The World in Europe

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INTRODUCTION

This report is the collective effort of the CIDOB researchers to show the extent to which global dynamics are today present in Europe. The multiple crises on our borders are consolidating an arc of instability the ramifications of which directly affect the security of our fellow citizens. In turn, global dynamics are moulding an increasingly multipolar world in which the EU's capacity for influence and projection is steadily diminishing.

It is 65 years since the seeds of the integration process were sown and more than 20 since the EU formulated a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The celebration of Europe Day must go beyond highlighting the benefits of the most advanced regional integration process in the world and warning of the need for the EU to take a leading role and speak with one voice on the international stage. The 9th of May must also be the moment to identify the trends that make Europe an international player with strong connections to global developments.

This report analyses some of the most significant global crises and trends affecting Europe today. The contributions are presented in a uniform manner, giving an assessment of each of the challenges faced, the responses and policies being enacted by the EU and what it should do to make itself a decisive actor. In sum, it is a collective effort to think about the world from Europe and, above all, to identify how the world is reflected *in* Europe.

Pol Morillas
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A challenge to the European security order

Moscow has shown a clear determination to strategically rival the EU and represents a double challenge for Brussels. On the one hand, it is eroding the fragile European unity - under German leadership - on the sanctions imposed on Russia and the need to stand firm against its interference in Ukraine. On the other, alliances and cooperation with European political forces with openly anti-EU agendas (Front National, Jobbik, UKIP, etc.) are being formed with the clear objective of weakening the Union. The Ukrainian crisis and the tensions with Russia (including military) are particularly difficult to handle for an EU whose common foreign and security policy is still non-existent. In fact, foreign policy and defence are the two areas in which Brussels is weakest and most dysfunctional. What is more, this challenge arises at a time when the EU is facing a profound crisis, which makes the risks greater and raises questions about the process of European integration itself. Ukraine is an issue of the greatest importance and not only for its symbolic value. The European security order has been put into question, dynamited by Russia's annexation of Crimea and questioning of the borders and the full sovereignty of the other ex-Soviet republics.

A response based on the sanctions

The EU, in line with the USA, has approved three packages of sanctions against Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in Ukraine. Russia, for its part, has imposed a veto on the importation of foodstuffs from the EU that is turning out to be particularly harmful to Germany and the countries of southern Europe. Its impact, however, is not comparable to the effects of the European sanctions on the Russian economy, especially when added to the collapse in the price of oil, which is the main source of income for the Russian state. The EU, led by Germany and France, actively backs the protocol subscribed to in Minsk in February 2015 establishing a precarious and uncertain road map for peace in Ukraine. The uncertainty derives, fundamentally, from the divergent interpretations of each party (Ukraine on the one side and

Russia and the insurgency it sponsors on the other) when it comes to the political aspects of the document ("process of decentralisation" and "national inclusive dialogue") and from the de facto right of veto over the process of Ukrainian constitutional reform granted to Moscow.

The challenge of European unity

EU unity will again be put to the test in June when European leaders will have to formalise the agreement reached in March 2015 connecting the validity of the European economic sanctions with the "full implementation of the Minsk accords". This means the extension of the sanctions until at least the end of 2015. The agreement was promoted by the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French president, François Hollande. Member states like Greece, Hungary and Cyprus have shown, more or less explicitly, their opposition to its continuation, while Germany has already made its stance in favour of the sanctions clear, which is shared by the Baltic countries, Poland and the United Kingdom. Others such as Spain, Italy and France are taking a position that is committed to European unity but more ambiguous, and is marked, above all, by the primacy given to the economic interests in play. The problem is that these divisions affect not only the economic issues but, as has been indicated, the principles of the security order in the European continental space as well. For all of these reasons, a rigorous, profound debate in the EU about its relationship with Russia is essential. Otherwise, the vagueness and ambiguities will continue to weaken its position when facing the Russian giant.

Eduard Soler i Lecha
Research Coordinator, CIDOB

Trafficking, terrorism and conflict

The crises are piling up for the EU in its immediate surroundings and the Maghreb is no exception. Libya, just a few hundred kilometres from European coasts, projects instability in the form of drugs and arms trafficking and as a sanctuary for transnational criminal and terrorist groups. The fact that the terrorists who attacked the parliament and a group of tourists in Tunis on March 18th received military training in Libya is one example of this. The region's borders are porous and difficult to control and the collapse of Libya's state structures is exacerbated by the fragility of the countries in the Sahel. The areas that remain beyond government control are the stage on which terrorist groups operate and strengthen in collusion with other criminal organisations.

