Bush signs a directive ordering that suspected terrorists may be tried in military courts.

2 December
The US energy giant Enron is declared bankrupt after the company's irregular accounting comes to light.

2002

29 January
In his State of the Union address, Bush labels Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil".

21 July
The greatest accounting fraud in the history of the United States is uncovered, committed by the telecommunications giant WorldCom.

25 November
The Department of Homeland Security is created, one of the largest in the federal government, which has the function of protecting the country from terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

2003

1 February
The space shuttle *Columbia* disintegrates with seven astronauts on board when it was passing through the atmosphere during its return from a mission.

20 March
The United States begins its military campaign in Iraq. The aim of the invasion is to defeat the country's president Saddam Hussein, who is accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi War produces mass demonstrations against the invasion around the world, damaging the reputation of President George W. Bush.

2004

April
A scandal breaks out over the pictures showing the abuse of Iraqi prisoners under US custody in Abu Grahib prison in Iraq.

July
A Senate report reveals that the United States and her allies went to war with Iraq based on erroneous information.

2 November
George W. Bush is re-elected with 50.7% of the vote, compared with 48.3% of the Democrat John Kerry.

2005

1 March
The Romper vs. Simmons judgment: the US Supreme Court decides that the death penalty for crimes committed by minors is unconstitutional.

August
Hundreds of people die in the wake of hurricane *Katrina*; New Orleans is flooded.

2006

March
Congress renews the Patriot Act after an intense debate over its impact on civil liberties and the government's commitment to restricting the obtaining of information.

April -May
Millions of immigrants and support groups demonstrate against plans to criminalise irregular immigrants.

7 November
The Democratic Party wins control of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld resigns.

2007

January
Bush announces a new strategy in Iraq, with the deployment of 21,000 extra troops to strengthen security in Baghdad.

19 April
President Bush submits to his NATO allies his plans to develop a long-range antimissile defence system together with Poland and the Czech Republic.

27 November
The Middle East Peace Conference is held in Annapolis, with the aim of revitalising the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

2008

4 March

John McCain, Senator for Arizona, wins the Republican candidacy for the presidency.

3 June

The Senator for Illinois, Barack Obama, wins the Democratic candidacy for the presidency after defeating Hillary Clinton in the last primaries, held in South Dakota and Montana.

September

Lehman Brothers, the largest investment bank on Wall Street, goes into bankruptcy, with other major banks following it in its demise.

October

After first rejecting it, the United States Congress gives the green light to the 700,000 million dollar financial plan to rescue certain financial organisations.

4 November

Barack Obama wins the presidential elections and becomes the first African-American president of the United States. With 52.9% of the popular vote, the Democratic candidate is the most-voted in 28 states; the Republican John McCain wins more votes than Obama in 22 states.

2009

20 January

Barack Obama is sworn in as the 44th president of the United States.

Sources:

Revista DCIDOB núm. 107. Estats Units, entre el poder i la seducció. Fundació CIDOB, 2009.

Produced by: CIDOB

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

The foreign policy of the United States.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

The foreign policy of the United States

During the 20th century, no other country influenced international relations as decisively as the United States of America did. The values of liberty, equality, democracy, justice and progress were the foundations that orientated the USA's early foreign policy as from the Declaration of Independence in 1776. In effect, the ideals based on economic and personal freedom, liberal democracy and constitutional Republicanism have underpinned the essential principles of US foreign policy up until the present.

The USA's participation in world affairs has developed gradually in accordance with international events, and in line with its own national interests, to shape a foreign policy with a profound sense of morality founded on the conviction of the USA's singularity, or "manifest destiny". As can be seen during the course of the country's history, the values that have permanently guided US diplomacy have been used to justify dissimilar foreign policies, ranging from "isolationism" to "commitment" (Kissinger, 1996).

FROM ISOLATIONIST NATION TO WORLD POWER

Isolationism shaped US foreign policy from independence until the early 20th century, as demonstrated by US neutrality towards the wars in Europe, with the argument that the country should first consolidate democracy within its own borders, in order to later act as a "a beacon of liberty" for the rest of humanity. This neutrality towards events in Europe contrasted with an interventionism toward its own continent, expressed in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, with its maxim "America for the Americans".

The First World War changed this approach by stimulating a moral responsibility to defend fundamental US values. In the eyes of then president **Woodrow Wilson** (1913- 1921), there was no difference between freedom for the USA and freedom for the world, and US entry into the European conflict in 1917 helped to bring about an Allied victory. The Wilsonian idealism expressed in his "Fourteen Points" proposed a "collective security" instrumented by a League of Nations, a visionary initiative that neither his own country nor the European nations on the other side of the Atlantic were prepared to bring into being. At the end of the war, the USA returned to isolationism, at the same time as it enjoyed economic prosperity between the wars under the mandates of Harding (1921- 1923), Coolidge (1923- 1929) and Hoover (1929-1933).

It was **Franklin Delano Roosevelt** (1933-1945) who brought an end to isolationism as the basic principle of US foreign policy by setting the US into the path of international commitment, which took the form of the country's entry into the Second World War following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. While he implemented the "New Deal" to tackle the consequences of the economic crisis of the 1930s, he also developed a policy of "good neighbourliness" based on economic and political cooperation between the United States and the nations of South America, at the same time as acting as the architect of the post-war international agreements. The foundations for the US to establish itself as a military, political and economic power on a world level were now in place.

FROM ICY CONFLICT TO THE "UNIPOLAR MOMENT"

After the Second World War was over, it was imperative that a new world order be constructed. US post-war policy was based on international cooperation and collective security within the framework of the United Nations, an organisation inspired by Wilson and created in 1945. However, the unity of the victors was soon broken, giving rise to the bipolarism that characterised world politics during the Cold War years: two areas of influence with their centres of power in Washington and Moscow, and with the whole planet as their battleground. For US diplomacy, the ideological clash between communism and capitalism was justified not only from a geopolitical point of view, but especially in the defence of the essential principles of its foreign policy.

This was the view of the government of **Harry Truman** (1945-1953), which set in motion the "policy of containment" to curb communist expansion, within a general framework that became known as the "Truman Doctrine" in 1947. This approach defined the conflict between capitalists and Communists as a struggle between "free peoples" and "totalitarian regimes" (Gaddis, 2005). In order to contain the enemy, military means were not sufficient; instead, economic and political aid to third countries in Europe and the Third World were essential. With this aim in mind, the "Marshall Plan" (1947) constituted a plan of economic aid to be used for rebuilding Europe through the consolidation of its respective capitalist economist and democratic systems. Meanwhile, the creation of NATO following communist expansion into Prague in 1948 highlighted the need for the United States to participate in the defence of the West by dealing with the power vacuum in Europe.

After the first years of the Cold War, characterised by great tension, a growing arms race between the two poles of power and the rise of new political leaders both in the US and in the USSR, another stage of the Cold War began, known as "peaceful coexistence". **Dwight Eisenhower** (1953-1960) succeeded Truman as US president and drew up a foreign policy strategy known as the "doctrine of massive reprisals". Under this doctrine, Washington threatened the USSR with the use of nuclear weapons in the event that it should adopt an aggressive foreign policy in its area of influence (Ambrose,

1985). However, in practice it represented a continuation of the policy of containment that was expressed in the agreements that brought an end to the Korean War (1953), the USA's non-intervention in the Indochina War (1945-1954), covert CIA actions in Central America, the creation of regional military agreements to contain communism, active diplomacy to prevent large-scale war following the Suez conflict (1956) and the promotion of the US space programme.

His successor, **J.F. Kennedy** (1961-1963) drew up a foreign policy based on the strategy of "flexible response" in contrast to the "massive reprisals" of his predecessor. During his time of office he authorised the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba (1961) and faced down the missile crisis on the island (1962); this was a critical moment in the history of US foreign policy, as it brought the two world powers to the brink of nuclear war. The beginning of the Vietnam War represented another landmark in Kennedy's brief presidency, as did the construction of one of the greatest symbols of the Cold War, the Berlin wall, or the "Wall of Shame", as the president himself called it. Meanwhile, Kennedy developed an active diplomacy in South America; unlike Truman and Eisenhower, who invested more in military than economic aid, Kennedy created the Alliance for Progress, a programme that granted 20 billion dollars to South American countries to modernise their economies as an incentive to containing communism.

While he promised to create a "Great Society", **Lyndon Johnson** (1963-1969) inherited from the Kennedy mandate (after Kennedy was assassinated in 1963) a great responsibility in the form of the Vietnam War. Johnson ordered constant bombardments of Hanoi and increased troop numbers on Asian soil without producing the expected results; however, US public opinion showed itself to be increasingly against the war. Meanwhile, given the fear of communist expansion, the US gave increased training to police and soldiers in Latin America, lending support to the coups d état that brought numerous authoritarian military governments to power in the region in the 1960s.

During the term of office of **Richard Nixon** (1969-1974), the internal consensus on which foreign policy was based was no longer as strong during the years after the war. As US supremacy on the international stage became weaker, Nixon was convinced that Wilsonian ideas should be blended with political realism to revitalise the USA's role in the world. The "Nixon Doctrine" – moulded by his influential Secretary of State Henry Kissinger – aspired to a new foreign policy adapted to a new international context. Far from being a return to isolationism, the new administration aimed to provide aid to combat any threat to Allied countries or nations that were vital to US security, though the main responsibility would fall directly on the government of the country involved. In this way, the fundamental objective was to ensure US interests through the nation's foreign policy. Meanwhile, Nixon attempted rapprochement with Communist China, meeting personally with Mao Tse-tung in 1972. The US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, which represented the first defeat in US military history, coincided with a new stage of the Cold War known as "detente".

The Watergate scandal brought about Nixon's resignation from the presidency, and he was succeeded by **Gerald Ford** (1974-1977). In his brief term of office, Ford continued with the policy of detente with the Soviet Union; he signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Helsinki Agreement, which ratified European borders following the Second World War. In the Middle East he persuaded Israel and Egypt to reach a truce, an act that was a prelude to the subsequent Camp David peace agreements that would be signed by his successor.

US foreign policy took on a new course under the mandate of **Jimmy Carter** (1977-1981), whose idea was to forge an international order in which interdependence between countries was greater than bipolarism, and in consequence ideological competition with the USSR should take priority over military competition. He drafted a foreign policy that bore his own hallmarks, based on morality, preventive diplomacy, multilateralism and particularly human rights. In the Middle East he promoted the Camp David agreement of 1978, established full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, completed negotiations of the SALT II Treaty and obtained the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a trend in his foreign policy towards greater interventionism (especially in the Persian Gulf) and a return to the policy of containment.

In the 1980s, the policy of detente came to an end. **Ronald Reagan** (1981-1989) continued the policy of containment, his government's main foreign policy aim being to turn the arms race into a technological struggle that would place the "empire of evil" (as he called the USSR) at a practical disadvantage. He launched an important rearmament programme that gave rise to the defence strategy known as "Star Wars", and followed a policy of military intervention to bring down Marxist regimes in the Third World, such as US support for the Nicaraguan Contra forces, the invasion of Grenada and support for the Islamist guerrillas in Afghanistan. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and implemented *Perestroika* ("restructuring"), this encouraged a new detente with the USSR during Reagan's second term of office.

US foreign policy entered a new era with the dismantling of the USSR and the subsequent collapse of the Communist system. The USA became established as the sole world superpower, the victor in a conflict which, over more than 40 years, had shaped an international system of great interdependence and a growing global economy. President **George Bush** (1989-1993) spoke of the emergence of a "New World Order" that would replace the balance of terror of the Cold War, at the same time as his foreign policy stressed the moral responsibility of US leadership as a guarantor of peace and security in the world. US victory in the Gulf War in 1991 showed that the role of the US as a military power continued to be fundamental, in parallel with the emergence of new threats such as drug trafficking, environmental problems, nuclear weapons, etc. Reagan signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START I) with Gorbachev, supported German reunification, while in South America he signed the Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico to create an area of free trade.

To sum up, the Cold War was a period of crucial choices for US foreign policy (Jentleson, 2007). The traditional orientational principles of North American diplomacy based on prosperity, democracy and liberty merged with the implementation of nuclear dissuasion and the containment of communism, the two central pillars of US power during the Cold War. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall – the most axiomatic symbol of the beginning of a new era in international relations – the USA stands out as a superpower in an international system that scholars tend to characterise as unipolar in military terms and multipolar in economic terms, in connection with the rise of countries such as China, India and Japan.

The internationalisation of the US capitalist model took shape under the two terms of office of **Bill Clinton** (1993- 2001). The principles of the free market expanded in accordance with the information technologies revolution in the 1990s and increasing economic and financial globalisation. The new administration's foreign policy went from "containment" to the spreading of democracy and the free market as central pillars of what became known as "economic diplomacy". It was a selective interventionism to boost democracy and the market economy in third countries. Humanitarian intervention represented another central element of Clinton's foreign policy, as in the cases of Somalia (with negative results) and Kosovo (where the NATO intervention was considered a success for the Clinton Administration). Clinton supported the bombing of Iraq following Saddam Hussein's refusal to receive a team of United Nations weapons inspectors, while other central features of his diplomacy included promoting the enlargement of NATO, a relaxing of international trade and the global struggle against drug trafficking. He also worked to lower defence costs.

FROM THE 11-S TERRORIST ATTACKS TO THE CHALLENGES FACING BARACK OBAMA

After the Cold War was over, the USA did not have any tangible enemy, and its main foreign policy objective was to maintain its unrivalled supremacy on a global level, marked by its military predominance, technological leadership and its position as the largest economy in the world. The terrorist attacks of 11-S forced US foreign policy to take a new turn, thereby revitalising the country's mission to conserve the fundamental values of its overseas action. Policies of dissuasion and containment were no longer useful for achieving this end, given the context of the new threats and enemies of a non-state nature such as terrorist groups.

In light of these exceptional circumstances, President **George W. Bush** (2001-2008) drafted a foreign policy doctrine to combat terrorism that was strongly influenced by his cabinet's neoconservative wing and his belief in the supremacy of military power to ensure the country's national interests, whether it be in a multilateral manner, or unilaterally if necessary. Thus it was that the Bush Doctrine promoted preventive attacks and unilateral interventionism, in a worldview divided between the "axis of good" and "the axis of evil" – a constant dichotomy in US foreign policy throughout the course of its history. In its desire to make the world a safer place, the priorities of US foreign policy agenda focused on the war on terrorism and on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by state and non-state actors. The defence budget rose to levels comparable to the time of the Cold War, and interventions were carried out in Afghanistan (2001) in the framework of United Nations, and in Iraq (2003) without the backing of the international organisation. This unilateral action drew strong criticism from the international community, on top of the censure generated by the Bush government's refusal to take part in the setting up of an International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as reticence in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, among other measures.

