

The war in Ukraine and the EU's policy of economic globalisation: new security challenges and issues

La guerra en Ucrania y la política de globalización económica de la UE: nuevos retos y cuestiones de seguridad

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Abstract: This paper analyses the repercussions that the war in Ukraine since 2022 has had on the European Union (EU) policy of economic globalisation. The Union's comprehensive response to the conflict is examined from different angles, taking in energy insecurity, economic shocks, geopolitical shifts, humanitarian challenges, and technological vulnerabilities. In this context, the EU's adaptive resilience is evident on several fronts, such as the integration of its economic policies with security (particularly in critical sectors), its role in the European security architecture, and its commitment to incorporating Ukraine into the West. The study expands to include the flexible management of mass migration, tech vulnerabilities, energy resilience, economic stability, geopolitical alliances, humanitarian response action, and technological reinforcement.

Keywords: war in Ukraine, European Union, economic globalisation, geopolitical shifts, security

Resumen: Este artículo analiza las repercusiones de la guerra en Ucrania iniciada en 2022 en la política de globalización económica de la Unión Europea (UE). La respuesta integral de la Unión al conflicto se examina en sus diversas dimensiones: inseguridad energética, perturbaciones económicas, cambios geopolíticos, retos humanitarios y vulnerabilidades tecnológicas. En este contexto, la capacidad de resiliencia adaptativa de la UE se manifiesta en varios frentes, como la integración de sus políticas económicas con la seguridad —especialmente en los sectores críticos—, su papel en la arquitectura de seguridad europea y su compromiso con la incorporación de Ucrania a Occidente. El estudio se extiende a la gestión flexible de las migraciones masivas, las vulnerabilidades tecnológicas, la resiliencia energética, la estabilidad económica, las alianzas geopolíticas, las acciones de respuesta humanitaria, así como la fortificación tecnológica.

Palabras clave: guerra en Ucrania, Unión Europea, globalización económica, cambios geopolíticos, seguridad

The origins and consequences of the Ukraine War in 2022 represent a watershed moment in world geopolitics, particularly concerning the European Union's (EU) overarching Globalization Policy. This introduction digs into the conflict's beginnings, attempting to understand the many factors that contributed to its eruption. Understanding the complexities of the Ukraine War is critical for considering its far-reaching consequences for the EU's Globalization Policy. The EU's economic globalization policy is a multifaceted strategy aimed at fostering economic integration, promoting sustainable development, and advancing prosperity in an interconnected world. In the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, the EU leveraged this policy framework to support Ukraine's recovery, resilience, and economic transformation. In the aftermath of the conflict, the EU extended its support to Ukraine through trade liberalization measures (The World Bank, 2022).

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The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), provided Ukraine with preferential access to the EU's single market, fostering economic diversification, export growth, and job creation. By reducing tariffs and

harmonizing regulations, the agreement enhanced Ukraine's competitiveness and integration into global value chains, mitigating the economic impact of the conflict. In parallel, the EU assisted Ukraine in enhancing regulatory coherence and institutional capacity to facilitate trade and investment. Through technical assistance programs, the EU supported Ukraine in aligning its regulatory framework with EU standards and best practices, improving business environment, transparency, and governance. Strengthening institutions such as the National Bank of Ukraine, the State Fiscal Service, and regulatory agencies, the EU promoted good governance, accountability, and the rule of law, fostering investor confidence and sustainable economic development (Irtysheva *et al.*, 2022; Musayeva–Gurbanova & Hajiyeva, 2023; European Parliament, 2019). Moreover, the EU integrated principles of sustainable development and inclusive growth into its assistance programs for Ukraine. Initiatives such as the European Green Deal and the European Social Fund supported Ukraine's transition to a low-carbon economy while investing in education, healthcare, and social protection systems, promoting human capital development and social cohesion.

While a broad range of working papers and policy reports have been dedicated to analyzing the impact of the Ukraine War within the European region, a noticeable void exists in the realm of scientific literature concerning its specific

implications on the European Union's (EU) Economic Globalization Policy. This conspicuous gap underscores the critical need for scholarly studies into the nuanced connections between the Ukraine War and the EU's economic global aspirations. From reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels to navigating economic turmoil and fortifying cybersecurity measures, the EU exhibits adaptive resilience (European Commission, 2022d). As the EU navigates these new realities, this analysis emphasizes the nuanced understanding required to comprehend the implications on energy resilience, economic stability, geopolitical alliances, humanitarian responses, and technological fortifications. The EU's strategies are not only evaluated for their immediate impacts but also for their long-term sustainability and strategic foresight in safeguarding its interests amid evolving global dynamics (Guenette *et al.*, 2022).

