

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**La seguridad europea: Diálogos para
el siglo XXI.**

Introducción.

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Prólogo.
Javier Solana

Prólogo

*Javier Solana

No creo que sorprenda a ningún lector de esta edición especial de la revista *Afers Internacionals*, ni a ninguno de los distinguidos expertos participantes en las Jornadas sobre Seguridad Europea organizadas por la Fundació CIDOB, si afirmo que estoy convencido de que 1997 pasará a la historia como un año excepcional para la seguridad europea. Se trata de un año que nos encamina hacia el siglo XXI mucho mejor preparados, para afrontar los desafíos que se nos puedan presentar, de lo que jamás nos podíamos haber imaginado. Estoy convencido de que nos adentramos en el próximo milenio con un nuevo sentido de unidad y de dirección común en una Europa que me gusta definir como *de la integración y la cooperación*.

Ello será posible porque, en menos de 12 meses, el panorama de seguridad en nuestro continente ha cambiado radicalmente y lo ha hecho para bien. Una de las causas de esta positiva evolución es, sin duda, la gestión y aplicación de una agenda ambiciosa con objetivos básicamente integradores, que la Alianza Atlántica está siendo capaz de llevar a buen término.

La organización que tengo la responsabilidad de dirigir ha asumido plenamente que, en el mundo global en que estamos inmersos y tras la caída del muro de Berlín, la seguridad ya no es sólo militar ni se puede restringir a la defensa. Abarca otros campos, debe ser integradora y sobre todo humana, e incluye la economía, el comercio, la ecología, e incluso el derecho de las minorías; además, no puede provenir de una sólo institución, sino que depende de todo un entramado de estas.

Donde más claramente se ve esta interrelación y a la vez división de trabajo es, precisamente, en Bosnia. En este país están presentes todas las instituciones, desde la OTAN hasta la Unión Europea, codo a codo con las agencias de Naciones Unidas, compartiendo un único objetivo: llevar la paz a este país devastado por la guerra.

Por ello la agenda política de la Alianza no se circunscribe a ella misma, a los 16 países miembros (19 antes de que acabe el siglo). Los aliados tenemos ahora una visión de la cooperación y, por tanto, de proyección de estabilidad a toda la región euroatlántica, desde Vancouver hasta Vladivostok. Pero más que de límites geográficos, yo prefiero hablar de una comunidad de naciones que comparte los mismos valores democráticos y los mismos objetivos de paz y estabilidad.

Uno de nuestros anhelos es, por consiguiente, robustecer los procesos de integración, de interdependencia política, económica y social que se están dando en la actualidad, con el fin de lograr una Europa en paz, estable, próspera, vinculada a Norteamérica y firme en su condición de socio no sólo fiable sino también cooperador de todos los países del continente y de sus vecinos de la cuenca mediterránea.

Las grandes decisiones que hemos tomado a lo largo de 1997, principalmente en la Cumbre de París de mayo pasado, y en la de Madrid de julio, muestran la determinación con la que nos encaminamos hacia ese ambicioso objetivo:

-Hemos concluido las negociaciones de adhesión con Hungría, la República Checa y Polonia, los tres países invitados a formar parte de la Alianza. Estamos a punto de firmar los protocolos para su adhesión y confiamos que serán miembros en 1999, cuando la Alianza Atlántica cumpla 50 años.

-Nos hemos comprometido a dejar la puerta abierta a nuevos miembros, ya que no queremos que nunca más surjan líneas de confrontación en Europa.

-Una nueva relación especial con Rusia, a través del Acta Fundacional firmada entre Rusia y la OTAN que nos ha encaminado definitivamente en la senda de la cooperación y que hemos institucionalizado con un Consejo Permanente Conjunto.

-Hemos puesto en marcha una relación específica con Ucrania, un país clave en Europa, en cuya capital, Kíev, la OTAN ha abierto su primera oficina de información, como muestra de interés bilateral que tenemos en desarrollar la cooperación en todos los campos.

-Un Consejo de Asociación Euroatlántico sienta alrededor de la mesa de Bruselas, cada mes, a 44 países, todos los aliados más 28 socios, con los que tratamos todo tipo de asuntos políticos relacionados con la seguridad.

-Después de convertirse en el programa de cooperación militar más exitoso de toda la historia, hemos reforzado todavía más la Asociación para la Paz (APP), en la que participan 27 países de Europa Central y del Este, incluidos los nuevos Estados Independientes surgidos de la ex Unión Soviética e, incluso, algunos países neutrales como Suiza, Moldavia y Finlandia.

-Hemos intensificado el diálogo con los seis países de la ribera sur del Mediterráneo, con el objetivo de superar recelos y lanzar una cooperación que contribuya a la estabilidad de una zona que la Alianza no quiere olvidar y con la que queremos dejar atrás los recelos o malentendidos que pudieran existir.

-Estamos avanzando en la reforma interna, en especial en la nueva estructura de mandos y en el desarrollo de una Identidad Europea de Seguridad y Defensa (IESD) en el seno de la Alianza.

Toda esta ambiciosa agenda la hemos desarrollado mientras estamos realizando la mayor operación de paz jamás llevada a cabo. En Bosnia, los soldados de la Alianza, junto a los de otros 21 países no miembros –entre ellos Rusia– desplegados en la Fuerza de Estabilización (SFOR), contribuyen con su presencia al cumplimiento de los Acuerdos de Dayton. A veces en situaciones difíciles, pero siempre eficazmente y con voluntad de imparcialidad. Sin la seguridad garantizada, por la presencia de las tropas aliadas y de los países socios, la reconciliación y la reconstrucción física y económica de Bosnia serían sólo una quimera.

En mi opinión, no hay reflexión posible sobre el futuro de la seguridad en Europa sin un análisis de la crisis en Bosnia y sin tener en cuenta las lecciones que nos ha enseñado este conflicto, que ha marcado el final del siglo en nuestro continente. Bosnia ha marcado también mi trayectoria como ministro de Exteriores español y mi mandato al frente de la Alianza Atlántica. Durante toda la Guerra Fría en Europa no murió nadie víctima de una guerra. Desde 1990 hasta 1997, han muerto, en cambio, decenas de miles de personas sólo en dos conflictos: Bosnia y Chechenia. Sirva este espeluznante dato para alentar a todos, especialmente Gobiernos e instituciones, a trabajar con empeño para sentar las bases de un futuro más seguro.

Estos *indicadores del cambio* –algunos de los cuales fueron brillantemente analizados en las Jornadas del CIDOB– como constatarán los lectores de esta revista, son la confirmación de que la Alianza de hoy es totalmente distinta de la de ayer. Una Alianza que, al sumar la proyección de estabilidad más allá de las fronteras de sus miembros a su misión tradicional de la defensa mutua, confirma su voluntad de contribuir a forjar una nueva Europa, libre de las divisiones del pasado y dispuesta a dejar de ser escenario para ser actor en el contexto mundial.

El gran impulso que hemos dado a la agenda de la Alianza no ha estado exento de debates y, por qué no admitirlo, a veces controvertidos. Pero la realidad nos ha dado la razón a los que la hemos empujado hacia adelante con dedicación y, si me permiten, incluso con pasión. Por ejemplo, nos han tenido que dar la razón quienes, desde un típico anclaje en posturas del pasado, estaban empeñados en hacernos elegir entre realizar la apertura de la Alianza hacia el centro y el este de Europa y tener unas buenas relaciones con Rusia. Hoy tenemos pruebas más que fehacientes –cada mes nos reunimos con representantes rusos para tratar de los problemas de seguridad que nos afectan, y Rusia está a punto de abrir una delegación militar ante la OTAN– de que se pueden hacer, y de hecho se hacen, las dos cosas a la vez.

También han tenido que aceptar que estamos en la buena dirección quienes se

habían opuesto a la ampliación con todo tipo de argumentos, incluidos los económicos. Hemos iniciado el proceso de apertura de la Alianza ante todo por motivos morales, para saldar cuentas que la historia dejó pendientes hace décadas. Pero también con visión de futuro, para sentar las bases de una Europa distinta. Y los resultados son más que positivos, ya que el mero hecho de ofrecer la perspectiva de adhesión ha servido de incentivo para que los países aspirantes abordaran irresolutas disputas territoriales, fronteras o situaciones de escaso respeto de sus respectivas minorías. En los últimos 12 meses, casi todos los países de Europa Central y del Este han firmado acuerdos bilaterales para poner fin a viejas querellas que nunca anteriormente se habían afrontado. La primera conclusión es que el panorama de la estabilidad ha cambiado radicalmente en el centro de Europa.

La agenda de la nueva Alianza Atlántica es dinámica, tiene como objetivo contribuir a forjar ese continente unido, estable que queremos que sea la Europa del siglo XXI. En los capítulos que siguen encontrarán reflexiones acertadas, inteligentes, y que invitan al debate. En suma, que ayudan a estos nobles objetivos que todos compartimos.

Bruselas, 21 de noviembre de 1997

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Se ha hablado más de una vez de que estamos en un cambio de siglo y en un cambio de milenio. El vicerrector aludía a la Edad Media; la Edad Media acuñó el término el *terror milenar*, que dio origen a extraordinarios movimientos de todo tipo y que hacía que los fines de siglo equivaliesen históricamente a una ecuación de cambio y crisis y los fines de milenio a incertidumbre, por no llamarlo terror y desconocimiento. Si a este binomio de incertidumbre y desconocimiento añadimos el concepto de seguridad, la lógica resultante debe de ser una cierta inquietud cuando no miedo, cuando no terror al próximo milenio. Creo que –y en esto quizá el tercer milenio que se abre delante de nosotros sea distinto de los anteriores, no tenga precedente– esta ecuación es falsa. Según las conclusiones de la encuesta –que ha realizado el Ministerio sobre la cultura de defensa en España– que presenté el 21 de mayo en el Congreso de los Diputados: el 72% de la población española no se siente amenazada. Hoy la sociedad europea en lo que respecta a seguridad y defensa no ve el próximo siglo, no ve el próximo milenio con miedo, con inseguridad. A mi juicio eso es así porque igual que los manuales nos enseñan que la Edad Contemporánea empezó en 1789, probablemente la siguiente Edad, el siguiente siglo, el siglo XXI, en materia de seguridad y defensa, ya ha empezado, ya nos es conocido. Si se trata de poner una fecha simbólica, ésta es 1989 –con la desaparición del muro de Berlín y la extinción del Pacto de Varsovia– que señala el fin del panorama estratégico que caracterizó la última parte del siglo XX en Europa,

que estuvo presidida por la Guerra Fría, por esa tensión bipolar que, en mayor o menor medida, estuvo presente desde el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial; y que para evitar una tercera conflagración se creó, poco después de la victoria aliada, la Alianza Atlántica (OTAN) en el Tratado de Washington.

Como es sabido, sólo los pueblos que renuncian a defenderse son devorados por la historia. Sería suicida no ocuparse del tema de la seguridad europea en el siglo XXI. Hay muchos riesgos, unos que son ya actuales, conocidos, que están presentes, pero hay también unos riesgos potenciales, unos riesgos previsibles según las tendencias por las que el mundo va caminando.

Hay que decir que es difícil, por no decir imposible, disociar la seguridad europea de la seguridad euroatlántica. En primer lugar, porque los riesgos y amenazas a Europa, en su gran mayoría, son compartidos por EEUU. Pero en segundo lugar, porque nunca diremos con suficiente énfasis la importancia que tiene el vínculo transatlántico para la seguridad europea. En términos generales, la tensión que caracteriza la Guerra Fría, es una tensión entre dos polos, el ánodo y el cátodo que están en una relación horizontal de Este a Oeste. Al caer ese panorama estratégico, empieza a emerger el que estaba como telón de fondo, detrás de la Guerra Fría, y no es la tensión Este–Oeste, sino la tensión Norte–Sur. Si ven ustedes cualquier cifra económica, cualquier cifra demográfica o cualquier mapa cultural verán que el Norte acumula riquezas, acumula poder, acumula experiencia, acumula tecnología; y el Sur, en términos generales, con notabilísimas excepciones, va quedándose progresivamente atrás en esos parámetros. De manera que yo creo que el telón de fondo que va a existir en el siglo XXI, en materia de seguridad europea, es un telón de fondo donde la tensión, ni siquiera hablo de riesgos, va a ser una tensión vertical Norte-Sur, mucho más que una tensión horizontal Este-Oeste.

Les decía que existen riesgos conocidos y riesgos desconocidos, riesgos previsibles. Creo que se pueden distinguir entre: riesgos de seguridad estrictamente dicha, riesgos económicos, demográficos e incluso medioambientales, y riesgos políticos y sociales. En los riesgos del primer grupo –riesgos de la seguridad– el primero, en relación a la seguridad, es la posibilidad de que fracase la consolidación de lo que se llama la arquitectura de seguridad y defensa europea. Hay que decir que las perspectivas de hoy son halagüeñas tras el acuerdo alcanzado por la OTAN, brillantemente alcanzado por su secretario general, Javier Solana, y las autoridades de Moscú, hay un lugar cierto para el optimismo respecto al éxito de la Cumbre de Madrid que, como hemos dicho, y sin pecar de chovinismo, es un hito histórico en la historia de la Alianza, no sólo porque se ha conseguido, se ha certificado la defunción del enfrentamiento entre los bloques; sino porque esa defunción va acompañada del nacimiento de una época de cooperación. Se están realizando en Bosnia, por ejemplo, acciones conjuntas, y no me cabe duda de que este incremento de la cooperación es la mejor garantía para la seguridad del viejo continente. Este continente sigue siendo un mosaico de intereses nacionales,

presentes, firmes, sólidos frente a los que se contraponen una ilusión, una esperanza, un deseo de consolidar estructuras supranacionales. Esta tensión, entre el interés presente y la voluntad futura, creo que es otro ingrediente que hay que poner al dibujar la seguridad europea del siglo XXI.

La cooperación tiene un vehículo básico, al que luego me referiré, que es el diálogo. Este diálogo, que ha empezado no sólo con el acta fundacional en relación con Rusia, sino también con instituciones como la Asociación para la Paz –y probablemente algo similar tenemos que hacer con una de las zonas limítrofes de Europa como es el Mediterráneo– es la mejor garantía para poder consolidar la perspectiva de paz que hoy tenemos. El objetivo es que la zona europea que es hoy zona de paz –la etapa de paz en Europa más duradera desde el Imperio Romano– estabilidad y prosperidad dé como resultado su consolidación en todo el continente. Creo que es esencial no construir lo que se ha venido a llamar en otro contexto la fortaleza europea sino abrir las puertas al diálogo y a la cooperación con las zonas limítrofes. No asegurar como en un castillo la estabilidad interna, y permitir riesgos, tensiones, conflictos fuera del castillo, sino muy al contrario tender puentes levadizos en todas las direcciones, de manera que como en una corriente eléctrica esos puentes, esos arcos voltaicos hagan que no haya demasiada diferencia de voltaje y puedan saltar chispas que normalmente encienden conflictos.

La arquitectura de estabilidad de Europa se asienta en diversas organizaciones: la Organización de Seguridad y Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), la Unión Europea Occidental (UEO) y, sobre todo, la OTAN. La Alianza Atlántica ha sido la garante de ese período larguísimo de paz durante los últimos 50 años en Europa y ahora se encuentra con que ha cambiado el panorama para el que fue creada. Creo que, con una rapidez fuera de lo común, ya en las Cumbres de Bruselas y de Londres, la Alianza Atlántica se preparó para afrontar la nueva situación. Se preparó, al dejar a un lado la especial relación con Rusia de la que hemos hablado, tanto en el aspecto interno, al elaborar una nueva estructura, como en el aspecto externo, al permitir que ese círculo o núcleo duro, de la máxima estabilidad, pueda irse engrosando con incorporaciones de otros países, aunque no tendrán ni aportarán el mismo grado de estabilidad y seguridad que los antiguos miembros; pero a medida que se ensancha el círculo se alejan los focos de tensión. Más ágil, más europea también, esa seguridad puede ir preservando esa estabilidad, con lo que, a mi juicio, será la más importante función de la diplomacia en el siglo XXI, pues será la diplomacia preventiva, probablemente, en el foro más amplio como es la OSCE. También se reforzará la capacidad política europea en el ámbito de la seguridad.

El segundo riesgo es la incertidumbre respecto a Rusia. Es sorprendente que en las postrimerías del siglo XXI la cuestión capital para la Humanidad, que es seguir preservando la paz, pueda estar dependiendo de algo tan singular como puede ser la salud de una sola persona, pero esto es algo que hemos vivido día a día en los medios de comunicación en los últimos meses.

Creo que debemos prestar una enorme atención a la opinión pública rusa. Todo esfuerzo por tranquilizar, por dar seguridad, por dar confianza a los ciudadanos de esos países no serán esfuerzos baldíos. Hay que superar recelos, aclarar malentendidos y disipar dudas en cuanto a las intenciones de la Alianza, que no son otras que las de asegurar la estabilidad.

El tercer y cuarto riesgo en materia de seguridad es de una especie muy diferente. Recordarán algunos de ustedes, probablemente, al mejor filósofo de la historia, Arnold Toynbee, en su voluminoso estudio de la historia comentaba las caídas de civilizaciones una por una; podríamos decir, confabulación entre lo que llamaba el proletariado interno y el proletariado externo de las sucesivas civilizaciones. Estamos en el apogeo, probablemente, de la civilización occidental. Naturalmente cualquier civilización tiene una parte de emporio, de comercio, y también es una parte de riqueza y genera por sí misma proletariado tanto interno como externo. Yo creo que deberíamos hacer una reflexión en cuanto a las raíces y capacidades de estos dos focos de riesgo en lo que hace referencia a los próximos años de seguridad europea.

Tanto sea interno como externo, lo que es insólito en la historia de la humanidad es que personas sin ninguna representatividad y con relativamente escasos recursos económicos tengan el poder de disponer de armas de destrucción masiva. Es algo que todavía no está en las conciencias de las opiniones públicas europeas, pero la proliferación de estas armas de destrucción masiva: biológicas, químicas, nucleares junto con el desarrollo de la tecnología de vectores balísticos, hace que con muy pocos recursos se puedan causar daños catastróficos e irreparables, tanto por entidades políticas, por Estados, como por grupos de terroristas, de mafiosos, de disconformes con la civilización. Este es el peligro más grave que con carácter inmediato acecha a Europa. Hemos visto algunos precedentes en atentados terroristas en aeropuertos, en catástrofes ferroviarias que pueden tener origen dentro de las fronteras o fuera de las fronteras, pero que en todo caso, y es insólito en la Historia, tienen una desconocida e increíble capacidad de destrucción. Éste es uno de los motivos por lo que la seguridad de Europa no puede ser sólo europea, porque frente a este riesgo todos los que queremos la paz debemos estar unidos. Saben ustedes que hay países, que no voy a citar, cuya actitud ante convenios internacionales como el Convenio de armas químicas, es preocupante; también hay alguna buena noticia como la actitud de Argelia en relación al Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (TNP).

En general hay motivos de incertidumbre y, por tanto, motivos para la cautela. Eso va a hacer que según el origen –si es una amenaza importante– interno o externo habrá que poner el centro de gravedad en la defensa y esto va a llevar a plantear unas nuevas reglas del juego, y estoy seguro de que en 1997, en España, todavía no sabemos cuáles deben ser esas reglas del juego, o creemos que son válidas unas reglas del juego que a mi juicio no lo van a ser. Me refiero a la línea divisoria entre la actuación de las

fuerzas armadas y las fuerzas de seguridad. Se ha venido entendiendo que para el riesgo interior eran fuerzas de seguridad y para el exterior fuerzas armadas. La aparición de estas armas de destrucción masiva, que pueden tener el origen tanto en uno como en otro lado, va a exigir una nueva distribución de competencias entre estos dos grandes cuerpos de las naciones, las fuerzas de orden público por un lado y las fuerzas armadas por otro. Quizá el nuevo criterio de distinción por el origen del riesgo empiece a no ser un criterio acertado.

Hay otro tipo de riesgos, los culturales, en los que también hay una novedad. Es ya tópico hablar de la aldea global; el increíble crecimiento de las tecnologías, básicamente de telecomunicaciones, ha hecho que el mundo se convierta en una aldea y hace que las tesis de Huntington de las fallas culturales se conviertan en un problema casi local. El libro del choque de las civilizaciones se basa en que los conflictos pueden surgir a lo largo de unas fallas como tectónicas, en este caso fallas culturales o de civilización, en las que esas diferencias pueden producir las confrontaciones. Esos choques que han hecho caer imperios. Quizá el que mejor lo ha escrito es Paul Kennedy en su libro *Auge y caída de grandes potencias*. Podemos recordar el papel del cristianismo en el Imperio Romano o el del Islam en la desaparición de Bizancio, pero el caso es que no debemos descuidar esas diferencias culturales, la aldea global las ha traído a casa, pero no creo que sea tanto un peligro de choque violento de civilizaciones, sino que tenemos, como ha dicho algún tratadista, una especie de manchas de leopardo, de focos culturales insertos en nudos esenciales de otras culturas (piensen en los flujos de inmigrantes en importantísimas capitales de países de Europa). Creo que aquí algo hay que aprender de EEUU y quizá algo pueda enseñar España. EEUU ha sabido hacer el *melting pot*, ha sabido absorber, ha tenido una gran capacidad de ósmosis, de absorción de diferentes culturas. Europa es más vieja, tenemos los hábitos más anclados y probablemente tengamos menos flexibilidad para la absorción de diferentes culturas. Si, de una vez por todas, abandonamos el complejo de la leyenda negra española y vemos sin prejuicios cuál es la historia de España y se descubre cuál ha sido la labor colonizadora que ha hecho España allí donde ha estado, el número de universidades que había en el siglo XVI en América, y se ve el trazado de sus ciudades, y se ve el diálogo acabado con el mestizaje de los pueblos, a lo mejor, podemos convencernos de lo que están convencidos otros países; y muy fundamentalmente los EEUU, que España tiene vocación global, visión global y capacidad de actuación. En ese momento, seremos capaces de desviar progresivamente la atención de nuestros problemas, de nuestro patio de vecindad, de nuestros problemas de campanario, y desarrollar lo que creemos es nuestra cultura —que no son sólo nuestros artistas y nuestros literatos— que es nuestra manera de entender la vida, que es nuestra manera de relacionarnos con lo demás y, a lo mejor, podemos volver a jugar el papel de puente que antes con la metáfora voltaica les hacía, es la necesidad fundamental de Europa de no encerrarse sino de abrirse.

Por último, hay unos riesgos técnicos, tanto de enfriamiento, no cíclico sino definitivo de la economía, como otro, nada despreciable: la competencia de los mercados emergentes. Se ha firmado el Acuerdo Mundial de Comercio, hay una organización que vela por la pureza de esto. El riesgo es, frente a la competencia descarnada de los países emergentes, los llamados tigres del sudeste asiático; se ha caído en la tentación, estamos permanentemente en la tentación de protegernos frente a esa competencia, de cerrarnos otra vez. En este contexto es donde se ha hablado de fortaleza europea. A mi juicio hay otra manera que es no protegernos sino exportar protección. No decir que no podemos competir, porque nuestros productos tienen además de un coste interno, un paquete social donde está la salud, la educación, las infraestructuras, y que no podemos competir con los productos de los países emergentes sin la tentación de deshacer el paquete social, que debemos añadir al coste salarial. Hay una tercera alternativa, que es convencer o forzar a esos países a que si quieren comerciar deben tener su paquete social; lo que no podemos hacer es competir con países que producen con salarios de hambre, no podemos ir a salarios de hambre en Europa o en América: lo que no debemos permitir son los salarios de hambre en esos países.

También existen los riesgos políticos, que están, por un lado, en la crisis del Estado y, por el otro, en la sociedad insolidaria. Es asombroso, pero una encuesta reciente en EEUU lo demuestra, que haya muchos millones de ciudadanos americanos, y no es diferente en Europa, que creen que su principal enemigo es el Estado. Tanto en EEUU como en Europa debe preocupar el auge de fenómenos novedosos: sectas, aparición de ciudadanos organizados y armados –que sustituyen por estructuras privadas el marco de orden y organización que tradicionalmente se reservaba al Estado– y cuya difusión es facilitada muchas veces a través de medios de comunicación como Internet. Este es un riesgo no despreciable, alguien debería estudiarlo porque es un vehículo en sí suficientemente nuevo.

Quería terminar diciéndoles brevemente cuál debe ser el papel de España y su respuesta a estos desafíos. Como han visto ustedes, he pretendido decir que hay unos riesgos ya existentes que conocemos y hay unos riesgos previsibles, no existentes, potenciales; pero en todo caso unos y otros van a requerir soluciones más del siglo XXI que del siglo XX. El común denominador va a ser la globalización de estos fenómenos y, por tanto, la seguridad de Europa no será nunca seguridad exclusivamente europea. Creo que las tecnologías que incrementan los peligros de las futuras amenazas deben ser también los principales instrumentos de prevención. Por encima de las tecnologías preventivas que utilizemos, creo que la clave de la seguridad europea para el siglo XXI está en la voluntad de diálogo, entendimiento y cooperación.

¿Qué papel puede jugar España? En lo políticomilitar España es hoy una potencia regional de tamaño medio. Está, después de muchísimas décadas de aislamiento, integrada en las principales alianzas y organizaciones de seguridad. En la economía,

según el librito de bolsillo de *The Economist*, es la octava economía del mundo, desde luego es la quinta europea y tiene reconocida capacidad de crecimiento e influencia. Socialmente es una sociedad dinámica y joven, a pesar de que hemos bajado, en la clasificación del coeficiente de natalidad de Europa, del número uno al último número, lo cual no deja de ser llamativo. Seguimos teniendo la media de edad más joven de Europa, pero, sobre todo, los últimos cambios que ha habido en España, en los últimos 30 o 40 años, y que se ven mucho mejor desde fuera que desde aquí, hacen que podamos decir que es el país de Europa que más ha cambiado en el siglo XX. Pues hemos pasado, en un abrir y cerrar de ojos, de ser un país rural a ser un país urbano, de ser un país agrícola a ser un país industrial, de ser un país analfabeto a ser un país con cotas de cultura parecidas a las de cualquier otro país europeo, de tener la tasa de mortalidad infantil típica de países subdesarrollados a tenerla mejor que Alemania; de un régimen dictatorial a un régimen de libertades, de un régimen de centralización a un régimen autonómico, de un Estado confesional a un Estado laico. Casi como un calcetín, nos hemos dado la vuelta, este país ha pasado de 300 dólares de renta per capita, en el año 1953, a 12 mil o 15 mil dólares en la actualidad. Este país tiene, porque ese cambio lo ha generado, lo que dicen los expertos que es la característica más importante para el siglo XXI: la capacidad de innovación. Además –antes les recordaba a Paul Kennedy– históricamente hemos sido un imperio del que nos queda por lo menos dos cosas:

1. La visión global de los problemas. Sólo hay un puñado de países en el mundo que compartan con nosotros la visión global de los problemas.

2. Un modo de hacer que ha dado lecciones al mundo de diálogo, de cooperación y de solidaridad. Les recomiendo la lectura desapasionada de los textos históricos o de los que hoy hacen los que han conseguido quitarse el tópicos de la leyenda negra y que, por desgracia, son mayoritariamente extranjeros.

Creo que España tiene un papel que jugar, lo está jugando en las operaciones de paz, lo está jugando en los distintos foros de diálogo y espero que superemos los complejos derivados del aislamiento histórico, para jugar el papel que le corresponde a España en Europa, y que le corresponde muy sustancialmente a Europa en el Mediterráneo. Como dice el profesor Lesser, tradicionalmente el Mediterráneo estuvo en el centro de los problemas europeos, pero últimamente ha estado en los confines. En el nuevo ambiente estratégico este panorama se está terminando y puede empezarse a hablar, otra vez, del Mediterráneo como un centro de la nueva preocupación mundial de seguridad. La Europa mediterránea, probablemente, va a jugar un creciente papel central en la evolución de Europa.

Estamos en Barcelona, estamos en el Mediterráneo, estamos en España. Hoy somos los últimos miembros de la Alianza Atlántica. La Alianza Atlántica se ha pasado 50 años mirando en una sola orientación, al Este. La sugerencia que hacemos es que de acuer-

do con que no se deje de mirar al Este, pero que alguna vez se mire hacia el Sur, y en el Sur somos los que más experiencia, conocimiento, interés y posibilidades tenemos.

Creo, y con esto termino, que tenemos un halagüeño panorama de paz y seguridad para Europa en el siglo XXI. Que no debemos bajar la guardia, que debemos esforzarnos en la cooperación transatlántica con la conciencia de que cada vez más los riesgos son globales y las respuestas deben ser conjuntas. Que la mejor diplomacia debe ser la diplomacia de prevención y que los mejores instrumentos que tenemos son el diálogo, la cooperación y la solidaridad; si los utilizamos, estoy seguro de que en el siglo XXI, y ojalá durante todo el tercer milenio, seguiremos disfrutando de la paz que ahora tenemos.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

An Understanding of Europe's Overlapping Political Realities.
Vladimir Baranovsky

An Understanding of Europe's Overlapping Political Realities

*Vladimir Baranovsky

The aim of this paper is to discuss the emerging political landscape in Europe and its impact on European security. The first part presents an overall assessment of the situation of the continent, where it is argued that today's Europe has considerably better prospects for forestalling large-scale instabilities in contrast to all preceding periods in modern history. Subsequent parts discuss the problems that may challenge this optimistic conclusion, taking into consideration the various security zones on the continent. The concluding part focuses upon the interaction between these zones and analyses possible implications for maintaining security and stability in Europe.

FACTORS OF STABILITY

A natural inclination of anyone dealing with the current international relations is to focus upon alarming problems and trends that may bring about tragic consequences for peace and stability and, in the worst case scenario, shatter the existing international order by unleashing war or sowing seeds of chaos. It is also true that Europe –after a short-lived period of the post-Cold War euphoria– has produced

dramatic, sometimes even horrifying, examples of clashes, conflicts and atrocities reminiscent of the Dark Ages.

However, it seems important not to underestimate the considerable advantages that Europe enjoys today –in comparison, for instance, to most of its history from the 16th through 20th centuries.

First, Europe is not an arena of enmities among the major powers. The importance of this phenomenon can be fully appreciated against the background of the pre-World War I historical record when open and hidden rivalries between France and Germany, Russia and Great Britain, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia incessantly brought about realignments. Indeed, the most important single factor that provoked continental wars was re-configuration of the European political landscape. Today, Europe is free of this burden. The very concept of conflicts among great powers in Europe has radically changed both in terms of substance and as far as its political relevance is concerned.

Indeed, even if the bipolar confrontation in the post-World War II were deemed as the manifestation of rivalry between the two superpowers –The USA and the Soviet Union– the dissolution of the latter has basically removed the issue from the political agenda. Russia is weak and predominantly inward-oriented, and Moscow's assertiveness, although often justified by the argument of Russia's 'great power predicament', is only of a rhetorical character. The USA, on the other hand, seems to have more problems with, rather than advantages provided by, its status as the only remaining superpower. At the same time as its involvement in Europe is diminishing and increasingly becoming a subject of serious domestic criticism, its leadership is becoming more welcomed (even if reluctantly so) than contested by most Europeans. Beyond the USA and Russia, the states of Western Europe that might reasonably be included in the category of major regional powers have successfully embarked on a process of learning how to manage their affairs in a non-confrontational way. Hopefully, this drive will continue even after two major incentives –the memories of the two "hot" continental wars and the consolidating effect of the Cold War– have essentially disappeared.

Second, stability in Europe has always suffered when the disintegration of its 'big components' has given way to an acute competition among other actors over the spoils of the collapsed entities. Suffice it to recall examples of both the distant past –the war over Spanish heritage and other dynastic disputes– and in the more recent history –the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire – that provoked struggles for influence over the newly-emerged independent states.

Today, the situation in Europe is fundamentally different, which does not mean that the twenty successor states to all three collapsed entities –the former Yugoslavia,

the Soviet 'outer' empire and the USSR itself— have successfully managed to escape from competing external influences; rather, there are numerous indications to the contrary that do not, in any event, seem to go beyond a 'normal' and not necessarily crisis-prone pattern. It may certainly be argued that, in some cases, external factors were crucial and even played a fatal role, as with the recognition of Croatia's independence which contributed to the breakout of war in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, however plausible this argument is, it points to an exception rather than to the rule. Given the scale and depth of the transformation of the USSR that once embraced over half of the European landmass, it appears striking that, in contrast to the past patterns, external pressures and competitive drives have played only a secondary role in developments concerning the three entities in question.

Third, there are no powerful 'revisionist' or 'rogue' states in Europe. In fact, all the actors on the continent tend to operate as 'status quo' powers, a reality which signifies a shift from the tradition of the past century which continuously witnessed attempts by one or more powers to overthrow the existing international order. Owing to the fact that these were the leading European countries, such as Willhelmine or Hitler's Germany, the post-1871 France or the post-Tsarist Russia/USSR, stability on the continent was always shaky and easily undermined.

It is true that nowadays some states do not feel particularly satisfied with the current political geography of the continent. None of them, however, appears to consider practical an option of radically revising the maps. The political forces that threaten to overthrow the existing international order may find certain domestic support, sometimes even on a large scale (as in the case of Russian claims over Sevastopol and the Crimea) – but it is doubtful that such appeals can be translated into an official policy that is, in any event, contingent upon so many other variables. In brief, the most traditional threats to stability in Europe –disputes over territory and/or assertive demands by a powerful actor for a 'new order'– do not appear on the horizon.

Fourth, the role of military factors has become considerably less prominent than in the past. True, these factors play (or have played) a significant role in the on-going or recently terminated conflicts; furthermore, it is still generally accepted that military instruments are needed for maintaining stability. However, in a strictly military sense, the balance of forces which used to be a crucial concern for, and was thoroughly monitored by, almost all the actors in Europe, seems no longer to be perceived as a critical variable. Even the review of the CFE Treaty remains a low-profile issue, notwithstanding all the official statements to the contrary. By and large, Europe is now, against the backdrop of its history, less vulnerable to instabilities generated within the military sphere than it was in earlier periods.

Fifth, ideology does not figure among the serious conflict-generating factors that

contain the potential of undermining the overall stability on the continent –as was the case with religious wars in the past and the communism/capitalism dichotomy until very recent times. Today, it is hard to detect any powerful ideological system of values that might provoke a pan-continental upheaval.

There are, however, numerous ideological phenomena that might destabilise the international system in Europe: nationalism, xenophobia, and a revival of interest in state paternalism among certain social groups in post-communist societies whose expectations associated with democracy and private ownership remain unfulfilled. In a similar vein, and as evidenced by the war in Yugoslavia, religious tensions continue to contribute to the breakout of, and perpetuation of, hostilities. However, being mostly of a local character, these incidents are not harbingers of a threat to the emerging pan-European order; what's more, in a broader sense, even though different civilisations do exist and complicate the task of maintaining security in Europe, their predicted clash is not on the continent's immediate agenda.

Sixth, the institutionalised cooperation on security issues is emerging as an important element of a future European architecture, yet it is by no means a panacea. In fact, this very phenomena may engender tensions, rivalry and conflicts among the actors involved. Nevertheless, by gradually consolidating multilateralist instincts in states' behavior as opposed to unilateralism, institutionalised cooperation has had on the whole a positive impact on the prospects of maintaining stability on the continent.

HETEROGENEOUS SECURITY LANDSCAPE

To sum up, a number of fundamental circumstances serve to minimise the likelihood of a destabilised Europe. However, what considerably challenges this benevolent prediction is the obvious fact that Europe is by no means a homogeneous political space as regards the task of maintaining international security.

However attractive the general thesis of 'indivisibility of security' might seem, Europe is not one, but many, in terms of the security-related status of its components. Among the important parameters that differentiate various actors on the European scene are the character of objective security risks, the way of assessing the substance of vital national interests, the available means of defusing possible threats, a country's role and place in the emerging security architecture, its options of alignment and, more generally speaking, its security interaction with other actors. Accordingly, for analytical purposes, Europe may be roughly divided into a number of security sub-zones – NATO/EU, East-Central Europe, the Baltics, the Balkans/South-East Europe

and Russia/'Russia *plus*'.

THE WESTERN CORE AREA

The core area of the European security space is indisputably formed by 'the West'. The countries participating in NATO and/or the European Union have reached (or, at least, closely approached) Karl Deutsch's model of an ideal 'security community'. No serious security challenges that they face are associated with possible developments within this zone, and they are sufficiently well-equipped to deal with external challenges to security should they emerge (which is not very likely for the time being).

The security of the West European states is derived, to a significant degree, from the welfare of their respective societies and their social and economic well-being. Viewed from this perspective, the security of these nations is increasingly dependent on their ability to effectively handle domestic agendas, make deep structural adjustments, and harmonise their socio-economic policies through multi- and supra-national mechanisms, such as the EU. Failing or falling short in resolving these tasks would undermine their security more significantly than any traditional threat. Also, these countries are still to display their might in responding jointly or individually to 'non-traditional' risks, such as the uncontrolled flows of refugees, the trans-border activities of organised crime, the illegal transfer of arms, drugs, fissile materials, trans-national environmental challenges, etc.

