



## Analytical Glossary

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## Executive summary

The Analytical Glossary provides detailed and concise definitions, terminology, concepts and benchmarks as key reference document for InvigoratEU research.

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## About InvigoratEU

InvigoratEU is a Horizon Europe-funded project, coordinated by the EU-Chair at the University of Duisburg-Essen (UDE) together with the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin. The project, with a duration of 3 years from January 2024 until December 2026, examines how the EU can structure its future relations with its Eastern neighbours and the countries of the Western Balkans. The consortium has received around three million euros for this endeavour.

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About the project: [www.invigorat.eu](http://www.invigorat.eu)

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## 1 Work Package Structure and Keywords according to Analytical Logics

The following table offers an overview of InvigoratEU's Work Package structure, while subdividing WPs into their corresponding objectives, and overarching analytical logics.

*Table 1 Overview of the InvigoratEU Work Package Structure and Keywords according to the project's two analytical logics*

Resilience			
WP3: 'Framework and Stocktaking'		Resilience Modernisation and geopolitical logics Tools & Objectives of enlargement and neighbourhood policies Multidimensional & integrated security Strategic autonomy	
Modernisation logic		Geopolitical logic	
WP4: 'Democratisation in Conflict and Post-Conflict'	Democracy, democratisation Stability Resilience 'Non-Western' approaches to democratisation Hybrid war	WP6: 'External actors' geopolitical ambitions'	Resilience Multidimensional & integrated security Political, economic & social influences Influence & leverage Regional stability Scenario-building
WP5: 'Acquis Compliance'	Resilience Social Cohesion, instability, (socioeconomic) inequality Economic liberalization Welfare statism Legal/legislative/formal & social convergence Compliance	WP7: 'Critical Infrastructures'	Interdependence Connectivity Critical infrastructure (energy, transportation, communication, cyber) Cyber & kinetic attacks
		WP8: 'Security and Defense'	Capacity-building Resilience Military arrangement and instruments/European security architecture
Vision, Strategy and Toolbox			
WP9: 'Visions and Toolkit for Policy-Community'		Regional and European resilience Foresight Differentiation	
WP10: 'Toolkit for citizens and CSO'		Resilience Defensible citizens	

## 2 Key Theoretical Concepts and Frameworks

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### Resilience

In its traditional definition, resilience is defined as *“the ability of states and societies to reform thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”*<sup>1</sup>. This conception *“requires us to be prepared for unknown risks; adaptation, learning by doing and flexibility as a way to respond to shocks, to embrace change and to live with rather than completely eliminate uncertainty.”*<sup>2</sup>

Resilience differs from ‘stability’, as resilience calls for states and societies to respond, adapt and to change **peacefully**<sup>3</sup>, as opposed to presenting stable, but non-adaptive (autocratic) regimes. It is thus based on three interrelated sources: *“social trust within societies and communities, legitimacy of (state and non-state) governance actors and institutions, as well as effective, fair, and inclusive governance institutions.”*<sup>4</sup> These governance actors and institutions can be both state, and non-state actors.

The term ‘resilience’ has been criticised for its ambiguity, its tendency towards the de-politicisation and responsabilization of the actors in conflict, while shifting the burden of security-provision from the state to the level of society, and the change of its conception of insecurity from external and controllable, to internal and inevitable.<sup>5</sup> It has been further argued, that *“resilience risks overlooking the systemic factors underlying societal vulnerabilities that drive risks and crises [such as ... inequality]”*<sup>6</sup>.

InvigoratEU’s understanding of resilience responds to these criticisms in a twofold manner. (1) It is based on a holistic understanding of resilience that addresses the resilience of the EU territory as being connected to the resilience of its neighbourhood and third actors’ geopolitical ambitions. (2) It relies on a broad definition that includes both **societal and state resilience**.

**Societal resilience** aligns with the modernisation logic. This assumes that higher and more inclusive forms of social trust, as well as more efficient and legitimate governance institutions, i.e. more social cohesion, internal, health and human security, less socio-economic inequalities, increase the abilities of entities to anticipate, cope with, adapt to, and recover from external and internal challenges. Hence, engagement to foster societal resilience is not state-centric, but engages local governance actors, civil society and also the private sector. This more traditional interpretation of resilience is thus different from other cognate

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<sup>1</sup> European External Action Service: European Union Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Ana E. Juncos: Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn?, in: European Security, 26 (1), 2017, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Eric Stollenwerk/Tanja A. Börzel/Thomas Risse: Theorizing resilience-building in the EU’s neighbourhood: introduction to the special issue, in: Democratization, 28 (7), 2021, p. 1223.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1221.