Theoretical framework and methodology

Researchers have employed diverse perspectives, such as neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and crisis integration, to analyze the EU's actions and developments. Alcaro & Tocci, 2021; Cross, 2017; Dinan *et al.*, 2017; Schimmelfennig, 2018; Riddervold *et al.*, 2021) This article specifically focuses on the role of the EU in shaping security and defense policy, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. Traditionally viewed as having a weak position in this domain, the EU's influence has expanded, especially since 2016, challenging prior assumptions (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015; Riddervold and Trondal, 2020; Strikwerda, 2019). Various explanations have been proposed, ranging from neofunctionalist dynamics and the concept of 'creeping competencies' to the EU's role as a policy entrepreneur, emphasizing its ability to frame issues and build coalitions with member states (Citi, 2014; Edler and James, 2015; Chou and Riddervold, 2015).

Moreover, the convergence of interests between major member states like France and Germany and EU institutions has been highlighted, along with the EU's strategic use of crises as 'windows of opportunities' (Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier, 2021; Chappell, Exadaktylos, and Petrov, 2020). Additionally, judicial developments, particularly the threat of 'court-driven integration,' have been explored as tools employed by the EU to push for policy changes (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013). The literature also underscores the ongoing interplay between the EU, member states, and institutions like the Political and Security Committee in steering EU foreign and security policy (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011; Michalski and Danielson, 2020).

The applicability of the Economic Integration Theory provides a robust framework for analyzing the impact of the Ukraine War on the European Union's (EU) economic globalization policy (Baldwin, 1995; Balassa, 1961). According to scholars such as Bela Balassa and Richard Baldwin, the Economic Integration Theory offers valuable insights into the process and implications of regional economic cooperation and integration (Balassa, 1961; Baldwin, 1995). By applying this theory to the context of the Ukraine War, we can gain a deeper understanding of how the conflict has influenced the EU's economic dynamics and globalization efforts. One key aspect of Economic Integration (EI) Theory is its emphasis on trade liberalization and market integration among member states (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2006). As noted by Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, increased trade flows and reduced trade barriers are essential components of economic integration (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2006). In the aftermath of the Ukraine War, disruptions to trade routes, supply chains, and cross-border commerce have significant implications for the EU's economic integration agenda.

Furthermore, The EI Theory highlights the importance of investment flows and capital mobility in driving economic integration (Mundell, 1961; Eichengreen, 1993). Scholars such as Robert Mundell and Barry Eichengreen argue that financial integration plays a crucial role in deepening economic ties among countries (Mundell, 1961; Eichengreen, 1993). In the wake of the Ukraine War, uncertainties surrounding geopolitical risks and security concerns may impact investment decisions and capital flows in the EU. The EI theory enables us to examine the role of regulatory harmonization and policy coordination in facilitating economic integration (Francois & Horn, 2006). As emphasized by Joseph Francois and Henrik Horn, aligning regulatory frameworks and policy measures is essential for minimizing trade barriers and promoting market efficiency (Francois & Horn, 2006). In light of the Ukraine War, the EU may face challenges in maintaining regulatory coherence and policy coordination, particularly in sectors affected by geopolitical tensions or security threats.

The Ukraine War also led to heightened geopolitical risks and uncertainties, impacting investment decisions and capital flows in the EU (Ivanov & Kilic, 2022). In 2022, foreign investors faced uncertainties regarding the stability of the region, leading to cautious investment behavior and capital outflows from affected areas (Ivanov & Kilic, 2022). Economic Integration Theory allows us to examine how these developments affect the EU's ability to attract foreign investment, promote financial integration, and foster economic convergence among member states. By considering the implications of changing investment patterns and capital mobility within the theoretical framework, we can assess the broader economic consequences of the conflict.

The paper utilizes a multifaceted methodology to comprehensively analyze the impact of the Ukraine War on the European Union's (EU) Economic Globalization Policy. The article conducts an extensive literature review, highlighting a noticeable gap in the scientific literature regarding the specific implications of the Ukraine War on the EU's Economic Globalization Policy, underscoring the need for a scholarly study, and prompting the author to contribute to the academic discourse by offering an in-depth analysis. To provide a comprehensive understanding, the article employs a comparative analysis framework by comparing the EU's Economic Globalization Policy before and after the Ukrainian-Russian War, focusing on key aspects such as economic policies, trade agreements, market stance, diversification strategies, security integration, resilience building, humanitarian support, global alliances, and geopolitical shifts. The evaluation is structured using qualitative descriptors to denote the level of change or emphasis in each aspect. Additionally, the article incorporates real-time data and developments post-Ukraine War, such as the EU's responses to energy insecurity, economic disruptions, geopolitical shifts, humanitarian challenges, and technological vulnerabilities. This approach ensures the analysis remains relevant and captures the dynamic nature of the EU's policy adjustments in the aftermath of the conflict. This comprehensive methodology strengthens the article's contribution to the academic discourse on the subject.