Still, the western security core is not homogeneous. First, the agendas of some actors are shaped by specific domestic problems, such as separatism (Ulster in Great Britain, Corsica in France, the Basques in Spain, and the Northern League in Italy) and disputes over the distribution of authority between the central and the local administrations (Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and prospectively Great Britain). Second, there are different security priorities and sensitivities in various 'sub-zones'. To illustrate, the Mediterranean countries feel exposed to a threat from the south; the Northern states are concerned about developments in the Baltic Sea area; Germany is especially interested in preventing instabilities in East-Central Europe; and Greece and Turkey continue to distrust each other. Third, the lists of participants in NATO and in the EU are overlapping but not identical, while for some countries the neutral status continues to be an attractive option even in the post-Cold War setting. Fourth, there are traditional 'transatlantic diseases', such as the unfinished (all official declarations notwithstanding) debates over the role of the United States in Europe – burden-sharing, the substance and forms of the 'European defence identity,' to name a few. Finally, after the Cold War the problems of leadership and of disparity among Western Europe's

powers have not become less delicate and tension-prone.

By and large, the NATO/EU-centred security zone in Europe is the main pole of stability on the continent, both powerful and attractive to other international actors. It faces, however, three major challenges. First, its doctrines, equipment, and institutional structures were built in a different era and have to be adapted to a new security environment on the continent. Failure to do so would only increase the strength of inertia at the expense of tasks oriented to the future. Second, in the absence of a clearly defined external threat as the most powerful factor of consolidation, maintaining a mutually acceptable balance within this zone becomes an essential task whose relevance will only increase with time. Third, considerable (if not predominant) attention will have to be given to the issues of external interactions, such as 'power projection' outside the zone itself, the acceptance of new members, and relationships with outsiders. Mishandling of any of these tasks might undermine the sustainability of the NATO/EU zone as a provider of security for the whole of Europe.

RUSSIA *PLUS*

Russia (or, more precisely, 'Russia *plus*') forms an alternative pole of the European security space. 'Alternative' should not be understood in this context as being in confrontation with, or in rigid opposition to, the Western security community. Although such a possibility is by no means negligible, Russia's problems with European security are of a different character.

First, Russia is not concerned about challenges to its security that emanate from the West *per se*, any statements to the contrary notwithstanding. Rather, its main problem consists in developing and implementing a broader strategy of promoting the country's role on the continent and re-establishing its international status. Anything which is perceived as denying Russia a respectable place in an evolving European security space, or which relegates it to the sidelines of European developments and undermines attempts by Moscow to reassert its waning influence on the continent –provokes a painful reaction and may contribute both to Russia's imposing activism and to its alienation with respect to Europe.

Second, Russia confronts domestic challenges on a scale unseen in most post-communist countries. A poor economic performance amid highly controversial market reforms, the fragility of the budding political system of a country whose territorial integrity is threatened, a rudimentary character of the civil society, a growing criminalisation of the country and a progressive 'oligarchisation' of the regime –taken

together these undermine internal security and make Russia's interaction with the outside world volatile and dependent on domestic developments.

Third, although Russia's territorial space has shrunk by one third as compared with the former USSR, the country remains by far the largest in Europe and is indeed larger than the rest of the continent when looked at apart. This imbalance, defined not only in terms of territory or military might, also affects the European perception of, and thinking about, Russia. However unrealistic the following might seem today, a once recovered, perfectly democratic and non-assertive Russia might one day inspire an inferiority complex in other Europeans. A more likely scenario, though, is that a less democratic and more assertive Russia will increasingly find itself alienated from Europe.

Fourth, Russia extends far beyond Europe. Its security agenda is not only significantly broader than that of most European states but is in many respects of a different character. Suffice it to mention the place in the agenda for Russia's immediate neighbor –the Chinese giant. Furthermore, Russia's sensitivity towards non-European security problems will grow with time, which will inevitably affect Russia's posture as an actor on the European scene. Operating in Europe will not be Russia's only role, even if such a role is considered as the top priority by Moscow. Alternative options will always be viewed as available, even if not particularly attractive; and other Europeans will most probably keep doubts about the extent of Russia's commitment to Europe, despite sincerely welcoming it.

Fifth, Russia is still experiencing considerable difficulties in adapting itself to the country's radically changed geopolitical situation –a phenomenon not unfamiliar to some former European colonial powers. Even in the most liberal-oriented circles in Moscow the loss of superpower status and the sudden emergence of new states on Russia's periphery are sources of considerable unease and confusion, which are often exploited by all the forces that believe that Russia is in an 'imperial predicament'. The post-imperial frustration is exacerbated by the fact that Russia's position with respect to a number of traditional security parameters, such as access to the high seas and availability of critical resources, etc., has significantly deteriorated with the disintegration of the former USSR. Furthermore, new problems of the utmost sensitivity have emerged, above all the plight of tens of millions of ethnic Russians who have suddenly found themselves living outside 'their' country.

Sixth, Russia has a specific agenda with respect to the CIS area that affects the prospects of the European security space in several ways. Russia has built upon its involvement in practically all conflicts within the former USSR, playing both a role of external stabilizer and a promoter of its own predominance in this area which is being increasingly (although only tacitly) recognised as, if not Russia's sphere of influence, then at least as the zone where Moscow has better chances to contain instabilities than anyone else in Europe. At the same time, broadly held discussions on promoting 'integration'

with the former Soviet republics, though by no means reflecting the actual situation within the CIS area, cause apprehension in Europe where Russia is suspected of designing to turn the CIS into its 'velvet empire'. Such a suspicion exists even more so in the light of Russia's obvious inclination to treat the CIS as its exclusive zone of influence to which other international actors should be denied or enjoy significantly limited access.

'Russia *plus*' is a security zone of a variable geometry wherein multiple and often conflicting trends are at work. On the one hand, Russia's swift *rapprochement* with Belarus may result in the incorporation of the latter into the former. On the other hand, the combination of Ukraine's possible further alienation from Russia and Moscow's predictable reaction thereto may become the strongest factor of corrosion of this zone and, in the worst case scenario, evolve into the most serious single challenge to European stability.

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Part and parcel of the Soviet Union's 'outer empire' a few years ago, East-Central Europe is now a potential candidate for inclusion into the Western multilateral structures – NATO, the EU, and the WEU. Remarkably, this transformation has occurred when there have been no real external dangers in the region. After a brief debate discarding the option of a neutral status, their rapid reorientation toward the West has become sort of a psychological compensation for being held in the fifty-year long grip of a 'Big Brother'. As regards rational security considerations, these have been based on theoretically worst-case scenarios rather than on the estimates of a real situation in the region where an important role is played by the dictum that it is necessary to forestall the emergence of a 'security vacuum', which is valid if all previous European history is taken into account, though questionable within the context of the movement towards the formation of a cooperative pan-European security architecture.

The East-Central Europe security zone is not homogeneous. Not surprisingly, all the attempts to foster security cooperation within the Visegrad mechanism have not brought any tangible success. Putting aside a scenario of the restoration of something similar to the Soviet Union that has ambitions to control its former allies, the only factor that unites the countries of East-Central Europe, in essence, has been their exalted desire to join NATO (though this factor has also become important in terms of their competition among themselves). In the rest, their security concerns are of a unique character for which there is hardly a common denominator.

Indeed, for Poland an important issue is the status of the neighboring former Soviet

republics, something the Czech Republic is indifferent to. Prague has been experiencing a good deal of euphoria in connection with its close *rapprochement* with Germany, whereas for Warsaw a similar process (though its relations with Germany are as friendly as ever) is pregnant with painful historical reminiscences as well as anxiety about the post-World War II territorial readjustments. Hungary is, on other hand, more vulnerable to instability emanating from the former Yugoslavia than from other East-Central European states, despite the plaguing issue of the status of the sizable Hungarian minorities in these neighboring countries. Slovakia, meanwhile, appears to be a pariah state in East-Central Europe, which creates certain incentives for its orientation towards the East.

Though not usually included in the zone of East-Central Europe, two former WTO members –Bulgaria and Romania– have signed treaties with the EU identical to those which other ECE countries have. They also enjoy the same status of being Associate Partners with the WEU, participate in the Partnership for Peace activities, and aspire to join Western institutions. While Romania is negatively linked to the countries of ECE through the issue of its Hungarian minority (despite some progress, this issue is still considered by Romania as one of its major national security concerns), Bulgaria appears close to the zone of East-Central Europe.

THE BALTIC STATES

In contrast to East-Central Europe, the three Baltic states have more substantial reasons to be concerned about their national security. Their geo-strategic vulnerability, rudimentary military potential, the presence of a sizable Russian-speaking minority, and the problems associated with their status give serious grounds for fears of their becoming objects of external pressure which may be difficult for them to withstand.

The Baltic states declared their aspiration to join NATO, and this intent has provoked an extremely painful reaction in Moscow. There is a strong psychological component involved (as regards the territory of the former USSR, not its 'outer empire'), as well as concerns about the ramifications for Russian security in view of these countries' aspirations to join NATO. Concerns such as access to the Baltic Sea (sharply limited since the disintegration of the USSR), the maintenance of ties with the strategically important enclave of Kaliningrad, the effectiveness of air defence systems, and the overall military infrastructure that is developing in a north-west direction can hardly be regarded as absolutely unfounded and so are, in this respect, unlike the concerns that affect East-Central Europe.

In this zone there emerges a classic 'security dilemma'. From the standpoint of

security, the Baltic states have many more reasons to aspire to be under NATO's umbrella than East Europeans; yet, this very intention has the potential of provoking a much more severe crisis than that related to the first round of NATO expansion.

The situation here calls for a good deal of delicate diplomatic effort. Key moves would be those that lead towards a gradual relaxation of tensions between Russia and the Baltic states over, first of all, the problems related to the Russian diaspora and territorial issues, and other moves leading towards an overall build-up of cooperative links. Another important step would be the development of a broader regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea basin. The third important parameter to consider would be the maintenance of a balance between the growing involvement of Western countries (including the US, which is doing so, in fact, for the first time) and the demonstration of this involvement's non-provocative character with respect to Russia.

Though this zone seems more homogeneous in terms of security than East-Central Europe, distinctions among the three countries must be kept in mind. Lithuania does not have problems with Russia, as the latter has with Latvia and Estonia, over its Russian-speaking population and territorial issues. At the same time, however, Lithuania is Russia's main partner (or object of Russia's eventual pressure) as regards the transit links to the Kaliningrad *oblast*. In addition, Lithuania's relations with Poland are of particular importance regarding security – relations marked by a controversial historical experience. Finally, among the Baltic states themselves there are also territorial problems, though these, seemingly, require but routine diplomatic efforts to resolve.

THE BALKANS/SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

In terms of security, South-East Europe is the most unstable zone on the continent. The war in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated the extraordinarily explosive potential for spontaneous territorial disintegration based on ethnic-religious arguments. The war's conclusion, though it enabled to restore the credibility of international peacemaking efforts to a certain extent, has not led to the formation of a stable political environment in the region. The future of Bosnia is unclear. Ample potential remains for further ethnic conflicts, the danger of forced migration of significant masses of population, and the threat of a conflict's spill-over to neighboring countries.

Shaky also is the emerging balance of power both inside the former Yugoslavia and in its vicinity – indeed, for the entire region of South-Eastern Europe. Precisely because the old security equilibrium, fragile as it was, happened to be destroyed, one may expect a strengthening of mutual suspicions among all countries in the region in light of the

circumstances that as old mutual claims have resurfaced and new ones emerge almost no country feels secure in the days ahead. This is fertile stuff for a spiraling of events that could lead to military confrontations, despite regional arms control efforts.

Noteworthy to a certain extent, too, is the above description's relevance to the countries in the region that, due to their membership in NATO and/or the EU, can be included in the "Western zone of security" –Greece and Turkey. Their bilateral relations (territorial waters, Cyprus, etc.) appear to have entered a new and lengthy phase of antagonism. Turkey feels not only its growing isolation from Europe but an estrangement on Europe's part, which, in turn, limits Europe's ability to influence developments in Turkey. Against this background, Greece appears interested in seeking other partners with whom a *rapprochement* would be possible on the grounds of concern over Turkey, an interest that creates additional incentives for Greece's interaction with Russia.

Recent events in Albania have displayed still another facet of the situation in the region: the possibility of the collapse of post-communist regimes in the region. Even though such an extreme scenario is not very likely to recur, it is evident that many political regimes in the Balkans are much less stable than those in East-Central Europe, as the recent political crisis in Bulgaria illustrates.

Given that South-East Europe is fragmented in terms of security, it is difficult to expect that the South-East zone will be incorporated in the pan-European security zone any time soon. At the same time, however, due to its dramatic experiences, the region has become a testing ground for the development of mechanisms of external intervention (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement). A remarkable feature of the latter trend is the broad participation of many European countries, as well as the first experience of mutual cooperation between NATO and Russia towards implementing and stabilizing the peace in the zone.

CONCLUSIONS: PATTERNS OF INTERPLAY

1. All five security sub-zones in Europe are heterogeneous. Participants in each of them share some security interests or confront similar threats, but the participant's specific security concerns and sensitivities are by no means mitigated by an existence of a 'common cause'.

2. As the basic organizing principle of 'commonness', the role of security (in its traditional meaning) is diminishing. Nevertheless, the more traditional pattern is still relevant in the case of the Baltic states as is its contrary –the absence of security– which continues to play a similar role in the Balkans. The other sub-zones mentioned here are mainly built upon the political orientation of their participants.

3. The delimitation of the five security sub-zones has a relative character. There exists a certain overlap of sub-zones, as with Russia/Kaliningrad in the Baltic states or with Greece/Turkey in South-East Europe. Also, the participation in some zones is characterized by certain shifts, with Slovenia moving closer to East-Central Europe, Slovakia out of it, Bulgaria and Romania hedging their bets, and Ukraine gradually withdrawing from 'Russia *plus*'.

4. All the sub-zones seem to have a transitional character and may evolve into something different from their present configuration. East-Central Europe is on the verge of becoming part of NATO, although the period of adaptation will be, by necessity, gradual, thus allowing the sub-zone itself to continue to exist for some time to come. While the prospects for the Baltic states to endure are considerably high, in the Balkans the prospects are that the continuing turmoil will either lead to another outburst of hostilities or (hopefully) open the way to a more structured regional arrangement –since the existing one is both fragile and imposed by force. 'Russia *plus*' , meanwhile, contains two elements of uncertainty; one is related to Russia itself, and the other is to its zigzag relations with its post-Soviet neighbors, above all with Ukraine. Finally, as the NATO/EU zone is likely to expand, its viability will largely depend on its ability to change and adapt to different security related situations.

5. Three major areas of potential conflicts can be identified in Europe, each having its own particular scenario, probability of escalation, and consequences for continental stability. The probability of new hostilities in the Balkans is the greatest one, since the region remains internally unsettled and contains numerous inceptions to conflicts; however, the tensions can also realistically be expected to be contained within the area. In the zone of the Baltic states, a drastic change in the status quo as a consequence of NATO expansion into the area might represent the most dangerous implications for stability in Europe. Nevertheless, a sufficiently prudent policy by most of the actors involved holds the promise of preventing such a development. The most unpredictable situation may emerge in the triangle Russia-Ukraine-the rest of Europe; at work here are both incentives for preventing a serious destabilization and factors influencing moves in the opposite direction.

6. The NATO/EU zone operates as the most significant security provider in and for Europe. It has gradually turned into an important factor of external influence over the most unstable zone on the continent, i.e., the Balkans, and also represents the main pole of attraction for East-Central Europe and the Baltic states. However, the zone's perceived domination is a matter of serious concern to Moscow, which considers unacceptable that a central role in making critical decisions on the issues of European security is played by institutions to which Russia does not have access.

7. Viewed from this perspective, the controversial issue of NATO enlargement is seen as most of all related to the evolving political organization of Europe, rather than

to security *per se*. Russia's fears persist, however, about having its status downgraded, and about itself becoming marginalised and disengaged from its potential allies in the post-Soviet space. It is therefore important to focus on all three of the following elements in order to prevent any destabilizing consequences from occurring –by giving Russia a voice in European security to be heard and respected; by offering Russia full-scale involvement in European affairs, even in those which have traditionally been considered the exclusive domain of Western interests; and lastly, by engaging Russia in the post-Soviet area in full respect towards its sensitivities, operating there together with Russia and not against it.

REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS INTERNACIONALS 38-39.

La seguridad europea: Diálogos para el siglo XXI.

La seguridad y sus contenidos: ¿político-militar o multidimensional?
Pere Vilanova

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La presente reflexión versa sobre los cambios en el sistema internacional en materia de seguridad y en el concepto de seguridad en sus diversas acepciones, a la luz de los cambios producidos en el sistema internacional desde la crisis del sistema bipolar hasta hoy.

Debo decir a título de introducción metodológica que esta intervención es estrictamente académica, no institucional, en el sentido de que, a diferencia de algunos de los ponentes, no represento a ninguna de las instituciones objeto del presente debate. Por tanto, al ser académica, va a tratar de ser analítica y descriptiva y en ocasiones deliberadamente crítica (en el sentido académico del término).

Efectivamente, la descripción de los problemas de seguridad, desde el concepto que imperaba en el sistema bipolar hasta el concepto actual, ha sufrido diversos cambios que se deben en parte a las mutaciones que se han producido en el sistema internacional. Pero también a dificultades conceptuales que tenemos para construir nuevos conceptos cuando no tenemos ni la menor idea de hacia qué sistema internacional vamos, entendiendo por sistema lo que su propio nombre indica en el campo de la Ciencia Política. Esto es –por usar una somera descripción convencional–: un conjunto formado por elementos interrelacionados entre sí, de tal modo que la acción de uno o varios de ellos produce necesariamente reacciones en los demás y en el conjunto como tal. Pero el sistema internacional carece del mínimo de regulación institucional y nor-

mativa que tienen los sistemas políticos estatales clásicos. Lo cual dificulta el análisis de los factores de estabilidad y crisis (en el caso internacional).

Lo que había en el sistema bipolar era de una claridad visual y expositiva que no se produce en estos momentos, y que no se va a repetir en mucho tiempo. Por tanto, en un momento de mutación sistémica a gran escala, podemos constatar que los conceptos anteriores no valen. Sin embargo, no podemos pretender tener respuesta inmediata a los problemas actuales. Porque los conflictos más importantes a los que nos hemos enfrentado, excepto el del Golfo que será la excepción y no la regla, han puesto de relieve hasta extremos insospechados las carencias de nuestros elementos teóricos de análisis y gestión de conflictos.

En el sistema bipolar, basado sumariamente en dos ejes Norte-Sur y Este-Oeste, la seguridad era susceptible de descripción como estabilidad. Es decir, básicamente como ausencia de conflicto empírico o efectivo en su centro, disuasión de las agresiones militares, fueran convencionales o nucleares, y competición ideológica (con la conocida evacuación de los conflictos convencionales a la periferia del sistema, o *tercer mundo*). La amenaza principal estaba claramente identificada en términos geográficos, políticos y de actores internacionales. Y la seguridad consistía, en la concepción predominante en amplios sectores del *establishment* (Gobiernos, organizaciones internacionales de seguridad, etc), en una defensa del statu quo y una disuasión. Aquí el arma nuclear tuvo mucha importancia política, y no militar, puesto que en la actualidad es obvia la diferencia entre el uso político y el uso militar de un arma nuclear.

Después de 1990, por utilizar una fecha simbólica, se anunció muy apresuradamente un nuevo concepto de seguridad, unas nuevas amenazas e incluso un *nuevo orden internacional*. En relación a estos puntos, hay que aclarar algunos conceptos.

En primer lugar, y haciendo referencia al nuevo concepto de seguridad, se dijo acertadamente que éste tenía que ser polivalente y tenía que poner el acento en varias cuestiones. En mi opinión, se ha demostrado que enterramos demasiado deprisa la primacía que sigue teniendo la dimensión militar del nuevo concepto de seguridad, entre otras cosas porque es el único concepto que sigue teniendo una capacidad disuasoria sin competidores inmediatos, en determinadas condiciones objetivas.

Con relación a este nuevo concepto de seguridad polivalente, se dijo que tenía que poner el acento en la democracia política, en el crecimiento económico (aunque no se solía precisar que debería ir acompañado de una distribución social equitativa del crecimiento), y en las relaciones pacíficas internacionales. Crecimiento económico acompañado de una distribución social equitativa del crecimiento no es lo mismo que deificar la economía de mercado, o mejor dicho, el concepto simplificado que se extendió de manera imprudente sobre las virtudes inmediatas de la economía de mercado, y que han producido un desajuste social en los antiguos países comunistas. Lo sucedido en Bulgaria y en Albania en estos años recientes es sólo un tímido reflejo de este fenómeno.

Por lo tanto, el nuevo concepto de seguridad pone el acento en la democracia política, la democracia social y la democracia internacional. Esto es un programa a largo plazo, como en las Constituciones los valores constitucionales son un programa a largo plazo. Pero eso no es en sí mismo un instrumento de seguridad.

Añadiría un elemento adicional a estas tres facetas de la democracia mencionadas: no se dará un salto cualitativo en la seguridad internacional, formulada en positivo, a no ser que se mejore sustancialmente la eficacia del Derecho Internacional Público en sentido comparable a la eficacia del derecho interno de los Estados. Y por tanto, si no mejoramos la *rule of law*, la primacía del derecho a nivel internacional, ello obligará un día u otro a replantearse inevitablemente el principio de libre aceptación de la obligación por parte de los actores estatales como fundamento esencial del sistema en la actualidad. Me parece que esta tesis no es una hipótesis, ya que no necesita como la hipótesis una ulterior demostración. La clave de la seguridad del futuro está en la supremacía del derecho y su posible imposición por la fuerza a los actores, en particular a los estatales, pero desde el principio de la igualdad ante la ley.

En cuanto a las cuestión de las nuevas amenazas, mi discrepancia con el discurso dominante en los años 1990, 1991 y 1992 es total. Y creo que los hechos me han dado la razón. No porque no fueran amenazas —es preferible llamarles factores de riesgo—, sino porque se han venido recitando como una cierta letanía en diversas instituciones europeas, por la necesidad de que los poderes públicos deben tener respuesta para todo, cuando hubiera sido más acertado simplemente no decir nada, expresar dudas (o escenarios diversos) y esperar a tener la respuesta correcta.

Estas *nuevas amenazas* eran las siguientes (el orden es aleatorio): narcotráfico, ecología, migraciones, terrorismo, y fundamentalismos. Ninguna de las que he citado son nuevas. Y es poco ajustado preferir llamarlas amenazas a factores de riesgo. No eran nuevas, porque ninguna de las cuatro aparece como novedad después del año 1990. Y en particular, los terrorismos, las migraciones y el narcotráfico.

Las migraciones se producen en Europa en las décadas de los cincuenta y sesenta. La población musulmana que hay en Francia y en Gran Bretaña no es de después del año 1990; la población turca en Alemania tampoco. Y la gestión del problema de la migración presenta muchos puntos débiles, pero no se ha hecho tan mal, o por lo menos no se han cumplido los escenarios catastrofistas que en materia migratoria se anunciaban en 1990 y siguientes (en particular desde el norte de África y desde el antiguo bloque del Este). Lo que es nuevo es la conjunción de este fenómeno con el paro estructural que generan nuestras sociedades, allá donde coinciden bolsa de paro con la población inmigrada o sus descendientes (en algunos casos ya de tercera generación). Eso sí es un cóctel que cualitativamente, y no cuantitativamente, se ha vuelto más peligroso. Se podría decir que también la ecología se ha convertido cualitativamente en un problema más grave que hace 20 o 30 años. Pero ni el terrorismo, ni el llamado fundamentalismo islámico, que

en su versión de activismo político destabilizador aparece con el jomeinismo en 1978, 11 años antes de la caída del muro de Berlín, son en realidad problemas nuevos.

El problema que no se aborda convenientemente es el de las políticas de respuesta a estos factores de riesgo. Así como la amenaza militar se podía disuadir en términos contables y militares de manera muy clara y pragmática presupuestada año tras año, la respuesta a la migraciones, al terrorismo, a la crisis económica o al paro estructural, sólo se puede hacer con políticas públicas gubernamentales, *public policies*, con fuerte consenso social y sabiendo que no se pueden esperar resultados antes de medio o largo plazo, es decir, décadas. Y sabiendo también que son problemas transnacionales que requieren respuestas concertadas intergubernamentales y supranacionales. De manera que es habitual que los Gobiernos no inviertan grandes sumas de recursos presupuestarios en políticas que no tienen dividendos a corto plazo. Y esto es un problema gravísimo que no se suele observar en documentos y análisis oficiales.

En otro orden de cosas: ¿cuáles son las razones de que no haya una Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común (PESC) o algo digno de tan pomposa denominación? No puede haber hoy en día una PESC y no la habrá hasta que se den una serie de condiciones que señalaremos más adelante.

En primer lugar, la arquitectura europea de seguridad debería ser llamada de otro modo, porque hay demasiadas organizaciones internacionales para la escasa lógica relacional entre ellas en términos de distribución de competencias. En segundo lugar, convendría empezar a abordar el fin de la literatura sobre la Unión Europa Occidental (UEO) y la reorganización de los dispositivos, que son los más clarificables, de seguridad en temas europeos, y que pasa por una precisión y una sinceración en relación a la imprescindibilidad de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), si es que se opta claramente por el mantenimiento del *Transatlantic Link*, la relación transatlántica, cosa que me parece obvia a estas alturas. En tercer lugar, el escalonamiento de la relación con la Rusia postsoviética ilustra muy bien que los titubeos y la prudencia en el progreso de la agenda común no se debe en realidad a la existencia de una amenaza comparable a la que había en el sistema bipolar, sino a la noción de incertidumbre. Porque no se ha dado ningún argumento convincente de por qué era tan imprescindible que primero hubiera un Consejo de Cooperación del Atlántico Norte, luego un *Partnership for Peace* o asociación por la paz, y ahora por fin un Tratado *comme il faut* en el que se dice que la OTAN y Rusia dejan de considerarse adversarios. Sin embargo, estimo que podemos considerar que desde diciembre de 1991 (o desde diciembre de 1987, según se mire) ya dejaron de ser adversarios, ya que desde esa fecha no ha habido ninguna amenaza mutua. Entonces ¿qué se ha hecho en estos seis años?

Como conclusión, quiero añadir un factor de análisis a las evidencias mencionadas arriba. Hay que señalar que muchas de estas decisiones y muchos de los errores se explican por la constante interacción entre los actores estatales, sobre todo cuando son

superpotencias o grandes potencias, entre decisiones en política exterior y constreñimientos en política interior. Todas las contorsiones rusas en política exterior, desde el año 1992 hasta la actualidad, deben ser leídas en clave de la estrecha relación entre política exterior (en relación a la seguridad y en la relación con la OTAN), y política interna, si se considera los virajes que ha tenido que hacer Yeltsin cuando ha creído que, porque había elecciones o por la evolución de su opinión pública, tenía que sacrificar a Koshirev y girar hacia un supuesto electorado que de lo contrario sería tentado por fórmulas neoconservadoras o viejoconservadoras, es decir, ultranacionalistas o tardo-comunistas. En definitiva, hay que analizar la relación entre política exterior y política interior de los Estados. De lo contrario, estaríamos errando en lo esencial, que es quién decide, cómo decide y por qué decide en política exterior.

Lo peor es lo referente a la arquitectura de la seguridad. Habría que explicar que si ésto se pudiera construir hoy desde cero desde una lógica relacional y de atribución competencial, probablemente la relación que existiría entre los Estados europeos y las organizaciones internacionales a crear ex novo, sería muy distinta a la que empíricamente existe hoy entre la UEO, la OTAN, la Unión Europea (UE) y la Organización de Seguridad y Cooperación en Europa (OSCE).

Para acabar, decir que no deberíamos dejar de hacer una lectura de las lecciones que se derivan de la gestión internacional del conflicto en la ex Yugoslavia. En contra de quienes teorizaron durante cuatro años que por la complejidad objetiva del conflicto no se podía optar por la solución militar, en septiembre de 1995, en seis días, se demostró que para resolver por lo menos la parte militar dicha solución era válida. Se trataba en suma de un problema de decisión. Y el problema es que la decisión la tomó uno cuando 12 o 15 no pudieron hacerlo en cuatro años. Y ello debido a que 12 o 15 agendas en política exterior, por definición, sólo pueden juntarse si se recurre al mínimo común denominador. Y el mínimo común denominador en la arena internacional no resuelve conflictos internacionales. Ni mucho menos los previene.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

Task-Sharing for European Security.
Dennis Sandole

Task-Sharing for European Security

*Dennis Sandole

With the title I've been assigned to talk about, task-sharing, I'm looking at the issue in the context of the title of this section. Also, I'm looking at the issue in the context of the title of the conference, which is broader in scope. Further on, I'm looking at task-sharing in the context of overall European security, and not just in the sense of what the Americans, Spanish, French and others can contribute. In essence, I'll be looking at task-sharing in the context of designing a peace and security system for post-Cold War Europe that is meant to be achievable: a peace and security "architecture" (to make use of a fashionable word) that is actually coming into place as we speak because of its making use of existing international governmental and non-governmental actors to provide for security on the continent.

The task-sharing that I'm about to share with you involves a model I've been looking at called the "New European Peace and Security System" – "NEPSS", for short. And NEPSS has both descriptive and prescriptive elements. Descriptively, as I just indicated, NEPSS is developing as we speak; but, it also has prescriptive elements, elements that I think ought to be there for the post-Cold War peace and security system in the new Europe to prevent what I call "future Yugoslavias".

First of all, the descriptive aspects of NEPSS: Here, I'm looking at the post-Cold War peace and security architecture for Europe in the context of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is the main organizing device for my model, for the simple reason that it includes all the former Cold War enemies, and the neutral and unaligned, numbering some 54/55 participating states in all. And, as you all know, the OSCE (coming from the old CSCE – the Helsinki Process) has three pillars, three distinguishing dimensions.

The first one used to be called “security” back in the old Cold War days; the second: environmental and economic; and the third, humanitarian and human rights. Now we view all three “baskets” as aspects of post-Cold War security in the comprehensive sense. So, basket one in the OSCE is now political-military aspects of overall security; basket two, economic and environmental aspects, and, basket three, humanitarian and human rights aspects of overall security.

What’s important about these three pillars of the OSCE? I think most of us would agree that we see paradigm shifts taking place in terms of other existing international governmental organizations in the region, whereby they are moving beyond national security toward *common* security. Let’s look at basket one, at the political and military aspects of overall security. Here we have NATO as the principle actor qualifying for political-military aspects of overarching security. And as we know, NATO is talking about increasing its membership to include former members of the former Warsaw Pact: In July, in Madrid, the Czechs, the Poles, and the Hungarians (these three, at least) will be asked to become members of the new NATO. And in addition to NATO as such reaching out to former enemies of the Cold War era, there are two creations of NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the latter having among its members most, if not all, of the former Cold War enemies, plus some of the neutral and unaligned. In terms of analysis, then, at the level of basket one we have, on the one hand, NATO as such; and, on the other, we have NATO as NACC and the Partnership for Peace reaching out to former Cold War enemies to include them in common security organizations. These moves towards common security are, I think, some example of NEPSS which are presently happening in basket one of the three-part OSCE structure .

At the level of basket two, we have the European Union clearly also doing the same thing – reaching out to former Cold War adversaries. In fact, the former Cold War enemies are quite active in looking to get some kind of status within the context of the EU. Some of them already have associate membership, while some are looking for full-fledged membership before the 21st century comes upon us. In any case, the point is that within the context of basket two of the OSCE, the EU is reaching out to former members of the Warsaw Pact as well.

And under basket three, we have the Council of Europe, which has been leading the way in many ways to embrace former Cold War enemies. So, very briefly in terms of the OSCE structure, we have existing institutions taking on board as new members, or contemplating taking on board as new members, former members of the Warsaw Pact, which thereby suggests to me that descriptively we have a paradigm shift taking place in those three dimensions of the OSCE – away from national security in the narrowly defined *realpolitik* sense, towards common security in a true post-Cold War European sense.

Now, having said all that, there's still a problem with the greater scenario, even though empirically these processes are happening. The problem is this: Everything I've talked about thus far is basically inter-state in nature. The OSCE is an inter-state structure. NATO is basically inter-state, as are its two creations, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace. The EU, although it has transnational, supra-state ambitions, is still basically inter-state. And the Council of Europe is inter-state. So, although these are exciting movements that I've talked about (the getting away from traditional *realpolitik*-based national security and movement toward common security), these developments are not by themselves sufficient to prevent "future Yugoslavias".

And by "future Yugoslavias" I mean conflicts, brutal conflicts, involving members of different ethnic communities, *within* state structures. All those organizations that I've just mentioned, NATO, NACC, OSCE and so on, are really not geared, nor are they designed to deal with these kinds of situations. They may talk about it – the OSCE certainly has; the High Commissioner on National Minorities does have the human dimension mechanism. Basically, however, the OSCE is still inter-state bound.

So, the NEPSS model has to go beyond its descriptive components to include some other dimensions, which brings us to the prescriptive element of NEPSS. And here, I'm also coming to you as a conflict resolution person and not just as an international relations or strategic studies person.

Under the prescriptive part of NEPSS, I have coined an expression called "integrated systems of conflict resolution networks". Integrated systems of conflict resolution networks have two dimensions: the vertical and the horizontal. Under the vertical dimension of integrated systems, I begin by assuming that all politics is local, that all conflicts have a local point of origin. Further, I imagine a vertical mapping of Europe in terms of many villages and cities embedded in societal, national, sub-regional, regional, and finally, international settings. For instance, in the context of former Yugoslavia we have Bosnia, wherein we have Srebrenica and Tuzla; next, we have the national level; further on, there's the sub-regional level in the Balkans; and, then we have the regional (European-wide); and, finally, the international level. I imagine that at each of these levels there's a combination of governmental actors, which are known as "track one" agents in the discipline and, corresponding to each of these governmental actors, there are non-governmental ("track two") actors which specialize in humanitarian and conflict resolution kinds of roles. So, for each of these vertically located levels (local, societal, national, sub-regional, regional, and international), we have governmental actors, and corresponding to each one of these, we have non-governmental actors which can complement what state actors and international governmental actors do, but don't do enough of. And here let me give some examples of what I'm talking about:

Traditionally, governmental actors deal with negative peace. Negative peace is not, by itself, bad. It's not called negative because it's bad. Negative means the absence of war; and that's not bad. I would have loved to have had negative peace in former Yugoslavia long before Richard Holbrooke and NATO came on the scene to help bring about negative peace, which is still holding. But negative peace, as the absence of war (although good in and of itself), does not lead automatically to dealing with the underlining causes and conditions of the conflict that has become waged through violent means. At some point in time negative peace has to be followed by positive peace. And positive peace deals with those underlining causes and conditions, which is not just about putting out the fire (the metaphor we often hear in track one governmental domains). Diplomats often say, "*We have to put the fire out. I'm so busy putting fires out that I don't have time to do anything else. What, deal with the underlining causes?*". Well, if all we do is deal with negative peace—which, again, in and of itself, can save lives—we may end up having a Cyprus-type situation.

But, as we've seen in the last couple of days in Cyprus, if all we have is a green line, manned and womaned by United Nations' troops, and thousands of Turkish forces in the northern part, we stop the fighting, we freeze in place the forces, but we do not deal with the underlining causes and conditions—which means that the violence, the fire in the house can flare up again at any point in time.

In the vertical part of integrated systems of NEPSS, track two non-governmental actors are meant to bring in a positive peace complement to the track one negative peace expertise of state actors and international governmental actors. They are meant to work together with governmental actors at each level: local, societal, national, sub-regional, regional, and international.

Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. At the level of Sarajevo, or Tuzla, or Srebrenica, we have governmental actors fulfilling welfare and law and order functions. Well, welfare and law and order functions may only go so far with regards to what the city or the village can provide. There may be, in this case, a need for a non-governmental actor which can help the state actors at the local level do a bit more of what they would like to do but lack resources to do. It is in such a case as this that track two non-governmental actors might, in fact, provide conflict-resolution expertise which track one governmental actors may not have.

To give you a personal example, I'm a former police officer and a former American marine: I've been trained to do lots of *realpolitik*, negative peacemaking, and negative peace maintenance. Never during my time as a police officer or as a marine was I trained to deal with the underlining causes and conditions of conflict. Now, you might say "that was not your job"; I accept that. That was not my job. However, a lot of the conflicts that the police get called upon to deal with, and that the Marines, Navy, Air Force and diplomats get called upon to deal with might have been dealt with years before the

house (if you will) had ever caught on fire to begin with. So that's why (as envisaged under the vertical dimension of the integrated systems) track two non-governmental actors ought to be in a position to help track one actors at each of those vertical levels.

Now, very briefly, the horizontal dimension. For positive peace conflict resolution to work, it has to have the involvement of all parties. After all, it is quite conceivable that one of the actors may wish to continue prosecuting (even!) a genocidal, ethnic-cleansing policy against another actor, in which case the vertical design may not work.

Also keep in mind that the vertical design is meant to be very practical: It's meant to implement Boutros-Boutros Ghali's idea of preventative diplomacy. If, at the local level something potentially dangerous is happening, it would be very important to get to that situation at that point in time using track two non-governmental as well as track one governmental actors for a variety of reasons: one, to stop the fire before it gets worse; and two, not only to stop the fire before it spreads to include others in other neighborhoods, but also to keep the costs for all concerned as low as possible. That intent may not work. The fire may spread, in which case the horizontal dimension must kick in.