<sup>5</sup> Wolfgang Wagner/Rosanne Anholt: Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising?, in: Contemporary Security Policy, 37 (3), 2016, pp. 419-422.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 419.

terms, such as “security” and “defence”, as it does not imply an ‘other’ from whom protection is needed.<sup>7</sup>

**State resilience** focuses on elements such as territorial security, energy security and the security of infrastructure. It is understood through a geopolitical logic in which external actors and external risks (regional, global and diffuse) can act as resilience spoilers.<sup>8</sup> Approaches to fostering state resilience range from democracy and stability programs, military and security capacity-building to connectivity initiatives across the EU and its neighbourhood, also in terms of critical infrastructure.

Within the context of EU policymaking, and its foreign and security policy, resilience concepts initially emerged as transformative ideals, stressing bottom-up and locally based approaches to foster democratization efforts based on mutual recognition. Additionally, resilience looked to bridge short-term and long-term intervention, contribute to effective multilateralism. By the time of its feature in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the understanding of resilience had taken a different turn, then focusing on a ‘principled pragmatist’ interpretation that featured crisis management, capacity-building and attention to the EU’s (closer) neighbours. This shift reflected changes in the international landscape, marked by the contestation of the rules-based order, experiences of unsuccessful crisis management, such as in Syria and Ukraine, and a generalized ‘crisification’<sup>9</sup> of EU policymaking. The “*ever more connected, contested and complex world*”,<sup>10</sup> attested to in the 2019 follow-up report on the EUGS, is the basis of the latest turn in the EU’s understanding of resilience. Resilience has become a defensive strategy by which the EU focuses on building its internal security by way of strengthening critical infrastructure, defending against hybrid threats and other forms of foreign interference. Its normative ambitions are greatly limited to the Eastern Partnership countries. Bargués, Joseph and Juncos argue that this latest “*defensive reinterpretation of resilience is eroding the distinctive, normative character of EU foreign and security policy*”.<sup>11</sup> The authors conclude that in order for the EU to retain its normative power, a move by the EU to a more transformative approach to resilience is required.<sup>12</sup>

The InvigoratEU project takes account of the concept’s trajectory by positing that Europe’s resilience – that of the EU and its neighbourhood – and an invigoration of its enlargement and neighbourhood policies need to consider both a modernisation and a geopolitical logic.

## Modernisation and geopolitical logic

**Modernisation logic:** is the traditional logic to the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies. It postulates that an alignment with the EU acquis serves to stabilise countries and to facilitate a deep reform process. Next to the ability to take on the obligations of the acquis communautaire and to effectively implement its rules, standards and policies, EU

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<sup>7</sup> Juncos: Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm, 2017, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Stollenwerk/ Börzel/Risse: Theorizing resilience-building in the EU’s neighbourhood, 2021, pp. 1226, 1230.

<sup>9</sup> Mark Rhinard: The crisification of policy-making in the European Union, in: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 57(3), 2019, p.617.

<sup>10</sup> European External Action Service: The European Union’s Global Strategy: three years on, looking forward, 2019, p.8.

<sup>11</sup> Pol Bargués/Jonathan Joseph/Ana E. Juncos: Rescuing the liberal international order: crisis, resilience and EU security policy, in: International Affairs, 99 (6), 2023, p.2283.

<sup>12</sup> See, *ibid*, p.2299.

accession candidates must reform to ensure stable institutions, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for an protection of minorities, as well as a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. These three elements constitute the EU's Copenhagen Criteria.<sup>13</sup> The modernisation logic and EU accession process draw from modernisation, democratisation, democratic transformation, and liberal peace theories. However, amid geopolitical challenges, it is becoming harder for the EU's modernisation policies to have their desired impact. Hence, *"InvigoratEU analyses democratisation processes in the specific context of conflict and territorial contestation and the role of EU democracy promotion therein."*<sup>14</sup>

Geopolitical logic: starts from the point that modernisation and democratisation in the EU's neighbourhood are undermined by threats to national security and geopolitical rivalry. Hence, the defence of the political and economic autonomy of the EU, the Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans trumps modernisation incentives and shifts the EU's focus towards security/military capacity-building and resilience-building by ways of increased connectivity, security and defence development and cooperation, and the development of joint strategies to counter other global actors' ambitions.