Meanwhile, the two main countries in the region, Algeria and Morocco, continue to pursue policies of rivalry and competition. There is little hope for reconciliation while the conflict in the Sahara is both an obstacle and an excuse. But without it, shared threats cannot be confronted and, no less important, the foundations of economic integration, the benefits of which would extend to neighbouring countries, cannot be laid.

In the hands of the states

Europe is not a distant spectator. Some member states, France in particular, have played a central role in the military interventions in Libya and Mali. For others, the key element is their physical proximity: Italy and Malta, because of how close they are to Libya, and Spain, which is the only European country to share a land border with the Maghreb. Intervention and proximity should be translated into shared responsibilities and interests. Nevertheless, the actions of the main states involved have not been backed by policies at a European level. Examples are the already-aborted Italian maritime rescue operation, Mare Nostrum, and the reduction in size of the European missions in Libya and Mali.

Libya is the cornerstone of the Maghreb-Sahel insecurity complex. Neither the EU nor its member states want to intervene militarily again. Recently, the possibility of deploying a further-reaching Libyan mission has been on the table, always with the aim of helping ensure that the agreements the parties in conflict should reach in the framework of the United Nations-led negotiations are respected.

In terms of regional integration, the EU appears to lack incentives with which to change the positions of the two key countries: Morocco and Algeria. Neither the calls to advance the processes of regional cooperation and integration, nor the support for projects of interconnection have been enough to change the priorities of those who block rapprochement.

Containment is not enough

In Libya, the EU must continue to support the dialogue process that is underway and, as far as it is able, create incentives for agreement. On the one hand, it is essential to prioritise actions that allow the recovery of a minimum level of security in Libya and in this way enable advances to be made in a dual process of reconciliation and reconstruction. On the other hand, recognition of the fact that Libya's neighbours are central to unblocking this situation must not be translated into a policy of outsourcing that allows the Europeans to avoid their responsibilities.

In Libya, as well as the rest of the Maghreb and the Sahel, what is needed is a coherent approach that is based not solely on security instruments but which does not exclude them. Recognising both the needs of the region and its own capabilities, of all the areas of action available Europe should give particular attention to institutional strengthening and regional cooperation. Inasmuch as part of the insecurity that this region projects is fed by criminal networks who are present on European soil, the EU should redouble its efforts to fight mafias and organised crime networks in its own territory.

Eckart Woertz
Senior Research Fellow, CIDOB

A security conundrum

The territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq is currently compromised and it is unclear whether it will be reinstated in the foreseeable future. This threatens to destabilise the Middle East and certainly affects the security of Europe. Returning jihadists might commit terrorist attacks on European soil, refugee flows are increasing and the flow of commodities could be disrupted.

The situation in Syria and Iraq is characterised by sectarian violence and proxy warfare by neighbouring countries. Saudi Arabia and Iran mistrust each other deeply and are making rival bids for regional hegemony. Like Saudi Arabia, Turkey is pushing for an end to the Assad regime and is, at the same time, anxious that Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and independent statehood may materialise as a result of the fraying territorial integrity of its southern neighbours.

Above all, it will need to be the region's peoples who resolve the current crisis. The possibilities of the West changing events on the ground with airstrikes are limited, considering that a ground invasion would be unwise after the negative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given that a quick solution to the crisis is unlikely, the best bet is a prolonged period of containment and muddling through.

What has Europe done thus far?

Europe has tried to stay out of both conflicts for a long time. In contrast to Libya, it has not chosen to take an active role and has not tried to help in toppling the Assad regime, even after the Syrian dictator used chemical weapons against his own population. Only the forward march of Islamic State (IS) in 2014 and the increased threat posed by returning jihadists has spooked Europe into action.

The UK, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark have participated in the US-led air campaign against IS positions. The UK, Germany,

France, Italy, the Czech Republic and several other European states have provided weapons and training to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, a move that has been welcomed by the EU. Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany and Denmark have also provided arms, training and non-lethal equipment to the Iraqi government.

On European soil, the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo and on a Jewish supermarket in Paris in January 2015 showed the potential security risks, as they claimed inspiration from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and IS. As a consequence of the attacks, Europe has tightened surveillance of Islamist groups and has sought to prevent jihadists from travelling to the Syrian-Iraqi war theatre.

A stronger, more joined-up approach

Europe can ill afford isolated policy initiatives at a national level, so European nation states need to coordinate their policies better if they want to play a meaningful role in the Middle East. Internally, the prosecution of jihadists needs to be intensified and the flow of recruits and funds to Syria and Iraq needs to be cut. Human rights violations and criminal activities by Europeans in Syria and Iraq need to be documented and the individuals need to be legally prosecuted in the case of return. Depending on the severity of their crimes, exit options and reintegration programmes could be offered.