The EU's economic globalization strategies pre and post-Ukrainian war

The Russia-Ukraine war of 2022 has reshaped the global economy, particularly impacting Europe and the energy sector. Described as a “massive energy shock” by the OECD which slowed global economic growth to 3.1% in 2022 from an estimated 5%. Europe's economy is projected to grow by just 0.3% in 2023 (The Economic Times, 2022). The World Bank estimates Ukraine's reconstruction cost at \$349 billion, surpassing its pre-war GDP. While the US provided substantial aid, EU countries led in financial support. The prospect of Russia paying reparations remains uncertain. The conflict spurred a shift in Europe's energy dynamics. The region is swiftly moving away from reliance on Russian hydrocarbons, with LNG emerging as a key alternative. Nuclear power has gained renewed attention for its reliability and zero-emission nature. This move reduces Europe's vulnerability to Russian influence, notably through Gazprom. Challenges persist, including Ukraine's reconstruction, the need for diverse energy sources, and navigating a complex geopolitical landscape (The World Bank, 2022).

The Ukraine War of 2022 was a turning point in international relations, prompting reevaluations of foreign policy strategies, notably in the context of potential shifts in US orientation under a second term for Donald Trump. The United States' pivot towards an "America first" approach under the Trump administration introduced complexities to EU policy dynamics (European Commission, 2021a). The administration imposed tariffs on €6.4 billion worth of EU exports in 2020, including steel, aluminum, and agricultural products (European Commission, 2021). This strained transatlantic relations, with EU-US trade declining by 12% in 2020 compared to the previous year (European Commission, 2021). The "America first" approach prompted scrutiny of EU-US relations and raised questions about the future of transatlantic cooperation (European Commission, 2021). A Pew Research Center survey in 2020 found that 63% of Europeans had little or no confidence in then-President Trump's handling of international affairs (Pew Research Center, 2020).

Since then, the EU's response has focused on revitalizing transatlantic ties while pursuing strategic autonomy in critical sectors (European Commission, 2021). However, differences persist, particularly regarding digital taxation, climate policy, and defense commitments (European Commission, 2021). The United States has emerged as a major player in global energy markets, thanks to its vast reserves of shale gas and oil (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2021). US LNG exports have increased significantly in recent years, offering European countries an alternative to Russian gas (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2021). However, the sustainability of US energy supply at competitive prices is subject to various factors, including domestic production levels, infrastructure capacity, and market demand (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2021). Despite the US becoming a net exporter of natural gas in 2017, domestic shale production has faced challenges, including environmental concerns, regulatory hurdles, and fluctuating prices (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2021). Moreover, the long-term viability of US LNG exports depends on factors such as global demand, competition from other LNG exporters, and geopolitical developments (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2021). For example, trade tensions between the US and China could impact US LNG exports to Asia, affecting pricing dynamics in global LNG markets (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2021).

In June 2023, the eurozone exhibited a significant turnaround in its external trade balance, shifting from a 27.1 billion euros deficit in June 2022 to a surplus of 23.0 billion euros. This improvement is attributed to a sharp decline in imports from both Russia and China. Eurostat reported that over the past 12 months, exports increased by a modest 0.3%, while imports plummeted by a substantial 17.7% (European Commission, 2023). When adjusted for seasonal variations, the trade surplus for June stood at 12.5 billion euros, a

notable increase from the 0.2 billion euros in May 2023 (Eurostat, 2023) and a reversal from the 7.9-billion-euro deficit recorded in April 2023. The primary factor contributing to the enhanced trade balance was a considerable reduction in trade deficits with Russia and China. The trade gap with Russia diminished significantly, dropping from 92.1 billion euros in the first six months of 2022 to 8.7 billion euros during the same period in 2023 (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023; World Bank, 2022). Similarly, the trade deficit with China contracted from 189.3 billion euros to 148.7 billion euros in the first half of 2023. This shift in trade dynamics is indicative of the impact of Western sanctions on Russia due to the conflict in Ukraine, influencing trade patterns and contributing to the notable rebalancing of the euro zone's external trade position (Estrada & Koutronas, 2022; Mauro, 2023; Braun *et al.*, 2023).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Union faced unprecedented challenges, with the eurozone economy contracting by 6.6% in 2020, the sharpest decline since World War II (European Commission, 2021). The EU responded by launching the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), a €750 billion stimulus package representing around 5.6% of the EU's GDP (European Commission, 2021). However, the pandemic also exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains, with EU member states relying on external suppliers for critical medical supplies (European Commission, 2021). For example, in April 2020, the EU imported 53% of its medical ventilators from China (European Commission, 2021; 2023). The pandemic highlighted the importance of strategic autonomy for the EU, particularly in critical sectors (European Commission, 2021). A Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2021 revealed that 67% of EU citizens believe that the EU should be more self-sufficient in essential products such as medicines and medical equipment (Eurobarometer, 2021). This scrutiny has led to calls for a reassessment of EU industrial policy and trade strategies to enhance resilience and reduce dependencies on third countries, particularly China (European Commission, 2021).