Here, I think, I disappoint some of my conflict resolution colleagues by saying if, in fact, one of the major actors in a conflict situation wishes to continue to prosecute genocidal, ethnic-cleansing policies against other actors, then it becomes imperative for the international community to use a little bit of *realpolitik*-based force, but as part of a larger *ideapolitik*-based positive peace conflict resolution strategy to bring about negative peace, to forcibly stop the fire, to forcibly separate the parties, and then to let the dust settle in order for more positive peace mechanisms, actors and processes to come in to the situation and encourage the parties to deal non-violently with the underlining causes and conditions of the conflicts which have turned violent.

So, to conclude, this has been an outline of NEPSS and of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of its integrated systems of conflict resolution networks. It is a lot of information in a short period of time, but I'll be more than happy to take any questions about it.

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**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

NATO Enlargement Eastwards and NATO/Russia Relations.
Paul Gebhard

NATO Enlargement Eastwards and NATO/Russia Relations

*Paul Gebhard

In response to the topic to be addressed, I'd like to touch on three broad areas. First, the why of NATO enlargement and the specific benefits the U.S. sees; second, a number of post-Madrid issues, or post-enlargement issues (what are going to be the key questions that each member of the Alliance is going to have to face); and third, provide a brief overview of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and some of its key provisions.

So, first to the why of NATO enlargement as far as the U.S. is concerned. The U.S. sees the great opportunity for democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe fomented by enlargement. The opportunity to join NATO clearly has served as an impetus for democratic change in a number of countries, specifically for greater civilian control over the military, greater parliamentary oversight, and the creation of transparent political processes. I believe this can be seen in new countries like Slovenia, where there are wonderful opportunities to build a new government from the ground up. It can be seen very clearly in countries like Poland, about which, up until three or four months ago, there were very deep concerns in the West concerning democratic control of the military. I think it's quite clear that as a direct result of western criticism over the way Poland was conducting its military affairs, the Polish government took very important steps to reform the defense bureaucracy and firmly establish civilian control over the military.

Second, it's clear that enlargement brings a stronger collective defense and ability to address new security challenges. Though it is a cliché that the Cold War is over, we also know that, as our troops in Bosnia make very clear, defense issues do remain still for Europe and the United States to address. And despite being at the far end of the

conflict spectrum, the Gulf War again demonstrated that there are also places outside of Europe where the United States and Europe can act together in defense of their interests.

The third issue is very clearly more than just on the horizon: I believe it is here today. And that is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which the Defense Minister Serra mentioned earlier. I think it's a very important issue for Europe partly because it is not an issue which develops over time; rather because it's an issue where the technical development can move very quickly based upon the import of technologies and the delivery of missile systems. The enlargement process here brings a larger circle of like-minded states together to make contributions on collective security and collective defense. And such cooperation can be seen elsewhere, also; for example, in Bosnia where NATO plus all of the Partnership for Peace countries are there making contributions together. These are contributions in terms of energetic forces with specialized capabilities that, in many cases, the countries developed which were not widely prevalent in NATO forces. And here I'm referring to certain kinds of civil affairs units and chemical defense units. As you can see, then, countries outside of NATO are truly bringing important contributions to NATO and the security of Europe.

Fourth, a benefit of enlargement is improved relations among states. NATO's lasting legacy for Europe, I would submit, is its role as a peace promoter and a peace manager. It has really served that function, dare I say, even better that it did in deterring outside threats. I say 'served better' because that function is, as I've said, part of the lasting legacy which still holds true today. For example, the potential for joining NATO has brought a number of countries, or spurred a number of countries, to settle disputes. Notably, Poland and Lithuania have signed an agreement clarifying their border, as have other countries as well: Hungary and Slovakia; Poland and Ukraine; Hungary and Romania. In each case, long-standing sores between nations have been given a lot of high level political attention in order to solve these issues and create acceptable decisions for these countries very much, I think, under pressure to clean up their international relations to make them more viable members of the West and, in particular, NATO.

Fifth, plenoprosperity. When these countries join NATO, they will have a more stable climate for investment and economic reform. If I were a large investor, I would certainly think about putting money into any of these countries coming into NATO, because clearly their investment risk is going to go down. Indeed, more countries and companies are going to be willing to put money into countries that are part of NATO thanks to the security guarantees that the Alliance supposes. And, clearly, those investments will be a boost to their chances for wider integration with the West.

Last, there is a great benefit to broader European stability from the enlargement of NATO. As I said before, democratic change in states, better relations with neighbors, and prosperity all equate to greater European stability. Historically, when Central and Eastern Europe were unstable, Europe had a penchant for instability. For the U.S., at

least, all of these reasons taken together add up to a very compelling argument for why the United States has been a very strong proponent for the enlargement of NATO.

I think it's also because these arguments really go across the board without reference to particular countries. There is probably nobody currently who could give you a definitive answer on who exactly is going to join or be asked to join in Madrid. But clearly, though, regardless of the specifics as to which countries are asked to join, there will be, as I've indicated, substantial benefits for Western Europe and for European security.

Now, there are going to be several issues that come up after Madrid. There are, shall we say, several challenges which will need to be addressed, whoever is invited.

First, there will be the action of parliaments and congresses. There will have to be fundamental questions asked, which I assume will be asked if not in all countries, in most. Yes, the immediate threat to European security is low (I say 'immediate' meaning today, tomorrow, and to the few years in the future); but, clearly the fundamentals of joining NATO are two-folded and linked. One question is whether the present members of NATO will have a willingness to spend and to defend these new states; that is, whether a new country is willing to join and defend the current members and all the other members who would join. The other question is whether the current members are willing to put their troops on the line for your country. The latter is basic: It brings to fore the fundamental component of NATO - the common defense of allies, which is the component which separates NATO from other security institutions in Europe. And as such it will be key issue for parliaments and congresses to decide.

Second, these new countries are going to have to be producers of security and not just consumers. Though they have (as I said before) made contributions, for example in Bosnia, clearly, these activities are going to have to be more regularized. These countries will have to make clear their willingness to join common tasks and will have to have a more thorough reform of their military structures to make them more compatible with, and more easily able to work with, the rest of NATO. There will be some costs involved in that to those countries; still, this brings up another fundamental requirement of anyone who joins NATO. And that is that members must contribute to the common good. Members do not just drain-off, if you will, security.

Third, and I think highly important for the debates leading up to Madrid and afterwards, is the fact that NATO must remain open. NATO's Article 10 makes clear that it is an open organization, and NATO has got to remain open to further accession. All of the elements I listed that were benefits from NATO enlargement rest fundamentally on the benefits that accrue from the steps states are willing to take in order to make themselves ready and attractive to join NATO. Should NATO wish to maintain that process of democratic change and economical reform, NATO has to make clear that it is willing to take in new countries after the first draw. Important to remember is that the overall goal of the enlargement and NATO security policy is an

undivided Europe. And if it is not clear that NATO remains open, I believe that goal comes into jeopardy. So, the handling of this question will be a key issue for Madrid and for the post-Madrid discussions.

The fourth challenge after Madrid is very clear (it was touched on in the introduction), and that is the relationship with Russia. I don't think that the United States puts too much emphasis on this issue given the great influence that Russia has historically (and not just since 1945) had on the development of European politics. Russia continues to be the largest player on the continent. It is a country going through profound economic and political change. It is a country which has lost much of its previous self-identity and is searching for a new self-identity. In view of this, I think any steps that NATO can take, or that countries can take bilaterally, to build a relationship with Russia will be steps towards greater development of stability in Europe.

Briefly now, let me turn to the elements of the Russia-NATO Founding Act, which was signed on May 14th by Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov. (The full title is, by the way, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.) The act contains five basic principles, plus a preamble in which it is made clear that neither NATO nor Russia considers each other an adversary; and, although this is an important point that NATO made very clear at the end of the Cold War, it is the first time that NATO and Russia have both articulated this non-adversarial position.

The first section lays out the principles governing the relationship of states based upon international norms such as the UN and the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, in which there are explicit commitments to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states — particularly important issues given NATO's enlargement.

The second section creates a new forum called the Permanent Joint Council. This is an extremely important group comprised of 17 countries (NATO 16 plus Russia). The Council would obviously expand after Madrid, after countries are formally brought into the alliance, which would most likely be in 1999. But, as it stands now, the Council is the permanent forum in which NATO and Russia will consult. Section three describes a very large range of issues for NATO and Russia to discuss; for example, conflict prevention, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the development of security strategies.

Section four was probably the most controversial and the most delicate to negotiate; and, I think a lot of credit devolves to Secretary Solana for bringing about the accords. This is the military dimension of the relationship. The key provisions of it are a re-duraction of NATO's nuclear statement of December of 1996: that NATO has no intention, no plan, no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new countries. This section contains a reference to NATO's statement on how it would intend to carry out collective defense through interoperability, integration and reinforcement. A key

provision here is that NATO does not intend to station substantial combat forces in new countries. There was a recognition in this section that NATO will require adequate infrastructure on the territory of new members as part of its strategy of reinforcement. Also mentioned is NATO's and Russia's commitment to prompt adoption of the CFE Treaty, which is an important provision because that is a legally binding instrument by which Russia and NATO can negotiate security in Europe.

Finally, there's the clear articulation that NATO retains its full prerogatives: As President Clinton said, "Russia will work with NATO, but not within NATO". In sum, the NATO-Russia relationship reflected in the Founding Act offers Russia many opportunities for consultation, rewards for constructive engagement, and even joint action should there be a consensus. Should Russia wish to take what we hope is a very constructive, a very positive approach to European security, there are many ways to pursue it through the Permanent Joint Council. But, again, the Founding Act clearly does not offer Russia a veto should it choose otherwise.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

Leadership in Crisis Situations.
Cameron R. Hume

Leadership in Crisis Situations

*Cameron R. Hume

The basis of the international system is still the nation-state. During the last fifty years decolonization divided the entire world into nation-states, and the UN Charter enshrined the juridical norm of sovereign equality and the rule against intervention in matters essentially within their domestic jurisdiction. At the same time states have accepted restrictions on their freedom of action to achieve shared goals and to preserve order within the system. Whether through cooperation or conflict, states pursue their interests. For a diplomat the term “crisis situation” evokes conflicts between states.

Today’s typical crisis is the failure of the state to perform basic functions: providing for the security and welfare of all its citizens and managing relations with its neighbors. As a state breaks apart into warlord fiefdoms, the basis for the rules of sovereign equality and non-intervention disappears. The spread of chaos damages the security interests of other states. Refugees, trade disruptions, arms flows, brigandage, and drug trafficking: what starts out as an internal conflict becomes a regional threat.

Leadership means showing how to get there from here. It has three elements. First, there must be a capacity, the resources, to do the job. Second, will is needed, and among states the surest source of will is the perception that important interests are at stake. Third, a leader needs a vision, not “the vision thing” but the ability to guide the way forward from a crisis to a solution. Leadership for today’s crisis situations is in deficit in all three ingredients: capacity, will, and vision.

WHICH CRISIS SITUATIONS?

The pattern for the crises ahead seems set - conflicts within the borders of individual states, having limited international causes but growing impacts neighboring states, causing enormous human suffering.

The Security Council's active agenda lists the current crises affecting international peace and security. Twenty years ago the Council only discussed conflicts in the Middle East and in Southern Africa, but now the docket is full: El Salvador and Haiti; the Former Yugoslavia; Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh; Afghanistan and Tajikistan; Cambodia, North Korea; Iraq; Cyprus; the Arab-Israeli conflict; and then Africa - Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Angola, Liberia, Western Sahara, Libya, and the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon. All of these crises are caused by sick states.

A comparative list of crisis situations appeared in a recent U.S. government study entitled *Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996*. It defined humanitarian emergencies as situations in which large numbers of people depend on humanitarian assistance from sources external to their own society or on physical protection to have access to subsistence. While the details in the report are open to debate, the major trends are undeniable:

- in the last ten years the number of people in need of assistance has increased 60 percent, reaching a plateau of 40-45 million;

- internally displaced persons (22-24 million) now greatly outnumber refugees (16 million);

- most emergencies are manmade, and the number of such emergencies in 1994 was five times the average for the period 1985-1989;

- most such emergencies take place in developing countries, which now must include new states in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia;

- the 23 crises described in the study are essentially internal conflicts; all have some international consequences, but not one can be characterized as essentially an inter-state conflict.

What relationship does this list have to the Security Council agenda? Last year the Security Council discussed all of these crises areas except for Sri Lanka and Chechnya. Only five conflicts on its agenda escape the list - the peace-keeping operations in Cyprus, Lebanon, Macedonia, Syria, and the Western Sahara. Arguably none of these are now crisis situations.

To the extent that the present is a guide for the future, upcoming crisis situations will have several characteristics:

- The most frequent crisis situations will be internal conflicts that produce humanitarian emergencies on a scale that threatens neighboring countries.

- Most of these conflicts have no immediate, substantial impact upon the interests of the great powers.

- The international response to such crises will rarely be decisive.

CAPACITY

The crisis level is up, but the resource level is down. I would like to cite three trends: in the level of resources that the U.S. provides for the civilian instruments of its foreign policy; in the resources available for military interventions by the international community; and, in the level of international funding for emergency humanitarian assistance.

First, the U.S. account for civilian international programs. In January Secretary Christopher told a Harvard audience that forces in Congress would cut the foreign affairs budget so deeply that the U.S. "would have to draw back from our leadership." In fact much cutting had already been done. Funding for the State Department, economic assistance, peace-keeping, and assessments to international organizations has declined since 1984 from \$37.5 billion (in 1996 dollars) to \$18.6 today. These cuts hamper the U.S. ability to lead, and, by limiting funding for international organizations, they restrict the capacity of states to act through multilateral institutions. Either way, needs go unmet.

Second, military resources for emergency interventions. Today's crises take place in faraway, primitive, hostile locations. What does it take to project power there? Advanced transport and communications; a logistics system able to sustain force without local supplies; disciplined, trained troops; and, command and control for a multinational operation. In addition to the United States, among NATO members only Britain and France have such a capability, and their intervention forces are 10,000 each. The Russian military is straining at tasks close to home; the German and Japanese constitutions bar such actions; and, no other state has this capacity.

Without Britain, France, or the United States taking the lead, can emergency interventions be conducted? India put a peace-keeping force in Sri Lanka, and Nigeria leads in Liberia a force composed of troops from neighboring states. The United Nations, if it has support from Britain, France, and the U.S., can put a force into a non-hostile environment. Of course the primary task of the British, French, and U.S. military is to protect vital national interests and to prevail in battle, not to lead emergency interventions. When these three states decide not to participate, the international community lacks the means to intervene.

Third, international funding for emergency humanitarian assistance. In the last ten years both the needs and contributions have multiplied, but now funding is on the decline. In 1994 donor government provided \$2.2 billion of the \$2.8 billion requested in UN consolidated appeals; last year the level down to \$1.8 billion of the \$2.5 billion requested. This year, even if funding levels remain constant, food prices are rising. The U.S. Department of Agriculture predicts that this year that 16.5 million metric tons of food will be needed to meet both chronic food deficits and emergency food needs, but the Food and Agriculture Organization warns that only 7.6 million tons of food aid will be available. Parts of Africa expect poor crops, and the prospects are grim.

WILL

States act based on perceived interests. During the Cold War the United States perceived that it had interests at stake wherever the Soviet Union might be able to gain influence, and it was ready to react everywhere. No longer, as the decline in resources testifies. When President Bush acted in the name of a New World Order, he was using resources provided for the Cold War and which are no longer so readily available. Washington now sees important U.S. interests to be concentrated in fewer areas.

This February a White House report identified situations in which the President would commit U.S. forces:

-when vital interests are involved, the U.S. would respond unilaterally when it must and with allies when possible. Such vital interests include protection of U.S. citizens and territory, the territory of allies, and vital economic interests. A recent example is the U.S. reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

-when important interests are involved, the U.S. would respond only when the response was commensurate with the risks, when it was deemed likely to succeed, and the commitment was limited. Such intervention would normally not be unilateral. Deployments of U.S. forces to Haiti and Bosnia are examples.

-when a humanitarian emergency occurs, the U.S. would normally not commit its own forces. In such cases it would act only in conjunction with other states, and its role would be limited to areas where it can make a unique contribution, such as jump starting the operation with logistics, transport, and communications support. U.S. troops would normally not have a ground role. The U.S. military response to the crisis in Rwanda in 1994 would be an example; airlifting food to Bosnia would be another.

After the global competition with the Soviet Union ended, vital interest seem to be located on U.S. territory, in Western Europe, in Northeast Asia, and in the Persian Gulf. In areas such as the Caribbean or the Balkans, where important but not vital interests are involved, the U.S. is prepared to lead first with an active diplomacy: to assess the risks of neglect or engagement, to improve the odds of success, and to secure partners; intervention as part of a coalition might then follow. In most crisis situations today the U.S. claims no leading role and U.S. participation depends on cooperation with others to share the burdens and decision-making. How ready are others to act?

Not ready. West African states now threaten to end their peace-keeping operation in Liberia unless the local warlords respect a cease-fire. The Secretary-General asked 64 states if they were willing to provide a battalion to assist in demilitarizing the camps of Rwandan refugees in Zaire; 63 said no. France will not provide troops to assist with any operation in Burundi, claiming negative reaction in the region to Operation Turquoise, through which France helped stabilize the flight of refugees from Rwanda in 1994. Spurred on by setbacks in Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia, UN peacekeeping has dropped from 78,000 troops two years ago to 27,000 today.

The urge to join in a military intervention, let alone to lead it, is weak. Few are the crises today likely to generate either unilateral action by the United States or its determination to forge a coalition ready to act together. And without such determination by a few leading states, especially the United States, UN peacekeeping is unlikely.

VISION

We have only dimly seen the way to move from crisis situations to solutions.

The approaches taken have been experimental, and the results have not been encouraging.

Diplomats have a range of methods for promoting the national interest in managing relations between equally sovereign states. We now put these methods to use for a different purpose: to prevent the outbreak or continuation of internal conflicts. One key impediment has been that a recognized government and an insurgency are not equals in status, and in fact the entire conflict can turn on the issue of relative status. Higher level diplomatic involvement accentuates this impediment and often complicates efforts to launch a dialogue. In addition, the rule against intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states guarantees that such action is always criticized. Few such interventions have led to reconciliation among the parties.

Military interventions involving the use of force have taken two approaches. First, when the authority to use force is vested in a national command guided by vital or important national interest: Operation Desert Storm, the initial U.S.-led operation in Haiti, and IFOR were organized as multi-national forces enjoying explicit Security Council authority to use all necessary means to accomplish stated objectives. Second, when the authority to use force is vested in a UN command - an attempt to separate decision-making authority, command and control from the national interests of the states contributing to the force:

- during the second stage of the UN's Somalia operation, U.S. forces attempted to arrest General Aideed. U.S. spokesman, not citing any vital U.S. interest, presented this as a UN operation. When the attempt backfired and 18 U.S. servicemen died, public support for any U.S. role unraveled.

- the UN force sent to Rwanda to help implement a cease-fire did not have the mission or capacity to use force when the situation deteriorated in April 1994. Nevertheless, Belgian authorities have court-martialled the commander who failed to use force to liberate Belgian soldiers being held as hostages.

- UNPROFOR almost never used force to carry out its mandate, nor did its British and French commanders authorize sustained use of NATO air-power until after the

fall of Srebrenica. When NATO member states agreed last July on the use of air-power, the commanders soon authorized its use.

After five years of experimentation it is time to reaffirm Dag Hammarskjold's advice: UN forces cannot perform mandates that require the initiative in the use of force.

WHAT TO DO?

Failures diminish the will to intervene and the level of resources available. The best way to improve the odds for success is to get the politics of intervention right before launching an operation. Know the purpose of the intervention and insist that the necessary means are available. When there is no important national interest at stake and when the operation seems hazardous, non-intervention may be the wisest policy.

Here are five guidelines for leadership in today's crisis situations:

1. Leave space for other actors: When the origin of the crisis is not a conflict between states, non-state actors may have essential roles to play in initial contacts between the parties, in convening a dialogue, in sustaining a political process, and in helping to ameliorate the internal consequences of the conflict.

2. Seek dialogue as a basis for international action: When the parties can agree on a process for managing their conflict, the international community has a legitimate basis for a broad range of activities to support their agreement: human rights monitors, cease-fire observers, election assistance, monitoring and training of police, demining, and help with demobilizing contending forces and forming a national defense force.

3. Preserve international norms: Here the international community should act together in the community interest. Certain regimes are a basis for international action even in the absence of agreement by the parties, and they should be respected: the laws of war, international human rights, prohibition on the use of certain weapons, laws regarding treatment of prisoners and refugees, and other specific actions sanctioned by the Security Council, such as Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq or the embargo against sale of arms to Liberia.

4. Provide an international framework for specific interventions by regional actors: Oversight arrangements are needed to make the legitimacy of such action conditional on international standards – examples are the UN observer missions that have tracked the CIS operations in Tajikistan and Georgia, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia, and the U.S.-led multinational force in Haiti.

5. Leave the authority for the use of force to national forces: This responsibility cannot be successfully delegated to an international organization. Those who oppose the easy recourse to force should welcome this restriction.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

OSCE and European Security.
Mark Sigler

OSCE and European Security

*Mark Sigler

For those who may not be entirely familiar with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, let me briefly describe the OSCE. It was created in the early 1970's as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Starting in Helsinki, the Conference continued in a number of capitals, including Madrid in the early 1980's. It currently has 54 participating States, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Andorra recently joined. All States of the former Soviet Union are participants. Both the U.S. and Canada are in. OSCE decisions are taken on the basis of consensus. A Chairman-in-Office – the Foreign Minister of one of the States – serves a one-year term, and has responsibility for executive action. The CiO is assisted by the “Troika” which includes the previous year's CiO and the next year's Chairman. A Secretary General, who is the chief administrative officer, heads a secretariat of slightly over 100 people. There is a Documentation Office in Prague, the High Commissioner on National Minorities hangs his hat in the Hague, and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is headquartered in Warsaw. Ten OSCE missions are deployed from the Baltics to the Balkans and east to Tajikistan. More on those in a minute.

A Senior Council is to meet twice a year in Prague, and can set policy guidelines. The Ministerial Council, OSCE's central governing body, meets annually. The Permanent Council meets weekly in Vienna and is the normal body for consultations and decisions. OSCE Heads of State and Government have been meeting at the Summit level every two years.

OSCE is a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. As such, OSCE States may jointly decide to refer a dispute to the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the OSCE.

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To begin with a truism, security is multi-dimensional. European security is no exception. Security – national and multilateral – is enhanced to the extent there is not only stability in military relationships but also due to attention to human rights, social issues, economic development and prosperity, and the environment.

OSCE embodies that truism. It has sought to establish among its participating States a network of principles and commitments that acknowledges the importance of each of these dimensions of the security mosaic. And to some extent the OSCE internal structure reflects the multi-dimensional approach: The Forum for Security Cooperation seeks to build confidence, transparency, and cooperation in the political-military dimension. Annual meetings in Warsaw track whether human dimension principles and commitments are adequate and honored. We look to the Economic Forum, which meets each year in Prague, to play a similar role for the economic dimension.

The Helsinki Decalogue – the politically-binding basic principles governing relations among OSCE's participating States – also reflects these various security dimensions. The Decalogue encompasses not only such traditional military aspects of security as inviolability of frontiers and a pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force, but also respect for freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, equal rights, and self-determination of peoples. The OSCE carries out a constant review of implementation of its principles and commitments, both to ensure they are honored and as a means of identifying what additional commitments might be warranted.

The importance of both the human and economic dimensions of security was underscored recently at OSCE's Lisbon Summit, where Heads of State and Government tasked OSCE to elaborate a mandate for a coordinator on economic and environmental activities, as well as a mandate for a representative on freedom of the media.

Preventive diplomacy is at the core of OSCE's contribution to European security. OSCE seeks to ensure stability and security by anticipating crises and preventing conflict. In pursuing this art, it has at its disposal a number of tools:

OSCE has ten long-duration missions: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya (called an "Assistance Group"), Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, Skopje, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. Staffing levels run from over 200 (Bosnia) to as few as 5 (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia-FYROM). There is also a two-person Central Asian liaison office in Tashkent. A Chairman's special representative on Nagorno-Karabakh undertakes functions similar to those of a mission among the parties to that dispute. There also are OSCE representatives to the Latvian-Russian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners, to the Estonian Government Commission on Military Pensioners, and to the Joint Committee on Skundra Radar Station. Belgrade's participation in OSCE has been suspended since July 1992. The long duration missions in Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina in Serbia were withdrawn in June 1993 when FRY authorities refused an OSCE request to prolong the Memorandum of Understanding on the deployment of those missions.

The “preventive” nature of the mission’s work is reflected in the mandates of these missions. These are reviewed every six months, with the exceptions of the Chechnya Assistance Group, for which no end date has been specified, and the one-year Bosnia mandate. The mandate can be fairly specific: Intensify discussions with all parties to given conflict; prepare reports on the human rights situation. Others are more general: Gather information and report developments, maintain a high profile, assist in establishing the facts. Mission mandates are tailored to individual circumstances, but what the missions have in common is their recognition of a situation that has the potential to degenerate into conflict, and a determination to prevent that from happening.

The position of High Commissioner on National Minorities was established at the OSCE Helsinki Summit in 1992. The High Commissioner works to prevent conflict by providing early warning and early action at the earliest possible stage in regard tensions involving national minority issues that have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but that have the potential to develop into a conflict with the OSCE area. His job is to look ahead, identify potential problems, and work to resolve the underlying issues before they degenerate into conflict. He is an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage. His ability to succeed depends greatly on the willingness of the parties concerned to cooperate with his efforts. He has been active in the Central Asia republics, Central-Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltics.

Active throughout the OSCE area is the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights –ODIHR – formerly known as the Office for Free Elections. The Office is a tangible reflection of OSCE’s conviction that respect for human dimension issues is central to stability and security in Europe. Advising on, helping to conduct, and monitoring elections remains an important focus of ODIHR’s work as the successor to the Office for Free Elections, but as the name suggests, the ODIHR is also strongly focused on human rights. The two go hand-in-hand: ODIHR helps to build the democratic institutions – free elections, respect for “rule of law” – that are necessary for implementation of human rights. In doing so, it works closely with non-governmental human rights organizations, and helps monitor and review the implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments.

I should say a word now about another OSCE institution whose name warrants mention here. The OSCE Secretariat includes a Conflict Prevention Center. It is an ambitious title. The CPC in fact functions in large measure to support OSCE missions in the field. It also facilitates information exchanges as agreed under certain confidence-and-security building measures, and organizes the annual meeting that assesses implementation of Vienna Document commitments.

Beyond these institutions for conflict prevention, OSCE has a number of procedures, or “mechanisms” it can call on to help prevent conflict. To touch on them briefly:

The Vienna Document on Confidence-and-Security Building Measures includes a November 1990 “mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual

military activities.” The mechanism provides that OSCE States will “consult and cooperate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled activities of their military forces outside their normal peacetime locations which are militarily significant...and about which a participating State expresses its security concern.” Again, this is a two-phase mechanism. One State requests clarification, which the other State must provide to all OSCE States within 48 hours. The initiating State may then request a bilateral meeting, or an emergency meeting of the OSCE. This mechanism was invoked in 1991 by Austria and Italy because of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

The Berlin mechanism, agreed in June 1991, facilitates consultation and cooperation with regard to emergencies. It may be used when there is “a serious emergency situation which may arise from a violation of one of the Principles of the Final Act or as a result of major disruptions endangering peace, security or stability.” Again, it is a two-step mechanism. A State may seek from another “clarification” when it believes an emergency situation is developing. The response is to be provided to all OSCE States within 48 hours. Thirteen States may then request an emergency meeting of the OSCE, with the understanding that any OSCE decision will require consensus. The effect of this mechanism, therefore, is to raise an issue to a high political level, and to exert political pressure on an OSCE State. It has been used twice: once against the former Yugoslavia during the conflict there, and once by Hungary in a dispute with Czechoslovakia over the Gabčíkova dam.

A meeting in Valletta in early 1991 established a mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes. It can be applied to disputes between OSCE States, except when at issue are territorial integrity, national defense, sovereignty over land, or competing claims of jurisdiction. Qualifying disputes are submitted to one or more independent experts drawn from an established list. These experts, referred to as the “mechanism,” are charged with offering comment and advice to the parties as to how best to settle the dispute. The parties may decide to accept as binding the advice or comment of the “mechanism.”

The Valletta mechanism was strengthened at the end of 1992 by adoption of a provision for directed conciliation. This allows the OSCE Council of Ministers to direct any two OSCE States to seek conciliation to assist them in resolving a dispute.

The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document established a multi-phase mechanism for addressing human dimension concerns. It involves a written response to requests for information, bilateral meetings, and the involvement of all OSCE States. The Vienna mechanism has subsequently been supplemented, including by the Moscow mechanism, or emergency mechanism for the human dimension, which went into effect in 1992 and provides for a variety of OSCE missions of rapporteur or experts to look into human dimension issues. In the case of suspected massive violations of OSCE human dimension commitments, an emergency mission may be sent at the behest of several OSCE States, even if the receiving State is opposed. The Moscow mechanism has been used in Estonia and Moldova at the invitation of those States, and in Croatia on an emergency basis.

A consensus-minus-one principle agreed in 1992 allows for political measures to be taken against a State in which massive and gross violation of human rights occurs. This provision was the basis for suspension of the former Yugoslavia, in connection with its action in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

Beyond the early warning and conflict prevention stage, OSCE is involved in crisis management and conflict resolution.

In Bosnia, an end to the killing brought a Dayton Agreement-mandated role for the OSCE in elections, “regional stabilization”, and human rights. OSCE successfully supervised national elections last September (1996), and is assisting in preparations for municipal elections this September (1997). As I noted, there are over 200 people in OSCE’s Bosnia mission.

Both Georgia and Moldova became OSCE members with the break-up of the Soviet Union. Their independence was followed by armed conflict with portions of their territory attempting to break away from control by central authorities. Once cease-fires were established, OSCE sought to facilitate long-term political settlements.

In Moldova, the OSCE mission assisted the parties in negotiations that would consolidate the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity for Moldova while at the same time providing an understanding about the special status of the separatist Trans-Dniester region. Thanks in part to that effort, and those of Russia and Ukraine, a Memorandum was signed in Moscow May 8 between Chisinau and Tiraspol representatives, providing a framework for a final round of negotiations to resolve the status of Trans-Dniester within Moldova. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office also signed, as a witness, a separate statement by Russia and Ukraine offering to guarantee compliance by both parties with the terms of the status agreement.

In Georgia, the OSCE mission sought to intensify discussions with the parties to the South Ossetia conflict, in order to identify and seek to eliminate sources of tension and extend political reconciliation throughout the area of conflict. The Mission is also mandated to make recommendations regarding the early convening of an international conference under OSCE auspices, with the participation of the UN, aimed at the resolution of the conflict, including the definition of the political status of Southern Ossetia.

In the case of the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict, the OSCE Mission works to ensure liaison with the UN operations in Abkhazia, with a view to facilitating the participation of the representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, at UN invitation, to the negotiations carried out under UN auspices.

In Chechnya, OSCE found itself conducted with a situation already well beyond the normal bounds of preventive diplomacy or even crisis management. The task was to assist in finding a peaceful end to an ongoing conflict. With the support of Russian Federation and some elements of the Chechnyan opposition, a small OSCE Assistance Group was deployed to Grozny. The Group worked to facilitate meetings and discussion

between the sides in order to end the killing, enhance respect for human rights, and ease the way for delivery of humanitarian assistance. The personal security of Assistance Group members was often in doubt, and, on occasion, members had to re-deploy out of Chechnya. Ultimately, however, these OSCE representatives were instrumental in helping the doves on both sides of the conflict reach agreement on a cease-fire and the outline of a political solution to the crisis. The Group was also key to organizing elections in Chechnya once the shooting stopped. Their work now is focused more sharply on humanitarian issues, and – yet another important aspect of preventive diplomacy – reconstruction of Chechnya’s destroyed economy and society.

In the case of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the OSCE mandated in 1992 that a conference be held in Munich to “...provide an ongoing forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis of the principles, commitments, and provisions of the (then) CSCE.” The Minsk Conference has yet to take place. Armenia and Azerbaijan have conditioned their participation in a conference on the other’s withdrawal from occupied territory. Those withdrawals have not occurred. For now, a preparatory group, called the Minsk Group, is working on the parameters and agenda of the Conference. Incidentally, little or none of the work of the Minsk Group takes place in Minsk.

A cease-fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia was concluded in May, 1994. It more or less remains in force, although there are periodic violations. In 1994 OSCE Budapest Summit promised that an agreement to end the hostilities would be followed by a dispatch of an OSCE peacekeeping force, to help implement the agreement. In Vienna, OSCE created a “High Level Planning Group,” to prepare for the work of the peacekeeping force. The parties to the conflict have yet to reach agreement on a formal cessation of hostilities, and the work of the HLPG remains to be implemented.

Therein lies an important feature of the OSCE view of peacekeeping. When Heads of State approved in principle the possibility of OSCE peacekeeping (the 1992 Helsinki Summit), they had in mind an additional tool for conflict resolution. There was no desire to engage in peacekeeping without end, or peacekeeping for its own sake. The necessary political conditions had to be present to offer the expectation that peacekeeping, as an additional instrument of OSCE preventive diplomacy, would further the cause of conflict resolution. In Nagorno-Karabakh, where there is still no political agreement to cease armed conflict, that is not yet the case.

A number of international organizations contribute to Europe’s security and stability. More than one of them is represented here today. How do they relate to each other, and where does OSCE fit in?

As others have said, European security is not a “zero sum” game. We see room for contributions by all who are able to contribute in a positive way. Mutually-reinforcing cooperation, not competition, is the way ahead. To have a number of organizations

working to enhance European security and stability can be beneficial, provided there is coordination and cooperation.

Nor do we see a need to elevate OSCE to the position of first among equals in that cooperative effort. In the words of OSCE's former Secretary General, Wilhelm Hoyneck, hierarchies do not seem to serve the purpose of effective cooperation.

What is the comparative advantage that OSCE brings to cooperation among European security institutions?

First, it is very nearly all-inclusive. No security organization is a more inclusive Euro-Atlantic forum. None comes closer to being "pan-European." Everyone gets to play.

Second, participation is equal. When it comes time to decide, everyone has a voice, and all voices are equal.

Third, it is flexible. OSCE is not legally-based. When it comes time to act, there is no need to consult a Charter to see if the contemplated action is permitted. Rather, maximum value is placed on the ability to react quickly and effectively to unfolding events. To be adaptable and creative. To cite an example close to home, when the refusal of Serbian authorities to recognize opposition electoral victories led to crisis in Belgrade, the Chairman-in-Office was able to send former Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez to Belgrade as his special representative. No vote, no argument, no time lost. The Gonzalez findings brought enormous public pressure on Serbia authorities to respect the results of the November 17(1996) balloting and helped those elected claim their rightful seats.

Perhaps fourth is a strength that some may consider a weakness. When issues must be decided by OSCE participating States, consensus is usually required. Admittedly, this can mean a weaker outcome than some would like. But it also helps to ensure that whatever action is agreed will, in fact, be implemented.

There may be a fifth strength that is somewhat less tangible than the others. Here I need to draw on the words of our Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, John Kornblum, in his remarks to the OSCE last March:

"The United States considers the OSCE to be an essential aspect of our own hopes...for a truly integrated Europe. Integration to us means not a specific organizational solution or a fancy treaty. It means integration of all aspects of cooperation within and among societies and governments at all levels. It means overcoming the sense of instability which still burdens many parts of Europe. And in the new era of democratic cooperation, it means above all transferring the initiative for building security to the peoples and nations of our community. When we are able to give our peoples a sense of investment in their mutual security, when they feel they have the power to deal openly and positively with each other, our goal of true integration will be achieved. The OSCE is the best place, perhaps the only place, where these complex aspects can be debated, defined, and transformed into concrete action."

A final word about one aspect of OSCE work that makes room for contributions from all players in European security. At OSCE's Budapest Summit 1994, the participating States undertook to begin a discussion on a model of common and comprehensive security for the OSCE region for the twenty-first century. Views differ as to where this discussion should lead. Some would like it to conclude in a legally-binding Charter that might overtake OSCE's Helsinki Principles. Other, my government among them, hold the Helsinki decalogue sacred.

Whatever the outcome, it is the current state of play of the security model exercise that is of interest for our immediate purposes. The security model discussion has required as a necessary step the identification of risks and challenges to security – with the understanding that it might then be possible to construct a model that addresses those risks and challenges. States were asked to list their security-related concerns. The old favorites made the list, of course: sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity. But there were some newcomers as well, including drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. The OSCE has just concluded a seminar – held under the auspices of the Security Model exercise – that looked at the security challenge posed by these last three issues. There are, you see, some new elements to be factored into the European security equation. New facets of perhaps familiar security dimensions. And addressing them effectively will require cooperation among Europe's security institutions, as well as the flexibility and innovation that are OSCE's hallmark.

REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS INTERNACIONALS 38-39.

La seguridad europea: Diálogos para el siglo XXI.

¿Existe una coherencia estratégica entre los países del Sur?
Miguel Alonso Baquer

¿Existe una coherencia estratégica entre los países del Sur?

*Miguel Alonso Baquer

Estrategia es, en primera instancia, el arte de concebir planes de operaciones coherentes con la finalidad política de una comunidad de hombres libres y, en segunda instancia, estrategia es el arte de conducir la fuerza armada hacia los objetivos que se consideran decisivos.

Aceptando que la definición que, aquí y ahora, nos conviene se limita al arte de concebir planes de operaciones por parte de los Gobiernos de los países del sur del Mediterráneo Occidental, cabe contestar a la pregunta planteada en los siguientes términos:

“No existe un notable grado de coherencia entre las estrategias de los países del sur del Mediterráneo o países del Magreb”.