Since January 2009, the current Democratic president **Barack Obama** has been faced with the task of recomposing a US foreign policy that has been eroded by the war on terrorism. Its main challenges include those of improving the image of the USA throughout the world, providing a response to the open fronts in Afghanistan and Iraq, revitalising multilateralism, energizing relations with European allies and South American neighbours and providing stable solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. And with the international background scenario of the current world economic-financial crisis, all of these challenges will put US leadership to the test and will undoubtedly shape the foreign policy of the first African-American president in the White House.

As US foreign policy has evolved, ever since the country's independence, it can be observed that the cornerstone principles of promotion and defence of democracy and liberty throughout the world have served as foundations for the different foreign policy doctrines, and have continued to have a strong influence on US political ideology up until the present day.

Mariana Foglia,
Assistant of the Latin America Programme of CIDOB

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMBROSE, Stephen E. (1985). *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938.* New York: Penguin Books, 1985. ISBN 0140268316 <http://www.alibris.com/search/books/isbn/0140268316>.

GADDIS, J.L. (1982). *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. ISBN 0195030976.

HEFFER,J.; LAUNAY,M. (1992). *La Guerra Fría 1945-1973*. Madrid: Akal, 1992.

JAIMES VARGAS, L.; OCAÑA PADILLA, S. A. (2005). "Doctrina Bush: Reflejo real de la tradición estadounidense

en política exterior". Degree thesis. International Relations. Department of International Relations and History, School of Social Sciences, Universidad de las Américas, Puebla, November 2005.

JENTLESON, Bruce (2007). *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007. ISBN 0393928594

KISSINGER, H. (1996). *La Diplomacia.* México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996. ISBN 9681647475.

VEIGA, Francisco; DA CAL, Enrique U.; DUARTE, Ángel (2006). *La paz simulada. Una historia de la Guerra Fría, 1941-1991*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2006. ISBN 84-206-4827-9

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

US security strategy since World War II.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

US security strategy since World War II

In the aftermath of World War II (WWII), with the defeat of the Nazi regime and Japan along with the decline of the British and French empires, the international balance of power shifted, leaving the United States (US) and the Soviet Union as the remaining superpowers. Without the existence of a common enemy, the profound ideological and strategic divergences over post-war reconstruction put an end to the former American-Soviet Alliance and marked the beginning of the Cold War, an era characterised by bipolarity and a nuclear arms race. Subsequently, the nuclear threat became a central issue in drafting the American foreign policy and more particularly in the realm of strategic security and defence.

The beginning of the nuclear age forced the US to reconfigure its national security based on its own nuclear capabilities and those of the enemy, leaving traditional defence strategies behind. Two main very influential power doctrines emerged throughout the Cold War, both intrinsically inherent in the enmity between the US and the Soviet Union: nuclear deterrence, meant to prevent (Russian) attacks through the fear of retaliation, and containment, aimed at preventing Russia from spreading its sphere of influence and communism.[1]

The era that followed the Cold War was characterised by a new strategic environment, gradually leaving behind the bipolar dynamics that had prevailed since the end of WWII. The Gulf War was one of the first events that marked the US Security and Defence policy in the 1990's, followed by its involvement in a series of low-intensity, regional conflicts formerly contained by the Cold War and the superpowers' respective sphere of influence.

Today's global political reality differs greatly from that of 50 years ago, especially considering the added variable of terrorism. However, and as George W. Bush pointed out in 2002, American Security and Defence policy is not immune to some old doctrine: "For much of the last century, America's defence relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply, but new threats also require new thinking."

THE YEARS OF CONTAINMENT

It is in the context of the nuclear age that the National Security Council (NSC), one of the main organs of US foreign policy coordination system, was designed. It was created in 1947 (National Security Act of July 26 1947) "under the chairmanship of the President, with the Secretaries of State and Defence as its key members, to coordinate foreign policy and defence policy, and to reconcile diplomatic and military commitments and requirements".[2] The NSC was matched by a congress decision to incept the position of Secretary of Defence, a National Military Establishment, Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Resources Board. The Department of Defence was not created until 1949, combining the Department of War and the Navy.

In the early 1950s, the first American nuclear strategy was drafted under Truman's Administration in National Security Memo 68 and it stipulated that the global military containment of Soviet power and influence ought to be the backbone of US national defence. The former measure involved the development of a global ring of military bases, military alliances and a significant increase in defence spending.

At the beginning of the 1950's, Eisenhower's Administration launched the "New Look" policy. The US experience in the Korean War marked a decisive turn in its strategy policy, making deterrence the maxim of national security policies. For the first time, the US did not reduce its military build-up at the end of a war. Eisenhower's re-examination of the US strategy resulted in a "deeper dependence on nuclear weapons and long-range airpower to deter war" as the human and financial costs were significantly lower.[3] His administration gave a high priority to air defence initiating, notably, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line on 15 February 1954 "as the primary line of air defence warning of 'Over the Pole' invasion of the North American Continent".[4]

In parallel with the new military strategy to counter the Soviet threat, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles concluded, in addition to NATO and the Rio[5] Treaty, a series of mutual defence agreements, including the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East (later known as the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO) in 1952; the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 with France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan and Philippines; along with other treaties with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to cite only a few.[6] The growing hostility of Arab nationalist regimes after the Suez crisis of 1956 and the fear of communist influence in Egypt and Syria were the main incentives behind the "Eisenhower Doctrine". To protect western interests in the Middle East and to prevent the USSR from filling the power vacuum left by France and the UK, Eisenhower was willing and committed to sending US troops.[7]

In 1961, John F Kennedy turned away from the New Look policy, declaring "Our defence posture must be both flexible and determined. Any potential aggressor contemplating an attack (…) must know that our response will be suitable, selective, swift and effective."[8] He implemented a new strategic doctrine called 'Flexible Response' which rejected massive retaliation and opted for greater symmetry and flexibility to deterrence. In another attempt to contain the spread of communism, US intervention in Vietnam was supposed to be the ideal scenario to apply Flexible Response. By 1969, the

unsatisfactory results of this campaign (costing the United States 58,000 lives, 350,000 casualties and between one and two million Vietnamese deaths) compelled US leaders to reconsider their approach to the Cold War. Furthermore, Congress enacted the War Powers Act in 1973, requiring the president to receive explicit Congressional approval before committing American forces overseas.

Under Presidents Nixon (1969-1974, elected in part because of the country's dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War) and Ford (1974-1977), the US witnessed a considerable shift in its defence policy. With the collaboration of Henry Kissinger, Nixon drafted a strategy known as 'Détente'. This strategy relied on three main elements: first, a willingness to attribute the status of superpower to the Soviet Union; second, the acknowledgment of the changes in Eastern Europe after 1945 and the recognition of the existing borders in Europe;[9] third, the development of a series of agreements with the Soviet Union to ensure cooperation and interdependence; and last, both superpowers attempted to shift their competitive relationship from a confrontational one to a cooperative one.[10]

Upon taking office in 1977, President Carter endeavoured to alter the priority of containment that had prevailed in US defence policy since WWII, hoping to "engage the Soviet Union in a joint effort to halt the strategic arms race" and "to produce reciprocal stability, parity, and security."[11] Up until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter was committed to the principle of non-intervention and was hoping for a decrease in military spending. The Carter Doctrine was announced in 1980 and stated that the United States would use military force to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf and thus deter the Soviet Union from expanding in the region.

When President Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981, he opted for a hard-line anti-communist policy that no longer solely relied on the containment of Soviet expansion established during the Truman Administration but also on pushing it back or "rolling back". The 'roll back' involved a new military build-up and support for numerous anti-communist regimes and insurgents around the world. This policy shift, known as the Reagan Doctrine, was announced shortly after launching the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), a programme intended to harness technology to protect the US from incoming ballistic missiles by destroying them before they could land and reach their targets. In response, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev refused to pursue arms negotiations such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) unless the SDI was forsaken. The INF Treaty was finally signed in 1987 (Presidents Obama and Medvedev have recently envisaged restarting negotiations on START).

The years of containment and US-Soviet confrontation finally ended in 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the attempt to sustain a "Proper balance between the two dimension framework of conventional and nuclear weapons that had existed since 1945" did not disappear with the Soviet Union, as this conventional/ nuclear duality can be found in the security and defence strategies of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Overview of the main national military strategies since 1990

Starting from 1989 and as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,[12] the Chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff began communicating their military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defence through an unclassified national military strategy. The National Military Strategy (NMS) was designed to provide advice on the strategic direction the military should follow to support the National Security and Defence strategies. The main national military strategies since 1990 have all endeavoured to determine the required military measures and means to counter the nation's security challenges as expressed by the President in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Secretary of Defence in the National Defence Strategy (NDS).

The 1992 NMS was already drafted in President's George H.W. Bush NSS. To adapt to the post-Cold War environment, this strategy left behind the former strategies of deterrence and containment of the Soviet Union to elaborate regional strategies flexible enough to adapt to a new geo-strategic reality or again to a new world order: "it was one of the most fundamental change in US military strategy since the global containment strategy and the Cold War that began in the 1950s".[13] Indeed, this strategy relied on four principles: first, Strategic Deterrence and Defence which consisted of maintaining offensive and defensive nuclear deterrent; second, Forward Presence, which was assured by the development of a ring of military bases worldwide; Crisis Response, or ensuring a rapid responsiveness to more than one regional crisis at a time; and lastly, Reconstruction as the ability to rapidly rebuild military strength.[14]

The 1995 National Military Strategies had two main objectives: to promote stability and thwart aggression. In a context where the prospects of military aggression against the US and the number of troops deployed abroad consistently dwindled, the focus of military strategies slowly shifted towards the maintaining of peace and stability. This strategy exhibits three main components: first, peacetime engagement defined as the non-combat activities undertaken by the Armed Forces aspiring to endorse democratic values engaging in peace-keeping and conflict prevention activities, or again to participate in humanitarian missions; second, deterrence and conflict prevention which, combined, would dissuade potential enemies from launching an attack against the US; third, to fight and win as the utmost responsibility of all military operation, the latter pledging the vital interests of the nation.[15]

The 1997 National Military Strategy was based on three main components. First, the US would shape the international environment through its continued deterrence, peacetime activities and active leadership in alliances. Second, it should respond to the full spectrum of crises, thus reinforcing its deterrence potential and its ability "to deter or defeat nearly simultaneous large–scale, cross–border aggression in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with allies." And third, it must now prepare for an uncertain future by cultivating the military superiority of the US to uphold its global leadership and its interests worldwide.[16]

With the 9/11 attacks, followed by the two military operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001) and Iraq (Iraqi Freedom in 2003), the 2004 National Military Strategy context and content significantly differ from previous ones. In the 2002 NSS, the US is said to be facing four kinds of challenges: (1) traditional challenges characterised by the use of recognised military capacities in inter-state situations of conflict; (2) irregular challenges defined by the use of unconventional methods against strong opponents; (3) catastrophic challenges posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction; and (4) disruptive challenges involving the use of innovative technologies to reverse some US strategic and military advantages. The 2004 NMS developed the four main challenges by adding three key aspects (a wider range of adversaries, a more complex and distributed battle space, and the global proliferation of technology) that would allow for a quick adaptation and execution of the military strategy. However, it asserts that despite the usual effectiveness of international alliances and coalitions to deter enemies, the potential of an attack against the US, its allies and interests may necessitate actions in self-defence to pre-empt adversaries before they can attack.[17]

The Bush Doctrine

After the 9/11 attacks, the traditional two-dimensional conventional/nuclear security strategy became obsolete. While the nuclear threat diminished in intensity after the Cold War, it was still perceived in China and Russia and in potential aggressors such as North Korea, Iraq (before 2003) and Iran, which Bush identified as part of the Axis of Evil. Terrorism, and more particularly global terrorism, together with the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were added to the traditional security complex, turning radicalism and technology into the biggest threat to the nation.[18]

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 2001

The 9/11 attacks generated a significant wave of pro-US support and the decision to go to war in Afghanistan was initially backed by Canada, Australia, Germany and France or, in the words of Bush, "by the will of the free world".[19] The number of countries volunteering to send military troops rapidly climbed to 20. With the spontaneous solidarity of these countries, the US did not have to engage in the war alone, and managed to demonstrate its pledge to multilateralism, or at least during the first phases of the military campaign in Afghanistan. By declaring that this military action in Afghanistan was a battlefront of an ongoing war, the war on terror or "long war", Bush justified the use of force based on the traditional definition of inter-state wars. In this sense, there is a solid belief that this declaration was paving the way for the 2002 NSS and its most controversial concept of pre-emptive action and self-defence.

The 2002 National Security strategy

The 2002 Bush National Security Strategy was produced after the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing Operation Enduring Freedom. The 2002 NSS establishes that the greatest threat posed to the US is radicalism and technology.[20] Differently put, the threats to the nation emanate from terrorist networks, rogue states (making specific allusion to Iraq and North Korea) harbouring terrorist activities as well as all attempts of the former to pursue and distribute weapons of mass destruction. In accordance with the principle of pre-emptive action or as posited by President Bush when he stated that "as a matter of common sense and self-defence, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed". In that context, there is a brief reference to international law which conditions the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat. If Bush explains that today's context requires a redefinition of the provision of pre-emptive self-defence, its scope, triggers and imminence are only vaguely mentioned: "The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies (…). The reasons for our action will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just."[21]

Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003

The new policy of pre-emptive strike marked a major shift in US military policy and provoked mitigated reactions among its allies. As we have seen in the previous section, the document provided argumentation justifying the US decision to undertake unilateral and pre-emptive actions under the cloak of "counterproliferation". The 2002 NSS placed particular emphasis on the determination of the US to protect its people from the threat posed by dangerous and aggressive nations which might acquire WMD and engage in their trade with the enemies of the US and its allies. Nevertheless, President Bush did not explicitly invoke pre-emptive action to justify this operation. Based on the assumption of an ongoing war, he chose to invoke a United Nations Security Council authorisation and declared that "the actions that coalition forces are undertaking are an appropriate response (…) to defend the United States and the international community from the threat posed by Iraq and to restore peace and security in the area"; this can be attributed to the controversial nature of this doctrine.[22]

Pre-emption and the 2006 National Security Strategy

The 2006 National Security Strategy demonstrates a clear continuing commitment to the 2002 NSS. The war on terror is still striving to thwart terrorists' ambitions and prevent them from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. In this sense, the struggle between the ideology of freedom and tyranny is still at the heart of President Bush's discourse, where one can find a very detailed list of all the potential situations and factors terrorism might stem from. Bush declares that a viable solution to terrorism is the promotion of democracy and its values throughout the world. In the short term, this translates into preventing attacks by terrorist networks before they occur, denying WMD to rogue states and to terrorists' allies who would use them without hesitation, denying terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states (singling out Iran and Syria as such), and last, denying the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launch pad for terror.[23] To stall the potential of these threats

and strengthen the defence and deterrence capabilities of the US, a New Triad was developed combining "offensive strike system, active and passive defences (including missile defences) and a responsive infrastructure all bound together by enhanced command and control, planning and intelligence systems."[24] As in the 2002 Strategy, the use of force and pre-emption are still justified in a self-defence scenario and there is no reference made to international law or guidance as to the use of force.