Regarding immigration, Europe needs to acknowledge its demographic imbalance and see immigration as an opportunity: many refugees from the region are highly educated, and so, rather than seeing refugees as merely a burden, one should not lose sight of the possible benefits. This would require the integration of accepted refugees and immigrants into the European educational institutions and job markets.

On foreign policy issues, it should be noted that European supplies of military equipment to Kurdish forces have helped to push back IS. Such military aid can be a means of last resort, but it can also be misused and is difficult to control. Some of the arms that were delivered to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces ended up in the hands of the a Kurdish group in Syria, the YPG, which is affiliated with the Kurdish PKK in Turkey, which the EU still lists as terrorist organisation. The EU should also be aware that the delivery of arms to the Iraqi government could also have problematic ramifications, as shown by the revenge killings and human rights violations by Shiite militias in the wake of the recapture of Tikrit.

From a broader geopolitical perspective, the EU must acknowledge that regional powers such as Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia also play a crucial role in resolving the Syrian and Iraqi crises. Increased surveillance of border flows by Turkey and reconciliation with the Kurds, a crackdown on private donations from Gulf countries to jihadist groups and a change of Iran's support of the Assad regime would go a long way towards a regional solution. Europe should thus encourage such steps in its foreign policy towards these regional powers.

Moussa Bourekba
Researcher, CIDOB

A European phenomenon with national tentacles

This year, the assault on the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* (January 7th-9th, 2015), the twin attacks on the Danish capital (February 14th, 2014), as well as the arrest of about twenty people accused of recruiting "would-be jihadists" and planning attacks in Barcelona during various anti-terrorist operations show that many EU member states are exposed to the threat of violent extremism.

Although this series of events has shaken public opinions throughout the old continent, pushing national political leaders to strengthen domestic security measures, the threat posed by violent extremism should be dealt with at European level.

An underutilised European strategy

Indeed, this was the aim of the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment launched in 2005. Structured around prevention (promoting anti-extremist discourses) and disruption ("disrupting the activities that draw people into terrorism"), this strategy also gave birth to the European Network of Experts in Radicalisation, which serves as a platform where experts and researchers can discuss the roots of radicalisation and provide EU policy-makers with their expertise in the field (exchange of best practices, etc.).

However, during the decade after this strategy was launched, many additional challenges have made the need for a coherent, multidimensional strategy against violent extremism urgent. According to the EU justice commissioner, Vera Jouriva, more than 6,000 Europeans are estimated to have left for Syria to swell the ranks of violent extremist organisations such as the Islamic State organisation and Jabhat-Al Nusra.

As a result, each member state has implemented its own security strategy against violent extremism, whereas the scope of such a phenomenon clearly shows that EU members need to cooperate not only in the field

of repression, but also, and, above all, in the field of prevention. This includes more intelligence sharing, an improvement in the exchange of information between the police forces and judicial systems of member states, a wider exchange of best practices, and a genuinely European institution that allows experts and practitioners to look at the diverse reasons people opt for violent extremism.

Towards a long-term preventive strategy

What is more, the EU's neighbouring MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) has become the site of an unprecedented explosion of violence since 2011 (Libya, Tunisia, Sahel, Syria, Iraq) while many economic challenges urgently need to be addressed. The persistence of civil wars in Iraq, Syria and Libya and their implications (proliferation of militias and weapons in these countries and their neighbours) as well as the need for structural reforms (this region has the highest level of youth unemployment in the world) definitely sow the seeds of violent extremism.

A context of this kind and its possible consequences for many EU partner countries and the EU itself demand attention. In parallel to the short-term and often repressive measures taken, the EU should also tackle the issue of violent extremism in the light of the push factors that make both European and non-European citizens vulnerable to radical ideologies. This means cooperating more closely with the MENA countries not only in the field of security but also by supporting socio-economic structural reforms with a long-term perspective.

Elena Sánchez Montijano
Research Fellow, CIDOB

The data of a global crisis

At the end of 2013, there were 51.2 million people worldwide displaced from their homes as a result of persecution, conflict or human rights violations; 6 million more than in 2012, according to the UNHCR. Of these, nearly 17% are internationally displaced and, in more than 85% of cases, find themselves in countries under development (Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon and Jordan are the main host countries). For their part, most rich countries have gone from receiving, in a decade, 30% of refugees to just 14%. The largest number of refugees in 2014 is comprised of those coming from Syria, with 3 million.

As a consequence of the intensification of conflicts and the resulting increase in displacements around the world, the EU has seen the number of people seeking asylum double in just four years. So while in 2011 asylum seekers totalled 309,710, in 2014 the number was 626,260, according to data from Eurostat. Of these asylum seekers, one in every five was Syrian and one in four was a minor.