La falta de coherencia procede de la disparidad de sus políticas de defensa y, a su vez, esta evidente disparidad tiene su causa en la política general a la que se atienen constitutivamente Libia, Túnez, Argelia, Marruecos y Mauritania.

Esta observación no oculta la posibilidad misma de la existencia de elementos de las cinco estrategias que pueden considerarse comunes.

Las cinco estrategias dedican algún esfuerzo a favor de la autonomía de sus capacidades de resistencia a la penetración en sus pueblos de los valores de Occidente, en concreto, a las políticas de modernización que no toman en cuenta la especificidad del Magreb (en conjunto) y de Libia, Argelia, Túnez, Marruecos y Mauritania (en particular).

La resistencia a la penetración de los valores occidentales de cuño europeo es muy fuerte en Libia y en Argelia, muy débil en Mauritania y alcanza un nivel intermedio alto en Túnez, y bajo en Marruecos. Pero no puede hablarse de la vigencia de planes de operaciones de carácter ofensivo hacia el Norte dotados de suficiente proyección de poder militar.

Las políticas de defensa de las cinco naciones están polarizadas hacia la estabilidad interna. Aunque se lograra tener en un plazo de 10 años una coherencia muy superior a la actual y se alumbrara una estrategia magrebí debidamente combinada, seguiría siendo una estrategia al servicio de la estabilidad interior.

El único problema pendiente, en términos militares, consiste en orientar estas cinco estrategias (actualmente introvertidas e insolidarias) hacia un concepto regional de estabilidad que pudiera ser compartido por las potencias europeas del escenario, particularmente, Italia, Francia y España.

LA DISPARIDAD DE LAS CINCO POTENCIAS DE DEFENSA MAGREBÍES

El logro de la estabilidad, en todos y cada uno de los países ribereños del Mediterráneo, es uno de los objetivos de la política de seguridad y defensa de la nación española. Ahora bien, la estabilidad, referida al *Mediterráneo Oriental*, en las tres últimas décadas ha venido implicando a múltiples potencias del más variado signo. Actualmente, están siendo activados en su entorno más de un proceso de paz, entre los que destacan: a) el que consideramos adecuado al conflicto árabe-israelí en el Próximo Oriente y b) el característico del conflicto bosnio-serbo-croata en los Balcanes. En cambio, la estabilidad referida al *Mediterráneo Occidental* ha concitado a un número menor de actores internacionales. Los conflictos propios de esta zona parecen menos complejos. Pero desde España son percibidos como más cercanos y como mejor ajustados al alcance de nuestra capacidad de actuación.

Particularmente, España desea y fomenta con diferentes medidas de confianza el mantenimiento de relaciones cordiales y constructivas con todos y cada uno de los cinco Estados soberanos que constituyen el llamado *Gran Magreb*. Y es de estas relaciones, preferentes o prioritarias, de lo que vamos a ocuparnos en estas reflexiones.

La denominación *Gran Magreb* toma conciencia de un fenómeno tanto histórico como geográfico. Se refiere a la localización en el norte de África de una isla islámica que se comporta, de hecho, como el núcleo más occidental del espacio dominado antaño por los primeros conquistadores mahometanos.

La gran isla islámica del *Magreb*, limita al norte con el Mediterráneo Occidental y al sur con lo que suele denominarse “Sahel” o zona de penetración en el desierto. Geográficamente posee una notable unidad que, en lo político, se proyecta necesariamente hacia el Norte. Por su posición en el mapa se puede predecir que entrará, bien en conflicto, bien en cooperación, con todos los pueblos de condición europea que tengan intereses en la libre circulación por las aguas comprendidas entre el estrecho de Gibraltar y el estrecho de Sicilia.

En los tiempos actuales pueden diferenciarse un Magreb central y dos Magreb periféricos. El Magreb central lo constituye Marruecos, Argelia y Túnez. En las costas atlánticas hay un Magreb periférico, Mauritania, y en las costas mediterráneas otro Magreb periférico, Libia.

EL MANTENIMIENTO DE RELACIONES CORDIALES Y CONSTRUCTIVAS CON EUROPA

Tres naciones europeas han venido practicando, en los tiempos modernos, una política de influencias sobre la totalidad del Magreb: Italia, Francia y España.

España ha sostenido, enclavadas en el Magreb desde hace más de cuatro siglos, dos ciudades, Ceuta y Melilla. Ya en el siglo XX, alterando un comportamiento histórico que venía siendo ajeno al ideal de penetración tierra adentro, ha compartido con Francia el protectorado sobre Marruecos en virtud de acuerdos internacionales. La presencia española en África Occidental –Sáhara e Ifni–, aunque dispone de lejanos antecedentes, guarda alguna analogía con la presencia francesa en otra tierra de moros, en Mauritania. En realidad se trataba de un espacio africano que gravitaba más hacia las Islas Canarias que hacia el Mediterráneo.

Francia, desde 1830 como fecha emblemática, había practicado una política de asentamiento de población en Mauritania, Marruecos, Argelia y Túnez. El final del proceso –un proceso en el que agentes magrebíes participaban activamente en las vicisitudes de la historia de Francia– puede considerarse ligado al conflicto de la V República por el general De Gaulle.

Italia se ha proyectado durante más de nueve décadas sobre Libia. Las circunstancias dolorosas de la Segunda Guerra Mundial cierran en corto plazo la presencia política de Italia en Libia como potencia administradora, aunque se intentará con algún éxito, sostener una red de intereses comerciales a partir de su independencia.

Las tres naciones europeas, España, Francia e Italia, están igualmente interesadas en la estabilidad política del conjunto magrebí. A las tres les preocupa cualquier sombra de crecimiento de la hostilidad entre sus cinco naciones. Y les preocupa, también, que un poder hegemónico, venido desde fuera de la zona, pudiera forzar en su beneficio la unidad del *Gran Magreb* y alcanzara a imprimir una orientación contraria a los intereses de Occidente. Lo deseable para las tres naciones europeas es que los cinco Estados del Magreb superen hábilmente las crisis sociales y económicas internas y fortalezcan, por decisión propia, los lazos comerciales con España, Francia e Italia.

LAS TRES ZONAS DE INFLUENCIA

EUROPEA EN EL MAGREB

Los cinco Estados del *Gran Magreb* son de población musulmana, pero tienen regímenes políticos diferentes. Mauritania –percibida desde la posición española y por españoles– está siendo gobernada por un régimen militar; Marruecos, por una monarquía formalmente democrática y de hecho autoritaria; Argelia, es todavía una república de partido único; Túnez se está encaminando con cautela hacia una democracia vigilada y Libia mantiene un régimen autoritario de tipo cesariano, es decir, un poder absoluto personalizado en un solo hombre.

Las diferencias de régimen político se corresponden con diferencias internas muy acusadas. No se pueden considerar homólogos a los partidos políticos ni a las corrientes de opinión pública. Sólo cabe constatar que las minorías cultas—cualquiera que sea su modo de identificarse culturalmente— existen pluralizadas en los cinco Estados.

Las minorías cultas del *Gran Magreb* están polarizadas en tres direcciones: una (residual) retiene la nostalgia de la ideología marxista-leninista; otra (vigente en precario) espera alguna forma de modernización de cuño occidental y una tercera (exaltada o irritada) predica el retorno a los fundamentos del Islam. Estas minorías cultas, en la totalidad del Magreb central, están muy influidas por la cultura francesa. En Mauritania y en Libia tienden a fortalecerse tras las huellas indelebles de lo islámico. La huella hispánica –en paralelo formal con la italiana en Libia– parece sólida, únicamente, en las comarcas del Rif y de la Yebala al norte de Marruecos. En Ifni-Sahara pervive esta huella en el horizonte de una pretensión autonómica que no ha podido materializarse en términos de soberanía política.

LOS CINCO REGÍMENES POLÍTICOS DEL MAGREB

La influencia del fundamentalismo islámico –el retorno a la pureza absoluta en la ampliación de las normas de los textos sagrados– es notable, cualquiera que sea su actual peso político a partir de un círculo que tiene su epicentro entre Túnez, Argelia y Libia.

La aportación de España, Francia e Italia, en términos culturales mejor que políticos, resulta hostil o reticente cara al crecimiento del fundamentalismo, integrista o islamismo, y resulta favorable respecto a una práctica serena de los mandamientos de aquella religión. Desde estas tres naciones, los expertos suelen manifestar un cierto temor a que el creciente desarrollo del laicismo occidental en los programas de los Gobiernos, lejos de aminorar la tensión, favorezca por reacción popular el apoyo electoral a los partidos fundamentalistas desde las bases sociales.

En la vida económica de la totalidad del Magreb central, –los Magreb periféricos son demasiado diferentes entre sí– Francia disfruta de una posición privilegiada que España –y más aún Italia– le disputan, siempre según las normas de comercio internacional, queriendo incrementar, a través del estrecho de Gibraltar, –e Italia a través del estrecho de Sicilia– la circulación de bienes y servicios. Pero lo más significativo es que las dos terceras partes de la actividad económica de los países del Magreb se dirigen a Europa y que sólo el 3% circula de país del Magreb a país del Magreb. El resto –un 30%– se queda a cargo del mercado interior de cada uno de los cinco países.

La atención española –de las élites reformistas españolas– hacia los problemas del Magreb es bastante antigua. A finales del siglo XIX, tras una experiencia bélica de breve duración (1859-1860), los políticos españoles renunciaron a una presencia militar con intencionalidad de expansión política. La diplomacia hispana hizo lo posible para que ni Francia, ni Inglaterra, ni Alemania se propusieran influir en demasía o –en caso extremo– aspiraran a arrebatar fragmentos de soberanía a los poderes del Islam sobre el norte de África. Pero no se pudo evitar un cierto reparto de zonas de influencia que desembocó al final de la Gran Guerra, en 1918, en la expulsión de los intereses alemanes y en el predominio de Francia. La tolerancia europea a la presencia italiana en la periferia libia del Magreb se corresponde a la obtención para España de una participación en el Protectorado de Marruecos. España hubo de librar entre 1909 y 1928 la llamada Guerra del Rif para cumplir sus compromisos de pacificación en este territorio.

Desde 1928, –cumplidas las etapas de una pacificación– España practicó una política de creciente amistad con todos los países árabes del área mediterránea. Esta política, compartida por varios regímenes, permitió resolver sin daños mayores la retirada española del protectorado marroquí, la llamada “retrocesión” del enclave de Ifni y un repliegue pactado de la Administración del Sáhara Occidental. No se puso en cuestión la presencia de España en Ceuta y Melilla, porque es cuatro siglos anterior al establecimiento en Rabat... o en Fez de la soberanía de la actual monarquía alauita.

No se olvida en España que la presencia británica en el peñón de Gibraltar viene desde el año 1704. Y conviene recordar que todas las crisis internacionales, padecidas por las potencias europeas desde 1704 hasta la década actual de los noventa, han tenido como factor común que ni España, ni Marruecos han perturbado el tránsito internacional por el estrecho de Gibraltar. Esta ha sido la más notoria aportación de España y de Marruecos a la estabilidad en el Mediterráneo.

LAS ÚLTIMAS ETAPAS AL SERVICIO DE LA PACIFICACIÓN

En la década más reciente de nuestras respectivas historias –las historias de los países ribereños del Mediterráneo Occidental– se han producido en el espacio del *Gran Magreb* algunos acontecimientos de notable interés para la estabilidad de este conjunto regional, que conviene recordar en estos momentos:

La percepción española de la situación es de preocupación, sobre todo, con respecto a las crisis de sucesión en el poder y los riesgos de derrocamiento de alguna autoridad establecida porque son estas coyunturas, de carácter aparentemente interno, las más propicias para la sorpresa y las más vulnerables a la injerencia procedente de fuera de las fronteras nacionales de los cinco países del Magreb.

En su día, –trienio 1987-1990– en España se percibió una mayor preocupación por los siguientes acontecimientos políticos del Magreb:

-El derrocamiento en Túnez el 7 de noviembre de 1987 de un líder carismático, Bourguiba.

-La apertura de buenas relaciones entre los líderes de Túnez y Argelia, Ben Alí y Gadafi, el 29 de diciembre de 1987.

-La reconciliación aparente entre los líderes de Marruecos y Argelia, Hassan y Chadli Benyedid el 16 de mayo de 1988.

-La intervención del secretario general de las Naciones Unidas, Pérez de Cuellar, en el conflicto entre Marruecos y el Frente Polisario, el 15 de julio de 1988.

-La denuncia marroquí de cinco de los puntos del plan de paz de Pérez de Cuellar el 16 de octubre de 1988.

-El derribo, quizás accidental, de un avión norteamericano a causa de un disparo procedente del Frente Polisario el 8 de diciembre de este mismo año.

Naturalmente que, con posterioridad a ese trienio 1987-1990, la atención española se ha centrado en Argelia. Pero lo más significativo ha sido el evidente progreso diplo-

mático en medidas de confianza que tienen, incluso, un componente militar. Ni que decir tiene que los dos acontecimientos básicos sobre el cambio de perspectiva han tenido su sede en Madrid (mayo de 1992), en relación con la paz en el Próximo Oriente, y en Barcelona en relación con la política mediterránea de la Unión Europea (octubre de 1995).

LOS ACONTECIMIENTOS DE LA DÉCADA FINAL DEL SEGUNDO MILENIO

En la actualidad, los riesgos de inestabilidad, con el origen localizado en alguno de los cinco países del Magreb, no inspiran graves preocupaciones; pero sí una inequívoca voluntad de favorecimiento del desarrollo político, económico y social, que comparten Italia, Francia y España. Se trata, en definitiva, de mostrar que ha habido un cambio de actitud donde se subraya la igualdad entre los pueblos y la confianza entre los Gobiernos mucho más que los intereses de Europa o que la obsesión por la seguridad de la población europea.

En síntesis, podemos decir que el análisis de los comportamientos electorales, sobre todo en Marruecos, Argelia y Túnez en las convocatorias azarosas de la década de los noventa, hace pensar que en el año 2000 ya se habrá producido la apertura de un período de fortalecimiento en estos tres países de su propia identidad, al lado de sus vecinos; que ya se habrá acelerado la búsqueda de nuevos compromisos en las viejas cuestiones fronterizas, que todavía les distancian, y que ya serán frecuentes los gestos amistosos de independencia política de cada uno de ellos.

PROSPECTIVA DE LA ESTABILIDAD MEDITERRÁNEA

Este período de apertura, que seguramente rebasará la fecha del año 2000, un período sin hegemonías internas en el Magreb y sin dependencias de potencias exteriores no excluye la posible irrupción de algunas inestabilidades en estas cuatro cuestiones:

1. Conflictos sociales, que son los propios de las primeras fases de los procesos de industrialización.
2. Tensiones agrarias creadas por las previsibles etapas de escasez en artículos de primera necesidad.

3. Polémicas culturales, que estarán en función de las exigencias de los sectores que llamamos fundamentalistas.

4. Luchas políticas en el seno de la estructura o élite del poder.

Ahora bien, este panorama previsible no nos conduce directamente a una ruptura de la estabilidad que, a su vez, sea capaz de alterar el equilibrio del sistema de relaciones internacionales. Ya no pueden formularse hipótesis de conflictividad fomentadas por los países del entorno del caducado Pacto de Varsovia. El despliegue de las fuerzas antaño atentas a la confrontación Este-Oeste está hoy más alejado que nunca del *Gran Magreb*. Puede añadirse a esta apreciación que lo que queda más cerca de este espacio es el poder disuasor de los miembros de la Alianza Atlántica ante cualquier hipótesis de generalización de un conflicto.

Las perspectivas de pérdida súbita de la estabilidad en la región ocupada por los cinco países del *Gran Magreb* guardan, más bien, relación con otros tipos de problemas a los que se tiene acceso desde criterios de perspectiva esencialmente demográfica. La investigación, de momento, se sigue apoyando en una discutible hipótesis que se debe a los expertos europeos en la ciencia que llamamos *polemología* o *sociología de las guerras*.

Los estudios, basados en la hipótesis de que la conflictividad que apela a las armas está en proporción directa al volumen de población joven que no encuentra puesto de trabajo, subrayan estos datos demográficos para el *Gran Magreb*:

a) La evolución de las cifras absolutas de población entre los años centrales del siglo XIX y el primer cuarto de siglo XXI será netamente ascendente.

b) Las diferencias netas en este crecimiento dentro de los cinco países magrebíes se crearán a favor de Marruecos, e inmediatamente de Argelia, ambos por encima de los 50 millones de habitantes en unos 20 años.

c) La fuerte presencia de jóvenes menores de 25 años en las pirámides de edades, precisamente, se localizará en lo que hemos llamado el Magreb central.

Probablemente, dentro de 20 años, Turquía, Argelia y Marruecos juntos tendrán más habitantes que la suma de Italia, Francia y España, un fenómeno inédito en los tiempos modernos. Los países europeos del área mediterránea envejecen deprisa; pero los africanos envejecen sólo un poco más rápido que los asiáticos de la misma área. Los tres países europeos citados quedan ya por debajo de todos los demás mediterráneos en población joven. Habrá, pues, con toda seguridad, una fuerte corriente emigratoria a través de los estrechos de Gibraltar y de Sicilia dirigida hacia el Norte.

Esta situación relativa nos obliga a italianos, franceses y españoles a seguir de cerca, con ánimo conciliador, todas las posibilidades de conflictividad que se localicen en el área mediterránea. Pero por razones ajenas o diferentes a las demográficas y a las económicas, —por razones estratégicas— nos parecen ahora evidentemente más probables las inestabilidades en el espacio que determinados teóricos llaman Oriente Medio, nos referimos a los teóricos vinculados a las dos superpotencias del endémico conflicto Este-Oeste.

Creemos que la atención de los organismos internacionales y que las cautelas del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas deberán, por un tiempo, aplicarse preferentemente a la estabilidad en torno al eje Norte-Sur que desde las aguas del mar Negro atraviesa por Suez el mar Rojo. Pero esta localización del centro o eje de gravedad de la violencia no puede servirnos a italianos, franceses y españoles para descuidar los comportamientos que conduzcan a la paz en el conjunto del *Gran Magreb* que sigue proyectado, con toda lógica, hacia el Mediterráneo, en sentido Sur-Norte por los ejes que pasan por Gibraltar y Sicilia.

La voluntad política de los españoles y su Gobierno, –y desde luego, la de las instituciones militares a él subordinadas– consiste en adoptar de manera permanente la línea de acción que favorezca el constante incremento de la estabilidad precisamente en el conjunto de la región mediterránea occidental y también en el interior de cada una de sus naciones: las europeas meridionales o las norteafricanas. La atención solícita en la evolución del bienestar en los cinco países del *Gran Magreb* resultará obligada, en bien de todos y nunca en beneficio de ningún tipo de influencia hegemónica.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

The Working Relationships between the EU, WEU and NATO.
John Roper

The Working Relationships between the EU, WEU and NATO

*John Roper

In addressing the working relationships among the three institutions responsible for European and transatlantic relations in the field of security, it is necessary to examine why they were relatively separate until the beginning of this present decade, why they had initially so much difficulty in developing affective patterns of cooperation, why this is now improving, and what the prospects are for their future cooperation into the 21st century. It must be noted from the onset that some of the problems of developing effective working relationships arise from the different, albeit overlapping memberships of the European Union and NATO; and while all the full members of WEU are members of both NATO and EU, the existence of a third player cannot be said to have always been helpful.

THE COLD WAR: AN EFFECTIVE DIVISION OF LABOUR

Until 1990 there was a broad functional division between NATO and the European Community (as it then was), NATO had been created in 1949 as a collective defence organisation with primarily political and military functions for its member states. When the European Economic Community was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 it had an implicit security purpose referred to in the phrase in the preamble where the signatories talk of their resolve “to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this combination of resources”. One of the driving factors behind the Treaty

(as it had been behind the earlier Treaty of 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community - ECSC) was the determination to provide an economic framework for the reconciliation of France and Germany and to put an end to the running conflicts between those powers which had in the lifetime of those negotiating the treaties twice brought such devastation to Europe. The whole of the European Communities' work until 1970 (and very largely until the end of the Cold War) was therefore in the economic area, although it did have an essential security function in helping to create, together with NATO, a network of cooperation and integration among its members so as to establish a "security community" among its members in the terms defined by Karl Deutsch: "one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way"¹.

In foreign and security policy there was a broad distinction made: NATO took the responsibility for the external security of Western Europe, while the European Community set out to develop an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity under the security umbrella of NATO and, particularly, the nuclear guarantee of the United States. It is true that NATO in the case of the recurring disputes between Greece and Turkey and the episodic "cod wars" between the United Kingdom and Iceland did attempt (more or less formally) to use its good offices to resolve conflicts between NATO members, but in both cases these involved non-members of the European Community. After 1970, the development of European Political Cooperation (EPC) among the member states of the European Community meant that the foreign policy was to some extent coordinated, but this very clearly excluded security policy and the member states had a "self-denying ordinance on anything with a military flavour"².

The five countries who had signed the Brussels Treaty in 1948 to create the forerunner of WEU did so to provide evidence of European readiness to make arrangements for their own collective defence; however, with the creation of NATO and the development of its integrated command structure, the organisation became more formal than substantial. And, indeed, when the Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954 to create the Western European Union and provide a basis for German membership of WEU and NATO, a new Article IV was inserted making this clear.

"In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information on military matters."

As a result of this WEU had, before 1993, no military staff of its own, apart from some officers in the ARMS Control Agency who were exclusively concerned with obligations among WEU's members.

By 1954, the original Brussels Treaty, which had in 1948 set itself broad goals for economic, social and cultural collaboration as well as collective self-defence, came to be modified, also. Understand by then that both OEEC (later OECD) and ECSC had been created; thus Article 1 of the Treaty, which set out the economic objectives, was amended to avoid any competition with them by the addition of the following clause:

“The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organisations, in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented, but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations.”

WEU's activities were very largely formal for most of the next three decades, but it can be seen that it was treaty bound not to trespass on the clearly defined areas of NATO and the European Communities. Thus, until the end of the nineteen eighties there was very little requirement to develop working relationships; in place of these, a benign but unplanned synergy existed between NATO and the European Communities which ensured the peace and prosperity of the West.

PROBLEMS OF SUCCESS: FUNCTIONAL OVERLAP AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

This neat division did not survive the end of the Cold War; all three institutions had to adjust to a very different security environment. Although there was a large overlap among their membership (total in the case of the WEU), the adjustments were made in ways which reduced the combined effectiveness of the organisations and have led to situations in which they have often appeared competitive rather than complementary and mutually supporting. The description of them (together with the OSCE) as being “interlocking” has too often led to the uncharitable comment that they've been more frequently “interblocking” than “interlocking”.

Unlike the two World Wars of this century, where a good deal of time was spent during the war in foreign ministries in planning for the post-war arrangements, there was little preparation for the post-Cold War. There was a need for readjustment both in understanding what the objectives and priorities of foreign and security policies were, and also, in agreeing on via what institutional frameworks they would be conducted. On this there were not only differences among Western European countries and across the Atlantic, but also on certain occasions within countries and even within governments. The organisations themselves had their own implicit if not explicit agendas.

It is not necessarily the case that Secretariats or Commissions have always been neutral - they have had their own interests if only of self-preservation. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the development of effective working relationships has been difficult, and may not be fully completed until the new millennium.

There have been different reasons for this apart from the political differences in approach of key member states. While NATO and the EU Commission and Council had all three been based in Brussels for over twenty years, there were very considerable differences in culture, both in their secretariats and in the missions from member states. NATO was explicitly a political-military organisation and the EC a civil organisation, and it was always surprising how little contact there was between them. Their geographical collocation had very little effect on even informal contact. WEU was until January 1993 based in London; and, even when it arrived, its very small size³, compared with NATO or the EU, meant that its presence could do little to bridge the gap between two very disparate cultures. Even though it was also a political-military organisation with the obligation in its 1954 Treaty to rely on NATO for military advice, it took until May 1996 before a Security Agreement was reached between NATO and WEU permitting the exchange of classified information and documents between the two organisations. The fact that there were two, and in some cases three, diplomatic missions from the member states in Brussels reporting to different parts of their foreign and defence ministries meant that even the commonality of membership hardly guaranteed any effective coordination.

1991 was to see parallel developments in NATO and the European Community, as it then was called, which were to lead to the institutional incoherence of the early nineties. Perhaps as significant to see, also, was the beginning of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia: Indeed, it was the inadequacies of the response to this problem by the key members of the various institutions that was one of the factors which led the drive for a more rational structure after 1995. In November 1991, NATO agreed on its New Strategic Concept setting out the risks - no longer threats- that its members faced in the post-Cold War. In setting out the principles of Alliance strategy it asserted "The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence...." Although there was some discussion of crisis management and conflict prevention, treating this issue was still very much in its preliminary stage.

At the same time, the members of the European Union and WEU were busy preparing the texts of the Treaty on European Union and the Declaration by the members of WEU to be agreed at Maastricht a month later in December 1991. These (very much as a result of Franco-German initiatives) were to establish a structure to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy for European Union (CFSP) and a much more prominent position for Western European Union, which its then Secretary

General William van Eekelen saw as acting as a bridge between NATO and European Union. In the context of this paper there was no discussion of the working relationship between NATO and the European Union; however, the Treaty on European Union states in Article J,4.2, “ The Union requests Western European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications”. In addition, the Declaration of the Member States of Western European Union on the role of WEU and its relation with the European Union and the Western European Union with the Atlantic Alliance⁴ does make explicit statements on the development of the working relations between WEU and the other two bodies.

Before looking at these it is worth noting what all members of WEU agreed at Maastricht.

“WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance, WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.

WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role”.

Turning to the development of closer relationships with European Union, the WEU declaration made five specific proposals:

- as appropriate, synchronisation of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonisation of working methods;
- establishment of close cooperation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and the General Secretariat of the Council on the other;
- consideration of the harmonisation of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies;
- arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the common foreign and security policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union;
- encouragement of closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament.

It is difficult from material in the public domain to analyse how far these five proposals were implemented, but some comments can be made. While some working groups involving experts from capitals of the WEU and EU have met on consecutive dates (to economise on travel costs), the fact that there was no overlap between the representations in Brussels to the WEU and the EU (unlike the partial overlap in NATO) meant that there was no need for synchronisation of the weekly cycles of Brussels-based meetings. The venues of the regular ministerial meetings were not synchronised, although during the Yugoslav crisis WEU foreign ministers did come to meet on occasions in the margins of the Foreign Affairs Councils of the EU, as happened in the Hague September 19, 1991. In reverse, the EU Foreign Ministers met in Luxembourg in the margins of the WEU Ministerial Council on November 22, 1993.

The second commitment to ensure close cooperation between the two Councils and Secretariats was implemented primarily through the country which had the presidency of the European Union, which included in its representation to the WEU Council representatives of the EU Council Secretariat and, sometimes, members of the Commission for selected items of WEU business. There was some exchange of documents. Liaison in the other direction was handicapped by the very small size of the WEU Secretariat.

The proposal on the harmonisation of the Presidencies of the two organisations was advocated by those who wished to see the rapid integration of the WEU and EU, and opposed by those who did not. In fact, the duration of the WEU Presidency was reduced to six months from July 1, 1994, which may well have had some negative effects on the organisation; still, the only time in which the Presidencies have coincided was in the first half of 1996 when Spain had the Presidency of both bodies, and there is little evidence that this overlap significantly improved working relations.

The proposal for cooperation between the European Parliament and the Assembly of WEU seems to have remained intact. The WEU Assembly has to date been enthusiastic about plans to bring the two bodies closer together and opposed to merger.

The 1991 Declaration of WEU Member States also made proposals "to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance":

- WEU Member States will intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.

- Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronised and working methods harmonised.

- Close cooperation will be established between the Secretariats General of WEU and NATO.

The results here were mixed. As far as the development of “joint positions” is concerned, progress was very slow and the number of occasions on which such joint positions introduced very limited. Nevertheless, the fact that there was some overlap between the representation of Member States to WEU and NATO meant that there was an opportunity for more informal exchanges. The Ambassador of the country holding the Presidency of the WEU reported on work in WEU to the weekly meeting of the North Atlantic Council, although this practice did not occur in the reverse direction after attendance at the WEU Council included countries not members of NATO.

In view of the overlap in National Delegations, WEU’s weekly schedule of meetings in Brussels had to take into account the NATO schedule. There were joint meetings of the permanent Councils of the two organisations every six months or so but, initially, these tended to be more formal than substantial. WEU Ministerial meetings tended to take place in advance of NATO Ministerials, yet these were not harmonised formally. On the only occasion when a WEU Ministerial and a NATO Ministerial occurred on the same day in the same place, namely in the margins of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki on July 10th 1992, it is easier to interpret the motivation as being one of competition rather than of cooperation.

There were formal meetings at middle levels between the secretariats of the two bodies, but the restrictions on the exchange of classified information until 1996 limited their effectiveness. The Secretaries General exchanged visits to the two Ministerial Councils, though it is probably reasonable to evaluate these as having been primarily symbolic rather than substantial.

Part of the explanation for the limited development of cooperation can be attributed to the internal dynamic of the three organisations as each tried to define its role and substantial policies for European security in the unfamiliar surroundings of the post-Cold War world. Part must, however, be attributed to the strong views of some of the key countries about their own preferences for the institutional development. France, Germany and Spain wished to see the fullest development of a defence role for the European Union - even at the cost of NATO, as was suggested in the case of France. Britain and, initially, Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands were very defensive of NATO’s position and reluctant to see it eroded, believing that this would run the risk of reducing North American commitments to European security. Britain, in addition, was very sceptical about any growing role for the European Union and appeared to resile rapidly from the commitments she had taken at Maastricht about the WEU being built in stages as the defence component of the European Union. Such discordant views certainly handicapped developments as can be seen by the inadequate responses to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

1991-1995 EUROPE'S YUGOSLAV DISASTERS

This is not the occasion for a complete analysis nor a complete judgement of the combination of errors by European and North American countries which occurred between 1991 and 1995 in and around the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. There were many remarkable, positive efforts by individual Europeans and their armed forces which should not be minimised; but, as regards dealing with the first post-Cold War crisis, the efforts did not very often demonstrate the effective working relations between the various bodies, and indeed all too often saw a reversion to patterns of diplomatic activity more reminiscent of a nineteenth century “concert of powers” than of the constructive development of a European Security and Defence Identity.

The following are perhaps the most depressing examples of the failure to use the three institutions as mutually reinforcing bodies: Reference has already been made to the extraordinary situation in Helsinki on July 10, 1992 when, after a special WEU Ministerial Council had been held in the margins of the CSCE summit to agree on the dispatch of a naval force under WEU auspices to the Adriatic to monitor UN embargoes and sanctions against former Yugoslavia, the same nine ministers from WEU countries - now accompanied by their American, Canadian, Danish, Greek, Icelandic, Norwegian and Turkish colleagues - met an hour later as a special NATO Ministerial Council and agreed on the despatch of a second force under NATO auspices. In fact, thanks to skillful Italian command, these two forces operated together and were eventually combined as operation “Sharp Guard”. However, allied cooperation was seriously challenged in November 1994 when the United States announced the withdrawal of its direct support for the enforcement of the UN arms embargo, a decision which had potentially serious effects on the WEU/NATO forces on the eve of a WEU Ministerial meeting at Noordwijk.

The meeting of a group of members of the UN Security Council in Washington on May 20, 1993, where a Joint Action Plan was decided on that effectively abandoned the Vance-Owen Plan, was a clear occasion when a group of countries acted without consultation in either the North Atlantic Council or the European Union Council. The Danish Presidency of the European Union, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands all made it clear that they were opposed not only to the content of the decision, but also to the process by which it had been arrived at.

A year later the establishment of the “Contact Group”, whose creation did not derive from either the European Union or NATO, effectively by-passed the existing institutional channels. The European members were not the troika of the European Union Presidency; instead, the three major European powers were. Without disputing the Contact Group’s effectiveness, its creation must be seen as again by-passing the institutional structures and, to that extent, as an example of reducing their relevance.

Finally, when President Chirac convened in Paris on June 3, 1995 a meeting of troop-contributing countries who were also members of the European Union and NATO, this was done as an *ad hoc* meeting of nations without any institutional framework. The decision to deploy a more heavily armed Rapid Reaction Force with armour and artillery from Britain, France and the Netherlands was taken outside any institutional framework - such a force was totally unrelated to either WEU or NATO.

This set of examples (apart from the first one) has been given to show that while there may not have been particularly close working relations between the institutions, this was in part because the key states at critical moments chose to bypass institutional structures. Although there were some examples of effective intra-institutional cooperation - as in the EU's civil administration in Mostar where WEU provided some police assistance, or in the post-Dayton cooperation between NATO and the European Union in Bosnia - the overall picture was not encouraging.

1995-1997 - SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT

The January 1994 NATO Summit launched the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), which was a mechanism to permit forces and headquarters made available to NATO to be deployed in some circumstances under European control. This was intended to provide a mechanism for effective cooperation with WEU. For the first eighteen months to two years after the announcement little progress was made on developing the modalities of such cooperation - tensions between the United States and Europe over policy in former Yugoslavia and traditional French suspicions of NATO mechanisms being partially responsible for this. In some ways the experience of IFOR, which itself had many of the characteristics of a CTJF, was to help to transform the situation. The new attitude of France and Spain also helped to change the atmosphere. Both countries had been outside NATO's integrated command structure, but on December 5, 1995 France announced that it would follow the Spanish model and participate fully in the work of NATO's Military Committee and International Military Staff. This change in climate was demonstrated in the communiqué of the NATO Ministerial meeting held in Berlin on June 3, 1996, in which for the first time considerable progress on the way a CTJF would work in practice was shown, including the "creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU."

Since then, there has been a good deal of practical planning: on one hand, WEU identifying illustrative missions which it might wish to undertake; and on the other,

NATO military staff developing initial plans for such missions. WEU has also, since its Ostend Ministerial meeting of November 1996, begun to play an active part in NATO's defence planning process, having made a contribution to the 1997 NATO Ministerial Guidance that will set the future parameters for such planning. The discussions on a framework agreement between NATO and WEU to govern the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities referred to in WEU's Paris Declaration of May 13, 1997 shows that practical details are now being taken forward. There is now planning underway for the first exercise whereby the CTJF formula would be used with the WEU Council in political control. It can therefore be claimed that, due to the change in French attitudes towards NATO, working relationships between WEU and NATO have significantly improved over the last eighteen months. There are, however, still other issues outstanding in the development of the new NATO; and, it is of course possible that if these are not resolved before the NATO Madrid Summit on July 8-9, 1997, the progress in WEU/NATO relations may be set back.

There has been less progress in the working relationship between the EU and WEU. This has been partly due to the slow progress in the development of the CFSP and the difficulty in defining two things: first, what sort of foreign policy actor the European Union should be; and second, how far the foreign and security policy was to be either a replacement for the policies of the individual members or rather an addition to what they would continue to do by themselves. The lack of progress has also resulted from the continuing division between Britain and the other full members of WEU on the implementation of their Maastricht commitment "to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union". It is by no means clear whether the recent change of government in Britain has affected this. Initial signs are not particularly encouraging. Most members would like to see some progress at the IGC, which is expected to complete its work at Amsterdam on June 16/17, 1997. There is still a possibility that language will be found to ensure that a reference to the "Petersburg" tasks of WEU - humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking - may be incorporated in some way into the EU's missions. Interestingly enough, language along these lines was put forward in the Finnish-Swedish memorandum of April 25, 1996 and, therefore, should not present problems to the five EU members who are not members of WEU.

Until the language issue is resolved it will be difficult to take cooperation between the EU and WEU forward. Still, the WEU Paris Ministerial Council May 1997 Declaration does make reference to "meetings of a WEU/European Union *ad hoc* group and the holding of a seminar which had brought together representatives of States belonging to both Organisations..." as examples of the intensification of work between the two bodies. It also stated work has been done on the "modus operandi" for the

implementation of paragraph 2 of Article J, 4 of the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht. The response that WEU had made to the request made by the European Union on the Great Lakes region in application of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty is referred to, though the fact that WEU was unable to take positive action in this case, nor in Albania, is seen by some as disappointing. It is probably inevitable that the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the IGC will have had its impact on the development of closer working methods in advance of Amsterdam in June; after Amsterdam, though, and perhaps irrespective of the outcome of the IGC, the removal of uncertainty may make it possible for more progress to be made.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

At least as far as NATO/WEU relations are concerned there are now, subject to other issues being resolved before the Madrid Summit, positive signs of developing relations. A satisfactory Europeanisation of the command structure of NATO would clearly facilitate this in the future, as would practical experience of the use of CTJF by the WEU. The other helpful development would be the possible accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria to NATO, and then to the WEU. In all three countries this possibility is now being discussed much more openly than in the past; in addition, political changes in Sweden could significantly increase the likelihood that it occurs within the next five years. Such developments would clearly reduce the asymmetries among the memberships of the three bodies and facilitate closer working ties. The future of the CSFP depends on much more than institutional changes in the IGC, though. A consensus about the substance of the CFSP is probably a prerequisite for the next steps forward in clarifying the relationship between the European Union and WEU. The fact that the new British government will be involved from the start in this debate of substance may ease the way for subsequent consequential institutional changes.