A brief overview of Obama's Security and Defence priorities[25]

The recent election of President Obama has raised many hopes and doubts as to the potential realignment of US security priorities. The previous Bush Administration was committed to devoting most of the military and financial resources to the prolonged American mission in Iraq. President Obama in contrast announced in February of 2009 "that the United States will pursue a new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility". Obama's plan consists of three parts: first, a responsible removal of combat brigades over 18 months (until 31 August 2010) and a complete removal of all troops by 2011; second, sustained diplomacy helping the Iraqis to advance progress in laying the foundations of peace and security, and third, a comprehensive engagement across the region with all nations (including Iran and Syria), a refocus on the elimination of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, and manoeuvring for a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab world. The new US administration is aware that the process to achieve US national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be extensive and sinuous. Obama is thus committed to reverse the Taliban's momentum in the coming year, and to do so, he calls on the international community to work with Pakistan to disrupt the threats to security along Pakistan's western border[26].

THE UNITED STATES' ARMED FORCES

The US Armed Forces are made up of six bodies: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the National Guard and the Coast Guard. All these bodies, except for the Coast Guard, report directly to the Department of Defence, which has its headquarters in the Pentagon, Washington, and is directed by a civilian, the Defence Secretary (Robert Gates, since December 2006). The Defence Department is responsible for implementing military, security and defence policy; meanwhile, following the 11 September 2001 attacks, a new civil agency was created, the Department of Homeland Security, with the aim of coordinating the fight against threats to security within the United States. In addition, it should be stressed that all the military bodies are also under the control of the US President, who acts as Commander in Chief. In the event of conflict with another nation, it is Congress that has the power to declare war, as well as having the authority to maintain the Armed Forces.

At present, the US Defence Department has six regional military commands for dividing up the actions of the Armed Forces of throughout the world: the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), which covers North America; Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), which covers more than 30 countries in Central America, the Caribbean and South America, the European Command (USEUCOM), which comprises Europe, Greenland, the North Pole and the Russian Federation; Central Command (USCENTCOM) which covers the Middle East, Egypt and the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia; Pacific Command (USPACOM) which covers Asia, the Pacific and the South Pole, and Africa Command (AFRICOM) which is spread throughout Africa, except for Egypt.

In total, the US Armed Forces possesses 1.4 million active troops, of whom 283.000 serve in more than 140 countries throughout the world (see Table I). Military service is not compulsory.

The Army

The US Army is the military body that is responsible for land operations. According to data from the Defence Ministry, in December 2008 it was made up of more than 540,000 soldiers in active service, making it the largest of the bodies of the Armed Forces. In addition to these active troops, there is also a reserve comprised of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

The Army has its origins in the Continental Army, which was created in 1775, one year before US independence, to fight in the War of Independence (1775-1783). After the war, in 1784 Congress created the Army, and it is currently managed by the Army Department, headed by the Secretary of the Army.

The Army is used for both operational and institutional missions. The operational Army consists of numbered armies, corps, divisions (it currently has 10), brigades and the battalions that lead the operations. The various institutional organisations provide the necessary infrastructure for recruiting, training, equipping, deploying and ensuring the preparation of all the Army's forces.

The Navy

The Navy is the body of the US Armed Forces that is responsible for naval operations. Its origins date back to 1775, when it was created with the aim of intercepting British supply ships off the coast of Massachusetts. Subsequently, and in spite of its high cost, it was consolidated as an important body within the Armed Forces, owing to continued pirate attacks on trade routes.

At present, the Navy has around 331,000 active troops and a reserve of 118,000; it has 283 vessels and more than 3,700 aircraft.

The Navy is administrated by the Department of Defence, under the civil direction of the Defence Secretary.

The Navy currently has nine operational forces: the Atlantic fleet, the Pacific fleet, Naval Forces Central Command, Naval Forces Europe, the Naval Network Warfare Command, the Naval Reserve, the Special Warfare Command, the Operational Test and Evaluation Forces, and the Military Sealift Command.

There are a total of six fleets that are distributed throughout the world: the Second fleet (Atlantic Ocean), the Third

fleet (Pacific Ocean North, South and East), the Fourth fleet (Caribbean Sea, Central and South America) the Fifth fleet (Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and Indian Ocean), the Sixth fleet (Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean North) and the Seventh fleet (Western Pacific Ocean).

The Air Force

The US Air Force is the body of the US Armed Forces responsible for air operations. Originally, the body was defined as a subdivision of the United States Army, and was declared an official combat force in 1920. After the Second World War was over, in 1947 it was acknowledged as a separate military body. It is currently comprised of 329,078 Air Force troops, it has over 5,000 aircraft and is present in over 1,000 countries.

Marine Corps

The US Marine Corps is a rapid response elite body that plays an important role as a first military force present on land in most of the conflicts in which the United States is involved. Its main areas of responsibility include attacking or defending advanced naval bases and other land operations to sustain naval campaigns; developing techniques and tactics and supporting amphibious landing forces, in addition to other tasks determined by the president.

In 1775, a resolution by the Continental Congress in Philadelphia created the Marine Corps under the name of "Continental Marines". At that time the body reported to the Navy, but in 1783 it was made independent, becoming another branch of the Armed Forces, while maintaining administrative dependence on the United States Navy. It currently has approximately 198,000 troops.

The National Guard

The National Guard is a body that has a special status, given that in time of peace and in normal circumstances, it is defined as a state militia; this means that each state has its own National Guard and the state governor is the commander-in-chief of the National Guard of his respective state. Furthermore, the National Guard is under the control of a department of the Governor's Cabinet and not of the Department of Defence, though the latter does possess powers of supervision. However, in the event of serious emergency or in time of war, the president may decree the "federalisation" of all or part of the National Guard, which then comes to form part of the Army or the Air Force on a temporary basis.

The Coast Guard

The Coast Guard is made up of various old federal services: the lighthouse keepers' service, the coast guards' service and the ship inspection service. In 1915, through a decree by Congress, the lifeboat service merged with the coast guard service, thus forming the Coast Guard. Until 1967, the service was under the control of the Treasury Department, when an executive order transferred the Coast Guard to the recently-formed Ministry of Transport.

The Coast Guard is run by the Department of Homeland Security in peacetime, though its control may be transferred to the Navy in time of war to act as an auxiliary force, or by the exclusive orders of the president. The Coast Guard thus maintains both functions: as a military force and for the maintaining of order. It currently has some 40,000 troops deployed throughout the nation.

Fadela Hilali
Research assistant, Mediterranean
and Middle East Programme of CIDOB

TABLE I. MAIN US NAVAL BASES OVERSEAS

Country	Naval bases	Number of troops
Bahrain	NSA Bahrein (base of the 5th Fleet)	247
South Korea	Chinhae	96
Cuba	Guantanamo Bay	1,559
Diego García Island	Diego García Base	654
Greece	Souda Base	358
Spain	Rota Base	988
Italy (3)	La Maddalena, Naples (base of the 6th Fleet) & Sigonella	1,166
Japan (5)	Atsugi, Misawa, Okinawa, Sasebo & Yokosuka (base of the 7th Fleet)	18,867

Note: the 2nd Fleet has its headquarters in Norfolk (Virginia), the 3rd Fleet is based in San Diego (California) and the 4th Fleet in Mayport (Florida).

Source: Department of Defense-Navy. Base Structure Report (30.09.2007)
Produced by: CIDOB

TABLE II. MAIN US AIRBASES OVERSEAS

Country	Airbases	Number of troops
Germany (4)	Buechel, Geilenkirchen, Ramstein & Spangdahlem	12,883
Belgium	Kleine Brogel	136
South Korea (2)	Kunsan & Osan	7,833
Spain	Morón	119
Greenland	Thule	133
Italy	Aviano	3,504
Japan (3)	Kadena, Misawa & Yokota	13,750
Portugal	Lajes Field	720
United Kingdom (7)	Alconbury, Croughton, Fairford, Lakenheath, Menwith Hill, Mildenhall & Molesworth	9,069
Turkey (2)	Incirlik & Izmir	1,416

Source: Department of Defense-Air Force. Base Structure Report (30.09.2007)
Produced by: CIDOB

Notes

1 Jentleson, Bruce W., American Foreign Police: the Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, 3rd edition, Norton

2 National Security Council http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/history/

3 Wolk, S. Herman "The New Look", Air Force Magazine, August 2003

4 The Dew Line http://www.lswilson.ca/dewline.htm

5 The Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) was signed Sept. 2 1947, and originally ratified by all 21 American republics. Under the treaty, an armed attack or threat of aggression against a signatory nation, whether by a member nation or by some other power, will be considered an attack against all.

6 Slantchev, Branislav "National Security Strategy: The New Look, 1953-1960", Air Force Magazine, August 2003

7 The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm

8 Espionage Info http://www.espionageinfo.com/Int-Ke/Johnson-Administration-1963-1969-United-States-National-Security-Policy.html

9 The recognition of borders was one of the clauses of the 1975 Helsinki declaration from the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

10 Jentleson, Bruce W., American Foreign Police: the Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, 3rd edition, Norton

11 Jimmy Carter , University of Notre Dame Commencement (May 22, 1977), http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3399

12 "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, caused a major defense reorganization, the most significant since the National Security Act of 1947. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and secretary of defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders." (National Defense University Library, Digital Collection, http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html)

13 1992 National Military Strategy

14 Ibid

15 1995 National Military Strategy

16 1997 National Military Strategy

17 2004 National Military Strategy

18 http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf

19 "President Bush announces operation Enduring Freedom", The Independent, October 7th 2001

20 2002 US National Security Strategy

21 2002 US National Security Strategy

22 Gray, Christina, "The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 of the USA", Chinese Journal of International Law (2006), Vol.5, No. 3, 555-578

23 2006 US National Security Strategy, 12-13

24 2006 National Security Strategy, 22

25 Considering that each American President disposes of 150 days after his investiture to present a National Security Strategy, this section will be based on the official statements and other information found on the White House official website.

26 Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq; February 27, 2009 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/

GRAPH I. EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE BUDGET (1950-2008)



Source: Ministry of Defence <http://www.defenselink.mil/>
<http://www.todaysmilitary.com/search>

Produced by: CIDOB

TABLE 3. US TROOPS AT HOME AND OVERSEAS (2008)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total
USA and territories	**472,443**	**215,841**	**159,416**	**270,938**	**1,118,638**
EUROPE	**45,337**	**4,759**	**847**	**30,639**	**81,582**
Germany	39,794	263	317	14,600	54,974
Belgium	667	98	23	468	1,256
Spain	93	685	141	311	1,230
Italy	2,900	2,263	52	3,945	9,160
The Netherlands	258	23	13	247	541
Portugal	26	29	7	716	778
United Kingdom	338	387	79	8,553	9,357
Serbia (incl. Kosovo)	1,100	0	20	0	1,120
Turkey	62	8	14	1,475	1,559
Others	99	1,003	181	324	1,607
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	**19,186**	**11,561**	**15,464**	**20,539**	**66,750**
South Korea	16,507	242	112	7,794	24,655
Japan	2,538	3,785	15,100	12,616	34,039
Others	141	7,534	252	129	8,056
AMERICA	**714**	**635**	**341**	**349**	**2,039**
Cuba (Guantanamo)	309	508	136	0	953
Honduras	224	2	6	186	418
Others	181	125	199	163	668
NORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA	**624**	**1,974**	**358**	**495**	**3,451**
Bahrein	18	1,283	142	24	1,467
Qatar	195	6	43	181	425
Others	411	685	173	290	1,559
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	**424**	**464**	**559**	**196**	**1,643**
Djibouti	356	434	382	177	1,349
Others	68	30	177	19	294
FORMER SOVIET UNION	**39**	**3**	**78**	**13**	**133**
OTHERS YET TO BE DEPLOYED	**3,798**	**96,445**	**21,839**	**5,909**	**127,991**
TOTAL TROOPS OVERSEAS	**70,122**	**115,841**	**39,486**	**58,140**	**283,589**
TOTAL TROOPS	**542,565**	**331,682**	**198,902**	**329,078**	**1,402,227**

Source: Department of Defense. Base Structure Report (30.09.2007) Produced by: CIDOB

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Economic and social indicators of the United States.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

Economic and social indicators of the United States

BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Following the outbreak of the financial crisis of August 2007, the United States entered into an economic recession during the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, with falls of around 6% in the real GDP, the worst figures since 1982. In a few months, the country passed from the path of growth that it had experienced during the period 2002-2006 following the 11-S attacks (with growth rates nearing 3% and unemployment at 5%) to a freefall with a profound deterioration of domestic consumption (which is responsible for 70% of the economy) and forecasts that unemployment could reach 10% in 2009.

In its 2008 edition, this section of the *International Yearbook* aims to analyse the evolution of the economic and social indicators up to this critical moment, indicators that some analysts have compared with the Great Depression following the stock market crash of 1929. There are many shadows cast currently over the US economy: public debt has rocketed to historic levels (50% of the GDP) that have never been experienced before, apart from a period between the wars, and compared to 33% in 1980: The dollar has also experienced a weakening over the past five years that would have been unthinkable in previous decades, with strong falls against the Euro, a fact that has led many emerging economies (including China) to consider replacing the dollar as the standard unit of currency for the international financial system. And then there is the financial system itself, which in the past was an example of dynamism and a generator of wealth, but is now viewed as a giant with feet of clay.