The absence of a collective response

The EU's discourse on the protection of displaced persons centres on the construction of a Common European Asylum System that guarantees a high level of protection for refugees, which is considered fair and effective throughout the EU. At international level, the EU's representatives have shown continued commitment to strengthening the help given to populations affected by conflicts such as those in Syria.

In spite of this and the global crisis data, the EU has, until now, been incapable of responding with a single voice to the refugee situation, either legislatively or procedurally. Although in June 2013 the merging of the EU asylum regulations was agreed, the lack of effective transposition into national legislation, as well as common procedure and final approval, create significant disparity in its implementation. Thus, while in 2014 Sweden received 81,325 applications of which 23% were initially

rejected, France received 62,735 applications, denying 78%, and, Spain, in the same year, had 5,615 applications of which 56% were rejected.

Refuge is an international right established in the Geneva Convention of 1951. As signatories to the convention, the EU and its member states have committed to safeguarding this right before the international community. The EU's collective response to a forced displacement of 51.2 million people at the end of 2013 should therefore be substantial.

A more ambitious policy

In seeking to create a Common European Asylum System, the EU must ensure that member states reflect the community acquis in their national legislation, as well as evaluating national practices. Likewise, the agreed-upon refugee admission quotas in the EU as a whole must be expanded. The EU's response to the tragedy on April 18th in which 900 people died in the Mediterranean cannot be an increase in the number of admitted refugees of only 5,000, while a better division of responsibilities is necessary to ensure the attention to surveillance and ensuring the safe access to the territory is maintained.

Anna Ayuso
Senior Research Fellow, CIDOB

The Atlantic as a laboratory for globalisation

Given the way the centre of power and economic growth is being displaced towards the global south, growing interdependence is affecting the reconfiguration of the traditional geopolitical spaces. The EU, which has been especially affected by these transformations, has found itself obliged to consider how to manage its decline and improve its position as a global actor.

As a consequence, the transatlantic relationship can no longer be read from an exclusively North-North perspective. Increased South-South trade and cooperation, economic and investment growth and the Atlantic energy boom are all sufficiently important features to merit a global political response. At the same time, non-traditional security issues, such as the trafficking of drugs, weapons and other unlawful activities are increasing in the Atlantic: the Gulf of Guinea, for example, is being converted into the access point for pirate attacks in the Atlantic. In addition to this, the Atlantic is currently the site of tensions generated by the growing efforts of the coastal states to obtain exclusive rights to the management and exploitation of natural resources.

The absence of an integrated vision for the Atlantic

These days the Atlantic as a geopolitical space is not high on the foreign policy agenda. The EU's approach to the challenges of security, the environment and energy in the Atlantic Space is fragmented by two traditional logics: North-North, dominated by the United States, and North-South, with a unidirectional focus towards Africa and Latin America. The negotiations on the EU-Canada (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement [CETA]) and those ongoing over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are the two major exponents of North-North alignment, despite the fact that their signing would have direct consequences for other Atlantic partners.

In terms of security, although in 2014 the EU adopted a Maritime Security Strategy that takes in the internal and external aspects of maritime security and is intended to provide a coherent framework with which to contribute to stability and security at sea, it lacks an integrated vision of the Atlantic Space.

Broadening the Atlantic Space

The EU should accept that the dominance of the north in the current governance institutions at global and regional levels is in question. The proliferation of exchanges in the southern Atlantic and the rise of new agendas provide opportunities for identifying new instruments and forms of political and economic cooperation.

In terms of security, establishing a pan-Atlantic community will require the growing participation of a wide number of regional actors, setting aside the fears of wider cooperation and focussing on the risks shared by the EU and the rest of the actors in the Atlantic. In the field of maritime security, the EU, as well as being one of the main maritime operators in the Atlantic basin, must take on the responsibilities of leadership and cooperation with the states in the Atlantic Space in the fight against piracy and the illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings.

On the environment, it is necessary to establish positive cooperation for the adaptation to climate change and the development of renewable energy and low-carbon emission technology. In the field of energy, the EU should strategically reorient its import flows, diversifying them with those coming from other parts of the Atlantic basin such as Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and North America.

Jordi Bacaria
Director, CIDOB

The globalisation of financial institutions

The governance of the international financial institutions has been subject to tensions over the last decade due to the appearance of new actors on the international scene. The emerging economies and, particularly, China, have not been given their rightful places in international financial governance in spite of their economic power and their greater participation in the global economy.