While the working relationships among the three bodies have been far from adequate to the challenges facing them during the first half of the nineties, the future prospects would seem to be more encouraging. In the longer term we may even be able to move to a situation where the principle of the 14th Century English Franciscan, William of Occam, known as Occam's Razor, *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*⁵ could be applied, thus leading to only two institutions. The debate on the working relationship between them would at least ensure plenty of work for academic security analysts as well as for those in government well into the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, 1957. Westport, Conn., p.8.
2. Simon J. Nuttall, *European Political Co-operation*. 1992. Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.13.
3. The budget of WEU is only one fortieth of that of NATO. It was only after 1992 that it began to develop any operational capacity.
4. The use of the phrase "Atlantic Alliance" was a courtesy to France who still had certain sensitivities to references to NATO.
5. *trans*: Entities should not be unnecessarily multiplied.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

Unresolved Issues: Assignments for the North and South.
Ian Lesser

Unresolved Issues: Assignments for the North and South

*Ian Lesser

The topic of the presentation that is indicated in the program is unresolved issues on a North-South axis, and I think it is an extremely good way to describe this presentation because most of the issues that we would discuss in a North-South security context are, in fact, unresolved. Some of them may even be unresolvable.

To begin with, there's the question of dialogue. And I assume in this case you know we're simply asking the question: if we are going to be considering the North-South dimension (the Mediterranean dimension) of European security more seriously in the future, if we are going to be talking to countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean about security, the question is –what are we going to talk to them about? So, what I thought I would do is simply offer you four assertions, four hypotheses about the content of the security problem and the content of the dialogue.

The first (and maybe the most uncomfortable) observation I'd make is that when we talk to southern states in the Mediterranean about security, above all we're going to be talking about their internal security. And that's not likely to be a very comfortable dialogue. The reasons for this I think are fairly plain, and many of the speakers have referred to them already. For the most part, these are states that face unresolved political futures, succession crises, and an erosion of legitimacy, which is maybe the most important point – even in places where we've come to convince ourselves that the political situation is tactically in control, like Morocco. Still, there are questions of

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The views expressed in this presentation are the author's, and do not necessarily represent those of RAND or its research sponsors.

legitimacy; these societies are changing very rapidly. In fact, we like to talk sometimes about an ‘arc of crisis’ in this region. It might actually be more accurate to talk about an ‘arc of change’ in the southern Mediterranean region.

More broadly, and not just politically, we’re talking about states that simply don’t work in many cases. These states cannot provide the kinds of services, the sort of welfare, the sort of governance that their populations are coming increasingly to expect. They are, in a sense, dysfunctional states. Dysfunctional: which is, in part, a function of the demographic trends, the failure of economies to keep up, lack of reform, and so on. In the United States, Robert Kaplan has written about this very convincingly in terms of the “coming anarchy”. And while he talks about sub-Saharan Africa, a lot of what he says is also relevant to North Africa: problems regarding demography, political instability, slow growth, environmental degradation. All these phenomena taken together equal societies that simply don’t work.

There was a point made yesterday about cities around the Mediterranean, which I think is actually an extremely important point. And the point is important not just in conflict resolution terms, but because of the following: all of these problems of dysfunctional societies have their essence, are found in the most concentrated way, in the Mediterranean cities. If we look around in the future, I think you need look no further than cities along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean to find out where the political fate of these societies is going to be determined.

I would say further (even as we are talking about internal security), perhaps an even more uncomfortable dialogue will be about personal security. I believe we can look around the Mediterranean and see that a lot of societies are changing in ways that are being driven by personal security. And this change reflects, in a way, the privatization of security. If we ask why Netanyahu was elected in Israel, I think it wasn’t a referendum on the peace process; rather it was a referendum on personal security in the face of terrorism. Looking at Algeria, I would say that as the violence there has changed over time, we now see something that has become very personal, very private, a situation which one might describe accurately as “rage”.

Another factor on the internal side is the information revolution, on which, I confess, I’m not an expert. Nevertheless, it seems to me that when you talk to southern Mediterraneans, much of what they are talking to you about in security terms is actually ‘cultural’. The talk is about ‘security of identity’, as some people are calling it. And this note is absolutely fostered by the availability of European television. Islamists in Algeria don’t talk about the *disparabolique* – they talk about *disdiabolique*. They have something in mind when they say this.

The second assertion I would offer is that it has become very fashionable to talk about Islamic fundamentalism as a driver of security futures in the region. I don’t want to dismiss Islamic fundamentalism as a political force; however, it seems to me that we

shouldn't forget about nationalism as not only a continuing force for change, but, in fact, a force that is redoubling in strength in many areas. If we look around the region, and simply observe where it is that there are more traditional threats to borders, where nationalism is fueling threats to borders, it's quite a catalogue: in the Western Sahara; and between countries like Algeria and Morocco; Tunisia and Libya; Egypt and Sudan; Israel and Syria; Syria and Turkey; and Turkey and Greece. That's not a full list: It's just an illustrative list. So, as we're thinking about some of these more esoteric threats to stability, we shouldn't forget that there are still some very traditional, conventional threats to borders. And, I think, these threats are in the future going to require confidence building measures of a very traditional sort to deal with the defense and security of borders.

The third observation, or the third assertion, I would make is very much forward-looking: still, you can already see, I think, evidence of what I'm referring to: countries, especially in the south, are going to be looking for new geometries, new dimensions to their security relationships. These are for the most part insecure societies, with reason - both internally and in terms of their regions. As such, they are, I believe in part going to be looking to us for these dimensions, for complements to their existing security relationships.

People have talked about Mediterranean security architectures, and Middle Eastern architectures; all of these things are dependent on progress in the Middle East Peace Process. It's fair to ask then, from an Israeli perspective for example, whether at the end of the day their security interests are more bound up with their regional neighbors or with the Atlantic security community. And I think for many countries, not just Israel, the answer may well be that they want some other dimension to their security. Whether the dimension comes from relations with the European Union, or with NATO, the southern states are looking for something else. In part, NATO has already begun work on this by trying to explore this dimension in its partnership with non-member Mediterranean states (there are six now). The dialogue initiative has its problems, though, and these are mainly due to the fact that there there's a great deal of wariness in southern societies - not just in the public, but also among elites - about what NATO is about and whether any kind of a deeper relationship is a good thing.

The fourth and the last assertion I would offer you (and maybe it's the most important) is that in my view it will no longer be possible in the future to talk about European security on the one hand and Middle Eastern security on the other, or for that matter even to talk separately about European-Middle Eastern-Eurasian security. All of these regions are going to be much more interdependent. We won't be able to draw neat intellectual and policy lines anymore. And that represents quite a challenge to which I see three dimensions.

One, very briefly: Politically, clearly, things that happen on the southern shore of the Mediterranean affect perceptions in the public, in the elites in Europe, not just in southern Europe. You can see this on immigration issues, you can see the fear over

Algeria, and over what's happening in Turkey and the way in which it changes views of the Muslim world on Europe's periphery. Similarly in the South, it is impossible to go anywhere in North Africa without hearing about Bosnia and the early failure of the West in responding to that crisis.

The second dimension involves energy and geo-political issues, beginning with the Caspian Sea Basin and the pipelines, and the redoubling of links for gas and oil across the Mediterranean and in the East. This area has a major energy future. And as the energy future to a certain extent is going to be determined in the Caspian over the next decades, one question is how will all of that oil and gas come to western markets? Will it come through Turkey? Will it come through Russia? Will it come through the Black Sea? The decisions being made are going to affect geo-politics right across the region. And it won't just be a question of European or Middle Eastern or Eurasian affairs: the questions and decisions will be about all three.

And finally, and maybe most dramatically in security terms, it is quite likely that in ten years time every European capital—certainly every southern European capital—could be in range of ballistic missiles based on Europe's periphery. I don't say there will be an attempt to use them, as I think most of the incentives for proliferation are really South-South, not South-North; nonetheless, we will feel the affects of that reality. When the United States talks to its European partners about cooperation in Middle Eastern crises, this dialogue will be very very different if Europe is not a place of sanctuary anymore.

So, finally, briefly let me from an American perspective just say that when we talk about the Mediterranean and the southern dimensions of European security, we may sometimes get the sense from American policy that the U.S. is very much more engaged in what's happening in the East. And that's obviously true at the moment; however, I think if we take a longer view, you'll find that this region is going to be a much more important place of engagement for the United States and Europe, even defined in terms of European security. People sometimes forget (and I keep reminding them) that the United States has been in the Mediterranean for 200 years, which is far longer than we've been involved in security terms on the European continent. I think all of the indicators suggest that this involvement is going to continue and deepen.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**La seguridad europea: Diálogos para
el siglo XXI.**

El proceso político de la PESC.
Eugeni Bregolat

El proceso político de la PESC

*Eugeni Bregolat

Los precedentes de la identidad europea de seguridad y defensa hay que buscarlos en los años inmediatos al fin de la Segunda Guerra mundial. El 4 de marzo de 1947 Francia y el Reino Unido firmaron el Tratado de Dunkerque, una alianza contra Alemania definida como enemigo. Su fin era evitar que Alemania pudiera volver a convertirse en una amenaza a la seguridad de los firmantes, tal como hiciera después de la Primera Guerra Mundial.

La satelización por parte de la URSS de los países que ocupó en Europa Central y Oriental produjo un rápido cambio en la percepción del enemigo: Alemania dejó de serlo para pasar a serlo la URSS. Esta nueva percepción se concretó en el Tratado de Bruselas del 17 de marzo de 1948, por el que Francia, el Reino Unido y los países del Benelux crearon la Organización de Defensa de la Unión Occidental. El fin era la legítima defensa colectiva. Ni Estados Unidos ni Alemania formaban parte de esta alianza.

El 4 de abril de 1949 se firmó el Tratado de Washington, que creó la Alianza Atlántica (OTAN). Estados Unidos y Canadá formaban parte de ella, junto a los anteriores, más Dinamarca, Portugal, Noruega e Islandia.

Estados Unidos quería reafirmar a Alemania para hacer frente a la amenaza soviética pero Francia se oponía. Surgió así el proyecto de Comunidad Europea de Defensa, cuyo Tratado Constitutivo se firmó el 27 de mayo de 1952 por parte de Francia, el Reino Unido, Benelux, Alemania e Italia. Preveía la creación de un Ejército Europeo. La Asamblea Nacional francesa lo rechazó.

El Tratado de París del 23 de octubre de 1954 reformó el citado Tratado de Bruselas del 17 de marzo creando la Unión Europea Occidental. Firmaron el tratado Francia, el Reino Unido, Benelux, Alemania e Italia. Se preveía la cooperación estrecha con la OTAN, para evitar la duplicación de esfuerzos. De hecho su contenido militar quedó disuelto en la OTAN.

EL PROCESO DE INTEGRACIÓN EUROPEA

En paralelo a estos precedentes militares se inició el proceso de integración económica europea. El 25 de marzo de 1957 (acaban de cumplirse 40 años) se firmaron los Tratados de Roma que creaban la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) y la Comisión Europea para la Energía Atómica (EURATOM). Les había precedido, el 19 de abril de 1951, el tratado de París, que creaba la Comunidad Económica del Carbón y el Acero (CECA).

La filosofía de los padres fundadores de las comunidades europeas es bien conocida: ante todo, evitar otra guerra europea entre Alemania y sus vecinos. Por otra parte, los países de Europa Occidental se veían obligados a aunar esfuerzos para evitar verse relegados al papel de mero sujeto pasivo de la historia.

La unidad política era el objetivo final; la integración económica sólo un paso previo. En la década de los cincuenta Walter Hallstein, uno de los presidentes de la Comisión Europea, veía la marcha hacia la unidad europea en tres etapas: unión aduanera, unión económica y unión política.

Este es el enfoque federalista, compartido por Alemania, Francia el Benelux y España, pero rechazado por otros países, como el Reino Unido o los países escandinavos, que prefieren un enfoque intergubernamental.

EL TRATADO DE MAASTRICHT

Dentro de la CEE, los primeros pasos hacia la coordinación en materia de política exterior se dieron a partir del Informe Davignon, de 1970. El Acta Única, de 1986, formalizó el sistema de consultas y coordinación: nació así la Cooperación de Política Exterior. Tenía un carácter estrictamente intergubernamental, voluntario y no obligatorio, con predominio de lo declarativo sobre la acción, con tratamiento insuficiente de la seguridad y ausencia total de la defensa.

Para hacer frente a estas limitaciones y para que la Unión Europea (UE) pudiera actuar con una sola voz en el ámbito internacional, el Tratado de la UE, o Tratado de Maastricht, del 7 de febrero de 1992, creó la Política Europea de Seguridad Común (PESC), como uno de los tres pilares básicos de la UE. El artículo B cita entre los objetivos de la UE: “afirmar la identidad de la escena internacional, estableciendo una política exterior y de seguridad común, que incluya en el futuro, la definición de una política de defensa común, que podrá conducir, en su momento, a una defensa común” Es decir, el Tratado de Maastricht incorpora la seguridad y, aunque de forma críptica, la dimensión de defensa.

El artículo B está desarrollado en el Título V (Artículo J.4) y prevé:

-La UE pide a la Unión Europea Occidental (UEO) que forme parte integrante del desarrollo de la UE, que elabore y ponga en práctica las decisiones y acciones de la UE en el ámbito defensivo.

-En materia de defensa todas las decisiones se toman por unanimidad (se excluye la mayoría cualificada).

-Se respetarán las obligaciones contenidas en el Tratado del Atlántico Norte.

Este artículo no es óbice para la cooperación entre dos o más Estados en el marco de la UEO o de la OTAN.

En este punto el Tratado de Maastricht supone un compromiso entre la concepción europeísta (federalista) y la atlantista (intergubernamental): se separan los conceptos de seguridad y defensa. La PESC abarcará las cuestiones de seguridad. El ámbito de defensa (o sea, el recurso a medios militares) corresponde a la UEO. El ámbito defensivo queda excluido de las acciones comunes, instrumento básico de la PESC.

La UEO tiene una naturaleza dual: componente defensivo de la UE y refuerzo del pilar europeo de la OTAN. El Tratado de Maastricht incluye dos declaraciones anejas que desarrollan esta doble perspectiva:

a) Relaciones UEO-UE: el objetivo es convertir por etapas a la UEO en componente defensivo de la UE. Se establece una sincronización y cooperación estrecha entre ambas. Los miembros de la UE que no lo sean de la UEO son invitados a adherirse o a convertirse en observadores de la UEO. Grecia se adhirió. Dinamarca, Finlandia, Suecia, Irlanda y Austria pasaron a ser observadores.

b) Relaciones UEO-OTAN: el objetivo es desarrollar la UEO como refuerzo del pilar europeo de la OTAN. Ambas organizaciones estrecharán sus relaciones. Los miembros de la OTAN que no lo sean de la UEO son invitados a convertirse en miembros asociados de ésta, con derecho a participar plenamente en sus operaciones militares. Turquía, Noruega e Islandia se convirtieron en miembros asociados de la UEO.

El desarrollo del Tratado de Maastricht en el campo de la defensa supuso cambios significativos en la UEO: la sede de ésta se trasladó de Londres a Bruselas, lo que facilita su contacto con la OTAN y con la UE. Se creó una célula de planeamiento en la UEO. Se definieron las misiones militares de ésta (defensa del territorio, operaciones de carácter humanitario, de evacuación, de mantenimiento de la paz). Se creó el centro de satélites de la UEO en Torrejón. Se estudia la creación de una Agencia Europea de Armamentos. El proceso sigue abierto: se trabaja en identificar medios y mandos OTAN para misiones UEO, creación de mecanismos de consulta adecuados entre ambas, etc.

Sin embargo, los países más europeístas no han podido convencer a los demás para que el país que ostente la Presidencia de la UE asuma la de la UEO (sólo España, por casualidad, tuvo las dos en la segunda mitad de 1995).

Pese a estos progresos, la guerra de Bosnia supuso el choque del Tratado de Maastricht con la dura realidad, demostrando que al carecer de un elemento militar propio la política exterior de la UE es poco creíble. Solo cuando EEUU se comprometió militarmente, permitió acciones aéreas de la OTAN, la guerra entró en vías de solución. Aunque el Tratado de Maastricht lo hubiera permitido, la UEO no fue utilizada para coordinar la intervención de varios de sus países miembros en la crisis yugoslava, en el marco de la ONU, como tampoco lo está siendo en la actual operación IFOR de la OTAN.

El protagonismo de la UEO en el conflicto de Bosnia se ha limitado a aspectos secundarios: control del embargo en el Adriático (operación combinada OTAN-UEO), control de sanciones en el Danubio, policía de Mostar (asesoramiento de la policía local y participación en patrullas mixtas).

LA CONFERENCIA INTERGUBERNAMENTAL (CIG)

En vista de la escasa eficacia y credibilidad de la PESC, la CIG en curso se propone reformarla. El objetivo básico de la CIG es la reordenación interna de la UE para hacer posible su ampliación. Para el logro de este objetivo se pretende: acercar la UE a los ciudadanos; reformar sus instituciones (el replanteamiento de la mayoría cualificada en primer lugar); refuerzo del papel exterior de la UE, o la reforma de la PESC. Esta última se desglosa en tres puntos:

- Más representación y visibilidad (creación de un *mister PESC*).
- Más preparación, creando una unidad de análisis que suponga un *input* propio, distinto de la mera yuxtaposición de puntos de vista nacionales (embrión de un Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores europeo).
- Refuerzo del elemento defensa, sin el que la PESC carece de credibilidad.

MISIONES DE PETERSBERG

Es en el Consejo Atlántico de Berlín (3 de junio de 1996) cuando se da un paso trascendental hacia la autonomía europea de seguridad y defensa con la creación de las misiones Petersberg. Supone un desarrollo importante de las relaciones entre la UEO y la OTAN, tema que centra las discusiones sobre la identidad Europea de Seguridad y Defensa en el seno de la Conferencia Intergubernamental (CIG).

La defensa colectiva europea frente a un ataque exterior sigue siendo responsabilidad de la OTAN (Artículo 5 del Tratado de Washington y Artículo 5 del Tratado de Bruselas). Pero las nuevas misiones de gestión de crisis (excluidas del Artículo 5 de los citados tratados), o misiones Petersberg, podrán ser realizadas bajo responsabilidad de la UEO, pero con medios colectivos de la OTAN, cuando se den determinadas circunstancias. Se acuña el concepto *fuerzas separables de la OTAN, pero no separadas*. El tipo de misiones que podrán realizarse, citadas más arriba, son: operaciones humanitarias, de evacuación, mantenimiento de la paz o imposición de la paz.

PROYECTO DE INTEGRACIÓN DE LA UEO EN LA UE

En la cumbre franco-alemana de Nuremberg se lanzó, el 9 de diciembre de 1996, un proyecto más ambicioso. Kohl y Chirac dirigieron una carta al presidente del Consejo Europeo pidiendo la inserción progresiva de la UEO en la UE. La CIG debiera fijar un plan por etapas y con fechas concretas.

España, Italia, Bélgica y Luxemburgo apoyan el plan franco-alemán. El Reino Unido, Austria, Suecia, Dinamarca y Finlandia se oponen. El nuevo ministro de Asuntos Exteriores británico, Robin Cook, ha reiterado la oposición de su país. Así, este proyecto no prosperará en la CIG.

La reforma de la PESC en lo relativo a seguridad y defensa probablemente se limitará en la CIG a dar carta de naturaleza a las misiones Petersberg y al refuerzo del texto sobre seguridad y defensa del Tratado de Maastricht. Si allí se dice que “la UE pide a la UEO que forme parte integrante del desarrollo de la UE, que elabore y ponga en práctica las decisiones y acciones de la UE en el ámbito defensivo”, un borrador en el que ahora se trabaja dice “el objetivo es la gradual integración de la UEO en la UE”. Este texto no ha sido aprobado aún y no es seguro que lo sea. En todo caso, puede excluirse que el plan por etapas y por fechas propuesto por Francia y Alemania vaya a ser aceptado.

ALBANIA

En los últimos meses la crisis de Albania ha confirmado la escasa capacidad de la UE y de la UEO para hacer sentir su peso en la escena internacional. Algunos países de la UE pensaban que esta era una ocasión perfecta para utilizar a la UEO, en los tér-

minos del Tratado de Maastricht. La oposición del Reino Unido y Alemania lo hizo imposible. La fuerza multinacional que actúa en Albania está formada únicamente por países voluntarios (algunos pertenecen a la UE y otros no). Esto es lo único que cabe hoy y es el modelo para el próximo futuro.

Cutilheiro, secretario general de la UEO, opina que “la coalición de voluntarios no debe convertirse en norma para intervenciones militares de este tipo de la UE. Ello perjudica la credibilidad de la UEO”.

El presidente de la Asamblea Parlamentaria de la UEO, el español Lluís Maria de Puig, denunció la ausencia de cohesión de la UE.

CONCLUSIONES

La Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común cuenta con instrumentos económicos (apertura del mercado comunitario, ayuda), pero no con un instrumento militar. Por esto sigue siendo básicamente declarativa y tiene una credibilidad limitada. Dotarse de un elemento de defensa es el ser o no ser para la PESC.

Hoy por hoy no se dan las condiciones para que exista una política exterior ni una política de defensa comunes en la UE. Los intereses, enfoques, y tradiciones de los países miembros divergen demasiado. Los factores diferenciales pesan más que los intereses comunes. La soberanía nacional, lo intergubernamental, el veto, prevalecen. Falta voluntad política para ir más allá.

Sin embargo, la dinámica de integración económica está en marcha. Hay una clara voluntad de avanzar hacia la moneda única. Esto llevará a la integración de las políticas económicas. Cuando exista una política económica común, o una política de seguridad interior común, el margen para políticas exteriores y de defensa independientes se irá reduciendo. A largo plazo esta lógica conduce a la aparición de una política exterior y de defensa unificada.

Los países miembros de la UE saben que sólo su plena integración evitará que queden convertidos en meros sujetos pasivos de la Historia. El proceso de integración no podrá quedarse sólo en lo económico; la lógica interna de la integración económica los llevará a la integración política y militar. Este es el hecho central.

Factores muy diversos influirán en el ritmo del avance hacia la identidad europea de defensa. Entre ellos, la evolución de la Alianza Atlántica, la percepción de las amenazas de carácter militar para Europa y la influencia que, por acción o por omisión, ejerza EEUU. Hoy existe un compromiso norteamericano sólido con la defensa de Europa y nadie en Europa quiere que el desarrollo de la identidad europea de defensa

tenga sentido antiamericano. Hay consenso en que la presencia norteamericana en Europa sigue siendo indispensable. Como las misiones Petersberg ponen de relieve, la identidad europea de defensa se desarrolla en el seno de la OTAN.

Siguen subsistiendo dentro de la UE los dos enfoques mencionados: el federalista, partidario del rápido desarrollo de la identidad europea de defensa, y el intergubernamental, contrario a ella. Esta falta de entendimiento pudiera llevar a que los países dispuestos a avanzar lo hagan solos. Se espera que la CIG incluya fórmulas de cooperación reforzada, flexibilidad o geometría variable que lo hagan posible (de hecho el Artículo J4.5 del Tratado de Maastricht ya lo prevé, al decir que el Tratado no es óbice a la cooperación entre dos o más Estados en el marco de la UEO o de la OTAN).

Si la UE no llegara a dotarse de mecanismos de flexibilidad en la CIG para temas militares no cabe excluir la posibilidad de que los países dispuestos a avanzar lo hagan al margen de la UE, siguiendo el modelo de la Brigada Franco-alemana, el Eurocuerpo, o Eurofor y Euomarfor.

No me atrevería a decir cuanto tiempo va a transcurrir hasta que aparezca un Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores Europeo o un Ministerio de Defensa Europeo. Seguramente varias décadas. Hay que dar tiempo al tiempo. Pero estoy convencido de que esta es la dirección de la Historia y nadie podrá pararla.

REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS INTERNACIONALS 38-39.

La seguridad europea: Diálogos para el siglo XXI.

Creando una identidad europea de defensa. La perspectiva de la
Unión Europea Occidental.

Lluís Maria de Puig

Creando una identidad europea de defensa. La perspectiva de la Unión Europea Occidental

*Lluís Maria de Puig

Para empezar, voy a pedir para siempre jamás a los organizadores del CIDOB que siempre que tenga que intervenir en unas jornadas me pongan al señor Bregolat antes, para que haga una introducción tan perfecta como la que acaba de hacer, cosa que a mí me ahorra entrar en los detalles históricos y en la exposición de cuál es la situación. Ello me va a permitir poder abordar temas más políticos y más directos en relación con el debate actual y las soluciones de futuro. O sea que, muchísimas gracias, señor Bregolat.

Visto el proceso histórico, cabe preguntarse qué hacemos, qué vamos a hacer, qué va a pasar con la UEO. Existía hasta hace poco un proyecto de defensa europea centrado más o menos en la UEO. Recordemos que, a finales de los ochenta, por una serie de razones reaparece la UEO, la *Bella durmiente*, como la llamaban, porque se había pasado 30 años aletargada o casi. Reaparece, incluso interviene en algunas acciones militares: hay que recordar la guerra Irán-Irak, por ejemplo. Reaparece y se produce cierto interés y se empieza a hablar de la posibilidad de recuperar la vieja idea de la Comunidad Europea de Defensa en torno a la UEO. Y llega 1989. Lo que ha pasado a partir de este momento es que en nuestro mundo se ha producido una mutación histórica de un calibre tan enorme que ha cambiado bastante lo que era una cierta lógica progresiva de la evolución. Lo que ha pasado es la caída del Muro, es el fin de la Guerra Fría y es el replanteamiento total de la geoestrategia y de las doctrinas, de los sistemas y de las instituciones de defensa. Esto es lo que ha pasado. Y el escenario en el que nos

encontramos hoy, en materia de defensa de Europa, difícil de prever hace muy pocos años, es pues el escenario de la preeminencia de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN). Yo decía hace unos momentos a un amigo: “Probablemente la OTAN se encuentra en el cénit de su historia”. La OTAN ha reaparecido, no sólo con una potencia enorme sino con un *glamour* que nadie hubiera predicho. Ahí tenemos a la OTAN, que va a hacer su reforma y que ha conseguido que todos los países de Europa Central estén llamando a su puerta con un entusiasmo indescriptible. Va a haber una reforma interna, va a haber una ampliación y encima un acuerdo con Rusia. Bueno, ya casi no se puede pedir más. Va a haber en Madrid una cumbre extraordinaria de la OTAN, en este momento en que nadie en Europa rechaza su proceso; nadie contesta la voluntad política de que la OTAN siga siendo la gran institución que da la garantía máxima de seguridad en Europa; eso no tiene discusión hoy. Ese proceso es aceptado por nuestros Gobiernos, por los que están dentro, por los que están fuera, por los que quieren estar y, de una manera muy mayoritaria, por las opiniones públicas sin contestación. Ante esta realidad, el tema del proceso europeo no parece tan urgente a ojos de muchos, quizás con todos los argumentos históricos a favor, pero no se podría estar aquí hablando de organizar una defensa europea o de institucionalizar una Identidad de Defensa Europea sin arreglar previamente el gran tema OTAN que es, por una parte, el vínculo atlántico y, por otra parte, qué se hace con los países de Europa Central y Oriental y, sobre todo, qué se hace con Rusia. Y a mí me parece extraordinario el acuerdo que ha habido entre OTAN y Rusia, porque es una fórmula de introducir, de meter a Rusia en el sistema global de la seguridad europea. Y éste es un hecho histórico indiscutible y de gran importancia.

Por lo tanto, quizá tocaba en primer lugar, entre las prioridades, arreglar el gran ámbito geoestratégico euroatlántico, el problema mayor o las inquietudes mayores o, si quieren, las dificultades mayores. De ahí que el proceso europeo haya quedado, por una parte, en segundo plano y luego, quizá también inducido por el otro proceso, lo que ha pasado es que han aparecido las dificultades reales de construcción de esta Identidad de Defensa Europea.

La verdad es que, a finales de la década de los ochenta, se retomó el discurso europeísta y clásico: “Es necesario que los europeos tengan más responsabilidad en materia de defensa. No es posible que nuestra seguridad descansa casi totalmente en las garantías que nos dan los americanos, es imprescindible que Europa asuma sus responsabilidades, que quiere decir, tomar decisiones políticas de gran importancia y, sobre todo, tomar decisiones económicas de gran importancia”. Ese discurso parecía tener buena acogida y ser en principio mayoritario. A su lado había otro discurso político muy vinculado a lo que acabo de señalar, que era el de decir: “Europa, si quiere ser algo en el mundo, no puede tener una dependencia semejante en materia de seguridad y defensa”. Hasta el punto que se dijo, y nos lo ha recordado el embajador Bregolat, que la Unión Europea no sería nunca

creíble, no tendría nunca la fuerza, la potencia necesaria, si no tiene además de la Unión Monetaria y de todos los procesos de unión internos, una política exterior y una política, también, de defensa y seguridad. Bueno, eran dos grandes argumentos, pero frente a estos argumentos, que yo apoyo sin ninguna duda, que nuestros Gobiernos en España han apoyado, han aparecido las dificultades. ¿Cuáles son estas dificultades? La primera es que hay una división todavía muy grande entre los europeos. Eso se ha visto en casos de debate general y en casos de debates concretos. Hoy entre los países de la Unión hay como mínimo dos bloques. El bloque de los que están dispuestos a organizar la Identidad de Defensa Europea, de darle en este momento fuerza y potencia a la UEO, pero en un proceso de integración en el futuro de la UEO a la Unión Europea. Y luego hay al menos cinco países que no están por la labor; uno es el Reino Unido, que tiene una doctrina política muy clara a este respecto; otros son los países neutrales que en este momento están en un proceso de reflexión sobre su propia situación de neutralidad y sobre su futuro. En este momento ustedes van a Suecia, a Finlandia o a Austria y lo que les dirán es: “nosotros no estamos para entrar en alianzas militares ni para apoyar alianzas militares, nuestra posición en este momento es otra”.

Pues bien, ésta es la realidad institucional y política dentro de la Unión Europea. Construir una organización de defensa europea muy sólida en esta situación es muy difícil; pero es que, además, existe otra realidad; y es que, aunque se haga un discurso muy europeísta en el campo de los otros 10, y hablo de Alemania, España, Francia e Italia, por ejemplo, aunque haya un discurso que parece muy unitario, la verdad es que no lo es. Hemos asistido en estos últimos tiempos a algún hecho que a mí me parece escandaloso. Vimos cómo había cierto debate político, cierta crispación en Francia, cuando se supo que el canciller Kohl y el presidente Chirac habían firmado lo que llamaron “El nuevo concepto estratégico”. A mí me parece que este nuevo concepto estratégico que firmaron el presidente Chirac y Kohl no era tan distinto de otros acuerdos en esa materia que habían firmado Francia y Alemania en las etapas por ejemplo de Mitterrand y también Kohl. Pero dicho esto, lo que a mí me sorprende es que el papel que firmaron Chirac y Kohl decía que tenían una misma perspectiva europea, que tenían una misma concepción de la seguridad europea y llegaban a decir que tenían una misma percepción de los riesgos. Es decir, una comunión total en materia de defensa, de concepción de la seguridad europea, y una voluntad de hacer las cosas conjuntamente cuando se tratara de Europa. Pues bien, en el primer momento en que se plantea la posibilidad de una acción típicamente europea, como es el caso de la crisis de Albania, no es ya que no hubiera manera de tomar una decisión; es que Francia estaba en un lado de la mesa y Alemania en el otro lado de la mesa. Fíjense ustedes, una crisis tan poco problemática desde el punto de vista geoestratégico y casi, diría yo, la crisis tipo, perfecta, para la actuación de una institución como la UEO. Pues bien, si no hay acuerdo entre alemanes y franceses para decir que haya una actuación UEO en Albania, ¿cómo vamos a

seguir hablando de que tenemos la misma concepción y de que tenemos la misma voluntad de construir una Identidad de Defensa Europea? A mí me parece que hay que señalar esta división por realismo político y para no engañar a la gente. Las posiciones están muy divididas y no es verdad que sólo la división sea entre los británicos y los alemanes y franceses. A la hora de la verdad la división también está entre los que parecen los motores del europeísmo, es decir, todavía funciona, pero que muchísimo, la perspectiva nacional, que tiene una fuerza enorme que impide avanzar más en este tema; y luego, no sólo impide ponerse de acuerdo sino, lo que a mí me parece más grave, y es que en el caso de Albania se decide que no, que la UEO no puede intervenir. Tampoco en la Unión Europea hay acuerdo. Estuve anteayer, lo puedo explicar porque había mucha gente delante cuando hablé con el ministro Kinkel, en Alemania, y él sabía, como ha dicho el embajador Bregolat, que yo me había manifestado públicamente en un artículo sobre la actitud de los Gobiernos en torno a Albania; quiso convencerme el ministro de exteriores alemán de los argumentos por los cuales se podía sostener que no había que intervenir en Albania y, al final, respetando mucho estos argumentos, le dije: “Mire usted, puede usted argumentar lo que quiera, pero en primer lugar las tropas están allí; ha habido que mandar tropas allí y el problema es que hay tropas europeas allí pero Europa no está allí”. Este es el problema: al final se tomó la decisión de que fueran tropas de tal país, de tal otro, de tal otro. Nosotros estamos allí, pero Europa como tal, la UEO como tal, no está allí. Y mi crítica pública no era pensando en que sólo la UEO podía ayudar a Albania; permítanme que les diga que en mi concepción la crisis de Albania podía ayudar mucho a la imagen de Europa. Eso es lo que pensaba en aquel momento y es lo que sigo pensando. Una actuación de la UEO en Albania habría dado la imagen de una cohesión y de una capacidad de intervención en un momento dado, la misma intervención que están haciendo estas tropas, no pido otra cosa, lo mismo que están haciendo las tropas de la operación Alba, pero con bandera europea, demostrando que en Europa hay voluntad política de construir algo serio en materia de Identidad de Defensa. Pues hubo una división evidente, como hay otra división en el proceso de la Conferencia Intergubernamental (CIG). Estoy totalmente de acuerdo con lo que ha dicho el embajador Bregolat, pero yo quiero señalar que, a mi juicio, se ha cometido un error político, quizás incluso un grave error político. Seis Gobiernos presentan una propuesta, aunque el proyecto original franco-alemán –y quizás en su primera redacción alemán, no sé si me equivoco–, fue sostenido y apoyado por una serie de países. Era la propuesta a la CIG de un proceso de integración hasta la fusión de la Unión Europea Occidental en la Unión Europea. Este documento establece tres fases, en la última la fusión total. Antes de llegar a ella, la UEO mantendría su independencia hasta ese momento final en que desaparecería porque se trasladaría totalmente el Tratado de Bruselas al Tratado de la Unión. Pues bien, esto no tiene ninguna posibilidad de avanzar; las posibilidades de que este documento sea aprobado son nulas, completamente

nulas, y uno se pregunta entonces por qué se ha presentado. Yo voy a afirmar aquí que lo que en ese documento se llama la primera etapa habría sido posible consensuarlo, si no se obligara a los países que no están de acuerdo en la fusión final, si no se les obligara a decir que ésta es la primera etapa de una integración final; es decir, si se negocia lo que se plantea en esta primera etapa como coordinación y como acercamiento entre la UEO y la Unión Europea. De hecho el documento neerlandés, que ahora conocemos, que es la propuesta que quizás va a salir, va en esta dirección. ¿Por qué, si conocemos las dificultades, por qué algunos países europeos pretenden hacer tragar a los demás, y permítanme este lenguaje llano, hacer tragar a los países que no pueden estar de acuerdo en este momento con la integración total, hacerles aprobar un documento que saben que no pueden aceptar? Eso, ¿a qué objetivo político responde? Yo soy integracionista y cuando digo que soy integracionista digo que estoy a favor de que a largo plazo la UEO se integre en la Unión Europea, y hablo a nivel personal; no estoy en este momento traduciendo una posición unánime de la Asamblea de la UEO, donde hay las discrepancias que todos conocemos. Yo no estoy representando aquí al conjunto, pero tengo que decir que en la UEO hay una mayoría más bien integracionista, aunque hay otros sectores que no estarían de acuerdo. Yo soy integracionista, creo que hay que ir en esa dirección, pero precisamente porque lo soy, creo que en vez de presentar un tipo de documento como el que han presentado nuestros Gobiernos, lo que había que hacer era intentar pactar ese primer escalón que para nosotros es el primer escalón de una fusión; pero para otros, por ejemplo los británicos, tal como decía su famoso documento sobre la defensa europea, podían aceptarlo si no representa ese paso hacia la fusión. Yo creo que, simplemente, es un error, pero a mí no me basta con decir: 'esto es un error'. Yo lo que pienso o lo que me pregunto es por qué se ha presentado esto. Por otra parte, fíjense ustedes, lo que significa, incluso desde el punto de vista de la pedagogía europea, se pide a los políticos que hagamos pedagogía; vaya clase de pedagogía es ésta, en la que se plantea un horizonte absolutamente utópico y luego habrá que salir en Amsterdam a decir que de lo que se quería, pues se ha obtenido el 10%, con lo que conlleva eso de mensaje de frustración europea, una vez más. En vez de atenerse a lo positivo, y decir: "Era modesto lo que nos habíamos propuesto, pero hasta ahí hemos avanzado", lo que se hizo fue lo contrario: gestos que redundan en cierto sentimiento de frustración, de incapacidad, absolutamente innecesarios desde el punto de vista táctico y desde el punto de vista del discurso europeísta.