GRAPHIC I. VARIATION IN REAL GDP %

(Base Year = 2000)



Source: *U.S. Bureau of Economic Analisis. Survey of Current Business.* April 2009

Structurally, the US GDP gravitates around consumption and private investment (85% of the GDP in 2008). The other components, in contrast, have a lesser contribution, with low saving rates and, even, a negative contribution in around five basic points of the trading balance with a deficit of 4.7% of the GDP in 2008. In a time of greater economic growth (2002-2005), the housing bubble was generated. Investment in real estate grew at a rate of 7.5% above that of consumption (3%) and of private investment (4%). This circumstance coincided with a background of low interest rates, the result of the FED's expansive policy, as the body still did not believe that the recovery from 11-S was solid.

The Treasury's situation, which had deteriorated owing to the military cost of the two wars that were commenced in 2003, worsened even further with the stimulus plans for the financial system initiated during the Bush Administration to save banks and insurance companies. In 2008, the deficit rose to 6% and figures are not expected to return to the black until after 2011.

The economic motors of the Union; that is to say, the states that contribute the most to the national GDP (see Table 3) have a production structure that is very diversified in the service economy, with the exception of Texas, which is focused on oil production and the chemical industry, and the states of the industrial belt (Ohio, Illinois). The distribution of revenue, in contrast, follows other geographical lines and favours the small East Coast states, as well as some states with low tax rates (Alaska and Wyoming).

DIRECT OVERSEAS INVESTMENT AND THE OVERSEAS SECTOR

The United States is by far the great vector of economic globalisation where the greatest investments are directed and originated, a third of which are channelled through multinational companies. Industry (15%), natural resources (8%) and finance and insurance (8%) are the most attractive sectors for US investors. Europe continues to occupy an important place in its portfolios (65% in 2008) and in recent decades investment in the Asia-Pacific region (16%) has been gaining on Latin America (17%) with respect to investment preferences.

The trade deficit (-4.7% of the GDP in 2008) has broken its fall with the beginning of the economic crisis. The growth in imports since 2002, much higher than the export rate, together with the increase in oil prices (which originated half of the trade imbalance) are the most widely-accepted causes of the origin of the deficit. Over the past decade, emerging economies such as China and Mexico have displaced Japan, a traditional trading partner of the United States, and they now represent 22% of US trade. China is the country with which United States has the greatest trade deficit (32% of the total in 2008).

	GDP Constant price billions $ (base year =2000)	GDP annual variation (base year =2000) %	GDP current prices billions $	GDP annual variation current prices %	GDP based on Purchasing power Parity capita (PPP), $
1980	5,161.68	-0.23	2,789.53	8.83	12,255.08
1981	5,291.70	2.52	3,128.43	12.15	13,606.84
1982	5,189.25	-1.94	3,255.03	4.05	14,022.55
1983	5,423.75	4.52	3,536.68	8.65	15,098.09
1984	5,813.60	7.19	3,933.18	11.21	16,644.33
1985	6,053.75	4.13	4,220.25	7.30	17,701.24
1986	6,263.63	3.47	4,462.83	5.75	18,549.30
1987	6,475.05	3.38	4,739.48	6.20	19,524.04
1988	6,742.65	4.13	5,103.75	7.69	20,834.40
1989	6,981.40	3.54	5,484.35	7.46	22,178.17
1990	7,112.53	1.88	5,803.08	5.81	23,207.90
1991	7,100.53	-0.17	5,995.93	3.32	23,662.66
1992	7,336.58	3.32	6,337.75	5.70	24,681.91
1993	7,532.65	2.67	6,657.40	5.04	25,590.97
1994	7,835.48	4.02	7,072.23	6.23	26,857.44
1995	8,031.70	2.50	7,397.65	4.60	27,762.90
1996	8,328.90	3.70	7,816.83	5.67	28,996.24
1997	8,703.50	4.50	8,304.33	6.24	30,438.61
1998	9,066.88	4.18	8,746.98	5.33	31,689.37
1999	9,470.35	4.45	9,268.43	5.96	33,196.97
2000	9,816.95	3.66	9,816.98	5.92	34,776.03
2001	9,890.65	0.75	10,127.95	3.17	35,514.66
2002	10,048.85	1.60	10,469.60	3.37	36,360.00
2003	10,301.10	2.51	10,960.75	4.69	37,715.16
2004	10,675.73	3.64	11,685.93	6.62	39,851.55
2005	10,989.50	2.94	12,421.88	6.30	41,976.56
2006	11,294.88	2.78	13,178.35	6.09	44,118.97
2007	11,523.90	2.03	13,807.55	4.77	45,778.45
2008	11,651.98	1.11	14,264.60	3.31	46,859.06

TABLE II. USA GDP COMPARED WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD (2008)

Country	GDP current prices billions $ (2008)	%
European Union	18,394,115	30.31
United States	14,264,600	23.50
Japan	4,923,761	8.11
China	4,401,614	7.25
Germany	3,667,513	6.04
France	2,865,737	4.72
United Kingdom	2,674,085	4.41
Italy	2,313,893	3.81
Russia	1,676,586	2.76
Spain	1,611,767	2.66
Brazil	1,572,839	2.59
WORLD	**60,689,812**	**100.00**

Source: *International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,* April 2009: *Nominal GDP list of countries.* Data of 2008.

TABLE IIIa. TEN HIGHEST-INCOME METROPOLITAN AREAS IN THE US (2006)

Metropolitan Areas	Per capita personal income (2006) in $	% over national average
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk	74,281	205.34
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont	57,747	159.64
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara	55,020	152.10
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta	51,868	143.38
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy	50,542	139.72
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island	49,789	137.64
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue	45,369	125.42
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford	44,835	123.94
Denver-Aurora	44,691	123.54
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos	44,237	122.29
United States	**36,174**	**100.00**

Source: *US Census Bureau of Economic Analysis*

TABLE I. BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS

GDP based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) share of world total %	Trade balance % GDP	Gross national savings % GDP	Annual inflation rate %	Unemployment rate %	General government balance % GDP	General government net debt GDP %
20.77	-0.5	19.70	13.50	7.18	-2.98	30.33
21.71	-0.4	20.93	10.38	7.62	-2.23	25.372
19.34	-0.6	19.33	6.16	9.71	-4.85	29.469
19.43	-1.5	17.23	3.16	9.60	-5.61	32.917
22.25	-2.6	19.67	4.37	7.51	-2.75	34.175
21.21	-2.7	18.19	3.53	7.19	-5.02	37.237
20.61	-3.0	16.44	1.94	7.00	-5.25	40.737
20.45	-3.1	16.81	3.58	6.18	-4.29	42.912
19.75	-2.2	17.93	4.10	5.49	-3.56	44.344
19.56	-1.6	17.22	4.79	5.26	-3.22	44.503
18.55	-1.3	16.21	5.42	5.62	-4.24	45.796
17.07	-0.5	16.08	4.22	6.85	-4.92	49.245
17.17	-0.5	14.96	3.04	7.49	-5.77	52.706
17.61	-1.0	14.46	2.97	6.91	-4.94	55.326
18.64	-1.3	15.14	2.60	6.10	-3.56	54.744
18.61	-1.2	16.01	2.81	5.59	-3.14	54.227
19.00	-1.2	16.52	2.94	5.41	-2.18	52.327
19.77	-1.2	17.59	2.34	4.94	-0.80	49.312
20.25	-1.8	18.28	1.55	4.50	0.43	45.561
20.63	-2.8	18.06	2.19	4.22	0.85	40.922
20.78	-3.9	18.04	3.37	3.97	1.62	36.249
19.14	-3.6	16.37	2.82	4.74	-0.39	35.517
18.40	-4.1	14.22	1.60	5.78	-3.79	38.132
18.43	-4.6	13.31	2.30	5.99	-4.83	41.472
19.35	-5.3	13.85	2.67	5.54	-4.35	43.019
20.00	-5.7	14.85	3.38	5.08	-3.26	43.43
20.09	-5.7	15.47	3.22	4.62	-2.24	42.526
18.78	-5.1	14.17	2.86	4.63	-2.89	43.159
17.45	-4.7	11.92	3.80	5.81	-6.07	49.908

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009

TABLE IIIb: STATES WITH MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL GDP AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION (2007)

State	Contribution to national GDP (2007) in trillion $	% over the total (Total=100)	State	Per capita personal income (2007) in $	State	% over national average[1] (USA=100)
California	1,813	13.20	Connecticut	54,117	Delaware	155.7
Texas	1,142	8.30	New Jersey	49,194	Connecticut	131.6
New York	1,103	8	Massachusets	49,082	New Jersey	124.8
Florida	734.5	5.30	New York	47,385	Massachusets	123
Illinois	609.6	4.40	Maryland	46,021	New York	117.6
Pennsylvania	531.1	3.90	Wyoming	43,226	Maryland	116.2
Ohio	466.3	3.40	California	41,571	Wyoming	112.7
New Jersey	465.5	3.40	New Hampshire	41,512	New Hampshire	109.3
North Carolina	399.4	2.90	Virgina	41,347	Alaska	108.3
Georgia	396.5	2.90	Colorado	41,042	Washington	106.9
Total	13,743	100	National average	38,611	National average	100

1. Available income discounting taxes

Source: *US Census Bureau of Economic Analysis*

TABLE IVa. US DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD BY COUNTRY (2008)

	Million $
Europe	**171,983**
EU-27	**143,289**
Netherlands	43,144
United Kingdom	23,270
Ireland	19,226
Latin America and the Caribbean	71,722
Bermuda Islands	18,378
Mexico	10,285
Brazil	9,834
Africa	**6,585**
Egypt	1,776
Middle East	**8,985**
Saudi Arabia	1,899
Asia-Pacific	**67,639**
Singapore	18,157
Japan	9,287
Australia	7,457
China	6,229
TOTAL	**352,030**

GRAPH IVb. US DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD BY INDUTRY (%, 2008)



GRAPH IVc. US DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION ABROAD ON A HISTORICAL-COST BASIS (1982-2007)



Source: *US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Analysis 2008*

TABLE IVd. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE US: COUNTRY DETAIL FOR INCOME (2008)

	Million $
Europe	**78,997**
EU-27	**53,951**
United Kingdom	26,321
Switzerland	23,629
Netherlands	12,008
Latin America and the Caribbean	**1,923**
Bermuda Islands	1,244
Netherlands Antilles	896
Mexico	845
Africa	**34**
Middle East	**-1,082**
Arab Emirates	66
Asia-Pacific	**67,639**
Japan	5,447
Australia	3,565
India	897
TOTAL	**99,075**

GRAPH Va. US INTERNATIONAL TRADE. EXPORTS-IMPORTS AND BALANCE (Million % 1992-2008)



Source: *US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Analysis 2008*

TABLE Vb. US INTERNATIONAL TRADE DEFICIT BY COUNTRY (2008)

	Country	Trade deficit in thousand millions $	%
1	China	-266.33	32.45
2	Canada	-74.64	9.09
3	Japan	-72	8.77
4	Mexico	-64.38	7.84
5	Germany	-42.82	5.22
6	Saudi Arabia	-42.31	5.15
7	Ireland	-22.91	2.79
8	Italy	-20.66	2.52
9	Korea, Rep. of	-13.27	1.62
10	Taiwan	-11.05	1.35
TOTAL		**-821.00**	**100**

TABLE Vc. US LARGEST TRADING PARTNERS OF GOODS (2008)

	Country	Exports	Imports	Total	% over total
1	Canada	261.40	335.60	596.90	17.60
2	China	71.50	337.80	409.20	12
3	Mexico	151.50	215.90	367.50	10.80
4	Japan	66.60	139.20	205.80	6.10
5	Germany	54.70	97.60	152.30	4.50
6	United Kingdom	53.80	58.60	112.40	3.30
7	Korea, Rep. of	34.80	48.10	82.90	2.40
8	France	29.20	44.00	73.20	2.20
9	Saudi Arabia	12.50	54.80	67.30	2
10	Venezuela	12.60	51.40	64.00	1.90
11	Brazil	32.90	30.50	63.40	1.90
12	Taiwan	25.30	36.30	61.60	1.80
13	Netherlands	40.20	21.10	61.40	1.80
14	Italy	15.50	36.10	51.60	1.50
15	Belgium	29.00	17.40	46.40	1.40
	Top-15	**891.50**	**1,524.40**	**2,415.80**	**71**
	ALL COUNTRIES	**1,300.50**	**2,100.40**	**3,400.90**	**100**

Source: *US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Analysis* 2008

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Natural resources not connected with energy are abundant in a region that is rich in forestry, fishing and mineral resources. Mineral resources contribute to the production economy on different levels (mines, processing and manufacturing). Trends in other sectors are usually reflected in consumption rates and mining production. For example, the collapse of the real estate sector in 2008 was anticipated by the continued falls in production and consumption of cement, gravel and other products associated with construction.

To get an idea of the contribution of mineral resources to the US economy, one has to follow the value chain of these raw materials. The estimated value of mineral raw materials produced in mines in the United States stood out around 71,000 million dollars in 2008. Exports of raw materials contributed around 14,000 million dollars to the national economy. The bulk of domestic production and recycled materials was used in the processing industry, with a value of 609,000 million dollars. These mineral products, including aluminium, copper, fertilisers, bricks and steel (46,000 million dollars) were consumed by the industry, adding a value of 2.3 billion dollars in 2008, which represents 16% of the GDP.