In light of this blockage, China has led the creation of other fledging institutions in both the BRICS framework and an Asian setting. The *New Development Bank* (NDB) created in July 2014 with a $100 billion reserve fund could play an alternative role to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in providing liquidity to help avoid balance of payment problems for the BRICS countries and the emerging economies. The objective of the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), created in 2015, is to fund infrastructure in Asian countries. Regarding their objectives, both institutions promoted by China are very similar to the IMF and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is participated by the World Bank, although their scope is for the moment limited to the part of the economic world that has remained under-represented in the governance of the international financial institutions.

Substantial European participation

In the IMF, the European Union, via its member states, has a relatively significant quota although the decision-making power has always remained in the hands of the United States, which blocked the reform proposal made in December 2010. This would have made China the third largest member of the IMF (Brazil, India and Russia would also have joined the group of the top 10), but it was rejected by the US Congress in April 2014.

In terms of the World Bank, the contribution of EU countries of more than $50 billion of subscribed capital (28.75% of WB capital) far exceeds

the total of that handed over by the United States and Japan, who, along with the countries in the BRICS group, are the largest shareholders in it. The Chinese initiative to create the AIIB with $50 billion of capital has incorporated 57 of the countries of the world despite the opposition of the United States and Japan. The majority of EU member states, led by the United Kingdom, France and Germany have asked to be founder members of the institution. The USA and Japan, who are the main shareholders in the WB and the ADB, have shown their concern about the emergence of a direct competitor in the area.

An active role facing the end of Bretton Woods

EU member states have not been able to counteract the power of the US in the IMF nor its refusal to reform it. The blocking of reform motivated the creation of the NDB by the BRICS and, with it, the fragmentation of the international financial institutions. Faced with the challenge of the AIIB, Europe should maintain its active role in the institution in order to not fall behind in terms of investment in Asia and its financing possibilities. If the current transformations of the international financial system and its progressive globalisation means the end of Bretton Woods, Europe should evaluate its own position, independently of US policy.

Carmen Claudín
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Eduard Soler i Lecha
Research coordinator, CIDOB

Democratising waves and authoritarian fascination

Various waves of democratisation have taken place over recent decades, both inside and outside Europe. The rule of law seemed to be gaining ground over other forms of government even in an Arab world which, until four years ago, seemed immune to this dynamic of democratic change. However, a parallel authoritarian counter-current is underway in numerous countries, from Russia to Venezuela via Hungary, a member of the European Union.

In a world of sudden changes, risks and vulnerability, the association of authoritarianism with strength and democracy with weakness is of great concern. The echo still resounds of the speech made by the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orban, affirming that the liberal democracies had coped worst with the crises while the most successful countries, such as Russia, Turkey and China, are not liberal and some are not even democratic.

New fundamentalist and neoconservative discourses, based on dogmatic readings of Christianity and Islam claim to be confronting the "decadent" world that the liberal ideology - the Western, above all - is meant to represent. Something very alarming is happening when a known neo-conservative commentator such as Patrick J. Buchanan declares that Putin is right to oppose the liberal model at a time when "conservatives, traditionalists and nationalists of all continents and countries stand up against the cultural and ideological imperialism" of a decadent West.

Democracy and human rights

The project of European integration is conceived in terms of democratisation. The enlargement of the EU towards the south and the east of Europe have responded (among other goals) to the demand of various countries that aspired to consolidate themselves as new democracies. Democratisation and modernisation are what the EU has projected to the outside. Not for nothing is the EU known as a normative power.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, which draws on more than €1.3 billion in current financial resources, is the umbrella of global reach under which all kinds of action is taken, from support for civil society actors to electoral observation missions. For the countries in its most immediate surroundings specific mechanisms are added. The most recent is the European Endowment for Democracy, which aims to support those who, for various reasons, cannot be supported through conventional channels.

Example and strategy

The EU's contribution to the strengthening of democracy in global terms begins with the building of a strong, open Europe. At these times, the sensation of permanent crisis being experienced in the EU, especially in the countries on the periphery, along with the strengthening of xenophobic, authoritarian forces throughout the continent, is undermining the global democratic projection of the EU.

But with or without the crisis, the EU would negate itself if it did not support the processes of democratic transition as much in its immediate surroundings (Tunisia, Ukraine) as thousands of kilometres distance away (Myanmar), or if it did not commit to a policy of constructive involvement with Turkey, where mutual distancing has coincided with polarisation and the strengthening of authoritarian attitudes. The EU has to bear in mind that, fortunately, democracy is not solely a European or Western asset. Political dialogue and joint action with emerging democracies, such as Brazil, India and Indonesia, must be a priority line of external action for the EU to support the demand for democracy at a global scale.