China's responses to global events, including the Ukraine War and the COVID-19 pandemic, have shaped EU policy dynamics. China's growing economic influence, technological prowess, and assertive foreign policy stance have prompted the EU to recalibrate its approach to China (European Parliament, 2021). In 2020, China became the EU's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching €586 billion (European Parliament, 2021). However, concerns over human rights violations, geopolitical influence, and unfair trade practices persist (European Parliament, 2021). The EU's evolving relationship with China has faced scrutiny, particularly regarding its economic dependencies and human rights considerations (European Parliament, 2021). A report by the European Parliament in 2021 highlighted that EU-China trade relations are imbalanced, with the EU running a trade deficit of €194 billion in 2020 (European Parliament, 2021).

The EU's response has been characterized by a dual-track approach, combining engagement on economic issues with assertive diplomacy and targeted sanctions in response to human rights abuses (European Parliament, 2021).

The EU's negotiations with Mercosur embody both its strengths and the challenges it confronts in advancing its initiatives (European Parliament, 2021). The agreement aims to create one of the largest free trade areas globally, potentially providing significant economic gains and strategic advantages for the EU (European Parliament, 2021). For instance, projections by the European Commission suggest that the agreement could lead to an increase of €45 billion annually in EU exports to Mercosur countries, translating to a potential 0.2% boost in EU GDP (European Commission, 2021). However, substantial challenges loom, particularly regarding environmental sustainability and economic competition (European Parliament, 2021). Critics argue that intensified trade with Mercosur nations, especially Brazil, may exacerbate deforestation in the Amazon rainforest (Climate Change News, 2020). Environmental organizations estimate that the agreement could result in an additional 200,000 hectares of deforestation annually, potentially exacerbating biodiversity loss and contributing to increased carbon emissions (Climate Change News, 2020). Furthermore, concerns have been raised about the potential adverse effects on European industries, notably agriculture (European Parliament, 2021). Reports from the European Parliament's Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development indicate that sectors like beef and ethanol production are due to increased competition from Mercosur imports (Climate Change News, 2020). Amid the Ukraine War, the EU's engagement with Mercosur gained complexity, emphasizing strategic alliances for security. Diversifying trade with Mercosur becomes crucial for the EU's global positioning and reducing reliance on Russian energy. French opposition, especially regarding agriculture and environmental impacts, adds hurdles, with the 2022 presidential election reigniting debates on policy alignment (European Parliament, 2021a).

The Gulf states, particularly Qatar, play a significant role as providers of liquefied natural gas (LNG), offering an alternative to Russian energy sources for European countries (Aljazeera, 2021). Qatar is the world's largest exporter of LNG, accounting for approximately 30% of global LNG trade (Aljazeera, 2021). In recent years, European countries have increasingly turned to LNG imports from Qatar to diversify their energy sources and reduce dependence on Russian gas (Aljazeera, 2021). However, the potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East poses a significant risk to LNG supply from the Gulf states (Aljazeera, 2021). For example, tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global energy supplies, could disrupt LNG shipments and lead to price volatility in global energy markets (Aljazeera, 2021). Moreover, geopolitical instability in the region may deter investment in LNG infrastructure

and exploration projects, further impacting supply availability and pricing (Aljazeera, 2021). In 2019, the attack on Saudi Aramco's oil facilities temporarily disrupted oil production, highlighting the vulnerability of energy infrastructure in the region to geopolitical tensions (Aljazeera, 2021). Such incidents underscore the importance of diversifying energy sources and enhancing energy security for European countries reliant on Gulf state LNG imports (Aljazeera, 2021). Rising energy prices pose challenges for German industry, particularly energy-intensive sectors such as manufacturing and automotive (Reuters, 2021).