The two-track logic is applied as the project's research design. Both tracks represent pieces of the same puzzle, that may complement each other, with different temporalities (short, medium and long-term): in the shorter-term, enlargement policy can refocus on capacity-building and critical infrastructure rather than regulatory alignment with the EU acquis.

Both logics are furthermore interdependent, as primary and secondary impacts of challenges to territorial security create additional challenges to social cohesion, economic and energy security and stability, social inequalities and increased polarization. At the same time, internal divisions and institutional instability can enhance vulnerabilities to the influence and leverage of (malign) third actors. Likewise, the combination of both elements reframes the discourse of and on enlargement: The geopolitical lens not only serves to situate enlargement in a context of instability, external threats and increasing risks, but also changes how, with which strategies and to what avail modernization strategies are undertaken.

InvigoratEU thus explores resilience and resilience-building through the prisms of democratisation (WP4), social cohesion and institutional stability (WP5), as well as integrated and regional security (WP6), strategic autonomy (WP3), trans-geographic connectivity, also of critical infrastructures (WP7), and military capacity-building and cooperation (WP8).

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<sup>13</sup> European Union: Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria), EUR-Lex, available at: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:accession\\_criteria\\_copenhagen](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:accession_criteria_copenhagen) (last accessed: 13.03.2024).

<sup>14</sup> See Stollenwerk/Börzel/Risse: Theorizing resilience-building in the EU's neighbourhood, 2021, pp. 1219-1238; Antoaneta Dimitrova/Geoffrey Pridham: International actors and democracy promotion in central and eastern Europe: the integration model and its limits, in: *Democratization*, 11(5), 2004, pp. 91-112; Frank Schimmelfennig/Hanno Scholtz: EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange, in: *European Union Politics*, 9(29), 2008, pp. 187-215; Kathryn Stoner/Michael McFaul (eds.): *Transitions to Democracy. A Comparative Perspective*, Johns Hopkins University Press 2013; Richard Youngs: *The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015; Laure Delcour/Kataryna Wolczuk: Spoiler or facilitator of democratization?: Russia's role in Georgia and Ukraine, in: *Democratization*, 22 (3), 2015, pp. 459-478; Ritsa Panagiotou: The Western Balkans between Russia and the European Union: perceptions, reality, and impact on enlargement, in: *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 29 (2), 2021, pp. 219-233; Giselle Bosse: Authoritarian consolidation in Belarus: What role for the EU?, in: *European View*, 20 (2), 2021, pp. 201-210.

### Triple “R” Approach: Reform, respond, rebuild

As discussed above, InvigoratEU offers a reconceptualization of resilience by combining the geopolitical and modernisation logics, while applying the innovative triple “R” approach. It posits that in order to invigorate resilience in Europe, analysis (Goal 1 of InvigoratEU) and recommendations on how to reform the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policy in a new geopolitical phase, respond to other actors’ geopolitical ambitions in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans, and rebuild the EU’s foreign policy arsenal in view of a prospective new era of military interventions on the continent are crucial.

### AVIS Scheme

The AVIS Scheme: Analysing, Visioning, Interrogating, Strategizing combines original empirical infrastructure in the InvigoratEU project with its new qualitative and quantitative data. The use of these four different dimensions will produce sound knowledge and scientifically robust recommendations culminating in a multidimensional toolbox (Goal 2 of InvigoratEU), which identifies credible pathways on how to make Europe more resilient and to invigorate the EU’s neighbourhood and enlargement policies.

Analysis: InvigoratEU investigates how to reform the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies in a new geopolitical phase, respond to other actors’ geopolitical ambitions, and rebuild the EU’s foreign policy arsenal in view of a new era of military interventions on the continent.

Visioning: Within the visioning domain, InvigoratEU consortium members elaborate plausible futures and scenarios based on identified drivers for a clear political agenda.

Interrogating: In the third dimension, Consortium members interrogate substantial research findings through exchange with stakeholders, civil society, citizens and topic-related research projects.

Strategizing: The aim of the strategizing domain is to identify instruments, institutions, and policies best suited to achieve the preferred scenario in a short-, medium- and long-term.