Roberto Toscano
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Iran matters for Europe

That April 2nd was an important day for the European Union and its foreign policy role was underlined by the fact that the Lausanne preliminary agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue was announced jointly by the EU's high representative for foreign affairs, Federica Mogherini, and the Iranian foreign minister, Javad Zarif. This was clear recognition of the role played by the EU in reaching that important – and difficult – juncture.

The Iranian nuclear deal is not only important in itself, but may turn out to be a significant test case for a substantial evolution towards a common EU foreign policy. At the same time, it will also constitute a test of internal cohesion and consistency among member states, as well as of the strength of the European alliance with the US.

How has Europe reacted and what should it do?

At the very beginning of the Iranian nuclear question, Tehran's interlocutors were not the Americans (who at the time were reluctant to engage with the Iranians), but instead, three European countries: the UK, France and Germany. The nominalistic debate on whether they should be called E3 or EU3 revealed something substantial: the initially less-than-evident role of the EU as such. Yet, as the negotiation laboriously proceeded over more than ten years, the role of the EU, and of its high representative, grew. Despite the prominence of the US, the EU's contribution should not be underestimated when assessing each player's role in the Lausanne agreement.

Now the issue for the EU is how to devise an active policy for the delicate post-Lausanne phase. The achievement of a final agreement at the end of June appears to be subject not so much to the solution of the remaining issues under negotiation, as to the role of political factors (and actors) both in Tehran and, especially, in Washington. The somewhat contradictory statements that have come out of Tehran since Lausanne reveal what seems to be more like instrumental posturing, in particular

by the Supreme Leader, than real opposition to the deal. However, much more dangerous for the final outcome of the agreement is the possible impact of the complex political-constitutional dialectics between President Obama and the US Congress.

The EU has proved consistent in its firm stance toward Iran, in particular by implementing both UN and EU sanctions that have been very costly to Europe in economic terms. At the same time, it has always been convinced that sanctions were aimed at inducing a more reasonable Iranian negotiating position, such as the preservation of a peaceful nuclear industry – albeit under an enhanced system of inspections – and not the achievement of an unrealistic total surrender of Iranian interests. The gradual convergence of the Obama administration with this approach, together with the more flexible Iranian negotiating stance adopted by the Rohani/Zarif team, allowed the negotiators to overcome what seemed insurmountable obstacles.

Firmness & unity will bring Europe benefits

Europeans – both as the EU and bilaterally – should therefore make it unequivocally clear to Washington that firmness and unity are necessarily tied to a steady commitment to reaching a final result, and that a collapse of the Iranian deal would entail consequences that both Americans and Europeans have a stake in averting. As noted by the New York Times: "*Even if Congress barred Mr. Obama from waiving American sanctions, the European Union and the UN could lift the sanctions they imposed, thus undercutting the American decision*". Thus, both economic interest (sacrificed only to achieve a satisfactory diplomatic result) and the perspective of the positive regional impact of an agreement explain why a positive conclusion to the Iranian nuclear issue is so important for the EU. And Washington should be made fully aware of it.

Francis Ghilès
Associate Senior Researcher, CIDOB

The EU: thirsty for energy?

Total primary energy dependence for the European Union stands at roughly half of its member's needs – a figure which has not changed over the past decade. The EU's negative trade balance in energy increased from 2.1% of GDP in 2009 to 3.1% in 2013, despite a decline in total energy consumption since the 2008 crisis and the rapid development of domestic renewable energy sources which has boosted their share in energy consumption from 8% to 11%.

The crisis in Ukraine has underlined the extent to which many EU members depend on imports of Russian gas. Countries such as Bulgaria and Estonia are totally reliant on Russia. Others such as France and Italy are also energy-dependent, although their suppliers are Algeria, Libya and other countries in Africa and the Middle East. The UK for its part is registering a fast decline in its crude oil output which implies a growing dependence on energy imports. No European country can currently escape a negative trade balance in energy, with the rise in imports of solid fuel – notably coal– adding a new twist to the story.

The new Energy Union

Reducing the vulnerability of member states to energy shocks is thus the key aim of the EU. Member states can diversify their suppliers, although a few constraints exist. There is no shortage of new possible suppliers for oil and gas, but in Eastern Europe, for instance, importing gas from a non-Russian source means building regasification plants or extending existing pipelines in Europe. Some new linkages cannot be built due to the interests of particular national suppliers, whose business depends on limiting open competition.

In addition, the existing underwater pipelines running from Libya and Algeria to Italy and Spain are underused. Broader security and geopolitical reasons are behind this trend. Production in Libya has been severely impaired by the civil war, while in Algeria a question mark exists over the

country's capacity to increase exports. Similarly, pipelines to central Asia have proved to be expensive long-term undertakings and there is no commitment to further developing them.