En cualquier caso, lo que acabo de exponer son las dificultades para ver qué hacemos con la UEO, si la vamos integrando, si le damos contenido; pero realmente, en el fondo, la pregunta es: ¿queremos o no queremos que haya una cosa europea en seguridad y defensa? ¿Vamos a tomar la decisión de que exista una Identidad Europea de Defensa o no, que exista un sistema propio autónomo de los europeos o no? No en contra de la OTAN, no en competencia con la OTAN, sino incluso absolutamente

articulado con la OTAN ¿O vamos a abandonarnos, como en el pasado, a las garantías que nos da la OTAN y a renunciar a que Europa tenga su propio instrumento? Yo creo que ésta es la pregunta clave y en este momento tengo mis temores. El temor se puede resumir en qué va a pasar con el artículo V del Tratado de Bruselas. Me explico. En el fondo, la gran decisión se tomará el día en que, por la vía de la fusión, de la integración, o por la vía de los nuevos acuerdos y del nuevo proceso europeo, se decida si el sistema propio de defensa de los europeos, tal como está establecido hoy en el Tratado de Bruselas, es decir en la UEO, va a tener o no una cláusula de asistencia mutua, es decir, de seguridad colectiva. Eso es lo que hoy da fuerza a la UEO, prácticamente lo único que le da fuerza a la UEO. Pero también en el Tratado de Washington existe un artículo 5, precisamente de seguridad colectiva. ¿Van a coexistir estos dos artículos, estas dos cláusulas, las que le dan fuerza a unos y a otros, o van a desaparecer de la futura institución europea, sea la UEO, sea la UEO fusionada en la UE? ¿Va a desaparecer la cláusula de asistencia mutua, del compromiso profundo de una defensa? En estos momentos está apareciendo la idea, en algunos Gobiernos, de aceptar tranquilamente que la garantía de seguridad colectiva es la OTAN y ahí puede estar la UEO para las misiones Petersberg, para ciertas misioncillas. Ha dicho en Perelada el lunes pasado, y tengo que decir con gran sorpresa por mi parte, el secretario general de mi organización, de la UEO: “Para la defensa está la OTAN y luego para ciertos aspectos de seguridad, puede estar la UEO”. Si eso es verdad, sería una renuncia; sería, por parte de Europa, renunciar a tener una institución realmente de defensa. Alguien me dijo, después de haber oído al secretario general, que es por otra parte en lo personal un buen amigo: “Ser secretario general de esta organización y augurarle este futuro es como ser Papa y no creer en el Espíritu Santo”. Creo que esta persona llevaba razón realmente; si esto lo dice el secretario general de la UEO, que Dios nos coja confesados, ¿no? Pero es que él reflejaba, en el fondo, la actitud de algunos Gobiernos y de ciertas opiniones que estarían de acuerdo en aceptar este modelo. Y éste es un modelo posible; pero hay el otro, el otro todavía existe, el de la voluntad de que la Unión Europea tenga también su organización de defensa, su dimensión de defensa y seguridad. Y en este momento, en un proceso largo de unificación de la Unión Europea y la UEO, la Identidad de Defensa Europea es la UEO, y lo que hay que hacer es reforzar la UEO, darle capacidad operativa, darle capacidad decisoria y, desde luego, vincularla y coordinarla al máximo con la UE. Sobre todo darle capacidad para que cuando vengan conflictos (ojalá no venga ninguno, ¿verdad?), pero si vienen conflictos como el de Albania, seamos capaces de tomar decisiones que vinculen el discurso europeísta con la realidad.

REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS INTERNACIONALS 38-39.

La seguridad europea: Diálogos para el siglo XXI.

Hacia una Identidad de Defensa Europea compatible y dentro de la
OTAN.

Rafael Estrella

Hacia una Identidad de Defensa Europea compatible y dentro de la OTAN

*Rafael Estrella

En *Alicia a través del espejo*, uno de los personajes de Lewis Carroll afirma: “Cuando hablo, mis palabras significan exactamente lo que yo quiero que signifiquen”, a lo que contesta Alicia: “La cuestión es cómo puedes conseguir que las palabras signifiquen tantas cosas a la vez”.

Algo parecido ocurre con la noción de Identidad Europea de Seguridad y Defensa (IESD) –como, en el pasado, con la de “Pilar Europeo”. ¿A qué Europa nos referimos? ¿Quién es el sujeto de la seguridad y de la defensa? Cuando se hacen estas preguntas, se encuentran respuestas completamente diferentes. El anterior primer ministro británico, John Major, tenía una respuesta simple: “la defensa europea ya existe: es la OTAN”.

La IESD aparece así como un objetivo común no definido; el acuerdo sobre los términos –alcanzado en Maastricht– refleja en este caso el desacuerdo sobre su contenido político en un debate que se presenta en una doble dimensión: el debate europeo y el debate americano. Otros ponentes se han referido al debate europeo. Para mí, éste es hoy el núcleo central del problema, porque es entre los europeos donde se manifiestan las limitaciones y dificultades para desarrollar una política común de seguridad y defensa, complemento de la unión política, económica, comercial y, pronto, monetaria.

Las razones que, desde 1945, han esgrimido quienes se oponen a esta expresión de la identidad europea son diversas: la negativa a que exista una autoridad europea sobre cuestiones que, como la defensa, se consideran elementos esenciales de la sobe-

ranía nacional; el temor secular a la hegemonía alemana; el convencimiento de que Europa es incapaz de defenderse sola y la necesidad de los americanos frente a la amenaza soviética.

Del mismo modo, el debate y la controversia no son algo nuevo, han estado sobre la mesa de forma recurrente. Lo planteó De Gaulle en 1968 de forma radical. En 1984, el propio Henry Kissinger, en un artículo titulado “Reforming the Alliance”, publicado en la revista *Time* proponía un SACEUR europeo, un comandante supremo aliado en Europa (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), un adjunto norteamericano y un secretario general de la misma nacionalidad. En otros momentos, el debate se ha planteado desde la perspectiva de que Europa asumiera mayores responsabilidades –y costes– en su defensa, el llamado *burden sharing*.

Acabo de decir que el problema está en Europa. Pero ello no quiere decir que no exista en Estados Unidos. De hecho, ha habido y hay posiciones muy diversas, tantas como escuelas de pensamiento sobre el papel de EEUU en el mundo. La tesis dominante en la actual Administración es claramente favorable a definir las relaciones EEUU–Europa en nuevos términos, más acordes con los cambios producidos en Europa.

En 1989 acaba la Guerra Fría, pero con el muro de Berlín caen también algunos de los argumentos que se oponían a una identidad europea de seguridad y defensa. Por otra parte, como evidencia de la poca relevancia del componente europeo de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) durante la Guerra Fría, la crisis de identidad de la Alianza en los años que siguen a 1989 no tiene como elementos el papel de los europeos –Unión Europea (UE), Unión Europea Occidental (UEO); se plantea simplemente qué hacer con la OTAN, y se plantea de forma casi angustiada: “new NATO or no NATO”, “out of area or out of bussiness”. Ya lo había anunciado Yuri Arbatov: “les vamos a crear un problema; les vamos a dejar sin enemigo”.

Durante los últimos años, la OTAN se ha ido adaptando a la nueva realidad. En Londres, en 1990, se proclama que la URSS no es ya un adversario. En 1991, en Roma, la Alianza aprueba un nuevo concepto estratégico; se abandona la doctrina de la Guerra Fría y se diseña una nueva estructura de fuerzas, más reducidas, flexibles e interoperativas. La Cumbre de Bruselas, en enero de 1994, produjo, por el impulso de EEUU, la formulación más coherente y sólida de una perspectiva común sobre el futuro de la seguridad europea. La Declaración de Bruselas contiene una clara visión de la futura arquitectura de seguridad europea y una constatación de la necesidad de transformación de la Alianza. Declara el pleno apoyo al desarrollo de la Identidad Europea de Seguridad y Defensa, un apoyo que no es sólo político, sino que se materializa en el concepto de *Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)* o Fuerza Operativa Combinada Conjunta. La CJTF se configura como un elemento esencial para las nuevas misiones que la OTAN debe asumir, pero también para facilitar el uso de recursos y capacidades de la OTAN por parte de la UEO. La Cumbre decidió también la creación de la

Asociación para la Paz, que ha demostrado su enorme utilidad para desarrollar un clima de cooperación en materia de defensa en Europa y para armonizar y complementar las políticas de defensa de la OTAN y las de sus antiguos adversarios. La Cumbre realizó también una primera aproximación al papel presente y futuro de Rusia en la seguridad europea, situó la proliferación en el centro de las preocupaciones de la Alianza y apostó por la ampliación de la Organización.

Los acuerdos adoptados en Bruselas, junto con otras cuestiones (Tratado sobre las Fuerzas Armadas Convencionales en Europa (CFE), Conversaciones para la Reducción de Armas Estraégicas (START II), Rusia o la propia ampliación) son elementos de la estrategia de EEUU en Europa. En junio de 1995, en Madrid, Warren Christopher planteaba las bases para un nuevo diálogo transatlántico, lo que él llamó la “agenda transatlántica”, que se formalizaría meses después en Madrid y que contemplaba la política de seguridad –con la OTAN como eje–, pero también aspectos políticos y económicos. Sin decirlo expresamente, Christopher estaba proponiendo pasar del *transatlantic bargain* al *transatlantic partnership*. Con todo esto, la Administración Clinton estaba planteando lo que, para mí, constituye una formulación de *gran estrategia*, algo que el Congreso EEUU tal vez no ha sabido apreciar suficientemente.

Se dirá, con razón, que esa estrategia es americana, no europea, y que puede o no coincidir con los intereses de Europa. Ese es precisamente el problema, que no existe una definición de cuáles son los intereses europeos y, por tanto, no existe una estrategia europea. Lawrence Friedman expresaba muy bien esta paradoja al finalizar su libro *Evolución de la estrategia nuclear* con la frase “c’est magnifique mais ce n’est pas de la strategie”.

Estamos de nuevo ante el espejo de Lewis Carrol, ante una utilización interesada de las palabras y una deformación de los conceptos. Veamos un ejemplo, en los últimos meses se ha producido, en torno al mando de la OTAN en Nápoles, un debate en que se confundía deliberadamente una mayor visibilidad europea –un mando europeo– con la propia identidad. Evidentemente, un general europeo al mando de Nápoles daría una imagen menos americana y más europea de la OTAN, pero ni eso es la Identidad Europea de Defensa, ni alteraría en los más mínimo la controversia sobre el fondo de la cuestión.

En las propuestas a que he hecho referencia, Christopher planteaba la necesidad de desarrollar acciones políticas comunes, y ponía como ejemplo el apoyo a las históricas transformaciones en el Centro y Este de Europa. Algunos tal vez consideren que lo que se está haciendo en este ámbito puede considerarse como una estrategia común. Yo tengo serias dudas, porque existe una diferencia esencial. EEUU tiene una estrategia global que redefine constantemente (*Bottom-up Review*) y que sin, duda, está sometida a tensiones y vaivenes internos. Así, lo que Pat Buchanan expresaba brutalmente como “*put America first*” reflejaba una clara orientación aislacionista (en el polo opuesto de Wilson). La política que viene impulsando la Administración Clinton –y buena

parte del actual Congreso— trata de equilibrar unilateralismo y multilateralismo, una forma más civilizada de poner a América primero en una visión global. Europa, por su parte, intenta definir una estrategia; no hay una formulación de los intereses de seguridad mundial ni regional de la UE (seguridad militar, económica, medioambiental, etc.). Las acciones comunes que se han producido, han sido impulsadas por EEUU y, ocasionalmente, por un país europeo singularizado, es decir, trasladando sus propios intereses nacionales al plano colectivo. Esta es la situación real ante la que nos encontramos y, en este contexto, criticar el pobre papel de Europa en la crisis del Golfo o la incapacidad europea para resolver el conflicto en la antigua Yugoslavia es, sencillamente, desviar el tiro e ignorar la realidad.

En el pasado, se culpaba a EEUU de la falta de peso de los europeos en las decisiones que afectaban a su propia seguridad. Esta crítica tenía bastante fundamento. El deseo de mantener un control centralizado sobre el conflicto Este-Oeste se traducía en un modelo dominado por la hegemonía de EEUU y carente de alternativas. Hoy, cuando ya no existen las razones en que se basaba dicho modelo, la realidad es que la OTAN ha dado pasos importantes para que, si los europeos lo desean, pueda desarrollarse una defensa europea compatible con la de la OTAN. También la UEO ha progresado en la línea —estrecha y ambigua— marcada por Maastricht que la designaba como núcleo integrante de la seguridad europea. La creación de una Célula de Planeamiento, el establecimiento de un centro de satélites en Torrejón, el traslado a Bruselas del Consejo y de la Secretaría General o la designación de unidades que actuarían bajo mando de la UEO son algunos de esos pasos.

Entre los pasos dados por la OTAN, la adopción del CJTF ofrece un instrumento para estimular y hacer viable el desarrollo de la Identidad de Defensa Europea. El terremoto estratégico que se produce en 1989–90 planteó a la OTAN la necesidad de adaptar sus procedimientos y estructuras a la nueva situación. El Nuevo Concepto Estratégico de la Alianza plantea la existencia de nuevos riesgos, de crisis que exigen dotarse de unas fuerzas capaces de articularse y desplegarse de manera rápida y flexible para desempeñar misiones no artículo 5 del Tratado de Washington (prevención de conflictos, mantenimiento e imposición de la paz, etc.), junto con la tradicional misión de la defensa colectiva.

En ausencia de amenazas a la seguridad colectiva, la capacidad de realizar de manera eficaz las “nuevas misiones” se convierte en una prioridad para la Alianza. A este objetivo responde la adopción del CJTF, un modelo operativo ya experimentado en el Joint Command USA. Pero, al mismo tiempo, el CJTF está diseñado para, mediante nuevos mecanismos de consulta, poner a disposición de la UEO capacidades y recursos de la Alianza; también, el CJTF se configura como instrumento vinculado a la cooperación militar —en el marco de la Asociación para la Paz— con los países que no pertenecen a la OTAN. La Fuerza de Aplicación (IFOR) —y ahora la Fuerza de Estabilización (SFOR)— responden al modelo de CJTF.

El nuevo concepto operativo fue formalmente adoptado en la reunión ministerial de Berlín, en junio de 1996. El documento establece la necesidad de planeamiento, ejercicios, etc, para el uso de capacidades de la OTAN –incluyendo los Cuarteles Generales del CJTF– en operaciones dirigidas por la UEO. Pero queda aún una amplia tarea: la identificación de las capacidades –separables pero no separadas– y de los elementos de mando necesarios para dirigir y ejecutar operaciones bajo mando de la UEO; los términos de referencia y el procedimiento de designación del SACEUR adjunto –un europeo–, que se ocupará prioritariamente de las operaciones UEO; los acuerdos para compartir información en operaciones UEO; los términos para la transferencia, supervisión y retorno de capacidades, etc.

Se trata, en definitiva, de desarrollar un concepto operativo para actuaciones de la UEO con medios de la OTAN, en operaciones –y esto es lo importante– que se realizarían bajo el control político y la dirección estratégica de la UEO. En dichas operaciones, el SACEUR sería un *supporting commander*, un mando de apoyo.

Desde mi punto de vista, pese a las indudables dificultades técnicas y políticas, la formulación del CJTF permite y hace viable el desarrollo de la IESD dentro de la Alianza. La pregunta que sigue en pie es si existe voluntad política de superar las visiones arcaicas sobre las relaciones transatlánticas y las concepciones estrechas sobre el futuro de Europa. Para EEUU, el reto es asumir que su peso como superpotencia dependerá cada vez menos de su preeminencia militar en Europa; para los europeos, entender la relación futura con EEUU, se basará cada vez menos en la presencia militar norteamericana en Europa.

Esta tarea no es tan fácil como podría parecer. Ya se ha hecho referencia al debate entre los europeos. Para EEUU, como ha señalado Ronald Asmus, “desde 1990, superada la autocomplacencia por la desaparición del comunismo, es necesario redefinir los intereses norteamericanos en Europa tras la Guerra Fría, la estrategia europea y mundial de EEUU”. Porque, en un sistema político tan abierto como el norteamericano, existe el riesgo de que se distorsione la realidad y se difuminen los objetivos, ocupando el lugar de la estrategia lo que no es sino una superposición de política e intereses. Sigue siendo una incógnita por despejar el saber si la Administración y el Congreso serán capaces de pasar del “contra quién estamos” al “¿quiénes somos?”, de plantear el necesario debate sobre la identidad. Anthony Lake, en un artículo publicado en 1996 en el *Washington Post* lo planteaba con una pregunta retórica: “¿Seguirá América involucrada en el nuevo mundo de la posguerra fría que ha ayudado a crear? o, por el contrario, ¿atenderemos a aquellos que por apatía o parsimonia restringirían la capacidad única de nuestra Nación para modelar el futuro del mundo y nuestro propio futuro?”.

El reto es, como ha señalado con gran acierto James Steinberg –hoy con importantes responsabilidades en el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional–, revisar no sólo los términos, sino la justificación de una relación en la que Europa aceptaba el liderazgo de

EEUU y los americanos protegían a Europa. El desarrollo efectivo de la IESD implicaría que Europa asumiera la responsabilidad primaria de su propia defensa y EEUU mantuviese un compromiso residual y una presencia visible, además del apoyo a la gestión de crisis en la periferia europea.

Es evidente que, aunque se supere en Europa la divergencia entre quienes tienen una concepción federal y quienes prefieren un fuerte componente intergubernamental, la creación de una política de defensa europea y de una defensa común no será cuestión de un día ni de un año; será un proceso largo. En todo caso, la emergencia de Europa como potencia mundial planteará como escenario la eventual colaboración global entre Europa y EEUU en futuras crisis.

Hoy, la pelota está en el tejado europeo. Hace años, en un encuentro con el fallecido Samora Machel, tras explicarle las difíciles negociaciones para la incorporación de España a la Comunidad Europea, resumió su valoración diciendo: “¡Ah, esto es el tribalismo europeo!”. Hoy, el tribalismo sigue siendo el parámetro dominante en el debate europeo sobre el futuro de nuestro Continente; una visión estrecha que se ha puesto nuevamente de manifiesto en una cuestión que, como la ampliación de la OTAN, tanto atañe a los europeos, y en el que ha sido patente un peligroso vacío de ideas europeas que contrasta con la amplia elaboración intelectual generada en EEUU. Y es que, como señaló el senador Lugar, “el debate sobre la ampliación de la OTAN en el Senado no será sobre la ampliación, sino sobre el papel de EEUU en el mundo de la postguerra fría”, una cuestión –la identidad– que, hoy por hoy, no figura entre las prioridades compartidas por los europeos.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

The Revitalisation of NATO and European Security.
Nicholas Williams

The Revitalisation of NATO and European Security

*Nicholas Williams

Since I have been involved directly in the Mediterranean dialogue with countries from North Africa and NATO, and since the Mediterranean is becoming quite important in arrangements for European security, which includes the input of the Western European Union, I thought you might be interested in some of the details between NATO and the countries there. And, in particular, I'd like touch upon the point that has been made by others about the difficulty of understanding.

I agree with most of the analysis that has been made at this conference about the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and many of the problems and the barriers about developing it. And though I agree with John Roper that progress towards developing an ESDI within NATO is now being made, I am aware that there is a certain lack of credibility in saying that for the simple reason that if you look back at NATO statements over the past few years, you will see that we're always 'making progress'. And so what's the difference between the progress we're making now and the progress we seemed to be making in the past? Well, all I can say is that this time round it's the truth – we are making progress.

To perhaps clarify that assessment, I thought it would be interesting to step back and look at why we were not making such progress in the early 1990s. I would say that in the early part of this decade there was a peculiar sense of mutual vulnerability between the two institutions, between NATO and the Western European Union, in the sense that as NATO (with a new strategic concept) was trying to define a new, broader role for itself, likewise the WEU was trying to define for itself, too, a new and broader role. And so each institution somehow felt that the ambitions of one would be held hostage

by the progress of the other. As such, much of the early relationship between NATO and the Western European Union was therefore rather bureaucratic and technical. From the NATO side, the Alliance was defining the conditions of its support for the Western European Union, often insisting on such principles as transparency and reciprocity; but, despite a sputtering start, one of the more useful elements which came out from that early relationship is the NATO-WEU Council. The two institutions have now gone from a position of not meeting at all to one where they meet regularly in the Council.

Today, I think NATO and the WEU have gone beyond those initial mostly bureaucratic and technical discussions. I once heard a Russian trying to explain the confusion and the difficulties in his country and he said, "Well, you've got to understand Russia is going through a transitional phase. We used to be in one phase - communism: Now, we're moving towards another phase - capitalism. But the intermediate phase is called alcoholism." In a way, NATO was in this sort of confused, intermediate 'alcoholic' stage in the early 1990s because it didn't know what the ultimate ambition, or the ultimate purpose, of this European Security and Defense Identity was. I think the Bosnia experience had a huge influence in the process of sobering up. In a sense, the Bosnia experience revalidated NATO in a way that few Europeans thought possible by exposing to the Europeans that there were limits that they could do, or were capable of doing, or wanted to do, without the support of the United States. I think it also demonstrated to countries, particularly to Spain and France, that NATO could be used in a way that served European interests, provided that those countries had an adequate voice in NATO. And so Bosnia's significance (it's 'sobering effect') on the whole debate has unleashed a new energy and a new process, or a new phase, in the development of the European Security and Defense Identity.

In 1996, a Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers decided and cleared up any ambiguity about the point that the European Security and Defense Identity would be built within NATO. I say 'ambiguity' because in the early 1990s there had been an attempt to build ESDI outside NATO, which caused much confusion about the ESDI's purposes and led suspicions to arise on behalf of the Americans about Europe's ultimate ambition. At Berlin, though, that point was finally cleared up by all sixteen countries: emphasis was made that within NATO there would be an arrangement which reflected a European military potential. And because this arrangement was being done for the first time in NATO, the understanding about ESDI has allowed some of the more difficult issue to be addressed head on.

So, at the moment, what is being discussed in NATO in preparation for the Madrid Summit and beyond? First of all one question is how do we conclude arrangements for assets and military capabilities of NATO and how can we conclude arrangements which would make these assets and capabilities available to the Western European Union,

should it be so agreed by the NATO Council. A second question concerns the debate about the new military command structure, including the elaboration of European command arrangements: that is, how it can be arranged so that within the NATO structure there will be command arrangements and capabilities which could be taken out, withdrawn from NATO and put at the service of the Western European Union.

These two discussions are fundamental. They didn't occur in the past. No such arrangements were close to being dealt with before. There was no possibility that NATO could have quickly made available anything to the Western European Union except after a long period of planning, discussion, preparation and so on. Now, however, we have the embryo, the germ of a different arrangement.

I think a third major result of the Berlin decision to build ESDI inside NATO is that it has eased a long-standing problem that Turkey has had with such a development. One of the frictional elements of the ESDI debate within NATO has been the fact that, of course, when we talk about 'Europeans', it's not clear what is meant by 'Europeans'. Though Turkey sees itself as a European country with a European vocation and a vocation of joining the European Union, within the WEU Turkey sees itself as having a second-class status. Within NATO, however, Turkey has an equal status. So, by building the European Security and Defense Identity in NATO, it's been possible to come to an arrangement which will give Turkey the possibility of full involvement in the ESDI as it's being built inside the Alliance. Here, then, real progress is being made.

Now, I'd like to look ahead slightly because, of course, as not all problems can be resolved, progress after Madrid towards building the ESDI will still be very slow. Why? Because after Madrid, NATO's primary purpose will not be to not build the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO: there are the movements towards enlargement and towards enhancing Partnership for Peace with our partners to work on. Plus, it has the relationship with Russia to put on a firm ground after the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Document next week. NATO has got a lot of things to do: ESDI will be one of them, but not the principle one.

One of the phrases that has been mentioned frequently during the conference is the idea of 'separable' but not 'separate' forces, which in the past has always been code for saying while ESDI should be done within NATO, NATO would define the boundaries and the limits of this ESDI. Now, however, NATO is allowing the emphasis to be put on the 'separable' element of that idea. At the moment, arrangements are being made which, if followed up, will actually make it possible to separate out significant military potential from the Alliance. Yet, a big question remains: Whose job is it to make these forces 'separable'?

If the Europeans are not united in themselves as to the purpose of the ESDI, if they are not willing to put in the resources or the energy to make this capability 'separable', then it seems to me very unlikely that this concept will be realized in any short time

frame. I would just remind you that the idea of NATO supporting the European Security and Defense Identity goes as far back as the London Summit of 1990. I would remark also that we've been able to make arrangements with Russia in a much shorter time frame than we've been able to agree arrangements on the ESDI, which tells you something about the relative complexity and, perhaps, priorities about this issue.

Let us now turn to the Mediterranean initiative. And let me begin with another story. I'm reminded about the tourist who is lost in Naples and suddenly found that his watch had stopped and he couldn't make it go. And he sees, by chance, in the corner of this square in Naples a watch shop, a shop full of watches and clocks – hundreds, even thousands of these things hanging in the window. He goes in and says, "Excuse me, my watch has stopped. Can you repair this watch?" And the man behind the counter says, "Sorry, we don't repair watches." And the tourist says, "Well, I need a watch. Could you sell me a watch? Can I look at some of your watches?" And the man behind the counter says, "Well, I'm sorry: We don't sell watches." And so the tourist says, "Well, what do you do? Your window is full of watches. You don't repair watches. You don't sell them. What do you do?" And the man behind the counter replies, "Well, actually, we castrate cats. What do you expect me to put in my window?"

And so it is like this in the Mediterranean dialogue which we've been having with our colleagues from Jordan and Israel and, particularly, the North African countries. They listen to what we say, but then say "Well, yes: NATO. You're a military organization. You're an organization which is defined for defense. You're a military organization. We hear what you say about security and cooperation and so on, but you are a military organization".

I should point out that we've made progress in this dialogue. Effectively what happens is that the ambassadors from these countries (who are sometimes accompanied by experts) come in and talk to the international staff in NATO. We speak to them individually and we tell them what is going on in the Alliance, and they respond by telling us what they think is going on in the Mediterranean. And though they've been very grateful for the information we've been trying to give, there is a fundamental problem. While NATO tends to spend "x" time telling them about what's going on with NATO, when the opportunity comes to say, "Now it's your turn. Tell us what's going on in the Mediterranean. How do you see the security situation?", they shuffle and sigh for minute and then they say, "Not much has been happening. We've told you all this three months ago. We live in the same geographical area and we have the same problems as we had three months go." Still and all, I think it's not been a useless dialogue in the sense that it would have been extremely strange if, of all European organizations and security organizations, NATO alone did not have a relationship with these countries. Such an absence would have reinforced the idea that somehow NATO was organizing against them. And the idea that the military organization called NATO

is possibly organized against them and is looking for a new threat to the South is quite a powerful one, politically, in these countries.

So, in this regard I think we've made progress (at least at the official level) in trying to get them to understand how NATO has changed. There is, however, another problem that now we're going to have to think about significantly, which is the one Ian Lesser mentioned before. Even though we've been making them understand that NATO poses no threat to them and that NATO has a new role and wishes to have good relations with them, there are two problematic issues which always tend to come up (in academic as well as official discussions) in relation to this dialogue.

One is proliferation of nuclear, chemical and other weapons and the means of delivery. The fact that this issue comes up almost exclusively in the context with the countries and the problems of that area tends to reinforce the view, or the suspicion, that somehow NATO, whatever it says, really sees them as a problem. And so I think we risk giving a contradictory message to these countries. Because we are raising non-proliferation in the priority of things that NATO is doing at the same time telling these countries that we want good relations with them, they wonder how can NATO say it wants good relations and cooperation while seeming to emphasize the risk of proliferation in their area. These countries want to know if they are considered as friends by NATO, as potential cooperation partners, in which case things can be done together, or if they are viewed as a risk or as a threat. And I don't think NATO has got a good answer to that, yet.

The second issue which will complicate the relationship and may undo some of the work we've done is the fact that the new command structure may well result in the appearance of more military infrastructure (to use a Russian phrase) in the south of NATO than in the north. If we've just reassured (to an extent) the Russians that NATO is not developing, and will not develop, its military infrastructure towards the East with enlargement, while at the time we appear to be reorganizing the military structure in the southern part of NATO, do we not give a signal contrary to the one that we've been trying to give – that NATO wants an open and friendly relationship with countries to the South? On the level of a military relationship, do we not risk giving a signal that we are saying one thing in our contacts but preparing others? Now let it be said that I think we're not actually doing anything in an overtly contradictory way, but we do have difficulty understanding them. And they, in turn, have great difficulty understanding us (for good reason) because of our not always seeming to speak in a consistent way.

So, finally, coming back to the issue at hand – building a European Security and Defense Identity: One other confusing aspect about the dialogues with diplomats in Brussels has to do with the following question which always seems to come up. It reads: "OK, today we are having our dialogue with NATO. Next week we are going to have it with the Western European Union. The week after that we're going to have it with

the EU as part of the Barcelona Process. Why can't we just do it all together? We diplomats understand that you all have different purposes and all that; but, where we've got small embassies, couldn't you do us a favor and just carry out all your negotiations and dialogues all in one go?"

And, of course, the answer is that we are not capable of doing it all in one go.

And so, while I think the inability to fully understand and analyze NATO is based on very good reasons and very good experience, I believe it also reminds us of the kind of diplomatic skill and patience we're going to need after Madrid if we are going to upgrade our Mediterranean dialogue.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

Think Tank Participation in Discerning Security Issues: The US
Experience.

Alyson J.K. Bailes

Think Tank Participation in Discerning Security Issues: The US Experience

*Alyson J.K. Bailes

The field I have been asked to cover in this presentation is great and my chances of doing it justice small. I can claim at least to have looked from both sides at the issue: as a civil servant and as a worker in a self-styled “think and action tank”; as a security policy maker working with American friends in Europe, and as an analyst looking back on Europe from New York. However, I am beginning to suspect that the longer I spend in the United States the less confident I shall be about understanding that remarkable country. You are perhaps lucky to have caught me at the stage of ignorance when I am still willing to make some assertions, and at least there will be plenty of chance for the better qualified speakers in this session, and yourselves, to correct them.

Let me start with some issues of definition. When we think of public/private sector interaction in the security policy spheres, we can no longer afford to limit the issue to the role of the traditional think-tanks. The analytical institute, whether inside or outside a university, national or international, is only one of many types of NGO with a stake in this game. Also very important are the campaigning organizations - with wide mandates like Amnesty International or a focused one like the anti-land-mine groups - and the active charities and volunteer organizations who have come so much to the fore lately in crisis management and reconstruction. And if we must step back to take a broader view of the influences on public decision makers, we must recognize that the strongest players are not often NGOs in the narrower sense but

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parliaments and other representative or civic institutions; lobbyists from the corporate and social sector; or the controllers and users of written, spoken and electronic media.

I would argue, further, that the circumstances of the post-Cold War world have tended to improve the odds of all these other non-traditional players influencing policy outcomes, at the expense of the traditional think-tank. Parliaments –real Parliaments– are more numerous because of the spread of democracy, and their grip on defence budgets and security actions is tightening; whether because of a more critical examination of defence needs in the era of the “peace dividend”; or the crisis of popular confidence affecting many contemporary governments; or the increasingly *legislative* nature of the international agenda which goes with the spread of integrative and globalizing processes. The corporate sector is becoming not only cleverer at lobbying –and in the case of the shrinking defence sector perhaps more desperately motivated to do so– but also cleverer at *thinking*, due to its own increasing grasp of the need for forward planning and free-wheeling analysis in a fast-changing global environment. Single-issue lobby groups like those on landmines which ruthlessly focus their efforts and use hyper-modern advertising techniques have produced faster and cleaner impacts, at least in the West, than any traditional arms control analysis. Finally, we are all too familiar with the omniscience that is claimed and the total access demanded by today’s news media, although as I shall argue later the policy-shaping qualities of information proffered are not always in direct relation to its quality. We should certainly not overlook the novel opportunities both for channeling information and propagating policy messages that are offered (in the security policy field like any other) by the electronic World Wide Web.

During the Cold War, think-tanks and other independent analysts enjoyed many comparative advantages. They possessed scarce information and the leisure to process it, they spoke directly into the ear of governments who could translate thought directly into action, and their representatives traveled across borders where sometimes diplomats, let alone businessmen or tourists, could go. In today’s more complex policy game they have the same basic choices as anyone deprived of a monopoly –to become more *competitive*, and/or to learn to influence the *other players* in the market as well as their ultimate customers. How well are they in fact surviving in this market, in the special and especially important case of the United States?

In hopes of giving some spurious scientific quality to my answer I thought I would offer you this *simple model* (first slide) for estimating the policy *impact* of any actor trying to influence an outcome over which he/she it has no direct control. It defines impact as the product of three terms: the quality of the input offered; success in defining the right targets to aim it at, and in hitting them; and the receptiveness of the targets themselves. To explain a little further: I see quality of input as covering not just the truth, novelty or intelligence of the ideas offered but also their *user-friendliness* –which demands inter alia an understanding of the environment, the limits and the timetables

within which decision makers operate— and their *digestibility*, which in a situation of permanent information overload has something to do with the clarity and leverage of language used. A further issue is whether the provider chooses to offer ideas alone, or also makes recommendations on process itself. The choice of *targets* is now quite a complex one because it covers not just national governments but international entities, and also the immediate players—parliaments, the corporate sector, public opinion—whose knock-on effect on governments might be greater than anything the initial provider of ideas could achieve directly. Clearly, each of these targets will need to be addressed by a different set of means and with different styles of language. Finally, the best-targeted ideas will be for naught if they fall upon stony ground: and thus *receptiveness* of the decision-makers is probably the most important of all the factors here—with the major exception of situations where your policy recommendation is actually to overthrow the government. If there is to be any interplay at all between public and private, public officials must want (or at least recognize that they need) a second opinion; must show some discrimination in what outputs they accept; and must have leeway in their opening process to incorporate them. This last might not be possible for a number of reasons: limitations of time and resources, self-imposed legal constitutional restraints, or the fact that the real decision rests not with them but with some other country, multinational or supranational entity.

I will offer a few comments on each of these factors in the US context; and I trust that those who paid my ticket here will understand why I dwell more at certain times on problems than successes. The US is our leader not just in defence terms, but in the sense of experiencing certain features of political and economical evolution ahead of most of its Allies. If we are, in some respects, seeing our own future here it is important to seek an honest view of whether it works.

I will start from the back end of the model with the question of *security actions and actors*. Here is a map of the world (second slide), taken from Penguin Books' excellent new edition of the 'State of War and Peace Atlas'. It shows security crises and potential crises of the 1990's where independent mediations or dispute resolution has made a significant difference. Out of the 70 successes identified, no less than 26 are attributed to the United States. Yet when we look at these detail, it becomes clear that they are not NGO successes at all. The mediation was certainly independent in the sense that the US was a non-involved and generally unbiased party, but it was actually carried out by serving officials, former Presidents, Senators and Congressmen. On occasions when ex-officials or non-officials took a genuinely independent initiative to intervene overseas, they were not backed by the Administration and they did not succeed. The explicit or implicit application of US national leverage was clearly what did the trick and I see a distinct difference here, at least in degree, from the Cold War years when back-channel operators from the NGO field or from business played a so much

greater role. I will leave others to speculate on the reasons, but in passing it is interesting to note that there is a something of a shortage of independently active, global organizations centred on US soil –no ICRC, Amnesty or Médecins sans Frontières– nor does the US host any regular international think-fests. Today's US contribution is typified by Dayton, not Davos.

It would be wrong to conclude that US-based think-tanks and other NGOs have played no part in security process. Some, like my own institute, have a very interventionist attitude to process but carry out their activities largely in Eurasia. Others have discreetly hosted meetings and other contacts between warring groups and recent adversaries who may find it easier to talk to one another on US soil. But with all due respect (and self-respect) one cannot say that these NGOs are *central* to the US's external policy-making. And that is in striking contrast to developments on the US's domestic front, where volunteerism has become all the rage in tackling social issues seen for sixty years previously as among the highest preserves of the government. Last month's Philadelphia Summit on youth action, headed as it was by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, brought out this external/internal dichotomy rather neatly. Again I will leave it to better-trained analysts to consider whether this is the post-modern state emerging, or an advanced stage in the life-span of great powers as predicted earlier by Paul Kennedy.

If we take one step back to the formulation of policy rather than its enactment, the US security-policy establish looks - at least to this outsider - rather impermeable at many times and on many issues. US advances in freedom of information would seem to point the other way. But they are offset by the complexity and unpredictability of the inter-agency process, the large number of individuals involved and the obscurity of lines of authority, which combine to make it notoriously difficult even for embassies to get their message across unless they dive pretty far into the melee themselves. The Presidential executive has a relatively strong grip on the policy process, including the political appointment of individuals, down to what other countries would consider relatively humble levels in the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats themselves have to operate within bounds set by the powers of Senate and the House of Representatives, by the limits on popular tolerance of which I shall say more later, and also by resources. In the richest country in the world, appropriations for diplomacy (and to a lesser extent for defence policy making) have been cut very short for several years now and it can be genuinely difficult for officials to find either the money or time for meetings with governmental opposite members, let alone for unofficial conferences and NGOs. The general atmosphere of work pressure and information overload makes it an act of some self-sacrifice to seek second opinions at all, and those who do, are often tempted to revisit just a few sources whom they trust to make inputs in a supportive or at least user-friendly way. A busy official's decision on which incoming phone-call to accept is thus at risk of replacing the

free play of the intellectual market. I hasten to add that the second Clinton Administration has shown a growing awareness of these issues and that Secretary Albright has a strong record herself as a proponent of open diplomacy. For understandable reasons, however, it looks as if any new resources available will be directed first and foremost to the outward flow of foreign policy information to the American people.