All dimensions are based on strong stakeholder, civil society, citizen engagement and exchange with topic-related research projects culminating in the InvigoratEU multidimensional toolbox with context-sensitive policy recommendations on how to invigorate the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies for a resilient Europe.



## 3 Alphabetical Glossary of Key Terms

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### Affiliate membership

(WP 3 → [EU integration models](#))

Affiliate membership: “a durable settlement and not [...] a springboard for full membership.” While there would be partial official engagement with the political, administrative and judicial institutions of the Union, and possibly full participation in EU spending programmes, “[t]he Copenhagen criteria should be retained by the EU as its benchmark for accession but not affiliation.”<sup>15</sup> As such, “affiliated countries would not be expected to sign up to the political objectives of the Union [... and would retain their] national sovereignty.”<sup>16</sup>

### Capacity Development

(WPs 4, 5)

Capacity development is understood from the purview of modernisation theory in which the EU and other external actors support the development of effective, fair, transparent, and inclusive political processes and institutions.<sup>17</sup>

### Capacity-building

(WP 8)

Capacity-building is understood from a geopolitical perspective, focusing on the development and expansion of military and security capabilities to ensure a robust regional ecosystem in the prospective era of military threats and (hybrid) security risks.

### Cohesion

(WP 5)

InvigoratEU defines cohesions as the “capacity of a society to ensure the well-being of all its members, minimising disparities, avoiding marginalisation”<sup>18</sup> and representing stable institutions. InvigoratEU investigates cohesion in the fields of social cohesion (life satisfaction, trust, social behaviour, inclusion, participation)<sup>19</sup>, economic cohesion (socio-economic equality, mutually beneficial labour migration) and territorial cohesion (geopolitical threats, secessionism).

### Compliance and convergence

(WP 5)

Compliance refers to the national implementation of EU law (or EU rules broadly defined). In the context of enlargement, it also concerns the implementation of EU rules by non-member countries (such as candidate and associated countries willing or obliged to adopt

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<sup>15</sup> Andrew Duff: Dealing with the Neighbours: The case for an affiliate membership of the European Union and a new Security Council, EPC, December 2021, p.9.

<sup>16</sup> Andrew Duff: The Wider Europe: a time for experiments, EU3D-Blog, January 2022.

<sup>17</sup> Eric Stollenwerk/Tanja A. Börzel/Thomas Risse: Theorizing resilience-building in the EU’s neighbourhood: introduction to the special issue, in: Democratization, 28 (7), 2021, p.1229.

<sup>18</sup> Xavier Fonseca/Stephan Lukosch/Frances Brazier: Social cohesion revisited: a new definition and how to characterize it, in: Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 32(2), 2018, p.234.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

EU rules). Compliance can be subdivided into the legal transposition of EU law into national law (as in the case of EU directives for member states and EU rules in general for non-member states) and the practical application of EU rules in national policy.

Convergence refers to a process of alignment. The object of alignment is variable. In the context of regional integration, or enlargement, it refers to the convergence of institutions, policies, state performance, or compliance with EU law. Moreover, we distinguish between convergence through catching up (beta-convergence) and convergence through growing together (sigma convergence). In the context of enlargement, beta convergence typically is the degree to which candidates and new member states align with a legal or policy standard set by the EU, whereas sigma convergence denotes to what extent the region becomes more similar. Note that sigma convergence can mean, in principle, that countries become more similar but deviate together from a given standard.

With regard to the “social dimension”, compliance refers to the implementation of the EU social acquis. Convergence refers how well the candidate countries as a group comply with EU social acquis (beta convergence) and to what extent the candidate countries become similar to each other and to the member states with respect to important social indicators.

### Comprehensive security

(WP 8)

InvigoratEU defines the comprehensive security approach as being comprised of territorial security, internal security and human security.<sup>20</sup> It follows the traditions of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy's which includes the “coherent use of all policies at the EU's disposal”, the EU's action at all stages of the conflict cycle (prevention, response, stabilisation), at different levels of governance and by ways of comprehensive partnerships and agreements with regional international partners.<sup>21</sup>

NB: The terms ‘multidimensional security’ or ‘integrated security’ may be applied synonymously.