Table 1. EU Policy between fragmentation and integration

Aspect	Before Ukraine War (Pre-2022)	After Ukraine War (Post-2022)
Geopolitical Unity	Generally, a unity among EU member states	Increased divergence in responses, testing unity
Economic Exposure to Russia	Varied levels of economic exposure to Russia	Divergent National Interests Impacting Cohesion
Security Priorities	Unified approach to security threats	Some states prioritize national security strategies
Collective Integration	Strong emphasis on collective integration	Renewed commitment to collective security measures
Foreign Policy Alignment	Generally aligned foreign policy objectives	Varied foreign policy responses to the conflict
Strategic Vision for EU's Role	Cohesive vision for the EU's role in global affairs	Evolving vision with challenges in defining a unified role

Source: Own elaboration, assessing information gathered from various sources, including Eurostat, EU Parliament reports and analytical papers, Carnegie Endowment, and Rand Cooperation.

Energy costs represent a significant portion of production expenses for these industries, impacting their competitiveness in global markets (Reuters, 2021). According to a report by the Federation of German Industries (BDI), every \$10 increase in the price of oil leads to an additional €2.5 billion in costs for German industry (Reuters, 2021). In 2021, surging energy prices, exacerbated by geopolitical tensions and supply disruptions, contributed to a 30% increase

in electricity prices for German industrial consumers compared to the previous year (Reuters, 2021). This sharp rise in energy costs has put pressure on profit margins and investment plans for German companies, leading to concerns about job losses and reduced competitiveness in export markets (Reuters, 2021).

As seen from the Table 1, firstly, there is a discernible divergence in geopolitical unity post-conflict, signaling challenges to the EU's cohesion as member states exhibit varied responses. Economic exposure to Russia displays pre-existing disparities but gains complexity due to altered national interests. Security priorities shift, with some states emphasizing national strategies over a unified EU approach, posing challenges to collective security measures. However, there is a renewed commitment to collective integration, highlighting recognition of the necessity for a unified approach amidst evolving threats. Foreign policy alignment shows post-conflict discrepancies, indicating challenges in maintaining cohesive objectives.

Following the Ukrainian-Russian War of 2022, the EU member states exhibit divergence in interests. Countries with strong economic ties to Russia, like Austria and Italy, may prioritize maintaining trade relations. Conversely, Baltic and Eastern European states may advocate for stringent economic sanctions against Russia due to historical security concerns. Eastern European states, facing direct security threats, could push for increased NATO presence and robust responses to Russian aggression (Galeotti, 2019). Western European states may lean towards diplomatic solutions, while nations heavily reliant on Russian energy might proceed cautiously in transitioning to renewable sources. Geographically proximate countries may prioritize managing refugee influxes, affecting their stance on EU-wide migration policies. Member states' geopolitical alignments also vary, with some favoring closer ties with NATO and the US, while others pursue more independent foreign policies (Mbah & Wasum, 2022; Sturm, 2022). These differing approaches complicate efforts to formulate a cohesive EU response to geopolitical challenges stemming from the Ukraine War.

Steering new realities: the EU's globalization policy post-2022

The geopolitical landscape has sparked complex difficulties and strategic developments for the European Union (EU) as a result of the Ukraine War in 2022. This detailed analysis investigates the EU's many responses to important dimensions such as energy insecurity, economic disruptions, geopolitical

reconfigurations, humanitarian initiatives, and technology vulnerabilities. From mitigating energy dependence on Russia to addressing economic upheavals and bolstering cybersecurity, the EU's strategies are scrutinized for their effectiveness, challenges, and long-term sustainability. Furthermore, the humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions depict the EU's response to mass migrations triggered by the conflict, showcasing the intricate balance between national and collective approaches. (European Commission, 2022d)

Energy insecurity and supply disruptions

The Ukraine War of 2022 has had significant implications for energy security and stability in the region. Ukraine serves as a transit country for Russian natural gas exports to Europe, with approximately 40% of Europe's gas imports passing through Ukrainian pipelines (European Commission, 2022a). The conflict has raised concerns about the reliability of gas transit through Ukraine, leading European countries to explore alternative energy sources and routes to reduce dependency on Russian gas. In 2022, amid the Ukraine War, European countries accelerated efforts to diversify their energy sources, with LNG imports from Qatar and other suppliers increasing by 10% compared to the previous year (Aljazeera, 2022). This shift towards alternative energy sources reflects a broader trend toward reducing reliance on Russian gas and enhancing energy security in the face of geopolitical uncertainties. In the previous year, the European Union (EU) demonstrated notable success in reducing its dependence on Russia for fossil fuel supplies, opting for alternative sources from other third-country suppliers (European Commission, 2022d). Eurostat data reveals a significant decline in Russia's share of EU energy imports by more than 10 percentage points, dropping from 25.5% to 15.1% between the first and third quarters of 2022.