GRAPH VIa. PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY FUEL (2007, %)



TOTAL CONSUMPTION IN THOUSAND BILLION BTU*: 101.4

* British Thermal Unit

Source: *US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Analysis* 2008

GRAPH VIb. PRIMARY ELECTRICITY GENERATION (2007 %)



ELECTRICITY GENERATION
(IN QUADRILLION BTU 2007): 40,60

Source: US Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Outlook 2009 With Projections to 2030

GRAPH VIc. VI (C). ENERGY EXPENDITURE AS A SHARE (1973-2008)



Source: US Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Outlook 2009 With Projections to 2030

TABLE VId: COMPARISION OF THE EVOLUTION OF ENERGY INTENSITY IN US AND OTHER WORLD POWERS (1981-2006)

	United States			China			Japan			Germany		
	Intensity in toe per $1000 GDP (2000)	CO_2 Emissions (million metric tonnes)	CO_2 Emissions per capita (tonnes)	Intensity in toe per $1000 GDP (2000)	CO_2 Emissions (million metric tonnes)	CO_2 Emissions per capita (tonnes)	Intensity in toe per $1000 GDP (2000)	CO_2 Emissions (million metric tonnes)	CO_2 Emissions per capita (tonnes)	Intensity in toe per $1000 GDP (2000)	CO_2 Emissions (million metric tonnes)	CO_2 Emissions per capita (tonnes)
1981	0.36	4,666.19	20.29	0.89	1,451.63	1.44	0.19	947.09	8.03	-	-	-
1982	0.35	4,421.14	19.04	0.85	1,519.50	1.49	0.18	901.82	7.6	-	-	-
1983	0.34	4,384.34	18.71	0.81	1,606.67	1.55	0.17	869.08	7.27	-	-	-
1984	0.33	4,631.39	19.60	0.76	1,739.09	1.65	0.18	937.92	7.8	-	-	-
1985	0.32	4,618.13	19.37	0.72	1,873.52	1.75	0.17	928.55	7.67	-	-	-
1986	0.31	4,628.86	19.23	0.7	1,987.46	1.83	0.17	881.22	7.24	-	-	-
1987	0.31	4,792.36	19.74	0.66	2,120.56	1.92	0.17	894.19	7.32	-	-	-
1988	0.31	5,013.42	20.46	0.64	2,259.37	2.01	0.16	964.03	7.85	-	-	-
1989	0.30	5,087.94	20.57	0.62	2,294.40	2.04	0.16	993.69	8.07	-	-	-
1990	0.30	5,028.46	20.10	0.6	2,293.39	2.01	0.16	1,053.77	8.52	-	-	11.9
1991	0.30	4,981.65	19.65	0.58	2,401.36	2.07	0.16	1,073.67	8.65	0.19	930.29	11.51
1992	0.29	5,079.53	19.77	0.52	2,475.26	2.11	0.16	1,078.48	8.66	0.19	896.37	10.94
1993	0.29	5,189.10	19.94	0.49	2,640.75	2.23	0.16	1,072.06	8.58	0.19	894.35	10.74
1994	0.28	5,267.00	19.99	0.47	2,855.77	2.38	0.17	1,126.55	8.99	0.18	877.03	10.56
1995	0.28	5,323.97	19.97	0.43	2,903.39	2.4	0.17	1,119.59	8.92	0.18	885.68	10.55
1996	0.28	5,511.50	20.44	0.4	2,936.98	2.4	0.17	1,138.21	9.04	0.18	891.73	10.66
1997	0.27	5,591.68	20.49	0.39	3,133.13	2.53	0.17	1,161.22	9.2	0.18	889.41	10.22
1998	0.26	5,619.66	20.35	0.36	3,029.19	2.43	0.17	1,115.82	8.82	0.17	871.7	10.22
1999	0.25	5,682.26	20.35	0.33	2,992.12	2.38	0.17	1,157.91	9.14	0.17	840.85	9.96
2000	0.25	5,860.38	20.75	0.31	2,966.52	2.34	0.17	1,203.71	9.48	0.16	856.92	10
2001	0.24	5,762.33	20.19	0.3	3,107.99	2.44	0.17	1,197.15	9.4	0.17	877.71	10.25
2002	0.24	5,823.80	20.21	0.3	3,440.60	2.68	0.17	1,203.33	9.44	0.16	857.35	10.44
2003	0.24	5,877.73	20.20	0.32	4,061.64	3.14	0.17	1,253.29	9.81	0.17	874.04	10.22
2004	0.23	5,969.28	20.33	0.34	4,847.33	3.73	0.17	1,257.89	9.84	0.17	871.88	10.14
2005	0.23	5,994.29	20.23	0.35	5,429.30	4.15	0.16	1,249.62	9.78	0.16	852.57	9.75
2006	0.22	5,902.75	19.73	0.34	6,017.69	4.58	0.16	1,246.76	9.76	0.16	857.6	10

Source: *US Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Outlook 2009 With Projections to 2030*

The main contributions to the total value of mining production in 2008 were those of copper (34%), gold (24%), iron (13%), molybdenum (13%), zinc (5%) and lead (4%). The greatest increases in value with respect to 2007 took place in magnesium (200%) and gold (24%). (Source: Mineral Commodity Summaries 2009, US Government)

The United States' dependence on external sources of mineral resources has increased over the past 30 years. In 2008, imports supplied approximately half of the apparent consumption of the 43 mineral raw materials, and were 100% dependent on 18 of them. In 1978, the United States was only 100% dependent on seven of them, and more than 50% on 25. At present, the US is the net importer of 21 mineral resources. In 2008, 11 states produced more than 2 billion dollars of mineral raw materials, around 59% of the total. The states are, in descending order of value, Arizona, Nevada, Florida, Utah, California, Texas, Minnesota, Alaska, Missouri, Colorado and Michigan.

As for natural energy resources, in 2007 the United States possessed proven oil reserves of 21 billion barrels of oil (12th in the world ranking, 1.8% of the world's reserves) and 7.5 trillion cubic metres of natural gas (5th, 3.4% of the world's reserves) (Source: *Oil and Gas Journal* y *World Oil*). The main oil reserves are found in Texas, Alaska and in offshore reserves off the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. There are large gas deposits in almost half of the 50 states, though five of them (Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico and Oklahoma) possess over half of the country's reserves.

Together with Canada, the USA's oil and gas markets are the most integrated and mature, and their price index (the Texas and the Henry Hub) are used as points of reference for the world market. The United States is the main consumer of gas and oil, the third-largest producer of oil (after Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation) and the second-largest producer of gas (after the Russian Federation).

Coal continues to be a fundamental source of energy in the United States, owing to its contribution to the generation of electricity. More than half of the electricity generated is produced by burning coal in over 600 coal-fired power stations. With its abundant reserves (300 years of supply at the rate of current production) the United States is the second-largest world producer of coal after China. Its production has increased by 70% since 1970, owing to the expansion of its use in power stations. The United States exports 9% of its production to more than 40 countries, including Japan, Europe and Canada.

The largest consumer of energy on the planet (22% of the world total), the US possesses a consumption structure that is dependent for the most part on fossil fuels: oil (39%), gas (23%) and coal (22%). Electricity generation is based on the massive use of coal (51%) and nuclear energy (21%). In 2007, the United States had 104 nuclear reactors with an installed potency of 106 GW – approximately a quarter of the world's capacity. The US is planning to build 26 more over the coming years. Renewable energies continue to be a developing sector (6.7% of primary energy). Excluding hydroelectricity, the areas that have experienced the sharpest growth in recent years are those of wind power and biofuels. The United States occupies second place (after Germany) in terms of installed potency generated by wind turbines, with 26.274 MW, and with a growth of 47% over the past 12 months. Texas (7,407MW), Iowa (2,791 MW), California (2,537MW), Minnesota (1,753MW), Washington (1,375MW), Oregon (1,168MW) and New York (1,162MW) are the states that have experienced the greatest development thanks to legislation that they have subsidised through generous bonuses to producing companies, as well as introducing strict restrictions on CO2 emissions. California – whose aim is to achieve 33% of consumption of energy through renewables by 2020 – was the pioneering state following its regulations in the 1990s.

Since 2005, the United States has overtaken Brazil as the leading producer of ethanol. The two countries represent 70% of world production. Biodiesel is marketed in many states that produce oilseeds, even though they are still produced in small amounts. Thanks to the new restrictions on pollution and climate change and to the boost given by fiscal policy, it is estimated that the US market will grow considerably in the coming years. In some states, it is compulsory to sell fuel mixtures containing 10% of ethanol (E-10). In accordance with the Biofuels Association, in 2005 the industry created 150,000 jobs and contributed 3,500 million dollars in taxes at local, state and federal levels.

DEMOGRAPHY, HEALTH, EDUCATION AND INEQUALITY

In 2008 the population of the United States totalled 303,825.000 inhabitants, making it the country with the third highest population after China and India. In the last decade, the growth rate is still positive (0.9%). Over the period 1990-2005 the United States was the member country of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that had received the highest net immigration flow (4.4 per thousand inhabitants) after Luxembourg (8.3), Spain (6.0) and Australia (5.2). In 2005, the registered population of immigrants was 38.3 million, around 12.9% of the total population and 15.2% of the labour force. Most of them come from Central America (Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador) and countries in Asia (China, India, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam). The Hispanic population has now become the most numerous minority. According to the US Census Bureau's Survey of Business Owners: Hispanic-Owned Firms: 2002, the number of Hispanic owners of companies rose to 1.6 million in 2002, generating 222,000 million dollars. The report also points out that the nucleus of poorest Hispanics is concentrated in California.

Immigration has helped to delay the aging of the population. In 2008, citizens over 65 represented 12.7% of the population, very much lower than European figures (between 15% and 20%), or Japan (21.6%). Furthermore, in contrast to the European novel, the absence of a welfare state in the United States diminishes the importance of the demographic structure beyond productivity.

In a country without national medical insurance, 46 million Americans do not have insurance. Health costs in the United States have rocketed since the 1960s with the aging of the population and the application of new technologies. The bulk

of health costs are concentrated in private companies and in the federal programmes Medicare (for those over 65) and Medicaid (for people with limited incomes). In 2008, the total cost reached 2.4 billion dollars, representing a cost per person of 7,900 dollars. In the economy this represents 17% of the GDP, or four times the cost of national defence. These figures are very much higher than those for other member countries of the OECD: Switzerland (10.9% of the GDP), Germany (10.7%), Canada (9.5%) and France (9.5%). The new Obama administration has taken on board the criticism of the US health system over its efficiency, growing costs, inflated prices and poor management, etc., and is attempting to carry out a profound reform of the system.

The US economy is the paradigm of dynamism, innovation, the efficient application of new technologies and the generation of wealth through knowledge. Spending on I+D in 2005 represented 2.62% of GDP. Industry contributed 64% of this spending. Almost 60% of public I+D was spent on research into defence. High-technology industries (40%) and service industries (36%) account for most of the outlay. In contrast, basic research in universities has lost funding in recent years. In 2005, spending on I+D in higher education represented 0.4%, very much lower than the figures for Sweden (0.8%), Finland (0.7%) and China (0.7%). The report on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) for students from OECD countries places the United States in the lowest section, with the worst performance in tests (18th ranking).

Debates between economists and sociologists in the past decade over the growing massive inequality in the United States increased significantly following the dramatic images of the hurricane *Katrina*, which shed light on the country's pockets of poverty and social marginalisation. These images placed in doubt the great American dream. The climax of the discussion took place following the Bush administration's tax reform in 2003 which, it was claimed, favoured those with higher incomes. The financial rescue of finance companies by the Obama government brought to light the scandal of the massive sums earned by executives in the form of bonuses; those same people who had led their companies into bankruptcy.

TABLE VIIa. DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE AND AVERAGE INCOME BY POPULATION GROUPS (2006)

Percentile	Income	Groups of Income	Number of families	Average income of the group ($)	Total US Income ($)	% over total income
		Total population	148,361,000	49,248	7,306,449.32	100.00
		Base 90%	133,524,900	29,952	3,999,404.23	54.74
		Base 10%	14,836,100	222,905	3,307,045.09	45.26
Top 10%	104,366	10-5%	7,418,050	117,643	872,682.31	45.26
Top 5%	147,839	5-1%	5,934,440	188,841	1,120,663.20	33.32
Top 1%	376,378	1-0.5%	741,805	384,921	285,536.04	17.98
Top 0.5%	592,681	0.5-0.1%	593,444	751,644	446,058.73	14.07
Top 0.1%	1,909,872	0.1-0.01%	133,525	2,524,222	337,046.51	7.97
Top 0.01%	10,482,368	0.01%	14,836	16,517,704	245,058.31	3.35

1. Income excluding revenues of the capital

Source: Emmanuel Saez. Http//elsa.berkeley.com.edu/saez/

GRAPH VIIb. SHARE OF TOTAL U.S. INCOME ACCRUING TO THE TOP 10% AND 1% (1917-2006)



Source: Emmanuel Saez. Http//elsa.berkeley.com.edu/saez/

The pattern of incomes in the 1917-2006 historical series shows that incomes in the top 10% bracket represented 45% between the 1920s and the 1940s. This proportion dropped at a dizzying rate during the Second World War and the years of the New Deal to 30%. The shrinking of incomes in the most favoured sectors lasted for approximately almost four decades, until in the late 1970s an increase began once again in the income levels of the highest classes, until they reached current levels, which are very similar to those of the Great Depression. By analysing the most recent period with the data available (1993-2006) it is notable that the progressive enrichment of the higher classes took place in the two periods of economic expansion, during the Clinton administration (1993-2000) and the Bush administration (2000-2006). In both periods, annual growth rates in incomes of the top 1% of the population was 10.1% and 11.0%, respectively, very much higher than the average annual growth rates of the population (3.7% and 2.8%). However, the difference lay in the fact that the distribution of income in 99% of the population enjoyed a growth of 2.4% during the Clinton era and only 0.9% in the Bush here, which suggests that families in the sector of the richest 1% received three-quarters of the country's growth in income.

In the opinion of some experts, the labour market has created greater inequality over the past three decades, as a result not only of technological changes (which promote the incomes of the high classes with access to better education), but also owing to the progressive withdrawal of institutions that emerged from the New Deal and the Second World War, such as progressive fiscal policies, union organisations, business provisions for retirement and health and legal initiatives against legal inequality.



The financial innovations by themselves would not have enabled subprime mortgages to access the market without another sophisticated element of the market: the process of "securitisation" of mortgages; that is to say, including them into financial packages and selling insurance policies backed by said packages to investors, who then received payments from the debt and interest of the purchasers. The two main government-backed mortgage companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, had been developing this technique since the 1970s, adding their guarantee to these insurance policies backed by mortgages to turn them into financial products. However, this market was relatively small until the late 1990s. In this way, Wall Street investors financed the purchasing of dwellings. Investment banks and the new industry of mortgage middlemen gave loans without backing them directly.

During the decade, the private commercial sector and the investment banks developed new instruments that succeeded in marketing subprime mortgages by grouping them together in what were called Collateral Debt Obligations (or CDOs), which were guarantees of payment for the issuing of bonds or the granting of loans. CDOs were fragmented into several different tranches to attract investors with different risk tolerances. Thus, it was achieved that credit assessment agencies allocated the highest rating to the insurance policies in the highest tranche. They were sold on the market as low-risk financial products when in fact they were backed by subprime mortgages. In some cases, loan companies, insurance companies and other market agents achieved something similar by selling Credit Default Swaps (CDS), instruments that ensured a debt in the event of non-payment by the issuer or of bankruptcy.