The plan for an Energy Union endorsed by the European Council last month suggests a more joined-up approach by the EU in combining energy and climate policies. It seeks to encourage more interconnection of gas and electricity capacities in the EU. This is important because the Commission has often been accused of having a silo mentality, with each of its directorates pursuing its own agenda with little overall coordination. The vice-president of the Commission, Maros Sefcovics, is strongly fighting to overcome past mistakes.

Europe should be bolder

Three main miscalculations have dogged the EU's energy and climate policies over the past decade: an over-estimate of the impact of liberalisation on integrating Europe's energy market; an underestimate of the cost of Europe's clean energy policies; and the false assumption that the external context for EU policies, both in terms of energy prices and energy security, would remain essentially unchanged.

The crisis over Ukraine, the volatile price of oil and gas and the ever-rising cost of renewable subsidies suggest than an even more joined-up approach is the only way to face the energy/security challenge. The Energy Union establishes a new level of policy- making above nation states and that is worth the effort. The EU should now go one step further and acknowledge that technical and scientific progress can have a huge and unexpected impact and put more efforts into linking energy policy with trade with other regions of the world. Nowhere will this be more challenging than with its unstable southern and eastern periphery, where the EU must strive to prevent collapse and war.

Oriol Farrés
Project Manager, CIDOB

The world's largest market and its most dynamic region

The economic rise of China and India, aided by the United States pivot towards Asia and the growth in South-South interaction, has shifted the axis of international relations from the Atlantic to the Pacific. These days, Asia shows signs of growing economic integration (above all in terms of production) that is, nevertheless, unaccompanied by internal political rapprochement.

Rather the opposite is true: the continent's tensions have been aggravated by a surge in nationalism and the persistent territorial conflicts that continue in the absence of the institutions and regulations with which to contain them. The countries facing such conflicts are the EU's four strategic partners in Asia (China, India, Japan and South Korea), all of whom are essential players in the fight against climate change, piracy, maritime security (40% of the world's goods flow through the region) and nuclear non-proliferation.

An unequal projection

Europe faces the challenge of keeping pace with the most dynamic region in the world at a time when it is still trying to refind its own path towards economic growth and recover the good image of its regional integration model. Beyond the unavoidable interest in China (set out in the 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation), the EU continues to use trade flows as the engine for closer bonds with Asia, in particular through free trade treaties, such as that with South Korea and the extremely advanced agreement with Japan, which could be signed at the end of the year. Significant progress on an agreement with Singapore is also being made, while others with Malaysia, Vietnam and India are foreseen, the last of which has enormous potential.

Despite this, the political projection of the EU is not equal to its economic potential, in large part due to the fragmentation of European national

policies towards the Asian powers. In security terms, the EU is also not perceived to be a relevant actor because of its weakness on military issues, despite significant potential in the areas of police training and the fights against piracy, smuggling and mafias. Likewise, the EU has an essential role in alleviating the consequences of natural disasters.

The EU continues to foster the construction of regional Asian institutions through its support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) –and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)–, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and its ongoing interregional dialogue through Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). By supporting the multilateralisation of the conflicts in Asia, Europe dissipates the risks of conflagration and encourages greater and more meaningful inclusion of China in the international system.

From default alliances to strategic alliances

Despite the many differences in culture and values, the EU and its potential Asian allies share, in large part, a vision of organised globalisation governed by regulation and institutions, with greater emphasis given to the role of the G20. Europe must maintain its constructive role in the consolidation of the Asian institutional architecture, such as, for example, the East Asia Summit, and could assist the progressive transformation of Japan into a new, conventional security power, mediating its neighbours' mistrust and offering a different approach to the US.

ASEAN has been the seed of institutionalism in Asia for decades and, by its nature, is the natural ally for the EU in the Asian space. The debate on an EU-ASEAN free trade agreement and the organisation's elevation to the level of strategic ally should be prioritised, given its potential to ease the tensions in the continent.

A specific area for possible advances in cooperation between the EU and Asia is scientific research, where the EU holds comparative advantages and the interests of the Asian educational powers (Japan, in particular) in internationalising their higher education and strengthening ties with the emerging scientific hubs converge. Additionally, in terms of climate change, Asia and Europe have shown greater awareness than other world powers such as the United States and Russia. While in the field of energy, the dependence of both European and Asian states on fossil fuels could be the means of turning mutual understanding into shared solutions.