The geopolitical landscape has sparked complex difficulties and strategic developments for the European Union (EU) as a result of the Ukraine War: energy insecurity, economic disruptions, geopolitical reconfigurations, humanitarian initiatives, and technology vulnerabilities.

Importantly, efforts to diminish the EU's reliance on Russian fossil fuels are ongoing, with the trajectory influenced by the implementation of new EU sanctions policies. In the aftermath of the Ukraine War in 2022, the European Union (EU) embarked on a comprehensive exploration of new energy partners (Eurostat, 2022). The geopolitical shifts resulting from the conflict, particularly the tensions with Russia, prompted the EU to strategically diversify its energy resources. In this endeavor, the EU turned its attention towards the South

Caucasus region, notably engaging with Azerbaijan as a prospective and reliable partner in the energy sector for the foreseeable future. This strategic move aligns with the EU's broader efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy sources and underscores the significance of fostering diversified and resilient energy partnerships in the evolving geopolitical landscape. The State of the Energy Union Report 2023 (European Commission, 2023) reflects on the EU's response to the recent energy crisis, evaluates the progress of the green transition, and outlines future challenges and opportunities. In the face of Russia's aggression in Ukraine and energy weaponization, the EU effectively accelerated the clean energy transition, diversified supplies, and saved energy. The REPowerEU Plan (ibid., 2022d) and emergency measures prevented supply disruptions, eased market pressures, and advanced structural reforms through the European Green Deal legislation. Key achievements include a 3% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions in 2022, significant reductions in dependence on Russian fossil fuel, and increased renewable energy capacity. Future challenges include ensuring affordable, reliable, and accessible energy, tracking and implementing shared commitments, and addressing energy poverty. Despite progress, continued efforts are necessary to meet revised 2030 targets and enhance climate and energy ambitions (European Commission, 2022a, 2022d).

Economic disruptions and trade volatility

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has significantly impacted energy markets both within the European Union (EU) and globally. In response to soaring energy prices, the EU and individual member states have implemented various emergency policy measures. Despite advancements in green energy initiatives and the collective pursuit of climate neutrality by 2050, the immediate-to-mid-term concern across all EU nations remains the elevated energy prices. In an attempt to undermine Russia's financial capacity for the war and hold accountable those responsible for the invasion on political, economic, and military fronts, the European Council has progressively introduced a series of economic sanctions against Russia. Despite the substantial impact of these sanctions, leading to a pronounced contraction in Russia's economy, the conflict continues unabated. In response to an unprecedented 1000% spike in EU gas prices in August 2022, reaching over €300/MWh, EU countries have endorsed a market correction mechanism. This mechanism establishes a price ceiling for gas transactions during exceptional price levels, addressing the European Council's call for a solution to extreme gas price peaks while ensuring supply security and market stability. The prolonged

surge in gas prices had adverse effects on the EU economy, escalating financial burdens on energy consumers, and challenging supply security, exacerbated by Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine. This situation led to an 11.5% inflation rate in the EU by October 2022. Given the ongoing unpredictability caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, EU countries are actively diversifying energy supplies and developing new infrastructure. The market correction mechanism aims to prevent future instances of excessively high gas prices, protecting European citizens and businesses from economically damaging shocks.

Geopolitical shifts and alliances

Through its recent intervention in Ukraine, Russia has significantly shifted the geopolitical landscape, prompting the European Union (EU) to uphold its commitments. Ukraine, currently facing an existential challenge, has become integrated into the Western security framework. The EU acknowledged this integration by granting Ukraine candidate status in June 2022, aligning its support for Ukraine's war effort with that of the United States without direct military involvement. A key EU interest now lies in ensuring Ukraine's resilience as a robust border state, encompassing a substantial territory with access to the sea. The potential fall of Ukraine would mean the EU sharing an extended border with Russia, complicating deterrence and defense strategies. Furthermore, a victorious Russia might view Ukraine as a launching pad for further military forays into the Black Sea region and the broader Mediterranean area.

The repercussions of the war extend beyond Ukraine, solidifying geopolitical fault lines across Europe. Grey areas and buffer zones are vanishing, evidenced by Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO, Denmark's participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and Moldova's attaining EU candidate status.