These innovations brought about the emergence of subprime mortgages from the year 2000 onwards, after which they continued to prejudice the real estate market, which was in a favourable environment featuring a lax Federal Reserve monetary policy and highly permissive regulations. With very low interest rates and regulatory organisations that kept their eyes shut, financial bodies loaned more and more money to finance their purchases of insurance policies backed by mortgages. The banks created subsidiary companies that operated beyond their balances as Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) to purchase financial assets backed by mortgages that were not subject to the regulatory restrictions of other

ANATOMY OF A CRISIS

The financial crisis that spread through US markets and then out to the rest of the world had its origin in a housing prices bubble fed by financial innovations that concealed risk, and without assessment or rating agencies or regulatory or supervisory organisations taking any action over the excess risk.

The price of housing had been increasing every year from the mid-1990s until 2006, very much above the increase in family income. As with other bubbles in the past (such as the one that took place with IT firms in the late 1990s), the continued rise in prices generated future expectations of future increases that stimulated the demand still further, and inflated prices even more.

The rapid increase in subprime loans (for buyers with low purchasing power) inflated housing prices even further. Before the year 2000, subprime mortgages were virtually non-existent, but from that year on they increased in an exponential manner. The sustained increase in housing prices and the introduction of new financial products turned subprime buyers (who had previously been marginalised by the mortgage market) into attractive clients for moneylenders.

financial markets. The financial institutions oriented their strategy toward the short-term, given the yields available, and they began to loan collaterals; that is to say, to repurchase agreements, so that "by 2006, many investment banks were buying and selling a quarter of their balance in one night" (Martin Neil Baily et al.).

The driving force behind the excesses in the mortgage market which led to the 2007 financial crisis was the continual increase in housing prices, and the perception that this increase was not going to end. In fact, from 1975 until the third quarter of 2006, the price index of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) almost never slumped (except for in 1981-1982, when it fell by 5.4%, in the worst recession since the Second World War). Growth rates stood at 6% in 1999, and 8% and 9% before the increases began to bottom out in 2005.

In real terms (that is to say, bearing in mind inflation), the price of housing experienced two expansive cycles from 1975: the first in the early 1980s, and the second in the early 1990s. Between 1975 and 1995, the price of housing increased slightly above the inflation rate. It was in the mid-1990s that the growth rate began to accelerate, up until 2005, turning the real estate sector into not only a great investment, but also a safe one. From the year 2000 onwards, the increase in housing prices shot up way above the growth rate of family incomes.



After the inflationary period of the 1970s and the early '80s, interest rates began to fall, and this trend continued until 2006. One year previously, the price of housing had begun to bottom out before its fall in 2007. It was then that the bubble burst, and the cycle began its dizzying deterioration, with owners of toxic assets (products originating from subprime mortgages) desperately trying to get rid of them.

The rise in housing prices did not take place uniformly across the country. In some states of the Union where there had been an abundance of land for development, as soon as interest rates dropped, the price rocketed, generating a real estate boom and a massive increase in supply. The number of houses built increased from 1.35 million in 1995 to 2.07 million in 2005, of which 1.52 million were built in the South and the West. The growth in demand very soon strangled supply in places of rapid growth where restrictions limited the availability of land, such as in Las Vegas and California, and in the East Coast cities. In the Midwest, however, a more modest increase in prices took place, given that the big cities of the industrial nucleus were already losing jobs as a result of industry migration and the fall in population numbers.

As the environment of low interest rates was a global phenomenon, housing prices also increased in other countries (Spain, Ireland, Great Britain) with the exception of Germany, where unification had created a surplus of housing. Thus house prices in Great Britain increased by 70% between 1998 and 2007, while in Spain they rose by 150% between 1995 and 2005.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

2006

5 December

Ownit Mortgage Solutions, a California mortgage bank specialising in high-risk products, declares itself bankrupt. This was the first mortgage bank to specialise in subprime loans, that is to say, loans to clients who could not fulfil the habitual requirements to access financing for house purchasing. One of its victims was Merrill Lynch, which the year before had placed 4 billion dollars on the market in loans from Ownit.

2007

8 February

HSBC Holdings, an investment bank based in London, declares losses to the value of 10.500 million dollars. The company announced that 20% of the increase in its losses was due to the US subprime mortgages that it contained in its portfolio of bonds.

28 February

Freddie Mae announces that it will not be buying any more issued subprime loans.

13 March

Figures from the Bankers Association for mortgages for the last three months of 2006 show that delayed payments or non-payments increased from 4.95% to 13.3%.

3 April

New Century Financial, a large mortgage bank specialised in subprime, goes into bankruptcy.

10-12 June

The rating agencies Moody's and S&P devalue the value of RMBS subprime mortgages by 5 billion dollars and announce a review of agreed CDOs exposed to RMBS subprime bonds.

12 June

Bear Sterns declares difficulties in two of its risk funds and announces a deterioration in the value of the insurance policies guaranteeing the mortgages.

22 July
Bear Stearns attempts to save one of its investment funds, which had been devalued, with a cash injection of 1,600 million dollars.

31 July
Bear Stearns' two funds file for bankruptcy.

1 August
The French insurance company AXA offers to investors to sell off the funds by converting a bond of 1 billion dollars after the fund had lost 40% of its value in the previous month.

2 August
The German bank IKB Deutsche is absorbed by a public bank owing to excessive exposure to US subprime mortgages.

6 August
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. files for bankruptcy.

9 August
The French bank BNP Paribas freezes three funds owing to losses linked with subprime mortgages.

The European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve increase loans to banks as a result of the lack of liquidity in the market.

For the first time in many years, the amount of commercial paper decreases, in what is a clear signal of a drought of liquidity in the markets.

16 August
The Federal Reserve announces it will be lowering the interest rate by half a point, leaving it at 5.75%

17 August
Countrywide Financial, the US leader in mortgage loans, obtains a credit line of 11.500 million dollars before being absorbed by the Bank of America.

14 September
The British bank Northern Rock receives a payment from the Bank of England in order to cope with the withdrawal of funds.

18 September
The Federal Reserve lowers the interest rate by another point, leaving it at 4.75%.

15 October
Citibank announces losses of 6,400 million dollars.

24 October
Merrill Lynch announces losses of 8,400 million dollars.

31 October
The Federal Reserve lowers the interest rate by a further quarter point, leaving it at 4.5%.

4 November
Citigroup's losses rise to 11,000 million dollars, and its chairman resigns.

7 November
Morgan Stanley declares losses of 3,700 million dollars.

14 November
HSBC reveals new losses to the value of 41,000 million dollars.
Bear Stearns announces losses of 1,200 million dollars.

11 December
The Federal Reserve lowers the interest rate by a further quarter point.

12 December
In coordination with the four other large central banks (the Bank of England, the European Central Bank [ECB], the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Canada), the Federal Reserve designs a line of loans for banks to the value of 40,000 million dollars.

13 December
Citigroup acknowledges a total of 49,000 million dollars of doubtful assets on its balance.

2008

18 January
Washington Mutual (which in the 1980s was the largest grouping of savings banks and was later turned into an investment bank) records losses to the value of 1,870 million dollars. It was acquired by JP Morgan in September 2008.

21 January
On the day that the US stock market closes for holiday (Martin Luther King Day) the largest global drop is recorded, with falls of 7.2% in Germany, 7.4 in India and 5.5% in London.

22 January
The Federal Reserve lowers the interest rate by three-quarters of a point.

16 March
Bear Stearns is sold to JP Morgan in an agreement sponsored by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury with a loan endorsed by the Federal Reserve of 30,000 million dollars. It was the first time that the Federal Reserve had provided aid to an investment bank.

Francisco Andrés Pérez
Research assistant, Europe Programme of CIDOB

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mineral Commodity Summaries 2009, US Government.

NEIL BAILY, Martin; LITAN, Robert E.; JOHNSON, Mathew S. (2008). "The origins of the financial crisis", 2008, nº 3. *The Brookings Institution.*

Oil and Gas Journal <http://www.ogj.com/index.cfm>

SAEZ, Emmanuel, webpage <http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~saez/>

SAEZ, Emmanuel (2008). "Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States". 2008. [en línea] <http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2006prel.pdf>

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Survey of Current Business. April 2009.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Analysis 2008.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. Annual Energy Outlook 2009 with Projections to 2030.

World Economic Outlook Database Nominal GDP list of countries. International Monetary Fund, April 2009 (Datos de 2008).

World Oil http://www.worldoil.com/

CIDOB INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 2009

KEYS TO FACILITATE THE MONITORING OF THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 2008

Migrations in the United States.

Elisabets, 12 - 08001 Barcelona, España - Tel. (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - info@cidob.org

www.cidob.org

Migrations in the United States

The United States is defined as a nation of immigrants. This country, which is the main receiver of foreigners in the world, has for centuries been fed by the arrival of people who were not born on its soil. Firstly, as the destination of colonial flows and the slave trade –of voluntary and forced migrations– and then later on, after independence, with the disembarking of millions of people, many of them attracted by the countries fame as the land of entrepreneurs, and by the promises over the country's ability to transform people from any origin into Americans, into citizens of "one single America".

Therefore it is hardly surprising that immigration has been the object of legislation virtually since the United States was founded. As far back as 1790, Congress passed a law defining the mechanisms for foreigners to become US citizens, and a century later, the federal government took on the responsibility of processing applications from thousands of people trying to enter the country. Since then, US immigration policy has fluctuated between periods of openness and others of greater restriction, in the government's attempt to model the persistent flows of foreigners, most of whom were Europeans until the 1970s, while in recent years they have been predominantly Asians and Latin Americans. The result is that today the US contains 38 million people who were not born in the country, and who represent more than 12% of the country's total population.

Even though the fact of migration forms part of the United States' DNA, the country has never ceased to ponder its implications and consequences. Since the 1980s, with the second great wave of migration of the 20th century (the first took place in the first three decades of that century), and with an increasingly large number of irregular immigrants, the country has been going through a process of demographic and cultural change. During the course of the 1990s and until the early 21st century, questions have persisted over who has the right to be a US citizen, the type of society that is being constructed, the danger of falling into a situation in which there is an excessive demographic concentration of immigrants which will hinder their integration (ghettoisation), the challenges to building social unity on the basis of diversity, the deficiencies of the current migration system's ability to respond to the country's economic needs and, particularly after 11-S, how to reconcile concerns over security and border control with an immigration policy that requires comprehensive reform.

EVOLUTION OF MIGRATION POLICY

In 1908, Israel Zangwill, a young Jew from England staged his play The Melting Pot in Washington. The play's message penetrated the American imaginary, with its metaphor about how a crucible of nationalities and cultures –the product of a process of immigration and colonisation– could lead to the construction of a new and more virtuous society. Under this premise, all immigrants could become "Americans". The term, framed within reflections on the "new man", became disseminated at a time that was marked by the massive arrival of foreigners to the United States, which until the end of the 19th century maintained an 'open doors' policy for whoever wanted to settle in the country. Irish, Germans, Italians and other Europeans from the East, Catholics and Jews all arrived in the country in a great wave of migration that represented the entry of almost 24 million people between 1900 and 1920. In fact, there is a record figure dating from this period that has never been surpassed in percentage terms: by 1910 the citizens born abroad represented 13.5 million of a total of almost 92 million people; that is to say, 14.7% of the total population (currently, the percentage of such immigrants stands at 12.6%).

In the 1920s, public attitudes to immigration became more hostile. At a time in which the Ku Klux Klan turned its wrath on blacks (though also on immigrants), the government opted for a policy that favoured foreigners from Western Europe. A 1921 law introduced the US quota system of entry according to nationality of origin, as well as imposing limitations on the number of immigrants who could enter the country every year, reducing the options for those from Eastern and Southern Europe and obstructing access for those from other parts of the world. In any event, the first major restriction on freedom of immigration into the United States had already been passed in 1884, when the Chinese Exclusion Act established that Chinese could not enter the country for a period of 10 years (under pain of imprisonment and expulsion) as a response to the thousands who had come to work on the construction of the intercontinental highway, and those attracted by "Gold fever" in California.

After having grown steadily in the first three decades of the 20th century, immigration stagnated with the Great Depression, and restrictive policies were maintained until after the Second World War. The reduced immigration rate, together with higher birth rates in the 1950s and '60s, resulted in a lower proportion of immigrants (see Graph 1), though the trend was reversed in the early 1970s following the passing of the Immigration and Nationality Act (1965). In accordance with the mood of defence of civil rights that prevailed in the 1960s, this law abolished the system of quotas according to origin, eliminating restrictions in accordance with nationality, and introduced a system of preferences that granted priority to the immediate family members of US citizens. Direct relatives (spouses, children under 21 and parents) were excluded from the annual immigrant limit, which in turn was increased from 154,000 to 290,000 people. In 1990, the maximum figure was 700,000.

GRAPH I. IMMIGRANTS IN THE US, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE
(1900-2007)



Source: *Center of Immigration Studies*

The Immigration and Nationality Act laid the foundations for a mechanism that has shaped the United States to the present day, and represented the country opening up to immigration from non-European countries. In fact, since the 1970s, Latin Americans and Asians have constituted 75% of the immigrants into the United States. This was in complete contrast to the early decades of the 20th century, when 85% of foreigners came from Europe. The change in immigration patterns of was also marked in terms of the size of the flows. While in 1950 the average annual number of legal immigrants was 250,000, by the 1970s it had reached 450,000, and it rose to 735,000 in the 1980s. From that point on, the figures shot up to one million a year, to the point that the population born abroad doubled in two decades, increasing from 14.1 million in 1980 to 31.1 million in 2000. In accordance with the most recent statistical estimates, the number of immigrants in the United States in 2008 stands at around 38 million, distributed in an unequal manner across the country. The highest numbers of foreigners are concentrated in the southern states and those of the East and West coasts, and in the great metropolitan areas (see Map).

As a consequence of these changes, the 2000 census showed that the United States was experiencing its highest levels of ethnic, racial, cultural and linguistic diversity. While in 1970s the great majority of Americans were able to identify themselves as black or white, in the 21st century, such options for identification had multiplied. In 2002, the US Census Bureau announced that Hispanics now outnumbered blacks as the main minority group, going from 6.4% in 1980 to 12.5% of the total population. According to projections made by this bureau and demographic experts, it is expected that by 2050 Hispanics will represent 25% of the population, compared to 14% of blacks, 8% of Asians and 53% of whites.