### Connectivity

(WP 7)

Connectivity refers to the linkage of territorial and political entities to one another. Connectivity in the sense of InvigoratEU includes an economic component as well as a political and security component.<sup>22</sup>

At the same time, increased connectivity can lead to strategic dependence, especially of critical infrastructure and supply chains. **Strategic autonomy** serves as a balance to connectivity challenges by positing – in the context of the EU – that the European Union must

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<sup>20</sup> Mary Kaldor/Iavor Rangelov/Sabine Selchow: EU Global Strategy and Human Security: Rethinking Approaches to Conflict. Routledge, 2018.

<sup>21</sup> See European External Action Service: European Union Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, 2016.

<sup>22</sup> Sven Biscop: Use connectivity to strengthen multilateral cooperation in the EU's neighbourhood, Egmont 2020.

ensure coherence and actorness in its policies, while upholding the values of the liberal international order.

## Credibility

(WPs 3, 4, 5, 9)

Following the External Incentives Model, EU conditionality – the conditional adoption of the EU acquis by candidate countries – hinges upon the credibility of conditionality.<sup>23</sup> The model distinguishes between the credibility of the threat to exclude non-compliant countries from accession and the credibility of the promise that countries that meet the conditions are then also admitted as members.

## Critical infrastructure

(WP 7)

Critical infrastructure refers to assets that are essential for the functioning of a society and economy. “Although the list of critical infrastructure [...] has grown in the EU and its member states in recent years, the analysis [within the InvigoratEU project] will limit itself to energy, transportation, and communication [including cyber security].”<sup>24</sup>

## Democracy

(WP 4)

Democracy is a political system in which political authority is legitimised through competitive, free and fair elections to which equal access is ensured. Democracy is one of the EU's founding principles and enshrined in Article 10 TEU.

In political science, there is broad variation in conceptualising democracy, including, for example, electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative or egalitarian conceptions.<sup>25</sup> In studies of [democratisation](#), democracy is generally conceptualised in liberal and institutionalist procedural terms<sup>26</sup>, whereby political institutions are seen as the normative procedural core of democracy, based inter alia on a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability and effective power to govern.<sup>27</sup>

## Democratisation

(WP 4 → [Democracy](#))

Democratisation is understood as the process of transition towards a more democratic political system, marked by increased political participation, pluralism, accountability, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Definitions of the substance, goals and determinants of democratisation depend on how democracy is understood and conceptualised. Four key

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<sup>23</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig/Ulrich Sedelmeier: The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: the External Incentives Model Revisited, in: Paper for the JMF25 conference, 2017, p.2.

<sup>24</sup> InvigoratEU Project Proposal, p.11.

<sup>25</sup> Michael Coppedge et al.: Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: A new approach, in: Perspectives on Politics, 9(2), 2011, pp.247-267.

<sup>26</sup> See for example: Wolfgang Merkel: Democratization, Taylor & Francis 2004; Douglas C. North: Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>27</sup> See for example: Lucan A. Way: Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, in: Scott Mainwaring/Tarek Masoud. (eds.): Democracy in Hard Places, Oxford University Press 2022.

perspectives on democratisation can be distinguished: (i) socio-economic, (ii) top-down, (iii) bottom-up and (iv) everyday democratisation.

Socio-economic democratisation: Early works analysed democratisation as the result of structural variables, such as socioeconomic development and in particular economic growth<sup>28</sup>, or dependent on specific cultural values.<sup>29</sup> Conditions of inequality between different social groups can also shape the character of the state-citizen relationship and thereby processes of democratisation and de-democratisation.<sup>30</sup> From this perspective, democratisation is conceived in terms of the degree to which a breadth of citizens has equal access to binding forms of consultation with the state and are protected from arbitrary state action, the extent to which trust networks are integrated into public affairs and policies and how far public policy is 'insulated from categorical inequality'.

Top-down democratisation: This perspective focuses on domestic as well as external actors and factors to analyse democratisation processes. Amongst others, scholarship has focused on the role of illiberal regional powers, such as the influence of Russia, China or Turkey on hampering democratisation.<sup>31</sup> Many works also examine the role of the EU in democratisation processes.<sup>32</sup>

Bottom-up democratisation: The concept of 'democratisation from below' refers to a bottom-up approach to democratisation where citizens take an active role in promoting democracy. This process typically involves civil society organisations<sup>33</sup>, grassroots initiatives and informal organisations<sup>34</sup> that seek to empower marginalised communities and hold political entities accountable, or social movements<sup>35</sup> generating pressures for democratic reforms through involvement of the 'masses'.