The repercussions of the war extend beyond Ukraine, solidifying geopolitical fault lines across Europe. Grey areas and buffer zones are vanishing, evidenced by Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO, Denmark's participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and Moldova's attaining EU candidate status. Moldova's destiny is now intricately connected to Ukraine's; the survival of the latter potentially paves the way for both to journey towards EU membership, while its fall may mark Moldova as Russia's next target. On the opposing side, Belarus has become wholly subjugated by Russia, marked by a significant influx of Russian troops and the announcement of deploying tactical

nuclear weapons. Even before the war, the consolidation of an expanded EU had instigated a notable shift in Europe's geopolitics. The EU, having eliminated the prospect of internal conflicts among its member states, now constitutes the core of the European security architecture, supplemented by its alliance with the United States as an additional safeguard against external threats. Since Russia cannot integrate into the EU, it remains excluded from the European security architecture in terms of decision-making authority over its members.

Humanitarian and socio-economic fallout

From the commencement of Russia's aggressive war, the European Union and its member nations have contributed over €82 billion to aid Ukraine and its citizens. This includes €31 billion allocated for financial, budgetary support, and humanitarian assistance, €17 billion directed towards aiding refugees within the EU, and €25 billion designated for military support. Even before the current Ukraine crisis dated back to February 2022, migration management has been considered one of Europe's most complicated, politicized, and poorly integrated policies that the EU member states even today, are more prone to take the measures and steps over migration at a national/local level than intergovernmental one. Referring to this, migration, like joint foreign and defense policies, is the embodiment of a highly sensitive topic that each EU member state carefully threads at the local level before it is negotiated in the EU, virtually usually resulting in watered-down concessions (Guild & Groenendijk, 2023). Following the Ukraine crisis in 2022, the political features of EU migration policy show the complications involved in responding to wars and their migration effects. In response to the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU has implemented a comprehensive migration management strategy to welcome refugees. Key measures include activating the Temporary Protection Directive, establishing rights for individuals under temporary protection, providing practical information through a multilingual webpage and a dedicated helpline, and coordinating efforts through the Solidarity Platform. The Solidarity Platform, coordinated by DG HOME, involves EU countries, Schengen Associated States, EU Agencies, international partners, and civil society organizations. Its objectives include facilitating discussions, collecting information on reception capacity, coordinating offers from EU countries, and utilizing relevant EU instruments. Concrete results have been achieved, as outlined in the 10-Point Plan, with ongoing efforts outlined in a communication assessing the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive (Gerlach & Ryndzak, 2022; Sturm, 2022; Кравченко & Жук, 2022; Опиола *et al.*, 2022).

Technological vulnerabilities

In the aftermath of the Ukraine War in 2022, Russia's cyberattacks have emerged as a significant concern, creating vulnerabilities in technology infrastructures, particularly within the European Union (EU). In 2023, a significant shift in cyber-attack geography has occurred, with an initial focus on Ukraine evolving into an escalating wave of incidents within European Union (EU) countries. The EU, particularly Western Europe, has witnessed a surge in conflict-related cyberattacks, highlighting the evolving nature of hybrid warfare. Pro-Russian hacktivist groups, notably Anonymous Russia, KillNet, and Russian Hackers Teams, account for 61% of reported cyberattacks, employing resources akin to organized cybercrime groups. DDoS attacks, constituting 75% of incidents, serve to harass and create anxiety rather than cause major operational impacts. The emergence of civilian hacktivist groups introduces a new dimension to the conflict, acting with political motives. These cyber incidents have underscored the critical need for the EU to address and fortify its technological defenses against evolving threats.

The cyber landscape has witnessed a surge in sophisticated attacks originating from state-sponsored actors, prominently Russia, targeting various sectors within the EU. These attacks aim not only to compromise sensitive information but also to disrupt critical infrastructures, posing a direct threat to the technological resilience of EU member states. The EU is now compelled to reassess and reinforce its cybersecurity frameworks, emphasizing collaboration, information sharing, and the development of advanced defensive mechanisms. This involves bolstering national and cross-border cybersecurity capabilities, implementing more stringent regulations, and fostering international cooperation to mitigate the impact of state-sponsored cyber threats. On September 15, 2022, the European Commission (2022b) proposed a Regulation mandating cybersecurity requirements for hardware and software products with digital elements connected to devices or networks. The focus includes design, development, production, and market availability. This proposal complements the EU Cybersecurity Act and the Network and Information Security Directive.

The Council amended the proposal, addressing scope, SME support, conformity declaration, and reporting obligations for manufacturers. Changes include notifying national CSIRTs instead of ENISA, introducing a two-step reporting process for cybersecurity incidents, and implementing a sanctions regime for non-compliance, with potential fines ranging from 5 to 15 million euros or 1 to 2.5% of annual global turnover. After discussions among EU member states, a consensus on horizontal cybersecurity requirements was reached on July 19, 2023, allowing negotiations with the European Parliament on the legislation's final version to commence (European Commission, 2022b).