THE ENTRY MECHANISMS: A HOUSE WITH THREE DOORS

How does the system for admitting foreigners into the United States operate? Regulation of immigration has been the responsibility of the federal government ever since 1876, when the Supreme Court recognised its exclusive powers in this field. The federal authorities, meanwhile, are in charge of processing applications for entry to the United States. In practice, the admission mechanism is often compared with a house with several doors: there is a front door, through which permanent legal immigrants enter, side doors for the foreigners who enter on a temporary basis, and a back door through which a large number of irregular immigrants enter.

The front door

Foreigners who enter through the "front door" acquire the status of Lawful Permanent Residents, or LPRs, on which they receive the renowned "green card", they have the right to work, they can attend public schools and universities and even work in certain departments of the Armed Forces, and if they comply with specific requirements they can apply for US citizenship. In this respect, the migration policy has four aims: encouraging family reunification, admitting immigrants who already have family members living in the United States, accepting workers with specific skills or those who can cover labour needs where there is a lack of labour, providing refuge to people who run the risk of political, racial or religious persecution in their countries of origin, and ensuring diversity, by admitting people from countries that historically have low rates of immigration into the United States. Generally speaking, it is worth noting that most of those who are "admitted" every year into this category of permanent resident were already living in the United States, whether as students or as irregular immigrants. According to official data for 2008, a total of 1,107,126 people obtained their green cards, of whom 42.1% were new arrivals while the other 57.9% merely changed their legal status.

Foreigners who gain permanent residence through the family route represent the most numerous group –65% of immigrants granted green cards. The reunification of direct family members is not subject to a numerical quota, though such a limitation does exist for applications of entry by distant relatives. The second group of foreigners that enters through the "front door" is comprised of those entering for work reasons. In this case, the system identifies five categories with job preference: workers with exceptional skills, professionals with high levels of education, workers in areas in which there is a lack of labour, special immigrants (members of the clergy, etc.) and employment creators (people prepared to invest one million dollars in business in the United States). A third group includes immigrants for "diversity". This category, created in 1990, has mainly favoured people entering from Africa and Europe, and has an annual quota of 50,000 people (with a maximum of 3,850 per country). According to the 1990 Immigration Act, a limit exists of between 416,000 and 675,000 admissions for residence permits allocated to family members, economic immigrants and "diversity" immigrants.

The last group that can enter the United States through the "front door" is comprised of refugees (who apply for admission from outside the country) and asylum seekers (who apply for protection whether from within the country or on arrival at US

borders). The first legislation in this field dates back to 1948, when the Displaced Persons Act enabled 400,000 people to enter the country from Eastern Europe. The current system is regulated by the 1980 Refugee Act, which grants powers to the president in order that he establish (after consulting with the Senate) the number of refugees to be admitted each year. In accordance with the most recent official figures, 48,217 people were admitted as refugees in 2007 (see Graph 2). It is worth noting that this category includes Cubans who, in accordance with a 1966 law, are admitted to the United States if they succeed in making it to the US shore. Known as "dry feet" they have the right to declare themselves as political refugees, while those who are captured at sea (known as "wet feet") are repatriated to Cuba.

with a temporary visa and then overstayed beyond the specified period. According to estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center, in March 2008 there were 11.9 million unauthorised immigrants living in the United States, a figure that represents 30% of a total of those born abroad residing in the country and 4 % of total population. Irregular immigration in the United States is a phenomenon that has increased significantly in recent years, and proof of this is that four out of every 10 irregular immigrants arrived in the country during the past decade. Of the total number of irregular immigrants, 80% are Latin Americans, and most of them (around 7 million) are Mexicans (see Graphs 3 and 4). In view of these figures, US authorities have concentrated their border control efforts on the southern frontier, where the Border Patrols try to stop people from entering illegally. In recent years, officers have arrested an annual average of one million people, of whom 90% were Mexicans. The rest are simply identified as OTMs ("Other Than Mexicans").

GRAPH II. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES (1990-2007)



Source: *Annual Flow Report,* julio 2008. Office of Immigration Statistics US Homeland Security Department

GRAPH III. IRREGULAR IMMIGRANT POPULATION (2000-2008)



The other doors

The system's "side doors" are those that allow the entry of foreigners on a temporary basis, for a specific purpose, and who are not considered "immigrants" by the US authorities. Dozens of visas exist in this category of non-immigrants, including visas for tourists, cultural exchange, business, etc., but two of them are of particular importance. Firstly, the ones allowing foreign students to enter the country (and which doubled in the past decade to reach a figure of 787,756 students in 2007), and secondly, we should highlight the group of temporary foreign workers, who are generally accepted to work in specialised areas such as those of health or the agricultural sector. In recent years, these visas have mainly benefited citizens of India, who represent one-third of the temporary workers admitted. On a global level, official statistics indicate that during 2007 a total of 171 million "non-immigrants" were admitted to the United States.

Without any doubt, the most complex access route is the one known as the "back door", the one for irregular immigrants. These are people who are in the United States while violating the country's immigration rules, either because they entered without the necessary documents, or because they entered

GRAPH IV. IRREGULAR IMMIGRANTS IN UNITED STATES BY COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN (2008)



Source: *Pew Hispanic Center / Pew Research Center*

MAP I. IRREGULAR IMMIGRANT CONCENTRATIONS IN UNITED STATES (2008)



Source: Pew Hispanic Center

THE SOUTHERN BORDER AND THE EFFECTS OF 11-S

Concerning migration, relations between the United States and its neighbours are crucial, especially with respect to the southern border. Mexico is the main country of origin of immigrants into the US, in terms of both legal and irregular immigrants. In 2006 it was calculated that 11% of people born in Mexico were living in the United States. If the total number of immigrants is added to the number of children of Mexicans born on the soil of their northern neighbour, the population with this origin reaches around 20 million. This is why Mexican presidents often make the comment that they have 125 million Mexicans under their responsibility: 105 million in Mexico and 20 million living in the United States (Martin, 2007).

The migration flow between the two countries has not always been so intense. Historically, the United States has needed Mexican labour, especially in the agricultural sector, and since the early 20th century agreements were signed that facilitated the hiring of workers from the south for specific activities. In the 1940s, US authorities promoted the Bracero Programme, in a context in which US labour was limited owing to the consequences of the Second World War. The programme, which lasted from 1942 to 1964, meant that more than 4 million Mexican workers moved to the United States on a temporary basis. When the plan was brought to an end (following political pressure to favour US labour), part of the Mexican labour force stayed and carried on working, many of them illegally. Even so, the flow of irregular immigrants did not increase until the 1980s, as a result of economic difficulties in Mexico. It was then that Mexicans went from working not only in agriculture and construction but also in industry and services for their northern neighbour.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 attempted to deal with the increase in unauthorised immigration in the United States. The law established sanctions for business owners that hired irregular immigrants while being aware of their status (common practice until that time), and promoted two amnesty programmes that led to the regularisation of 2.7 million people. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into force in 1994, set off alarm bells in sectors of the United States owing to its possible impact on flows of workers. Nevertheless, in practice the agreement (which favours the movement of assets, services and capital) maintained restrictions on the movement of labour and was complemented with measures that intensified border controls, such as the steel wall (known as the "Tortilla Wall") that was built on the border between Tijuana and San Diego, under the auspices of Operation Guardian.

In September 2001, Presidents Vicente Fox and George W. Bush succeeded in making progress with negotiations toward a broad migration reform between Mexico and the United States, which envisaged invited workers' programmes to legalise flows from the south to the north. They had not yet reached a definite agreement when the 11-S attacks froze the whole process. The country was shocked by the attacks, carried out by some 20 terrorists who had entered the country with student or tourist visas (four of them were in an irregular situation after having overstayed their visa). From that day on, security became the main issue on the political agenda, duly imposing its priorities on the sphere of immigration.

On an institutional level, the terrorist threat led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which merged 22 federal agencies and abolished the Immigration and Naturalization Service (created in the late 19th century). Instead, the United States Immigration and Citizenship Services (USCIS) was created within the DHS; this body is responsible for visa applications, naturalisation processes and asylum

and refugee requirements. Furthermore (and also within the DHS), the division of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was set up, which is responsible for supervising the entry of goods and people at all ports of entry in the United States. Their responsibilities now include the prevention and deportation of illegal immigrants.

Together with these organisational changes, the 11-S attacks also determined greater restrictions and controls for entry to the country and the passing of long-term public order laws, with consequences not only for supposed terrorists, but for immigrants in general, both those that were already in the country and those trying to enter. One of the most important of these laws was the USA Patriot Act, signed by President Bush one month after the attacks: the law expanded powers to search, arrest and deport people suspected of terrorism, and it meant that foreigners could be arrested and held for up to seven days, while the government decided whether it was possible to charge the detained person with criminal charges or for violation of migration laws (previously such people could only have been detained without charge for a maximum period of 48 hours).

In a context of mistrust and a rise in nationalist rhetoric, the figure of the immigrant went from being under suspicion to receiving renewed attention. In the US, the Muslim community became criminalised, but a new more profound reflection also began as to the new face of the country's immigrants (which had changed radically in recent years) and on US society itself. Following this trend, in 2004 Samuel Huntington published his controversial book Who are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity, which focused on US national identity and the possible threat that large-scale Latin American immigration constituted, owing to its potential to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures and two languages.

With respect to irregular immigration, from a perspective of national security the fact that large numbers of the population were in an irregular status and thus hard to control was also deemed as having risk potential. In 2006, the US House of Representatives passed the Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Law, which included several controversial regulations, including one that made "illegal immigration" a serious crime. In response, thousands of foreigners took to the streets in several US cities to demand a comprehensive reform of migration, while the Hispanics called for a boycott of work on 1 May (which was called the "day without immigrants") in an attempt to demonstrate the importance of immigration to the US society and its economy.

Under this intensified security logic, land borders also acquired a new dimension. The number of Border Control officers was increased from 6,000 in 1996 to almost 18,000 in 2008; high-technology detection systems were installed and Congress passed a law to build a border wall over 1,000 kilometres long between Mexico and the United States. As a result, the flow of people from the south has been rechanneled to inhospitable areas, and this has encouraged people trafficking networks and has significantly raised the mortality figures for those attempting to cross the border. The figures available vary, but in general they agree that the number of deaths every year reaches hundreds. According to The Economist, while 125 people died in the 1990s trying to cross the desert, since 2000 this figure has increased to more than 1,000. Meanwhile, Santiago Creel, the ex-Secretary of Governance of Mexico, said in 2004 that a Mexican had died every day since 1999 in the border area. In its entire history, fewer than 200 people died trying to cross the Berlin Wall.

The most recent statistical estimates indicate that the flows of illegal immigrants into the United States are reducing. According to a study by the Pew Hispanic Center, while the annual average was around 800,000 people between 2000 and 2004, in recent years this figure has fallen to around 500,000. The official DHS figures also pointed to a fall of 20% in arrests on the southern border in 2007, the lowest figure since 1998. One possible explanation for this decline is the intensification of control and greater vigilance in the application of immigration laws on a federal and state level. Even so, another possible cause is the decline of the US economy, compared to the stability and growth being recorded in Mexico and other Latin American countries. Likewise, we must remember that the crisis in the United States is having a particular impact on foreign workers of Hispanic origin; their rate of unemployment rose from 5.1 % to an 8% between 2007 and 2008, one point above the average unemployment rate in the labour market.

THE POLITICAL QUESTION: THE CHALLENGE OF A COMPREHENSIVE REFORM

On the subject of immigration, US public opinion often shows erratic and even contradictory attitudes which tend to be influenced by the economic situation or by specific events, such as 11-S, which increase the feeling of distrust. In general, opinion polls indicate that US citizens have a positive opinion of immigrants, but at the same time they believe that there are too many of them in the country; they also believe that the legal channels for foreigners in an irregular situation should be broadened, while rejecting the idea of amnesty processes. The public tends to be rather confused on these issues, and their answers depend a lot on how the questions are phrased.

On a political level, it is also argued that there do not seem to be any radical differences between Democratic and Republican voters on the subject of immigration; though Democrats show themselves to be more in favour of regularising irregular workers, while Republicans tend to support temporary employment plans. Historically speaking, both the Republican and the Democratic parties have sought support from immigrant groups and their descendants, but in recent years it was the party of Barack Obama that penetrated this area of the electorate most aggressively (Seele, 2008). According to the calculations of the Pew Hispanic Center, Hispanics now constitute between 6.5 % and 8% of the total number of voters, and they have a particular political weight in states such as California, Texas, Illinois, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Nevada. Though most Hispanics with the right to vote were born in the United States and, therefore, are not directly affected by immigration policy, this issue has a particular symbolic importance for them.

In the last elections, the candidates – both John McCain and Obama, but also Hillary Clinton – claimed to be committed to the idea of a comprehensive migration reform, which would include regularisations for irregular immigrants, temporary work programmes and measures to guarantee the application of the law. However, in the context, in which public opinion was more concerned with the economy and security, the migration issue was elbowed out of the central campaign themes, and in general, more attention was paid to initiatives concerning greater border security. The issue, in any case, represents a great political challenge for the new administration, given the fact that the most recent attempts to modify the system during the Bush term of office failed, in 2006 and 2007. There was not even success for a bipartisan initiative, jointly promoted by the Republican McCain and the Democrat Senator Edward Kennedy, in spite of protracted negotiations in Congress and of the desire (at least, a priori) of both groups to reach an agreement on this subject.

Obama's diagnosis –as he expressed it during the electoral campaign– is that the United States needs to ensure the integrity of its borders, to improve the immigration system (and especially its bureaucracy) and to bring irregular immigrants "out of the shadows", even if they only learn English and pay a fine (so as not to give the sense of an unconditional amnesty, which does not penalise the fact of irregularity). In Obama's opinion, the management of irregularity requires reducing the incentives to illegal entry, and working shoulder to shoulder with Mexico. The new president gave a commitment to present his proposal for migration reform during 2009. However, four months into his term of office, Vice-President Joe Biden admitted that it was not the right time to promote the reform, owing to the recession and growing unemployment in the United States.