Luigi Carafa
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The challenges ahead of Paris

The European Union is the third-largest carbon emitter in the world, after China and the United States. Over the last decade Brussels emerged as a frontrunner in domestic climate policy, setting an example for industrialised and developing countries. Lately the EU has been seeking to influence the international climate negotiations, which will conclude at the Paris climate summit in December 2015. What issues should the EU try to influence, and how far can it go in this respect?

The overall goal of the Paris process is to agree upon a post-2020 climate regime designed to keep global warming below 2°C. However, it is expected that any future Paris deal will be a lowest common denominator agreement that fails to reach the 2°C target (according to climate science projections).

Importantly, another big challenge lies ahead of the Paris climate summit. Emerging economies are projected to account for all global emissions increases by 2035. If the international community is not able to produce an agreement that deals effectively with at least this one challenge, the Paris 21st Session of Conference of the Parties (COP21) could be a double failure.

The EU should focus on implementation and monitoring

Back in Copenhagen it became evident that China would never accept a binding universal treaty on climate change – a cornerstone of the EU's international climate strategy. This means that any future Paris agreement should go for innovative soft-law instruments. The EU now has a shared responsibility to help create a credible climate governance system.

The EU should thus concentrate on the Paris agreement's implementation and monitoring system. With serious implementation mechanisms in place, it will be easier to manage the increase in global emissions – even

if a scenario below 2°C remains unlikely. However, if Paris does not put substantive implementation and monitoring mechanisms in place, a massive increase in global emissions is expected by emerging economies as well as other rapidly developing countries.

To be credible, the implementation and monitoring mechanisms adopted in Paris should at least foresee the setting up of an independent body to promote compliance and assess the countries' performance. And any such implementation and compliance mechanisms should be accompanied by adequate climate finance. The Lima COP20 conference already made it clear that the climate finance focus should be on reducing high-carbon investments and boosting 'climate-proof' investments.

These points set the floor (not the ceiling) for any sound EU climate action in Paris. And, interestingly, the working draft of a Paris agreement includes such options. Yet it remains to be seen whether countries will agree upon sound implementation and compliance mechanisms.

A test case for the EU's negotiation capacity

Some commentators say that the European Union is aiming to build a coalition with the countries of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), namely Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and Peru. This would certainly raise the pressure on developing countries and the top carbon emitters such as China, India and Argentina. The EU will also probe possible compromises with "veto players" such as China, the USA and India. At the end of the day, Paris will be a test case for the EU's capacity to negotiate any future climate agreement.

Pol Morillas
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A European vision of international relations

When, in 2003, the first European Security Strategy was published, the EU was emerging from one of the most acute episodes of internal fracture in memory. The Iraq war had divided the old continent between the allies of George W. Bush and his "agenda for freedom" and those who opposed the policies of the war on terror.

Designed to underline the common denominator for European diplomacies, the strategy defined the principles of a European vision of international relations. Certain elements stood out, such as the wide acceptance of the threats to international security, the use of an array of instruments beyond the strictly military and a fervent defence of multilateralism in conflict resolution.

Since then, the document, drawn up under the supervision of the former high representative, Javier Solana, has only been revised once: in 2008, when a review of the implementation of the strategy during the first years of its life was made; new threats, such as cyberterrorism, were added and the instruments of EU action were defined.

Strategy 2.0

Today, the Brussels authorities are preparing to carry out an update of the role of Europe in a world that is more complex, contested and interconnected than it was twelve years ago. New powers consolidating their presence on the global geostrategic chessboard, the resurgence of the geopolitical rivalry with Russia and the arc of instability at the borders of the EU are some of the challenges that the new strategy cannot ignore.

In December 2013, the European Council gave the current high representative and vice-president of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, the task of assessing these global transformations and reporting back to the Council in 2015 on the challenges and opportunities that arise from them. With this period of evaluation completed, the June 2015 European

Council meeting will ask the high representative to update the European Security Strategy in light of the challenges and opportunities identified. Mogherini will then have to initiate a process that should have the full collaboration of the member states and ensure that the new strategy unites the objectives, interests and instruments of the EU in a coherent manner.

The world in Europe

This report has shown that the threats to European security are no longer as remote as they were in the days of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ramifications of the war in Syria, jihadism, and the continuum of insecurity in the Maghreb and Sahel produce high levels of insecurity on European soil.

Furthermore, global dynamics are reducing the European influence in the definition of the rules of the international game. As an international actor, the EU is diminished in both political capacities and projection, with its centrality reduced as a consequence of the shifting of the centre of global power from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the consolidation of the BRICS and the creation of new international financial institutions.

The world and its crises are thus more present than ever in Europe. The writing of a new global strategy will be the first of many opportunities for the EU to think big.