Everyday democratisation: This perspective underlines the importance of the 'everyday places' to democratisation. 'Ordinary' peoples' ability to see and exploit their political rights is not viewed as innate, but rather 'learned first and foremost where citizens actually live their lives: in families, schools, workplaces and communities'.<sup>36</sup>

## Differentiated integration (DI)

(WP 3 → [EU integration models](#))

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<sup>28</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset: Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy, in: *The American Political Science Review* 1995, 53(1), pp.69-105.

<sup>29</sup> Gabriel A. Almond/Sidney Verba: *The civic culture*, Princeton University Press 1963, Princeton.

<sup>30</sup> Charles Tilly: *Democracy*, Cambridge University Press 2007, Cambridge.

<sup>31</sup> See for example: Jakob Tolstrup: When can external actors influence democratization? Leverage, linkages, and gatekeeper elites, in: *Democratization* 2013, 20(4), pp.716-742.

<sup>32</sup> See for example: Sandra Lavenex/Frank Schimmelfennig: EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance? *Democratization* 2011, 18(4), pp.885-909; Giselle Bosse: Ten years of the Eastern Partnership: What role for the EU as a promoter of democracy?, in: *European View* 2019, 18(2), pp.220-232.

<sup>33</sup> David Chandler: *Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations*, Palgrave-Macmillan 2004, Basingstoke.

<sup>34</sup> David Lewis: *Civil Society in Non-Western Contexts: Reflections on the 'usefulness' of a concept*, London School of Economics Civil Society Working Paper 13, 2001.

<sup>35</sup> Donatella Della Porta: *How social movements can save democracy: Democratic innovations from below*, John Wiley & Sons 2020.

<sup>36</sup> Paul Skidmore/Kirsten Bound: *Everyday Democracy Index*, Demos 2008, London, p.23.

InvigoratEU defines differentiation as any modality of integration or cooperation that allows States and sub-State entities to work together in non-homogenous, flexible ways.

## Effectiveness

(WPs 3, 4, 5, 9)

InvigoratEU understands the EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policies as being effective, when their overarching policy goals are achieved. The means to this process include a credible, fair and rigorous EU (conditionality) policy agenda, the transformation and convergence of policies and an interconnected strengthening of resilience by ways of enhanced connectivity and security.

## EU integration models

(WP 3)

Alternative EU integration models for the Wider Europe region may serve as practical solution to overcoming the conundrum of how the EU can ensure an effective enlargement process – with accession being driven by geopolitical necessity, as well as used as an instrument of geopolitical competition – all while ensuring that continuous reforms and the EU's *acquis Communautaire* are met by accession candidates.<sup>37</sup>

## External differentiation

(WP 3 → [EU integration models](#))

External differentiation can be defined at its base as “selective participation of non-member states in EU policies”. It is based on formal agreements on selective parts of EU regulations, policies and participation in EU institutions.

## Flexible integration

(WP 3 → [EU integration models](#))

The model of flexible integration serves as an alternative integration system, allowing for differences in regulatory alignment, organisational inclusion and political dynamics on which the EU's relationship with its Eastern and Western Balkan neighbours can be modelled.

## Geopolitical logic

(WPs 6,7,8)

Geopolitical logic starts from the point that modernisation and democratisation in the EU's neighbourhood is undermined by threats to national security and geopolitical rivalry. Hence, the defence of the political and economic autonomy of the EU, the Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans trumps modernisation incentives and shifts the EU's focus towards security/military capacity-building and resilience-building by ways of increased

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<sup>37</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig: Fit through Flexibility? Differentiated Integration and Geopolitical EU Enlargement, in: Göran von Sydow/Valentin Kreiling, (eds.): Fit for 35? Reforming the Politics and Institutions of the EU for an Enlarged Union, Sieps 2023:2op, 2023, p.15.

connectivity, security and defence development and cooperation, and the development of joint strategies to counter other global actors' ambitions.

### Gradual integration

(WP 3 → [EU integration models](#))

Gradual integration is a term echoed in the June 2022 European Council conclusions by which concepts, such as the reversibility and the merit-based approach to enlargement are mentioned in the EU's relationship with the Western Balkans.