Again, this does not exclude independent inputs altogether but it has tended to guide them into certain niches of time and space. NGOs of all kinds can make an impact in the early stages of discourse and definition on a new policy issue, especially if they catch the ear of new leaders coming into government. They can guide government quite directly if they work on direct mandate from it, with access to inside information, as RAND has done for instance on a number of enlargement-related studies. The very system of political appointment means that individuals with NGO background can move into and out of policy-making jobs quite freely by European standards, although there is bound to be an issue about how much of their independence remains once inside the machine. The scope for impact also varies from one policy domain to another; thus the “hard core” of security-policy issues are tougher for outsiders to penetrate –in part because they are conducted in a multi-national setting and at such a high tempo– than the design of policies for individual geographic areas. On the development of new US strategies towards (for example) Africa and China the terms of the debate among decision-makers and free analysts seem to be reasonably in synch. The obvious snag is that such differences in the *mode* of policy-making may aggravate risks of incoherence between the treatment of individuals regions and, in general, between the geographical and functional components of US diplomacy. Finally, NGOs can find a niche in partnership with government if they offer demonstrably useful services at the level of policy process and implementation –like the hosting of informal meetings and informal dialogues mentioned above or the provision of very specific and short-term advice. This is clearly easiest for bodies in or near Washington who can home in whenever the need arrives, and it works only when an NGO ready to come a long way out of the ivory tower finds officials in a good mood to meet it half-way.

Two brief examples may be taken as a test of this analysis. The idea of NATO enlargement first gathered steam in the US among non-governmental elites, and independent thinkers coined many of the catch-words still used today for justifying it. After the Clinton Administration and NATO as a whole became formally committed to this policy, there was a much-publicized backlash from US analysts fearing damage both to relationships with and within Russia, and to NATO itself. At that stage, although the Administration did adapt its policies to seal off some areas of special vulnerability, it handled the critics basically as part of the problem to be solved - listening rather to those (again, like RAND) who took the enlargement premise as given and offered remedies for its side-effects. The critics for their part have maintained purity and force

of argument at the cost of failing to notice a great part of what NATO is actually doing about enlargement and dodging the issue of what its abandonment would do for Euro-Atlantic relations at this stage. I may hazard an advance guess that is not they who will decide the outcome of ratification votes on the Hill. In my second example, the incoming Clinton Administration set itself apart from the Bush Administration by adopting the view of former Yugoslavia developed in think-tanks and in particular the moral supremacy of the moral cause. From 1994 onwards as intra-Alliance tensions proliferated and US diplomacy got more drawn in on the ground –perhaps especially after the Contact Group was formed– Washington’s policy became by degrees both more pragmatic and more inward-turning, culminating in the Dayton Agreement which has generally been viewed as a return to classic great power diplomacy, not least because nothing faintly resembling an NGO was present. (NGOs and multilateral organizations have of course been drawn into the Dayton implementation process, but relations between them and the main US players have not been conspicuously smooth).

A short word now about what I defined earlier as intermediate players - the House of Representatives and the Senate, media and public opinion. US think-tanks have not shifted strategy *en masse* to focus on influencing these influencers, and it is not difficult to imagine why. With each election Congress has fewer members with international experience (some 20% of them now carry passports) and the pressures upon them to represent local interests rather than policy opinion or even Party orthodoxy are growing all the time. Half at least of their week is spent in their home states and when they are in Washington it is the sectoral and social lobbies, not the think-tanks, who are battering down their doors. The best start strategy for merchants of ideas is generally agreed to be to aim at congressional staffers, but even they are hard to get at and especially for thinkers working outside Washington. In any case, as we saw with last month’s vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the bargaining which really shapes decisions on the Hill is done in terms ranging much wider than –and sometimes far away from– the policy merits of an individual issue.

US public opinion at large has been shown by opinion polls to have a low basic level of interest in foreign affairs and low threshold for information overload. It is sometimes also depicted as inherently or even hostile to the non-American world, and unwilling to make large or at least sustained efforts on outsiders’ behalf. This is way too simple because American public sympathy can demonstrably still be stirred by generous causes, especially if personalized in some way, and US soldiers did after all go out to Bosnia and stay there. Sustainability is more of a real issue and it must also be said that America as a nation seems better at giving than receiving, when it comes to ideas, influence or advice. This is perfectly natural for a super-power: as a character on “Star Trek” once said, “It’s hard to be a team player when you’re omnipotent”. For purposes of the present analysis it does, however, obviously limit absorptiveness to

independent ideas; and the one-way trade syndrome can be diagnosed even in some US academics who write about Euro-Atlantic institutions with references limited to US sources, the “Financial Times” and “The Economist”.


The case of the US corporate sector, at least in my limited experience, is interestingly different. They do by definition know about imports as well as exports and they have been highly exposed to—in many cases are leading—the famous processes of economic “globalization”. Information and ideas about the outside world are part of their currency and they are still ready to spend considerable resources on what might be called “cross-over” activities with the sphere of security analysis: either by commissioning and participating in forward-looking studies, or by making things happen in the actual security world. George Soros might be cited as representing the philanthropic end of this spectrum of involvement, and the research and political activities of the defence sales complex as a rather different dimension of it. Where traditional security think-tanks fit in is not yet so clear, because not many of them have consciously set out to meet the present-day needs of US industry and commerce. They must face real obstacles in the often ultra-rapid and personalized style of corporate decision-making as well as the self-confidence of private sector leaders who have hundreds of staff in foreign countries, can see foreign Presidents for their asking and are hard to persuade that they need a second expert opinion. There are solutions to this challenge but they will demand forms of partnership quite different from the traditional expert “consultancy” or the accustomed methods of academic interaction with government.

This brings us full circle to the first part of my equation: the usefulness and user-friendliness of what independent thinkers can offer. One clear truth is that if they wish to lead the thinking of governments, parliaments and CEOs, or even just tread helpfully at their sides, they cannot afford to fall behind them in terms of adaptation to the new world environment. Decision-makers live in an increasingly complex world of mixed national and international competence, confusion of the line between foreign and domestic affairs, new burden-sharing across traditional public/private boundaries, and new approaches to problem-solving cross functional divides. They exchange information in new fast ways and they have a whole new set of headaches about information management. Their element is change, and if NGOs do not themselves handle change well and help others to handle it, they risk being hit by globalization like the asteroid hit the dinosaurs—that is, not a quick death but lingering extinction in a cold and dark financial climate.

As to the solutions, let me take you through this diagram (third slide) adapted from the book ‘The Organization of the Future’ published by the Drucker Foundation last year. It is a prescription designed for modern organizations generally but it could fit a policy think-tank as well as any. Having *values* and an end in view is necessary for constancy in change, and for relevance in a time when information without pay-off has become a drug on the market. *Wide vision* is needed to match the global exposures

and interactions of real-world actors, and to see even further than they do to the neglected States and neglected issues of next year's headlines. Efficient acquisition and sharing of data, and target-sensitive packaging of information outputs, should go without saying. Just as important, and probably as difficult, is the breaking down of *functional divisions* within existing institutes and the creation of new *partnerships* between and beyond them to boost both their substantive reach and capacity for networking and influence. Each NGO must make its own call on whether to go one stage further and explore the niches open to those who will and can involve themselves *in process*: and it would probably not be healthy if every *thinking* institution were to decide the same way. However, it is suggestive that so many grants made nowadays by the major philanthropic foundations have been assigned to NGOs carrying out hands-on mediation and crisis prevention work. In sum, and in the competitive US environment above all, some kind of *strategy for change* must now be seen as the *sine qua non* for any independent think-tank's survival. After all, Mr. Chairman: how can a private institution claim to offer superior wisdom for the NATO debate if it has not itself embarked on the moral equivalent of Partnership for Peace, enlargement or opening towards Russia?

**SURVIVAL TRAITS
FOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE GLOBAL AGE**



IMPACT ?

VALUE OF
INPUT
(INCLUDING
USER-
FRIENDLINESS,
TIMELINESS)

X

TIFYING AND
REACHING
PROPER
TARGETS

X

RECEPTIVENESS
OF TARGETS

REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS INTERNACIONALS 38-39.

La seguridad europea: Diálogos para el siglo XXI.

Instituciones públicas y privadas: apoyo a los esfuerzos para una
seguridad europea.

Rafael Bardají

Instituciones públicas y privadas: apoyo a los esfuerzos para una seguridad europea

*Rafael Bardají

Espero que deduzcan, de las tres ideas que les voy a explicar, en qué consiste el trabajo que se realiza en el Gabinete del Ministerio de Defensa: la primera, desde mi punto de vista y creo que desde el punto de vista del Ministerio, es que la reflexión estratégica es una necesidad objetiva, aunque esto no signifique que la reflexión que se haga sea buena o se haga bien continuamente.

El ministro de Defensa en su exposición recordó que los pueblos que no se defienden eran devorados por la historia. Hoy me permito parafrasear a Napoleón quien, más o menos, dijo que quien no reflexiona sobre su estrategia está condenado a no tenerla o a seguir la de otros, que no sé lo que es peor. En el Ministerio creemos hoy en día que es necesario no sólo una conciencia de defensa que haga que mejore la relación y la comprensión general de la sociedad civil con las Fuerzas Armadas, sino desarrollar lo que el ministro denomina una cultura estratégica, es decir, unas élites de pensamiento que desde fuera de la Administración, o que entren y salgan de la Administración, hagan permeable el proceso de toma de decisiones y que lo apoyen. No es lo mismo conciencia de defensa que cultura estratégica. Evidentemente, esto el ministro lo ha repetido en los discursos, pero ha habido además unas acciones institucionales que refuerzan esa tendencia. El presidente Aznar firmó la Directiva de Defensa Nacional donde uno de los tres pilares esenciales es el desarrollo de esa conciencia de defensa y cultura estratégica. Ha habido una reubi-

cación institucional del Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos que estaba en el Centro Superior de Estudio de la Defensa, en el ámbito militar por tanto, y se ha llevado al ámbito político, por así decirlo, del propio ministro en la Dirección General de Política de Defensa en el Ministerio. Se han firmado acuerdos con universidades y con entidades, se ha creado el Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, y se han hecho una serie de cosas que encarrilan la acción del propio Ministerio en una dirección muy clara que es intentar apoyar, en la medida de lo posible, el desarrollo de pensamiento y de reflexión estratégicos.

Mi segunda idea es que los poderes públicos y las instituciones privadas están condenadas a entenderse objetivamente en este terreno. La crítica fácil, que se ha hecho siempre, de que a los Gobiernos no les interesa la transparencia, que el mundo militar era muy cerrado, esa dualidad entre verdad y poder, creo que no es del todo acertada; y que no es tanto una disposición ideológica de secretismo, sino que la propia dinámica del poder, de la toma de decisiones, del día a día, tiende a relegar la perspectiva a medio y largo plazo, y cuando hablo de medio y largo plazo me estoy refiriendo de aquí a una semana o quince días, no de cuatro o cinco años. Creo que en la Administración –y en el caso español es muy patente– hay, por un lado, una serie de hábitos que influyen en cómo se toman las decisiones y, por otro, hay una tremenda presión de inmediatez a la hora de tomar decisiones. Este mecanismo hace que se sea, muchas veces, reactivo en lugar de innovador y creativo. Es evidente que no se prima la prospectiva haciendo, simplemente, un catálogo de la Administración y viendo cuántos órganos hay dedicados al estudio a largo plazo, cuánto personal está asignado a ellos, qué recursos tienen y, lo más importante, qué influencia real tiene en la toma de decisiones. Quiero recordar que, independientemente de la crítica que se hace del secretismo en el tema de defensa, la inmediatez y la presión temporal para adoptar decisiones es un elemento esencial a tener en cuenta a la hora de tomar decisiones.

Eso me lleva a mi tercera y última idea, y es que si se siente la necesidad de una reflexión, como digo, si no se tiene una tremenda disposición o habilidad para ejercerla dentro de la casa –porque nos tenemos que ocupar de miles de cosas en pocos segundos– se puede llegar a una falsa consecuencia, y es que se financien órganos externos a la Administración, es decir, si yo digo que tengo que reflexionar ya veo que tengo que tener los ojos abiertos con el símbolo del dólar y extender cheques para financiar proyectos de investigación. Eso no es fácil, creo que llegar a esa consecuencia es falso, primero porque no hay dinero, tengo que recordar que con el 1,17% del PIB en defensa no hay ideas que sobrevivan durante demasiados meses. Y en segundo lugar –aunque tuviera mucho más dinero, que no lo voy a tener– es que por una relación de coste-eficacia yo no puedo regalarlo a espaldas porque si no los electores acabarían castigándonos. Creo que hay que ser muy sensato con el dinero público.

Me gustaría hacer una pequeña digresión. Los estudios estratégicos –a diferencia de lo que ayer mi querido amigo Pere Vilanova se planteaba como un discurso académico– no son una actividad inocente. No es hablar de estética, no es hablar del concepto infinito, matemático o del cero. Los estudios estratégicos o de seguridad, en el mejor de los casos, quieren mejorar el mundo, en el peor quieren vender un producto específico o defender una idea. Además creo, desde mi propia experiencia y la de mis propios colegas, que es muy frustrante desarrollar una serie de ideas, un marco conceptual, para que nadie te haga caso desde el Gobierno. Creo que uno de los factores que miden la eficacia de conferencias y de reuniones es si alguien desde la Administración está presente y realmente asume alguna de las posiciones. Por eso la esencia, para mí, de los estudios estratégicos es que sean relevantes en términos políticos, no en términos políticos/ideológicos, sino en términos de ayudar a tomar decisiones políticas. No tanto en términos académicos –que estén bien estructurados, que tengan las notas a pie de página, ese tipo de cosas que sabemos de las tesis doctorales– sino que realmente tengan un impacto. Si no se consigue ser relevante para gente que no tiene tiempo, cuya presión política y cuya agenda política no le permite el desarrollo de ideas a largo plazo, realmente habrá grandes construcciones teóricas que no se lean y que si se leen no se sabrá cómo aplicarlas. Con esto no quiero argumentar que haya que hacer trabajos específicos para lo que desde el Ministerio se pretende. Si ahora yo estoy en una campaña de prohibición de minas antipersonal, no necesito encargar al *think-tank* que me diga lo que opina o no, no es necesario eso. Yo releo las Guerras del Peloponeso para decirle al ministro lo que tiene que hacer al día siguiente, otra cosa es que pueda sacar enseñanzas o no de ello. Creo que hay que tener la chispa para intentar confluir entre lo que es el mundo académico y las necesidades de la Administración. Lógicamente, eso también requiere un esfuerzo por parte de la Administración, que en España es muy rígida, no hay apenas intercambio entre académicos y funcionarios, mucho menos entre militares y el mundo académico, aunque se han hecho algunas cosas, y creo que deberíamos poner en marcha algún mecanismo. Desde el Ministerio de Defensa lo hemos intentado en los últimos meses y, sorprendentemente, no hay ni siquiera un listado de personas expertas, que dominen ciertos temas. Me gustaría tener un catálogo de investigadores del Estado español, pues eso se está haciendo. Pequeñas cosas, más que millones regalados a instituciones, que puedan al menos señalar lo que el Ministerio necesita, y lo que los *think-tanks* y las instituciones privadas pueden ofrecer mutuamente, creo que sería lo más beneficioso. Como digo, el cambio que necesita la orientación de los estudios estratégicos se ha de realizar desde el ámbito privado, porque creo que es más fácil que cambien los *think-tanks* a que cambie la Administración española.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

**Think Tanks Dedicated to Security Affairs: The Dynamic of Networks.
Maria do Rosario Vaz**

Think Tanks Dedicated to Security Affairs: The Dynamic of Networks

*Maria do Rosario Vaz

First of all, I would begin by echoing what Alyson Bailes had said about the challenges facing think tanks in the post-Cold War, and about some of the reasons why the role of think tanks is evolving, if not declining in proportion to the increase of other actor's roles and influence in the system. Ms. Bailes also went on to present a number of reasons why think tanks should join forces in networks. And so, being networks the subject I'm to address, I'd like to pick up where she left off and highlight three basic points: points that are, in fact, more observations of what is already happening than very new ideas.

The first thing I'd like to share with you is that I think that the rationale behind networks of foreign policy and security institutes in general is not dissimilar because both pool resources. Both try to build a common approach, at least a cooperative approach, in the way they work by using some form of division of labor. By this I mean each one, foreign policy or security institute, is supposed to do what they do best. Furthermore, networks of foreign policy institutes, not unlike security institutes themselves, are instruments, tools for dialogues. And we've all dwelt on dialogue as a need, as a must if we are going to address security today and in the future.

At the same time, these kind of networks can also have (and indeed do play in some cases) a role in the building of confidence, which is a big part of what I hope to show you: how these kinds of networks contribute to building confidence among actors in the system concerning security issues.

Another observation is something rather banal, but which nonetheless may be useful underlining: and that is the fact that networking has become sort of a trendy thing to engage in. It has become, in a way, a fashion. For instance, in today's state of affairs, we now see networks of universities, of libraries, of doctors, and even of European publishing houses (those that publish the same book in different languages across Europe). Why does this happen? Why is networking becoming so popular and fashionable? Why are so many people in different walks of life thinking that this is a useful and good thing to do?

One answer might be the fact that networking is the combined result of two trends (and their accompanying subtleties) which we are witnessing in the world today, and may continue to witness indeed in the world tomorrow. First of all, the transnational dimension is becoming increasingly important. Everything -politics, finance, health, economic and social issues, and environmental concerns -is becoming transnational in scope and range. The media, too. Even internal security has aspects which are more and more transnational, and this dimension cuts across not only some problems, but also across some kinds of solutions. And sometimes the solutions can only be found at this transnational level.

Secondly, I think the transnational phenomenon is perhaps considered as a result of what is, in a way, a conflicting trend - and that is integration. In the world today we are witnessing integration in a number of different fields, from security to the economy. Some people argue that integration is one of the defining factors of the international system today. Naturally, security think tanks or centers that deal with security issues would tend to network inside these areas of the world in which they find themselves placed, but now they are also beginning to network amongst themselves in a number of different sectors.

Another reason why this phenomenon is taking off is the increased role of civil society. Civil society, while becoming more and more the subject of discussion, can still only become active through organizations. Civil society can not play a role as such in the processes of integration without organizing itself first into kinds of functioning bodies. But once doing so, the increased role of these organizations in civil society prompts other institutions to organize themselves in the best way so as to shape events as best they can.

In the security and foreign policy fields we have different kinds of networks ranging from the informal and the personal to the formal and the institutional. We have, among many, the Trans-European Policy Studies Association and another one, which I'm using as a basis for these observations -EuroMesco, the network of the foreign policy institutes of the twenty-seven member countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

One thing that networks can do (and like EuroMesco, some of them are doing) is contribute to the creation of a common language to deal with security. How important words can be goes right to the heart of any dialogue, certainly to any that concerns security issues. Indeed, how simple and yet easy to forget is the fact that sometimes we're talking to people using exactly the same words and everybody is giving a different

meaning to that same word and or same expression. And so misunderstandings happen, even among allies. For example, I think as the European Security and Defense Identity was being discussed here earlier maybe not everybody was thinking exactly the same thing when using these four words. If we're going to build trust among states or, indeed, among peoples, it is essential that these people who are promoting such dialogues do not get trapped into their own words; and, further, that they are able to engage in dialogue and not merely produce sets of monologues.

Nevertheless, this common language will not be a remedy for misperceptions. Misperceptions are an important feature of the security landscape because they shape reality, because they impinge upon reality in such a way so as to become part of it. And so this promotion of dialogue, this promotion of a common language is a key element in doing away with this interplay of misperceptions in the field of security.

So, to highlight another argument in favor of networking is how the North makes its contribution. By bringing together different people from different countries, making them think about a certain number of issues, which often relate directly to the security field, institutions in the North present a way of making civil society take part in integration in an organized way. It can also be argued that when talking about more complex processes - especially those involving two regions (here again I'm thinking of EuroMesco and the Barcelona Process)- networks can even be used to push stalling processes forward. In spite of whatever difficulties and obstacles the governments or international institutions may be experiencing a measure of dialogue will, at least, continue going on.

Throughout this conference we've talked a lot about the need for conflict prevention. If conflict prevention is to be taken seriously, then it seems that networks for conflict prevention are also a necessity. And here I'd like to speak in favor of the horizontal approach to networks, which brings in not only different partners from different countries, but different partners from different areas of expertise. NGOs should be talking to think tanks. Think tanks and businesses should be talking to each other. And they all should be talking to governments. Think tanks should be talking to all the actors involved in carrying a number of processes forward.

Let me cite just one example: In Albania right now I think there are four hundred NGOs active, a number which gives you an idea of the magnitude of not only the role civil society is playing but maybe the need to put all these people talking to one another together so as to end this sort of functional divide which has been present since the days of the Cold War, where conflict prevention people only talked to conflict prevention people, international relations people only talked to international relations people, and European affairs people did not, as a rule, talk to security affairs people. A strong case for horizontal networking would then draw attention to the need to bring in different national actors and different people working in different fields with different expertise so as to make conflict prevention work and endure in places like Albania. Thank you very much.

REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS INTERNACIONALS 38-39.

La seguridad europea: Diálogos para el siglo XXI.

Jornadas sobre la seguridad europea: diálogos para el siglo XXI.
Síntesis.

Juan A. Yáñez-Barnuevo

Jornadas sobre la seguridad europea: diálogos para el siglo XXI

Síntesis

*Juan A. Yáñez-Barnuevo

Los organizadores de estas Jornadas –a quienes agradezco su invitación y su confianza– me han encomendado la tarea de tratar de hacer una síntesis de lo discutido durante las cinco sesiones que se han desarrollado a lo largo de estos dos días; voy a tratar de cumplir con ese delicado encargo lo mejor que sepa y pueda. Han sido unas Jornadas muy ricas en contenido, por las aportaciones de los ponentes, a los que quiero felicitar por los trabajos que han presentado, y que espero que tengan la adecuada difusión; pero también porque ha habido un diálogo muy vivo y muy denso, y eso es algo que hay que agradecer a los participantes, que han sabido servir de estímulo a las mesas redondas que han tratado los diversos temas. Indudablemente, eso me ha complicado la tarea a la hora de intentar hacer una síntesis de lo debatido. Por tanto, no pretendo hacer un resumen circunstanciado de cuanto que aquí se ha dicho: sería prolijo y tedioso, e incluso así tampoco podría hacer justicia a las distintas ponencias presentadas; estoy seguro de que al final me perseguiría algún ponente quejoso de que no había recogido correctamente sus ideas o a sus argumentos. Tampoco puedo sacar unas conclusiones propiamente dichas, porque no creo que sea ése mi papel: las conclusiones las sacará cada cual por sí mismo, haciendo uso de sus propios criterios. Me voy a limitar, por ello, a expresar algunas impresiones personales al hilo de unas cuantas líneas básicas que me parece que han atravesado las distintas sesiones de estas Jornadas.

*Director Adjunto de la Escuela Diplomática

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La primera impresión dominante, y esto puede que ocurra cada vez que uno acude a este tipo de reuniones, es que me marchó con la sensación de haber aprendido y reflexionado mucho, pero quizá más perplejo que cuando llegué. A lo mejor, ése es precisamente el objetivo de un coloquio como éste, pero también ello nos indica hasta qué punto las cuestiones que hemos debatido están presididas hoy por unos grandes interrogantes y que no tenemos las respuestas, ni mucho menos, para todas ellas. Sin embargo, sí creo que es importante el ir identificando las preguntas correctas porque ello nos permitirá luego poder vislumbrar mejor el camino a seguir.

Cuando venía para Barcelona, estaba repasando las notas de un seminario, muy similar a éste, que se celebró en Toledo hace justamente 10 años, en 1987, también sobre los problemas de la seguridad europea. Visto desde esa perspectiva, maravilla el comprobar el cambio tan radical, cabe decir copernicano, que se ha producido en las condiciones de seguridad en Europa desde 1987 hasta ahora. Es algo que casi no nos podemos creer todavía. Los temas, cuestiones o materias que estaban en discusión hace 10 años no tienen nada, o muy poco, que ver con las cosas de que estamos hablando ahora. De eso debemos congratularnos, y así lo han subrayado varios ponentes, en el sentido de que la seguridad en Europa está globalmente en condiciones mucho más sólidas y positivas que hace unos años, gracias al final de la Guerra Fría. Es verdad, y también se ha dicho, que el mundo anterior, el de la confrontación entre bloques, era más claro, al menos intelectualmente, y en ese sentido proyectaba una cierta estabilidad, dentro de esa inseguridad básica –la del enfrentamiento de sistemas y el equilibrio del terror– en que estaba asentado. Ahora podemos decir con fundamento, y así lo señalaba el ministro de Defensa en su intervención al comienzo de las Jornadas, que los ciudadanos españoles, y también los europeos en su conjunto, se sienten menos inquietos ante el panorama de la seguridad de Europa y de la seguridad internacional globalmente considerada. Es verdad que en el escenario en que vivimos no todo es paradisíaco y que esa mayor seguridad internacional puede venir acompañada de una mayor inestabilidad en ciertas zonas, como se ha visto en la antigua Yugoslavia o en otros lugares. Ello tampoco debería sorprendernos, puesto que todo proceso de transición es también un proceso de ajuste, y los procesos de ajuste pueden acarrear esas consecuencias, tan dolorosas en muchos casos, a las que indudablemente hay que atender mejor de lo que se ha venido haciendo hasta ahora.

En todo caso, parece claro que la preocupación por la seguridad en el sentido clásico –es decir, todo lo que concierne a las políticas de defensa, Fuerzas Armadas, estrategia, armamentos, así como cuanto les acompaña en materia de control de armamentos y medidas de confianza– va dejando paso a una visión más compleja, más multidimensional, más polifacética de la seguridad: un concepto de seguridad que engloba consideraciones atinentes a la estabilidad política, el progreso económico y social, el cambio ordenado y pacífico de las sociedades. Todo esto lo estamos viendo muy cerca

de nosotros en la Europa Central y Oriental, y desde Europa Occidental y América del Norte se hace un notable esfuerzo para ayudar al desenvolvimiento de esos procesos históricos. Correlativamente, las antiguas amenazas, reales o percibidas –es decir, la URSS y el Pacto de Varsovia, desde la óptica de los occidentales, o la OTAN desde la óptica de Rusia– dejan paso a lo que se han denominado factores de riesgo, que pueden afectarnos a unos y a otros: son factores, más o menos graves, asociados frecuentemente a problemas de desestabilización y a conflictos localizados, pero que pueden tener consecuencias más amplias en muchas ocasiones.

Esto introduce inmediatamente un interrogante: cómo abordar esos factores de riesgo, desde una perspectiva internacional, de la forma más eficaz y apropiada posible. Aquí se ha hablado mucho de esta cuestión. Parece evidente, y muchos de los ponentes lo han señalado, que no basta con la adopción de medidas defensivas, incluso entendidas en sentido amplio, es decir, medidas que pudiéramos denominar puramente negativas para protegernos de las repercusiones de esos fenómenos. Obviamente, los Estados europeos, y las organizaciones en las que esos Estados se agrupan, también adoptan medidas de ese tipo cada vez que lo consideran necesario, pero parece claro que no bastan para afrontar con eficacia esta clase de fenómenos. Muchos han resaltado que es preciso buscar el desarrollo de políticas activas y positivas, con vistas a atajar las causas de inestabilidad, favorecer los procesos de cambio pacífico y fomentar cauces de diálogo y cooperación. Dicho de otro modo, se pasa de una estrategia que podríamos llamar de contención o de disuasión, que sirvió durante los 40 años de la Guerra Fría, al desarrollo de políticas más positivas, basadas en los conceptos de seguridad compartida o seguridad cooperativa.

En cuanto a los medios a emplear para desarrollar esas nuevas políticas de seguridad, algunos han expresado dudas respecto a que los instrumentos bien conocidos, que fueron eficaces en la puesta en práctica de las antiguas políticas, puedan ser apropiados, o igualmente eficaces, para el desarrollo de las que se requieren ahora; aunque, como está ocurriendo ya, esos instrumentos estén procurando su adaptación o su transformación en función de las nuevas circunstancias y necesidades. Se señaló en el curso de la discusión que faltaba, además, una indispensable adaptación mental: alguien mencionó el hecho de que aún perduran esquemas de *viejo pensamiento* en medio de las nuevas condiciones que prevalecen en Europa y en el mundo, recalcando que, si todos tenemos que hacer todavía un esfuerzo para entrar plenamente en la nueva fase, se requiere en especial una mayor adaptación de las mentalidades de los políticos con poder de decisión. Precisamente este tipo de reuniones puede contribuir a facilitar esa transición, así como el desarrollo de políticas y esquemas apropiados y de una estrategia que los englobe y la necesaria adaptación de los instrumentos que han de servir a esa estrategia.

En lo que se refiere más concretamente a la seguridad europea, se subrayó en el coloquio –pienso que correctamente– que hay que entenderla, ahora más que nunca, como seguridad del continente europeo en su conjunto, pues ya está del todo supera-

da la fase en que podía hablarse de la seguridad europea exclusivamente desde el ángulo de un lado del continente, olvidando otras partes de Europa. Yendo más allá, se sostuvo que la seguridad de Europa está estrechamente conectada con la seguridad de los espacios de su entorno. Obviamente, la seguridad europea está íntimamente ligada a la seguridad atlántica, como lo estuvo ya en el período anterior, y el vínculo euroatlántico o transatlántico sigue siendo tan importante o más que en los 40 años pasados. En esto creo que no hubo ninguna voz discrepante. Más bien, se hizo hincapié en los otros espacios geográficos que durante la Guerra Fría fueron considerados como secundarios desde el punto de vista de la estrategia principal, que se movía en un eje Este-Oeste: es decir, fundamentalmente el espacio mediterráneo, entendido en su sentido más amplio.

Se ha señalado que durante mucho tiempo se concibió ese espacio, desde una perspectiva estratégica, meramente como el *flanco sur*. Es evidente que ésta es una terminología que, además de que nunca fue apropiada, está ya del todo obsoleta y hay que superarla definitivamente. El Mediterráneo adquiere, más incluso que en otras épocas, protagonismo propio como centro de atención para quienes deciden políticamente y para los que piensan en términos de seguridad; ello reza para el conjunto de Europa, pero, muy particularmente, para los demás países y grupos de países que bordean el Mediterráneo. Esta preocupación que expresamos aquí no se debe sólo al hecho de que nos reunamos en Barcelona, ciudad mediterránea por excelencia, y en España, país muy directamente interesado por los temas que afectan a la seguridad en el Mediterráneo, sino porque cada vez más se demuestra —desde una perspectiva europea y euroatlántica— que los problemas del Mediterráneo no pueden dissociarse de los problemas de la seguridad europea en su conjunto y, a la vez, requieren un enfoque propio y singularizado.

Finalmente, se trató el tema de los instrumentos de la seguridad europea, y en torno a él fue donde se produjo un mayor debate y también donde se registraron mayores discrepancias. En principio, no hay discrepancias en cuanto a que la OTAN, por un lado, y la Unión Europea (UE), por otro, son los puntales básicos de la seguridad europea en el sentido más amplio de la expresión. Cada organismo por su lado, pero también actuando de forma coordinada o, a veces, actuando uno a espaldas del otro, configuran un espacio de seguridad y estabilidad inigualables para Europa: en primer lugar, para los países que forman parte de uno u otro, o de ambos grupos, pero asimismo proyectando su influjo más allá de sus fronteras, y de ahí los procesos en marcha para la ampliación de ambos, que habrá que manejar con cuidado de modo que, en lugar de provocar tensiones, incrementen la seguridad de todos.

Por su parte, la Organización de Seguridad y Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), de otra manera, quizá más modestamente, cumple unas funciones potencialmente muy importantes, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la prevención de conflictos y al desarrollo de mecanismos de diálogo, de solución de controversias y de promoción del cambio pacífico. Hubo mayor discusión, y realmente no puede decirse que hubiese

coincidencia, en torno al papel que pueda llegar a desempeñar la Unión Europea Occidental (UEO), bien sea dentro de la UE, o en el marco de la OTAN o como bisagra entre ambas organizaciones o si, a lo mejor, su futuro sería el de no ejercer ningún papel relevante, como hasta ahora. Hubo toda clase de opiniones al respecto y creo que ése es claramente uno de los temas abiertos para el porvenir, junto con el desarrollo o falta de desarrollo de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común (PESC). Sobre esta cuestión se recalcó el hecho de que no había ideas suficientemente claras entre los que tendrían que tenerlas, es decir, los Gobiernos europeos, y se opinó que en última instancia faltaría voluntad política para desarrollar un auténtico polo europeo de seguridad o una genuina identidad europea de defensa que pudiera llegar a tener en algún momento una autonomía real respecto de EEUU.

Me parece significativo que a lo largo de estas Jornadas se haya hecho mucho hincapié en el papel cada vez más relevante de la *sociedad civil*, llámense Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONG), *think tanks*, *lobbies*, movimientos sociales o incluso personalidades actuando a título individual. Se señaló que hay, sobre todo en el nuevo marco de la seguridad –no solamente para Europa sino también más allá del Mediterráneo– un papel muy importante que le toca desempeñar a las entidades e instituciones que configuran la sociedad civil. De hecho, ya están empezando a cumplir esa función en una serie de áreas, en particular en emergencias humanitarias, en la promoción de procesos de cambio pacífico en otras sociedades y en la ayuda a la institucionalización en sociedades todavía insuficientemente asentadas. Aunque tampoco faltó quien expresara escepticismo o dudas acerca del valor o la eficacia que pudieran tener esos esfuerzos si no se articulan mejor, mediante redes de cooperación y también en coordinación estrecha con los Gobiernos y los organismos intergubernamentales, que al final son los que disponen de mayores recursos y mecanismos para llevar adelante esas políticas de una forma duradera.

Como también se ha subrayado, no hay que olvidar que, en última instancia, la sociedad internacional de nuestros días –incluso la europea, pese a su proceso más avanzado de institucionalización e integración– sigue siendo básicamente una sociedad compuesta por Estados. Claramente, la soberanía del Estado ya no es lo que era, y no se trata de volver a poner la soberanía en un pedestal y de contemplar al Estado como la suma de todas las cosas, pero es verdad que el Estado sigue siendo la pieza fundamental de la articulación de la sociedad internacional. A este respecto, me gustaría traer a colación una reflexión del anterior secretario general de las Naciones Unidas, Boutros-Ghali, quien decía que muchas veces la mejor manera de promover la estabilidad y la seguridad en diversas zonas del mundo era precisamente ayudar a que los Estados se organizaran y funcionaran como es debido, al servicio del ciudadano. En su análisis, la principal causa de inestabilidad e inseguridad en muchas áreas del planeta radicaba en la falta de legitimidad y autoridad del Estado, e incluso en su tendencia, en ocasiones,

a desintegrarse o disolverse, abriendo así un vacío en el que se instalaba la anarquía, con repercusiones trágicas para la población civil y consecuencias muy negativas para los países vecinos y para regiones enteras.

Con lo cual volvemos al punto de partida: la necesidad de ampliar la visión y de saber afrontar los problemas de seguridad europea y de seguridad internacional cara al siglo XXI desde una perspectiva global, con un enfoque integrado y con una voluntad real de cooperación y de solidaridad.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

A Reflection on European Security.
Cameron R. Hume

A Reflection on European Security

*Cameron R. Hume

I think I can truly say you've been too kind because after a build-up like that I'm not sure I can get through this without disappointing everyone. Nevertheless, I look forward to being able to share with you some reflections on the themes that we were able to discuss and during the last two days. The first thing I would like to look at is why should an American be concerned about European security at all.

I think its a fair question. First of all, if we looked back five hundred years ago, Spain discovered America, and continuously from that time on there's been one strategic theater involving Europe and America. Spain's discovery of America was an event which changed Spain's position in Europe and thus set the tone for the kind of linked, or interdependent, futures that Europe and America have experienced ever since. When you go forward through the other centuries almost everytime there was a major war or fighting in the Americas, a strategic element linked the fortunes of both America and Europe. For example, when Britain and the Netherlands were fighting over control of the North Sea, the city of New York, which was then the dominant strategic position on the western edge of the Atlantic Ocean, changed hands from the Dutch to the British. And when the French and the British were fighting the war of Austrian Succession, the North American British colonies were fighting with the British against the French in Canada, which is why in the United States they call the conflict the "French and Indian War".

The struggle for our own independence was also very connected with Europe. We were assisted by loans and material from - no surprise here- the Netherlands and France, and we were also assisted militarily before the end of the war by French forces. Even

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after the severing of the colonial tie, the trans-Atlantic space continued to be one strategic theater. During the Napoleonic Wars, the United States doubled in size by the purchase of Louisiana from France, a sale triggered by difficulties to France in its relations with Haiti. Although it's hard to imagine exactly how the French made the calculation, it was a good deal for us. On the negative side though, before the Napoleonic Wars were over the British had burned down Washington.