The challenge to migration reform is unquestionably a very complex one. The legislative changes must consider concerns with respect to security, resolve the situation of irregular immigrants already in the country, generate mechanisms to ensure that the law is respected and bear in mind the demographic and economic needs of the United States. In this context, it seems unavoidable to acknowledge the role played by irregular immigrants in the United States economy, especially in sectors such as agriculture and construction, and to tackle their situation of precariousness, which makes them an extremely vulnerable sector of the population. It should be borne in mind that there are almost 12 million people in a situation of extreme vulnerability; these people do not only lack any kind of labour rights, but also social, economic and civil rights, and they live in permanent danger of expulsion, without effective recourse to US Justice. Thus they live in a situation of marginalisation that affects not only the social and economic life of the US, but also questions the country's very democratic nature (Massey, 2008).

It seems particularly important that the new regulation should establish respect for immigrants' rights, considering the latest report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants who, following his visit to the United States in 2007, condemned the policies of expulsion and detention of foreigners and claimed that there a worsening of xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes against immigrants had been taking place since 2001. Furthermore, until an effective law is devised at the federal level, state and local governments will continue to choose to generate their own policies (within their powers), which has until now led to a disparity in measures; thus there are some places in the US that attempt to prohibit irregular immigrants' access to public services (or who penalise those who rent accommodation to them), and others where irregular immigrants are allowed access to health and education services and even have the right to vote at a local level.

On a general level, it is highly probable that the trends in the debate will continue to fluctuate between those who are against immigration and demand that it be reduced (because they perceive it as a threat to US labour and cultural unity) and those who champion the idea of opening up borders (fundamentally to inject dynamism into the economy). Questions will persist on national identity and on the best way of managing the diversity of the country at the same time as promoting its political and social unity. Discussions will also persist over amnesties, temporary work permits and the possibility that the United States will adopt a model similar to the European one, instead of (or in addition to) militarising the border, opting for policies of economic support for Mexico and accepting flows as part of the process of economic integration with the United States' southern neighbour. It is an issue that is particularly complex and difficult to tackle for politicians, but it is one that requires responses. And even though it has not been presented as an urgent issue, it is (as The Economist puts it) "a lurking monster".

GRAPH V. NATURALISATIONS IN UNITED STATES
(1908-2008 and 2000-2008)



Source: *Annual Flow Report*, March 2008. Office of Immigration Statistics US Homeland Security Department



US POPULATION BORN ABROAD

PERCENTAGE BY STATE

- 0% - 5%
- 5.1% - 10%
- 10.1% - 15%
- 15.1% - 25%
- More 25%

Each State includes the total of the population born abroad

PERCENTAGE IN THE 25 MOST POPULOUS CITIES

- 4% - 10%
- 10.1% - 15%
- 15.1% - 25%
- 25.1% - 30%
- More 30%

FOREIGN PEOPLE IN THE 25 MOST POPULOUS CITIES (in thousands)

1	New York	3,038	14	Austin	145
2	Los Angeles	1,507	15	Las Vegas	132
3	Chicago	600	16	Forth Worth	111
4	Houston	576	17	Denver	97
5	San Jose	354	18	Charlotte	89
6	San Diego	335	19	Washington	74
7	Phoenix	334	20	Columbus	67
8	Dallas	321	21	Jacksonville	66
9	San Francisco	270	22	Baltimore	39
10	San Antonio	165	23	Indianapolis	51
11	El Paso	160	24	Detroit	38
12	Philadelphia	158	25	Memphis	35
13	Boston	157			

UNITED STATES (2006)

Total Population: 299,399,000
Percentage of foreigners: 12.5%
Number of foreigners: 37,548,000

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION BORN ABROAD BY REGIONS OF ORIGIN (2000)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2009. Statistical Abstract (data 2006)
Migration Policy Institute

Produced by: CIDOB

Naturalisations in the United States: 2008, breaking records

Immigrants can become US citizens through the process of naturalisation. In general, any foreigners with a permanent residence permit and who has been living in the country for more than three or five years (depending on the case) can apply for citizenship. For applicants who have served in the US Armed Forces, the time periods can be shorter. All those wanting to be naturalised should possess "good moral character", knowledge of the history and system of government of the United States, as well as of the English language, and should be prepared to support and defend the country and its constitution.

The number of people naturalised has increased substantially in recent decades, going from fewer than 120,000 people during the 1950s to around 500,000 in the 1990s. The year 2008 witnessed the record in the number of naturalisations, which reached 1,046,539 according to statistics from the Immigration Office of the US Department of Homeland Security (see Graph 5 and Table 1). In accordance with the dynamics of migration flows, until the 1970s most of the foreigners that achieved US citizenship were of European origin. Between 1976 and 2006, Asia was the main region of origin for new citizens, with the exception of the period 1996-2000, when a series of amnesty processes for irregular immigrants enabled the regularisation and naturalisation of a large number of foreigners from "North America" (which includes Central America, the Caribbean, Mexico and Canada, according to US official categories). Since 2007, naturalisation of Mexican immigrants has increased by 90%, while those of Salvadorans, Cubans, Nicaraguans and Guatemalans increased by more than 100%. Mexico is at the head of the list of countries of origin of naturalisations, and represented 22 % of the naturalisations recorded in 2008, almost tripling the figures for 2006. After Mexico, the main countries of origin of new citizens are India, the Philippines, China and Cuba (see Graph 6).

After obtaining citizenship, those not born in the United States may have access to almost all the benefits that the Constitution grants to "born and bred" Americans, including the right to vote. Some naturalised foreigners have reached high political office, such as the ex-Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger (born in Germany) and the actor and current Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger (of Austrian origin).

TABLE I. PERSONS NATURALISED BY REGION AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (2008)

Region/Country of birth	Number	%
REGION		
Africa	54,420	5.2
Asia	323,792	30.9
Europe	115,187	11.0
North America	462,372	44.2
Caribbean	131,935	12.6
Central America	86,168	8.2
Other North America	244,269	23.3
Oceania	4,781	0.5
South America	84,853	8.1
Unknown	1,134	0.1
COUNTRY		
Mexico	231,815	22.2
India	65,971	6.3
Philippines	58,792	5.6
China	40,017	3.8
Cuba	39,871	3.8
Vietnam	39,584	3.8
El Salvador	35,796	3.4
Dominican Rep.	35,251	3.4
Colombia	22,926	2.2
Korea	22,759	2.2
Jamaica	21,324	2.0
Haiti	21,229	2.0
Nicaragua	17,954	1.7
Guatemala	17,087	1.6
Peru	15,016	1.4
Poland	14,237	1.4
Canada	12,387	1.2
United Kingdom	12,095	1.2
Ecuador	11,908	1.1
Iran	11,813	1.1
All other countries	298,707	28.5
TOTAL	**1,046,539**	

Source: *Annual Report Flow,* March 2009. Office of Immigration Statistics US Homeland Security Department

The profile of the immigrant

A study by the Center for Immigration Studies on the profile of the population not born in the United States concluded in 2007 that 48.3% of immigrants are Hispanics, 23% Asians, 20.9% white and 7.5% black. One out of every three immigrants in the country is in an irregular situation. Half of the Mexicans and Central Americans and one-third of South Americans in the country do not have their documentation in order. Of the total of immigrant adults, 31% did not complete their secondary education, compared with 8% of natives; and this proportion has increased by 14% since the year 2000.

The poverty rate for immigrants and their children born in the United States (under 18 years of age) stands at 17%, which is almost 50% more than in the case of native-born Americans and their children. The percentage of homes maintained by immigrants using social welfare programmes is 33% compared with 19% in the case of native-born Americans, while 34% of immigrants do not have any health insurance, compared to 13% of born and bred Americans. According to the study, carried out by Steven Camarota, those not born in the United States make significant progress over the course of time, but even those who have been in the country for more than 20 years are more likely than native-born Americans to be in a situation of poverty, to lack medical insurance or in the use of social welfare programmes. This reality, the document notes, is determined by the low level of education among immigrants, and not by their legal status or by a lack of desire to work.

Ellis Island:
A symbol of the migration experience in the United States

On 2 January 1892, Annie Moore, a 15-year-old Irish girl, became the first foreigner to have her entry to the United States processed in the installations on Ellis Island. From that day on, and for the next 62 years, more than 12 million immigrants entered the country through this tiny island in the port of New York, located very close to the Statue of Liberty. In the late 19th century, political instability and the deterioration of economic conditions in Europe brought about a great wave of migration into the United States. Thousands of immigrants began to arrive at the ports of Boston, New York, San Francisco, Miami and New Orleans. Given the enormous numbers of people disembarking at New York, a favourite destination of shipping companies, the US federal government decided to build a new station for receiving immigrants on Ellis Island. It was there that the entry of foreigners was processed, access being denied them if they were suffering from a contagious disease that represented a danger for public health, or if they had a criminal record or an illegal work contract. In the 1920s, migration flows began to slow down, and from 1924 onwards only people with problems with their documentation, refugees or displaced persons were detained on the island, which was officially closed in 1954. After a monumental process of restoration, the island was reopened to the public in the 1990s with a museum dedicated to the history of four centuries of immigration into the United States, before and after its independence. The Ellis Island website (www.ellisisland.org <http://www.ellisisland.org/>) contains several different testaments from immigrant families and the names and routes of all the ships that sailed into the port of New York between 1892 and 1924. Furthermore, anyone who has immigrant ancestors in the United States can search for the name of their family members, find their disembarkation records and even images of the ships on which they sailed, all those years ago.

TABLE VI. TEN SOURCE COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1970-2007)

1970	
Italy	10%
Germany	9%
Canada	8%
Mexico	8%
United Kingdom	7%
Poland	6%
Soviet Union	5%
Cuba	5%
Ireland	3%
Austria	2%
All other countries	37%
TOTAL FOREIGN POPULATION: 9,619,302	

1990	
Mexico	21%
China	5%
Philippines	5%
Canada	4%
Cuba	4%
Germany	4%
United Kingdom	3%
Italy	3%
Korea	3%
Vietnam	3%
All other countries	45%
TOTAL FOREIGN POPULATION: 19,767,316	

2007	
Mexico	31%
Philippines	4%
India	4%
China	4%
El Salvador	3%
Vietnam	3%
Korea	3%
Cuba	3%
Canada	2%
Dominican Rep.	2%
All other countries	42%
TOTAL FOREIGN POPULATION: 38,059,694	

Source: Migration Policy Institute

Pamela Urrutia Arestizábal
Research Assistant, Migration Programme of CIDOB

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BARR, M., JEFFEFERYS, K. & MONGER,R. (2008): Nonimmigrant admissions to the United States: 2007. Annual Flow Report, Office of Immigration Statistics. US Department of Homeland Security (August); Washington D.C.
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ni_fr_2007.pdf>

CAMAROTA, S. (2007): Immigrants in the United States, 2007. A profile of America's foreign born population. Center for Immigration Studies (November). www.cis.org/immigrants_profile_2007>

Center for Immigration Studies (2009): Immigration History-Overview. www.cis.org/ImmigrationHistory>

Congress of the United States (2006): "Immigration Policy in the United States", Congressional Budget Office Paper, February.www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7051/02-28-Immigration.pdf>

CREEL, S. (2004): "La migración y la seguridad entre México y Estados Unidos". Foreign Affairs en Español, Vol.4, Nº 2, April -June. México D.F. Pp. 2-12.

GIL, S. (2002): "Extranjeros bajo sospecha: Lucha contra el terrorismo y política migratoria en Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea". Anuario CIP 2002: De Nueva York a Kabul, Icaria, Barcelona.

KOCHAR, R. (2009): Unemployment rises sharply among Latino immigrants in 2008. Pew Hispanic Center-Pew Research Center, February. <http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=102>

HOEFER, M; RYTINA, N. & BAKER, B. (2009): Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2008. Population Estimates, Office of Immigration Statistics, US Department of Homeland Security.
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2007.pdf>

JEFFERYS, K. & MARTIN, D (2008): Refugees and Asylees: 2007. Annual Flow Report, Office of Immigration Statistics. US Department of Homeland Security (July), Washington D.C.<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2007.pdf>

LEE, J. & RYTINA, N. (2009): Naturalizations in the United States: 2008. Annual Flow Report, Office of Immigration Statistics. US Department of Homeland Security (March), Washington D.C.
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/natz_fr_2008.pdf>

MANGUM, G. (2009): A historical perspective of US Immigration Policy, Policy in Depth. Center for Public Policy & Administration, University of Utah. www.cppa.utah.edu <http://www.cppa.utah.edu>

MARTIN, P. (2007): "Creación y recreación de Estados Unidos". Vanguardia Dossier, Nº 22, January -March. Barcelona. Pp. 28-36.

MASSEY, P. (2008): "La inmigración y las elecciones". Vanguardia Dossier, Nº 29, October-December. Barcelona. Pp. 56-59.

Migration Policy Institute (2005): A new century: Immigration and the US. Migration Information Source, February.
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Resources/united-states.cfm>

MONGER, R. & RYTINA, N. (2009): US Legal permanent residents: 2008. Annual Flow Report, Office of Immigration Statistics. US Department of Homeland Security (March), Washington D.C.
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lpr_fr_2008.pdf>

Naciones Unidas-Consejo de Derechos Humanos (2008): Informe del Relator Especial sobre los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes. Misión en Estados Unidos de América. March.

NIESSEN, J. & SCHIBEL, Y. (2003): EU and US approaches to the management of immigration. Migration Policy Group, Brussels.

PAPADEMETRIOU, D. & TERRAZAS, A. (2009): Immigrants and the current economic crisis: research evidence, policy challenges and implications. Migration Policy Institute, January./www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/lmi_recessionJan09.pdf>

US Department of Homeland Security (2008): Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2007. Office of Immigration Statistics, Washington D.C.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2007/ois_2007_yearbook.pdf

PASSEL, J. & COHN, V. (2008): Trends in unauthorized immigration: undocumented inflow now trails legal inflow. Pew Hispanic Center-Pew Research Center, October.
<http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.hp?ReportID=94>

SELEE, A. (2008): "La migración y las elecciones en Estados Unidos". Foreign Affairs en Español, Vol. 8, Nº 2, April-June. México D. F. Pp. 51 - 60.

SINGER, A. (2003): "La inmigración y los cambios del siglo XX y retos del XXI". Vanguardia Dossier, Nº 3, July- September. Pp. 82-88.

The Economist
- "Good Neighbours make fences", 2-10-2008
- "The lurking monster", 2-10-2008

The Washington Post
- "One Nation, Indivisible: Is it History?" 22-2-1998