### Hybrid threats/hybrid war

(WP 4)

According to the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats „[a]n inherent characteristic of hybrid threats entails blurring traditional dichotomies and creating ambiguity and uncertainty. The goal is to achieve national interests and objectives through strategies such as undermining public trust in democratic institutions, deepening unhealthy polarization, challenging the core values of democratic societies, interfering in democratic elections, and affecting the decision-making capability of political leaders, even by the use of military means.“<sup>38</sup>

### Influence and leverage

(WP 6)

At their base, both influence and leverage describe the power to have an effect. They are close to the idea of soft power. Soft power is applied in different dimensions and on different levels: political dimension (democracy vs. authoritarianism); social dimension; economic and trade dimension; and geopolitical/security dimension which links to the critical infrastructure, energy supply, cyber security and its protection.<sup>39</sup>

InvigoratEU understands leverage as a form of influence where an actor exerts influence over another actor by way of a hook. While influence can be less tangible and indirect, leverage is the direct and purposeful exertion of influence towards a specific goal or a specific action by the influenced party. Leverage can be political, geopolitical, economic and social.

### Influence-operations

(WP 6 → [Influence and leverage](#) & [Hybrid threats/hybrid war](#))

Influence-operations are the deliberate quest and use of influence to achieve a specific set of goals.

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<sup>38</sup> Hybrid CoE: COI Strategy and Defence, available at: <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/coi-strategy-and-defence/> (last accessed: 11.03.2024).

<sup>39</sup> See Danijela Jacimovic/Joel I. Deichmann/Kong Tianping: The Western Balkans and Geopolitics: Leveraging the European Union and China, in: Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2023; Agnieszka Le-gucka/Agata Wlodkowska: The Eastern Partnership as a Contested Neighbourhood: The Role of External Actors – The EU and Russia, in: Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs 25, 2021; Zweers Wouter et.al.: China and the EU in the Western Balkans. A zero-sum game?, Clingendael Report, 2020.

## Institutional stability

(WP 4 → [Stability](#) & WP 5 → [Cohesion](#))

The EU's Copenhagen Criteria define stable institutions as those able to “guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities”.<sup>40</sup> Institutional stability is seen within the InvigoratEU project as an integral part of the modernisation logic (amid democracy and social cohesion) and a means to manage brain drain.

## Interdependence

(WP 7)

Interdependence refers to intertwining relationships in terms of political and economic interdependencies, as well as across geographies. A holistic approach to interdependences considers the factors of connectivity, market integration and the protection of existing critical infrastructures.

## Integrated security

(WP 8 → [Comprehensive security](#))

## Modernisation logic

(WPs 4, 5)

Modernisation logic is the traditional logic to the EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policies. It postulates that an alignment with the EU acquis serves to stabilise countries and to facilitate a deep reform process.

## Multidimensional security

(WP 8 → [Comprehensive security](#))

## Resilience

(WPs 3-10)

Resilience is defined as “the ability of states and societies to reform thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”<sup>41</sup>. This conception “requires us to be prepared for unknown risks; adaptation, learning by doing and flexibility as a way to respond to shocks, to embrace change and to live with rather than completely eliminate uncertainty.”<sup>42</sup> InvigoratEU's understanding of resilience responds to previous scholarly criticism in a two-fold manner. (1) It is based on a holistic understanding of resilience that addresses the resilience of the EU territory as being connected to the resilience of its neighbourhood and third actors' geopolitical ambitions. (2) It relies on a broad definition that includes both societal and state resilience.

## Societal resilience

(WPs 3-10 → [Resilience](#))

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<sup>40</sup> See InvigoratEU Project Proposal, p.4

<sup>41</sup> European External Action Service: European Union Global Strategy, 2016, p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> Ana E. Juncos: Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn?, in: European Security, 26 (1), 2017, p. 4.

Societal resilience aligns with the modernisation logic. This assumes that higher and more inclusive forms of social trust, as well as more efficient and legitimate governance institutions, i.e. more social cohesion, internal, health and human security, less socio-economic inequalities, increase the abilities of entities to anticipate, cope with, adapt to, and recover from external and internal challenges.