Table 2. Evaluation of EU measures to support Ukraine

Category	Positive Aspects	Negative Aspects	Sustainability Forecast
Humanitarian and Military Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of humanitarian aid through the European Civil Protection Mechanism. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential challenges in ensuring efficient distribution of humanitarian aid. - Long-term sustainability of military assistance and its impact. 	Ongoing assessment is needed to ensure the continuous effectiveness of aid distribution and military support.
Financial Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proposal for exceptional macro-financial assistance of €9 billion. - Prompt disbursement of funds. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accumulation of debt due to loans for financial assistance. - Possible economic dependence of Ukraine on the EU with large financial support. 	Periodic reviews are required to gauge the economic impact, and adjustments may be needed to ensure long-term financial stability for Ukraine.
Import and Export Measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of solidarity lanes for Ukraine's agricultural export. - Removal of import duties and anti-dumping measures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential impact on local EU industries due to the removal of import duties for Ukrainian products. - Renewal of trade benefits may lead to tensions with other trading partners. 	Continuous evaluation is needed to balance trade dynamics and address any adverse impacts on EU industries, considering potential geopolitical repercussions.
Customs Waivers for Humanitarian Aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Temporary waiver of customs duties and VAT on life-saving equipment. - Extension of the exemption based on member states' requests. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Loss of revenue for EU countries due to the waiver of customs duties and VAT. - Potential misuse or mismanagement of humanitarian aid. 	Periodic assessments are essential to monitor the effectiveness of customs waivers and address any financial or logistical challenges that may arise.

Source: Own elaboration, assessing information gathered from various sources, including Eurostat, EU Parliament reports, Carnegie Endowment, and Rand Cooperation.

Policy adjustments and responses: strengthening security measures

The State of the Energy Union Report 2023 reflects on the EU's response to the recent energy crisis caused by Russia's aggression in Ukraine. The EU effectively accelerated the clean energy transition, diversified supplies, and saved energy through measures like the REPowerEU Plan and emergency legislative actions. Key achievements include a 3% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions, significant cuts in dependence on Russian fossil fuel, and increased renewable energy capacity. Challenges persist, necessitating continued efforts to ensure affordable, reliable energy, implement shared commitments, and address energy poverty.

Table 2 evaluates key EU measures supporting Ukraine, covering humanitarian and military support, financial assistance, import/export measures, and customs waivers for humanitarian aid. It considers positive aspects, drawbacks, sustainability forecasts, and academic relevance. EU's support is crucial for Ukraine's defense capabilities, deterring further aggression and enhancing regional stability. Financial assistance aids Ukraine's economic recovery, pivotal for resilience and independence. Sustainability hinges on ongoing economic efforts. Import/export measures stimulate trade, but managing potential imbalances is vital. Customs waivers for humanitarian aid ensure efficient crisis response. These measures collectively bolster Ukraine's security, economy, and crisis response, reflecting the EU's commitment to Ukraine's stability and recovery.

Concluding remarks

This research article investigates the effects of the Ukraine War on the European Union's Economic Globalization Policy in depth. By investigating the origins and repercussions of the conflict, a critical historical context is constructed, stressing the pivotal moment in world geopolitics. The analysis of the literature highlights gaps, emphasizing the need for a focused study on how the war especially affects the EU's economic landscape. The key findings point to a substantial shift in the EU's posture, from a concentration on integration and open markets to diversified initiatives linked with security concerns.

The post-Ukraine War geopolitical situation has resulted in significant political shifts within the EU. Economic reconstruction, energy instability, and

geopolitical realignment are all acknowledged challenges, but the EU exhibits resilience through a renewed commitment to collective integration and strategic economic reforms. The study indicates a complex yet adaptive response to the conflict's problems, positioning the EU to navigate an altered economic system with vigor. This study greatly contributes to the scholarly debate by providing a comprehensive knowledge of how the Ukraine War influences the EU's Economic Globalization Policy. As the postwar economic landscape evolves, further research will be required to analyze the long-term effects of this transformative phase on the EU's economic trajectory.

The study's limitations lie in predicting the dynamic geopolitical landscape amid the Ukraine War, impacting the European Union's (EU) Economic Globalization Policy. Geopolitical complexity introduces uncertainty, challenging accurate foresight of outcomes. Focusing solely on economic aspects may overlook other factors shaping the EU's response. Geopolitical decisions encompass political, social, and historical dimensions beyond economic policies. While insightful, readers should consider these limitations and the fluidity of global events when interpreting the study's findings.

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