## Stability

(WP 3, 4, 5, 6)

Various indexes in political science and international relations measure political (in)stability as reflection of the likelihood of a disorderly transfer of government power, armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest, international tensions, terrorism, as well as ethnic, religious or regional conflicts.<sup>43</sup>

## Staged accession

(WP 3 → [EU integration models](#))

Staged accession is another proposed model for EU integration. In it, accession is achieved in four stages based on the reform progress within the accession candidate countries: (1) 'initial accession'; (2) 'intermediate accession'; (3) 'new member state'; (4) 'conventional membership'. This model combines external and internal differentiation into one coherent process.<sup>44</sup>

## State resilience

(WP 3-10 → [Resilience](#))

State resilience focuses on elements such as territorial security, energy security and the security of infrastructure and institutions. It is understood through a geopolitical logic in which external actors and external risks can act as resilience spoilers.<sup>45</sup>

## Strategic Autonomy

(WP 3)

"The ability to set one's own priorities and make one's own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through – in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone."<sup>46</sup> Applied to an EU context, a different definition is even more appropriate: "a double movement of first looking inward, to build capacity and coherence, and then outward to intervene abroad decisively, being able to sustain interventions and partnerships."<sup>47</sup>

## Value-driven approach

(WPs 3, 9)

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<sup>43</sup> See for example: The Global Economy Political Stability Ranking, available at: [https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb\\_political\\_stability/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/) (last accessed 26.03.2024).

<sup>44</sup> Michael Emerson et.al.: A Template for Staged Accession to the EU, CEPS, CEP, October 2021.

<sup>45</sup> Stollenwerk/ Börzel/Risse: Theorizing resilience-building in the EU's neighbourhood, 2021, pp. 1226, 1230.

<sup>46</sup> Barbara Lippert/Nicolai von Ondarza/Volker Perthes (eds.): European strategic autonomy: actors, issues, conflicts of interests, SWP Research Paper, 4/2019, p.5.

<sup>47</sup> Pol Bargaúes: From 'Resilience' to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy?, EU-LISTCO Policy Brief, February 2021.



The EU is seen as a norm-exporter in its interactions and interrelations with its neighbourhood. These values are enshrined in Article 2 TEU: “representation, participation, openness, pluralism, tolerance, non-discrimination, civic engagement and the protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law”.<sup>48</sup> InvigoratEU understands the EU’s value-driven approach as being multidimensional: not only does the EU export its norms and values through its neighbourhood and enlargement policies, but it also adheres to a foreign policy on the basis of principled pragmatism, as outlined in the 2016 EU Global Strategy.<sup>49</sup>

### Wider Europe dimension

(WP 3 → [EU integration models](#))

The Wider Europe dimension in the InvigoratEU project refers in general terms to ‘everything but enlargement’.

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<sup>48</sup> Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in: Official Journal of the European Union, C326/1, 2012.

<sup>49</sup> See European External Action Service: European Union Global Strategy, 2016.

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## About InvigoratEU

InvigoratEU is a Horizon Europe-funded project, coordinated by the EU-Chair at the University of Duisburg-Essen (UDE) together with the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin. The project, with a duration of 3 years from January 2024 until December 2026, examines how the EU can structure its future relations with its Eastern neighbours and the countries of the Western Balkans. The consortium has received around three million euros for this endeavour.

### How can the EU invigorate its enlargement and neighbourhood policy to enhance Europe's resilience?

Our first goal is to investigate how to reform the EU's enlargement strategy in a new geopolitical phase, HOW TO RESPOND to other actors' geopolitical ambitions in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans, and HOW TO REBUILD the EU's foreign policy arsenal in view of a new era of military threats (triple "R" approach) combining the modernisation and geopolitical logics of EU enlargement, leading to new data – e.g. a public opinion survey in Ukraine, a set of scenarios, an external influence index (Russia, China, Turkey), and a social policy compliance and cohesion scoreboard.



Our second goal is to elaborate an evidence-based, forward-looking vision for the EU's political agenda and institutional frameworks for co-designing a multidimensional toolbox (i.e. two tailor-made toolkits), together with InvigoratEU's Expert Hub, Civil Society (CS) Network, Youth Labs, Workshops for Young Professionals and Policy Debates in a gaming set up, which will result in context-sensitive and actionable policy recommendations for European and national political stakeholders and (young) European citizens in particular.

Our third goal is to deploy a CDE (communication, dissemination and exploitation) strategy aiming at recommendations from Day 1 to maximize our scientific, policy and societal impact in invigorating the EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policies to enhance Europe's resilience. Ultimately, InvigoratEU is a deliberately large consortium respecting the diversity of Europe and political perspectives; 7 out of 18 are from Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the western Balkans (North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), complemented by our Civil Society Network of 9 representatives from all Western Balkan countries, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

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