When you go forward to the 19th century you see the same European-American dynamic interaction. There was, for example, during our Civil War very intense diplomacy from both the North and the South with European countries; and soon after the war's ending, we bought Alaska from Russia - also another very good deal. By the end of the 19th century, the composition of the American population had changed so radically because of the massive influx of people from Ireland, Scandinavia, Germany and from Central and Southern Europe that today, supposedly, the largest ethnic group in the American population is German, and the two countries that have the highest percentage of their population having emigrated to the United States are Ireland and Sweden. All in all then, there is fair reason for an American to be concerned about European security. After all, we've had the Consulate here for 200 years for a purpose. The concern is not new; it's something that has gone on now for five hundred years. It's not ominous. It's not threatening. I think the interest is normal.

The second question I'd like to look at is where the current partnership comes from, where it originates. And since you have to choose something to start with, what I would like to start with is something that happened almost fifty years ago to this week - actually it happened on June 15, 1947. George Marshall, who had been the senior American military officer during the Second World War, had been asked by President Truman to be Secretary of State. He accepted. Soon afterwards, he was invited to go up to Harvard University to deliver an address to the graduating class. There, Marshall, who was a man who knew how to get to the point, delivered certainly one of the most famous statements of American public policy in our history, and a statement which truly changed the kind of world that we lived in. It's only eight paragraphs long. I'd like to quote some of what he said and go through it with you because I think it does explain a lot how America has looked at Europe and European security, and at our connection with Europe for two generations. And I believe it will continue to influence how we look at Europe into the next century.

He said that the problem that had to be addressed was the dire state of the European economy and that the solution to this lay in finding a way to restore the confidence of the European peoples in their own future. I'll read now a little bit from what George Marshall said: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions

in which free institutions exist.... Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.”

He went on to say that it wasn't for the Americans to decide how Europe should be rebuilt. What the Europeans had to do was to get together and draw up some plan that was satisfactory to themselves about how they saw Europe being rebuilt. The US would then offer advice in trying to draw up a plan, and the US would not be lagging in providing support for it. From an American point of view, that policy, to me, shows some of the more enduring qualities of the approach we've adopted to Europe and to other aspects of our foreign policy. Within two years NATO was founded.

In preparing for this speech I went back and read a number of things, finding among others a reference made to a quotation about the founding purposes of NATO from the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, which read that NATO was founded “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down”. Such a view didn't fit Marshall's description of why we were involved with Europe, though. The main purpose of NATO then and now (and I'll be very brief) is the political purpose, which is to protect and promote the values of free institutions; the second is to foster cooperation among members on political and military questions; and the third is to consult on joint action in response to an attack.

Of course, when NATO was founded the specificity of its purposes was very clear because the joint response was framed in terms of responding to a Soviet attack. I think if there is a lesson from those fifty years, from the situation as it was then in 1947-1949 and how we've gotten to where we are now, the first lesson I would draw is that if the United States and its allies agree on the measures to be taken for their own security, they can have security. There are obviously a lot of discussions over how the arrangements should be made, but I don't believe that capacity should be questioned. Fate is in our hands.

I thought a lot about the title of the conference because (as I don't think in Spanish, I think in English) the term “Seguridad Europea” (European Security) is somewhat ambiguous. In the first instance, I think it means security in Europe, which I just talked about. Still, it means at least two other things to me, beginning with security for Europe. In other words, not security right “here” but security that deals with issues and threats that come from “nearby” and which, in turn, involves the question what would Europeans do - indeed, what would Europeans and Americans want to do - regarding these issues and threats.

Now, I'd like to focus on one aspect of the discussion which has been missing from the discussions these past two days, and this is one which concerns some public

attitudes that are present in the debate over NATO enlargement and some of the reasons put forth to support NATO's intentions. One wouldn't really know it from the discussions we've had, but there are well meaning, well-informed, thoughtful individuals who don't agree with NATO enlargement. Therefore, I think it's fair, given the nature of the kind of relationship that Americans and Europeans should have, that we be allowed to go over the reasons quickly just to know what they are.

First, I'd like to start off with some results of a poll last month in the United States. 86% of the people polled said that President Clinton should focus on domestic policy and only 7% said he should focus on foreign policy, whereas (and this is relevant to the comment I made yesterday that we've turned back half of the money we used to spend on foreign policy) 61% of those polled favored maintaining NATO despite the end of the Cold War. It's interesting to note, therefore, that in the discussion in the United States there is no credible opinion that says the object of policy should be the end of NATO. Instead, the debates are over, to paraphrase, "since the whole world has changed, how do you continue having a constructive security relationship including NATO with our European allies?" Only 20% of the people polled followed the debate on NATO enlargement, but among that group a large majority favors enlargement. Almost twice as many fear that Russia will threaten its European neighbors if NATO is not enlarged. In other words, these people think that Russia would threaten its neighbors if there is no enlargement because such a decision means these countries will never be our allies, despite whatever changes their political system has gone through and in spite of the political language in the NATO Charter. We would thereby dig deeper a line that divides Europe. Finally, a slight majority would broaden NATO's mission to include interests outside of Europe.

And so here I'd like to go over some of the arguments that have been raised about NATO enlargement itself. Here, the place to start is with George Kennan, a most distinguished American diplomat and diplomatic historian, who wrote at the beginning of this year that "expansion would be the most fateful error of American foreign policy in the entire post-Cold War era." He explained that "expansion" (what President Clinton's Administration calls "enlargement") would inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion. "Expansion" would have an adverse affect on the development of Russian democracy and would restore the atmosphere of the Cold War of East-West relations. Another argument was put forward by the British historian Paul Kennedy, who had written the "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers". His theory was that the greatest risk to the United States was "imperial overstretch"; that Washington, in his analysis, was about to repeat the mistake made by London in East Europe during the 1920s and 30s by giving security guarantees to borders in Eastern Europe without changing the military strategy adequately in order to be able to uphold that commitment; and that, as a result, there would be a large and dangerous gap between the objectives of policy and the assets made available for military strategy.

The third argument goes back to the question of drawing lines, although this one is a little harder to deal with: Some people would say if you don't enlarge, you're reinforcing a line that already exists and others would say if you do enlarge, you're drawing a new line. So, no matter how you do it, no matter what NATO does, I'm afraid there's a line in our future. The fourth argument is one I certainly think ought to be thought about more as it relates to Kennan's warning that, since European security increasingly depends on a series of arms reductions agreements that have been concluded in the last ten years (particularly the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe), enlargement of NATO would impede progress in arms control. Indeed, the head of the security council in Moscow, Mr. Rybkin, said this week that NATO "expansion" would make the ratification of Start 11 "almost impossible". Finally, I'd like to mention the fifth and quite common argument, which is that NATO is a special purpose defense alliance and that "expansion" of it would simply destroy its purpose.

There are answers to these questions, but I think the easiest thing to point out is that the answers have to come in terms of policy. What we're talking about here are political choices, not simply debating points. Therefore, I'd like to look at some of the suggestions raised in a recent article by former secretary of state, James Baker, a man who's known for being fairly hard-headed and realistic. He emphasized the point that the core essence of NATO is its political function; that is, to try to ensure that there is an environment conducive for free institutions and that the success of that function has to be the test. The fact that the Cold War has ended and that there is no longer a Soviet threat directed at the Western Alliance is not a reason for giving up an institution that has helped create an environment conducive to the spread of free institutions. He went on to suggest that just as NATO had met the old threat, surely the Alliance should be adaptable enough to meet new threats, and that the new threats would probably require less conventional responses to deal with them. He cited in particular some of the things that have been mentioned here such as the development of task forces and different means of cooperation within the Alliance. He also suggested that because the future is not subject to prediction (which is something worthwhile remembering - a little humility about the future is normally in good order), it was terribly important that NATO continue as a place for consultative relations both among members and with other actors in the area.

So, as all this shows, there is in the scope of European security a rich agenda that includes enlargement, the Founding Act, the discussion of arms control agreements, operations by the OSCE, and the EU's participation. Regarding the EU, however (and the following is important as it reflects a certain strain of thought in American public opinion), people in the United States do raise the question: "Why are Europeans ready to pledge their honor to protect the borders of countries in Eastern Europe, but they won't allow their tomatoes in?"

The final thing I'd like to do is to ask some questions, as it says in the title of the conference 'to the next century', which should be a very risky thing to talk about, but I want to try. What concerns me is (and this a point John Roper made very eloquently yesterday) what about security by Europeans. What about not just dealing with sort of our own in-house problems and worrying about ourselves or dealing with the people who are right next to us and the problems they might cause for us in our neighborhood. Rather, what about trying to look a little further ahead and trying to look a little farther away. The address made by your Minister of Defense yesterday was very far-seeing in this regard because he repeatedly recalled that, in the end, healthy societies have to do this in order to prepare for their future. And so there are a couple of thoughts that came to me that I wanted to share with you.

First, some things about the United States: There continues to be a great influx of immigration into the United States. Actually, in recent years we've had more immigration in total numbers than at any other time in our history. I live in New York; 42% of the people in New York - 42% - were born outside of the United States, while in Los Angeles the statistics say it's 43%. This is a society that is changing: about 15% of the American population are African Americans, and roughly 15% are Hispanic Americans - a percentage that's rising. However, the group that is rising most in relative terms are Asian Americans. And the reason why I'm mentioning this is because (as a result of immigration and the ties that are born from it) we are becoming more Asian in our outlook as a society, which is a tendency particularly true of elites.

Case in point: If you look at all the other secretary of states in the last fifty years, when they made their first trip overseas they went to three or four European capitals, then they went home. When Secretary of State Albright came to Europe, she went to three or four European capitals: She then went to Moscow, Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing, which was the right thing to do. This was a realistic, smart, intelligent thing to do because relations with those countries are becoming increasingly important for us, as they are to Europeans, aslo. True: Our relations with Moscow have long been very important but, due to the specific character of our historical diplomatic relations, it wasn't necessarily where you started out to visit as secretary of state.

There's also been a shift in the choice of foreign policy channels to work through. Just as Europeans have shifted much of their energies in their foreign policies to working through European institutions, in the last decade the United States has been accomplishing a lot more with the Mexicans and Canadians (for example, in NAFTA), which only makes sense: they live right next to us. In addition, we've started more consultations with countries in the Asian-Pacific region, which absorbs the majority of our foreign trade. And as I just indicated with Secretary Albright's trip, the bilateral relationships with Russia, China and Japan have increased in importance, particularly in terms of dealing with issues that aren't strictly, say, US-Japanese issues; here, I'm referring to matters of

mutual concern for Japan and the US in Guatemala, for instance. Seen this way the fabric, or the network, of foreign policy is becoming much more dense and diversified.

What do I as an American diplomat see happening in Europe regarding your changing perspectives as you look at a new century? Well, it's obvious that, as I said, increasingly your energies are directed towards each other. Yesterday, Professor Vilanova said in reference to the situation in Bosnia that fifteen actors can only agree on a lowest common denominator and that that can not solve problems. Although I have mixed feelings about Bosnia and how it was solved, I think it is nevertheless a fair issue to think about. In my view, Europe finds it very difficult to think about the use of force in foreign policy. As it stands now, to say you have a joint foreign policy means that you are able to agree on a commercial policy, you are able to agree on humanitarian policy, and you are able to agree on foreign policy when deep-seated interests and perspectives are not at stake. Though when deep-seated interests and perspectives are at stake, you can't agree, and not agreeing means you don't act. This is not because you have a lack of institutions: This is because you have a lack of will to act. The reason why force was not used in Bosnia by the European institutions or by the Western Alliance was because Western allies did not agree that force be used. Eventually, that changed. And though the United States had wanted force used for a longer period of time, I could not make an argument I know it would have been effective. No one is picking on anyone here; still, I think it's important to understand it's not that Europeans have bad institutions. But if one wonders why nothing was done, it's simply because decisions weren't made to do it. Maybe I'm being simplistic, but that's the way I look at it.

What would I suggest as to the kind of collective approach we might have as we look ahead? Although the Minister's speech having mostly covered this ground, I'm going to go over a few things again. First, dialogue is highly important, just as the title of the conference reminds us. Dialogue is extremely important with Russia. We were told yesterday by Dr. Baranovsky that "Russia has been downgraded, marginalized, and disengaged". Whether NATO 'expands' or doesn't 'expand', Russia should not be "downgraded, marginalized, and disengaged". We need a rich dialogue with Russia. What's more, and gauging from the tenor of the discussions we've heard here (including the many valid perceptions from those this city is home to), obviously we all need a dialogue with the Mediterranean, where incidentally the United States first deployed its forces and had diplomatic establishments. We need dialogue with other areas that aren't just our home area, too: We need it with Asia. And in pursuing this dialogue, we all have to be careful that we don't contribute to the idea that because that one group of people is Catholic and Protestant, or that another group of people had ancestors who went to Orthodox churches, or some people were Muslims, that they have to be different and they have to have clashes and they have to have security problems. People who are different can find ways to cooperate.

In our own relations, as it is now there is both cooperation and competition between the United States and Europe. Quite simply, what we have to do then is to find ways to emphasize the things that we can cooperate on. If we want to be good partners, we have to have projects that we work on together. You can't have a healthy, long-term relationship with another society and do nothing with it that you care about. There are, after all, enough changes in the world for us to cooperate meaningfully on. Two weeks ago, I was in Zaire in response to the most recent crisis situation there (and this is apropos to an issue which you can read about in the newspapers - that Americans are supposedly at the French throat all the time): When we stopped at Paris after being in Zaire, we spoke to the people in the Ministries in Paris that deal with Zaire, and one adviser working for President Chirac who is depicted as being the most conservative or most difficult to deal with was asked by United States Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson, "What would you like us to do?", and he said "Well, I want you to make a public statement that makes these points." It was no problem: Ambassador Richardson did it. There wasn't a fundamental clash of interests. There might have been twenty years ago, but not today. I would take that kind of cooperation as the example - if you don't make the effort, it's more likely to be seen as a clash. If you make the effort, you can find things that are positive you can collaborate on, which I think creates a dynamism that'll help move us all through some of the uncharted waters out there.

Agreeing with another point which the Minister made, I do think we have to welcome change. He mentioned globalization, scientific and technological innovation, looking East and South, and he also mentioned Spain's low birth rate. If we become timid before these harbingers of changes, we won't do very well in the future. We have to welcome change. And we have to welcome it with more than just having an attitude that we like change or that we're interested by it. By this I mean the following (and this gets to some of the comments on "think tanks" we've heard- I don't know if you need a 'tank' to 'think', but you do need to think): You can't really face the future only by having an attitude about it. You have to think about it enough so you have an objective, so you have a plan, so you have something that you want to do, welcoming change with energy.

Finally, the other point I'd like to make looks at the touchstone of (for worse probably) international relations, that is - how we make decisions about the use of force. Since I've already made some remarks about the difficulties European institutions have in constructing a foreign policy that includes contemplating that question, the following is a question that I rather have for you. I don't have the answer- but when I look at Europe I wonder how can Europeans legitimize the use of force unless the decision is made by politicians who have an immediate responsibility to the electorate that they are going to turn to and say give me your young people to go to that

dangerous place and either be shot at or to use force in order to accomplish an objective. When those decisions are made nationally, there's an immediate response. And though this may be a very American perspective, I feel when you make the decisions about the use of force not nationally but at the European level, you raise vital questions about legitimacy, objectives, and political responsibility. To this American it seems that national governments are still more capable than European institutions to make decisions on the use of force.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation.
Madrid, 8th July 1997.

Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation

Madrid, 8th July 1997

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 8th July 1997

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have come together in Madrid to give shape to the new NATO as we move towards the 21st century. Substantial progress has been achieved in the internal adaptation of the Alliance. As a significant step in the evolutionary process of opening the Alliance, we have invited three countries to begin accession talks. We have substantially strengthened our relationship with Partners through the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and enhancement of the Partnership for Peace. The signature on 27th May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Charter we will sign tomorrow with Ukraine bear witness to our commitment to an undivided Europe. We are also enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue. Our aim is to reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

A new Europe is emerging, a Europe of greater integration and cooperation. An inclusive European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this process.

2. We are moving towards the realisation of our vision of a just and lasting order of peace for Europe as a whole, based on human rights, freedom and democracy. In looking forward to the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty, we reaffirm our commitment to a strong, dynamic partnership between the European and North American Allies, which has been, and will continue to be, the bedrock of the Alliance and of a free and prosperous Europe. The vitality of the transatlantic link will benefit from the development of a true, balanced partnership in which Europe is taking on greater responsibility. In this spirit, we are building a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. We welcome the agreements reached at the European Council in Amsterdam. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

3. While maintaining our core function of collective defence, we have adapted our political and military structures to improve our ability to meet the new challenges of regional crisis and conflict management. NATO's continued contribution to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the unprecedented scale of cooperation with other countries and international organisations there, reflect the cooperative approach which is key to building our common security. A new NATO is developing: a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe.

4. The security of NATO's members is inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe. Improving the security and stability environment for nations in the Euro-Atlantic area where peace is fragile and instability currently prevails remains a major Alliance interest. The consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire continent, in accordance with OSCE principles, is therefore of direct and material concern to the Alliance. NATO's policy is to build effective cooperation through its outreach activities, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, with free nations which share the values of the Alliance, including members of the European Union as well as candidates for EU membership.

5. At our last meeting in Brussels, we said that we would expect and would welcome the accession of new members, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Twelve European countries have so far requested to join the Alliance. We welcome the aspirations and efforts of these nations. The time has come to start a new phase of this process. The Study on NATO Enlargement - which stated, *inter alia*, that NATO's military effectiveness should be sustained as the Alliance enlarges - the results of the intensified dialogue with interested Partners, and the analyses of relevant factors associated with the admission of new members have provided a basis on which to assess the current state of preparations of the twelve countries aspiring to Alliance membership.

6. Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of Accession at the time of the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999. During the period leading to accession, the Alliance will involve invited countries, to the greatest extent possible and where appropriate, in Alliance activities, to ensure

that they are best prepared to undertake the responsibilities and obligations of membership in an enlarged Alliance. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop appropriate arrangements for this purpose.

7. Admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance. It will involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily require. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to bring to an early conclusion the concrete analysis of the resource implications of the forthcoming enlargement, drawing on the continuing work on military implications. We are confident that, in line with the security environment of the Europe of today, Alliance costs associated with the integration of new members will be manageable and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided.

8. We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have previously expressed an interest in becoming NATO members but that were not invited to begin accession talks today will remain under consideration for future membership. The considerations set forth in our 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement will continue to apply with regard to future aspirants, regardless of their geographic location. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies.

To support this process, we strongly encourage the active participation by aspiring members in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, which will further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance. We also intend to continue the Alliance's intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions. To this end, these intensified dialogues will cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision. They will include meeting within the EAPC as well as periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session and the NATO International Staff and with other NATO bodies as appropriate. In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us.

We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999. With regard to the aspiring members, we recognise with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.

The Alliance recognises the need to build greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries of southeast Europe, and in promoting their increasing integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we recognise the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members. As we look to the future of the Alliance, progress towards these objectives will be important for our overall goal of a free, prosperous and undivided Europe at peace.

9. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Sintra constitutes a new dimension in the relations with our Partners. We look forward to tomorrow's meeting with Heads of State and Government under the aegis of the EAPC.

The EAPC will be an essential element in our common endeavour to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Building on the successful experience with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and with Partnership for Peace, it will provide the overarching framework for all aspects of our wide-ranging cooperation and raise it to a qualitatively new level. It will deepen and give more focus to our multilateral political and security-related discussions, enhance the scope and substance of our practical cooperation, and increase transparency and confidence in security matters among all EAPC member states. The expanded political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the EAPC will offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. The EAPC will increase the scope for consultation and cooperation on regional matters and activities.

10. The Partnership for Peace has become the focal point of our efforts to build new patterns of practical cooperation in the security realm. Without PfP, we would not have been able to put together and deploy so effectively and efficiently the Implementation and Stabilisation Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the participation of so many of our Partners.

We welcome and endorse the decision taken in Sintra to enhance the Partnership for Peace by strengthening the political consultation element, increasing the role Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and by making PfP more operational. Partners will, in future, be able to involve themselves more closely in PfP programme issues as well as PfP operations, Partner staff elements will be established at various levels of the military structure of the Alliance, and the Planning and Review Process will become more like the NATO force planning process. On the basis of the principles of inclusiveness and self-differentiation, Partner countries will thus be able to draw closer to the Alliance. We invite all Partner countries to take full advantage of the new possibilities which the enhanced PfP will offer.

With the expanded range of opportunities comes also the need for adequate political and military representation at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. We have therefore created the possibility for Partners to establish diplomatic missions to NATO under the Brussels Agreement which entered into force on 28th March 1997. We invite and encourage Partner countries to take advantage of this opportunity.

11. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed on 27th May 1997 in Paris, is a historic achievement. It opens a new era in European security relations, an era of cooperation between NATO and Russia. The Founding Act

reflects our shared commitment to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security. Its provisions contribute to NATO's underlying objective of enhancing the security of all European states, which is reinforced also through our actions here in Madrid. It provides NATO and Russia a framework through which we intend to create a strong, stable and enduring partnership. We are committed to working with Russia to make full use of the provisions of the Founding Act.

Through the new forum created under the Founding Act, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will consult, cooperate and, where appropriate, act together to address challenges to security in Europe. The activities of the Council will build upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. The cooperation between Russian and NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina and between the staffs at SHAPE demonstrate what is possible when we work together. We will build on this experience, including through PfP, to develop genuine cooperation between NATO and Russia. We look forward to consulting regularly with Russia on a broad range of topics, and to forging closer cooperation, including military-to-military, through the Permanent Joint Council, which will begin work soon.

12. We attach great importance to tomorrow's signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. The NATO-Ukraine Charter will move NATO-Ukraine cooperation onto a more substantive level, offer new potential for strengthening our relationship, and enhance security in the region more widely. We are convinced that Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty are a key factor for ensuring stability in Europe. We continue to support the reform process in Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation with a market economy.

We want to build on steps taken to date in developing a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine. We welcome the practical cooperation achieved with the Alliance through Ukraine's participation within IFOR and SFOR, as well as the recent opening of the NATO Information Office in Kyiv, as important contributions in this regard. We look forward to the early and active implementation of the Charter.

13. The Mediterranean region merits great attention since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the development of the Mediterranean initiative that was launched following our last meeting in Brussels. The dialogue we have established between NATO and a number of Mediterranean countries is developing progressively and successfully, contributes to confidence-building and cooperation in the region, and complements other international efforts. We endorse the measures agreed by NATO Foreign Ministers in Sintra on the widening of the scope and the enhancement of the dialogue and, on the basis of their recommendation, have decided today to establish under the authority of the North Atlantic Council a new committee, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, which will have the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue.

14. We welcome the progress made on the Alliance's internal adaptation. Its fundamental objectives are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within

the Alliance. We recognise the substantive work which has been carried out on the development of a new command structure for the Alliance; the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept; and the building of ESDI within NATO. We attach great importance to an early and successful completion of this process. Building on the earlier reductions and restructuring of the Alliance's military forces, it will provide the Alliance with the full range of capabilities needed to meet the challenges of the future.

15. We welcome the substantial progress made on the development of a new command structure which will enable the Alliance to carry out the whole range of its missions more effectively and flexibly, support our enhanced relationship with Partners and the admission of new members, and provide, as part of the development of ESDI within NATO, for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations.

We note that essential elements of the new command structure have been identified and will form the basis for further work. We must maintain the momentum of this work. We have, accordingly, directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the Military Committee, to work on the resolution of outstanding issues with the aim of reaching agreement on NATO's future command structure by the time of the Council Ministerial meetings in December.

16. Against this background, the members of the Alliance's integrated military structure warmly welcome today's announcement by Spain of its readiness to participate fully in the Alliance's new command structure, once agreement has been reached upon it. Spain's full participation will enhance its overall contribution to the security of the Alliance, help develop the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO and strengthen the transatlantic link.

17. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the CJTF concept, including the initial designation of parent headquarters, and look forward to the forthcoming trials. This concept will enhance our ability to command and control multinational and multiservice forces, generated and deployed at short notice, which are capable of conducting a wide range of military operations. Combined Joint Task Forces will also facilitate the possible participation of non-NATO nations in operations and, by enabling the conduct of WEU-led CJTF operations, will contribute to the development of ESDI within the Alliance.

18. We reaffirm, as stated in our 1994 Brussels Declaration, our full support for the development of the European Security and Defence Identity by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations. With this in mind, the Alliance is building ESDI, grounded on solid military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permitting the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. We endorse the decisions taken at last year's Ministerial meeting in Berlin in this regard which serve the interests of the Alliance as well as of the WEU.

We further endorse the considerable progress made in implementing these decisions and in developing ESDI within the Alliance. In this context we endorse the decisions taken with regard to European command arrangements within NATO to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities (including provisional terms of reference for Deputy

SACEUR covering his ESDI-related responsibilities both permanent and during crises and operations), the arrangements for the identification of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led operations, and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations. We welcome inclusion of the support for the conduct of WEU-led operations in the context of the ongoing implementation of the revised Alliance defence planning process for all Alliance missions. We also welcome the progress made on work regarding the planning and future exercising of WEU-led operations, and in developing the necessary practical arrangements for release, monitoring and return of NATO assets and the exchange of information between NATO and WEU within the framework of the NATO-WEU Security Agreement.

We note with satisfaction that the building of ESDI within the Alliance has much benefitted from the recent agreement in the WEU on the participation of all European Allies, if they were so to choose, in WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing for such operations. We also note the desire on Canada's part to participate in such operations when its interests make it desirable and under modalities to be developed. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to complete expeditiously its work on developing ESDI within NATO, in cooperation with the WEU.

19. The Alliance Strategic Concept, which we adopted at our meeting in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance. Recognising that the strategic environment has changed since then, we have decided to examine the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges. As recommended by our Foreign Ministers in Sintra, we have decided to direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop terms of reference for this examination, and an update as necessary, for endorsement at the Autumn Ministerial meetings. This work will confirm our commitment to the core function of Alliance collective defence and the indispensable transatlantic link.

20. We reiterate our commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including as necessary through joint consultations on how to address contingencies. In this context, we are determined to strengthen the institutional cooperation between the two organisations. We welcome the fact that the WEU has recently undertaken to improve its capacity to plan and conduct crisis management and peacekeeping operations (the Petersberg tasks), including through setting the groundwork for possible WEU-led operations with the support of NATO assets and capabilities, and accepted the Alliance's invitation to contribute to NATO's Ministerial Guidance for defence planning. We will therefore continue to develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning, preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.

21. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening the OSCE as a regional organisation according to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary instrument for preventing conflict, enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights. The OSCE, as the most inclusive European-wide security organisation, plays an essential role in securing peace, stability and security in Europe. The principles and commitments adopted by the OSCE provide a foundation for the development of a comprehensive and cooperative European security architecture.

Our goal is to create in Europe, through the widest possible cooperation among OSCE states, a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of particular states.

We continue to support the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in accordance with the decisions of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, including consideration of developing a Charter on European Security.

22. We welcome the successful holding of elections in Albania as a vital first step in providing the basis for greater stability, democratic government and law and order in the country. We stress, in this context, the importance of a firm commitment by all political forces to continue the process of national reconciliation. We also welcome the crucial role of the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, with the participation of several Allies and Partners, in helping to create a secure environment for the re-establishment of peace and order. We value the efforts of the OSCE as the coordinating framework for international assistance in Albania, together with the important contributions made by the EU, WEU and the Council of Europe. We are following closely events in Albania and are considering measures through the Partnership for Peace to assist, as soon as the situation permits, in the reconstruction of the armed forces of Albania as an important element of the reform process. Continued international support will be essential in helping to restore stability in Albania.

23. We continue to attach greatest importance to further the means of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

We welcome the progress made since the Brussels Summit, as an integral part of NATO's adaptation, to intensify and expand Alliance political and defence efforts aimed at preventing proliferation and safeguarding NATO's strategic unity and freedom of action despite the risks posed by nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. We attach the utmost importance to these efforts, welcome the Alliance's substantial achievements, and direct that work continue.

We call on all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Recognising that enhancing confidence in compliance would reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we reaffirm our determination to complete as soon as possible through negotiation a legally binding and effective verification mechanism. We urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty without delay so that negotiation of START III may begin.

We support the vigorous pursuit of an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban world-wide the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. We note the positive developments in the Conference on Disarmament. We further note the progress made by the Ottawa Process with its goal of achieving a ban by the end of the year.

24. We continue to attach utmost importance to the CFE Treaty and its integrity. In this context, we welcome the entry into force of the CFE Flank Agreement on 15th May 1997 and underline its importance for regional stability. We share the commitment of all thirty States Parties to continue full

implementation of the CFE Treaty, its associated documents, and the Flank Agreement. We confirm our readiness to work cooperatively with other States Parties to achieve, as expeditiously as possible, an adapted CFE Treaty that takes account of the changed political and military circumstances in Europe, continues to serve as a cornerstone of stability, and provides undiminished security for all. NATO has advanced a comprehensive proposal for adaptation of the CFE Treaty on the basis of a revised Treaty structure of national and territorial ceilings. The Allies have already stated their intention to reduce significantly their future aggregate national ceilings for Treaty-Limited Equipment. We look forward to working with other States Parties on the early completion of a Framework Agreement on CFE adaptation.

25. We reaffirm the importance of arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature, including those linked to illegal arms trade and acts of terrorism, which affect Alliance security interests. We continue to condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.

26. The steps we have taken today, and tomorrow's meeting with our Partners under the aegis of the EAPC, bring us closer to our goal of building cooperative security in Europe. We remain committed to a free and undivided Euro-Atlantic community in which all can enjoy peace and prosperity. Renewed in structure and approach, strengthened in purpose and resolve, and with a growing membership, NATO will continue to play its part in achieving this goal and in meeting the security challenges in the times ahead.

27. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Spain. We are looking forward to meeting again on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1999.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between
NATO and the Russian Federation.
Paris, 27 May 1997.

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.

NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

This Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia.

NATO has undertaken a historic transformation — a process that will continue. In 1991 the Alliance revised its strategic doctrine to take account of the new security environment in Europe. Accordingly, NATO has radically reduced and continues the adaptation of its conventional and nuclear forces. While preserving the capability to meet the commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty, NATO has

expanded and will continue to expand its political functions, and taken on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to address new security challenges in close association with other countries and international organisations. NATO is in the process of developing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. It will continue to develop a broad and dynamic pattern of cooperation with OSCE participating States in particular through the Partnership for Peace and is working with Partner countries on the initiative to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO member States have decided to examine NATO's Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges.

Russia is continuing the building of a democratic society and the realisation of its political and economic transformation. It is developing the concept of its national security and revising its military doctrine to ensure that they are fully consistent with new security realities. Russia has carried out deep reductions in its armed forces, has withdrawn its forces on an unprecedented scale from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries and withdrawn all its nuclear weapons back to its own national territory. Russia is committed to further reducing its conventional and nuclear forces. It is actively participating in peacekeeping operations in support of the UN and the OSCE, as well as in crisis management in different areas of the world. Russia is contributing to the multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I. PRINCIPLES

Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states.

NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as in enhancing its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. The OSCE, as the only pan-European security organisation, has a key role in European peace and stability. In strengthening the OSCE, NATO and Russia will cooperate to prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state.

Consistent with the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, and taking into account the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a Charter on European security, NATO and Russia will seek the widest possible cooperation among

participating States of the OSCE with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.

NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability.

This Act does not affect, and cannot be regarded as affecting, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, or the role of the OSCE as the inclusive and comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its area and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

In implementing the provisions in this Act, NATO and Russia will observe in good faith their obligations under international law and international instruments, including the obligations of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as well as their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:

- development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
- acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security;
- refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act;
- respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;
- mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines;
- prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;
- support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

II. MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION, THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL

To carry out the activities and aims provided for by this Act and to develop common approaches to European security and to political problems, NATO and Russia will create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.

The Permanent Joint Council will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia.

The shared objective of NATO and Russia is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible. As the relationship develops, they expect that additional opportunities for joint action will emerge.

The Permanent Joint Council will be the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability. Extraordinary meetings of the Council will take place in addition to its regular meetings to allow for prompt consultations in case of emergencies. In this context, NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will be built upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. In the course of their consultations and cooperation, NATO and Russia will inform each other regarding the respective security-related challenges they face and the measures that each intends to take to address them.

Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states.

The Permanent Joint Council will meet at various levels and in different forms, according to the subject matter and the wishes of NATO and Russia. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors/permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council.

The Permanent Joint Council may also meet, as appropriate, at the level of Heads of State and Government.

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The Permanent Joint Council may establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate.

Under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet; meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, and also monthly at military representatives level. Meetings of military experts may be convened, as appropriate.

The Permanent Joint Council will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member States on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia.

To support the work of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish the necessary administrative structures.

Russia will establish a Mission to NATO headed by a representative at the rank of Ambassador. A senior military representative and his staff will be part of this Mission for the purposes of the military cooperation. NATO retains the possibility of establishing an appropriate presence in Moscow, the modalities of which remain to be determined.

The agenda for regular sessions will be established jointly. Organisational arrangements and rules of procedure for the Permanent Joint Council will be worked out. These arrangements will be in place for the inaugural meeting of the Permanent Joint Council which will be held no later than four months after the signature of this Act.

The Permanent Joint Council will engage in three distinct activities:

- consulting on the topics in Section III of this Act and on any other political or security issue determined by mutual consent;
- on the basis of these consultations, developing joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel;
- once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation, making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis, including participation, on an equitable basis, in the planning and preparation of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia, together or separately, must be consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE's governing principles.

Recognizing the importance of deepening contacts between the legislative bodies of the participating States to this Act, NATO and Russia will also encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

III. AREAS FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION

In building their relationship, NATO and Russia will focus on specific areas of mutual interest. They will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the following areas:

- issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area or to concrete crises, including the contribution of NATO and Russia to security and stability in this area;
- conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these organisations in these fields;
- joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and if Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation in them at an early stage;
- participation of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
- exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes;
- arms control issues;
- nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum;
- preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combatting nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspects of proliferation;
- possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence;
- enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic capacity and reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, to promote confidence through increased measures of transparency and exchanges of information in relation to air defence and related aspects of airspace management/control. This will include exploring possible cooperation on appropriate air defence related matters;
- increasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of member States of NATO and Russia;
- reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO and Russia;
- coordinating a programme of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments, as further detailed below;
- pursuing possible armaments-related cooperation through association of Russia with NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors;

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- conversion of defence industries;
- developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defence-related economic, environmental and scientific fields;
- conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;
- combatting terrorism and drug trafficking;
- improving public understanding of evolving relations between NATO and Russia, including the establishment of a NATO documentation centre or information office in Moscow.

Other areas can be added by mutual agreement.

IV. POLITICAL-MILITARY MATTERS

NATO and Russia affirm their shared desire to achieve greater stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.

Recognising the importance of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) for the broader context of security in the OSCE area and the work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, the member States of NATO and Russia will work together in Vienna with the other States Parties to adapt the CFE Treaty to enhance its viability and effectiveness, taking into account Europe's changing security environment and the legitimate security interests of all OSCE participating States. They share the objective of concluding an adaptation agreement as expeditiously as possible and, as a first step in this process, they will, together with other States Parties to the CFE Treaty, seek to conclude as soon as possible a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, consistent with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment permitted in the Treaty's area of application

compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party. NATO and Russia encourage all States Parties to the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe's security environment.

The member States of NATO and Russia commit themselves to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations, as foreseen in the Document on Scope and Parameters, in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces - in particular with respect to their levels of forces and deployments - in the Treaty's area of application, in order to avoid developments in the security situation in Europe diminishing the security of any State Party. This commitment is without prejudice to possible voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests.

The member States of NATO and Russia proceed on the basis that adaptation of the CFE Treaty should help to ensure equal security for all States Parties irrespective of their membership of a politico-military alliance, both to preserve and strengthen stability and continue to prevent any destabilizing increase of forces in various regions of Europe and in Europe as a whole. An adapted CFE Treaty should also further enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and verification, and permit the possible accession by new States Parties.

The member States of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to take and resulting national Treaty-Limited Equipment ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all States Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, the substantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished.

The member States of NATO and Russia reaffirm that States Parties to the CFE Treaty should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty.

Each State-Party will base its agreement to the provisions of the adapted Treaty on all national ceilings of the States Parties, on its projections of the current and future security situation in Europe.

In addition, in the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the member States of NATO and Russia will, together with other States Parties, seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include Central and Eastern Europe.

Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation

NATO and Russia have clarified their intentions with regard to their conventional force postures in Europe's new security environment and are prepared to consult on the evolution of these postures in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council.

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

The member States of NATO and Russia will strive for greater transparency, predictability and mutual confidence with regard to their armed forces. They will comply fully with their obligations under the Vienna Document 1994 and develop cooperation with the other OSCE participating States, including negotiations in the appropriate format, *inter alia* within the OSCE to promote confidence and security.

The member States of NATO and Russia will use and improve existing arms control regimes and confidence-building measures to create security relations based on peaceful cooperation.

NATO and Russia, in order to develop cooperation between their military establishments, will expand political-military consultations and cooperation through the Permanent Joint Council with an enhanced dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its member States and of Russia. They will implement a programme of significantly expanded military activities and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels. Consistent with the tenets of the Permanent Joint Council, this enhanced military-to-military dialogue will be built upon the principle that neither party views the other as a threat nor seeks to disadvantage the other's security. This enhanced military-to-military dialogue will include regularly-scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will include the broad possibilities for joint exercises and training.

To support this enhanced dialogue and the military components of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish military liaison missions at various levels on the basis of reciprocity and further mutual arrangements.

To enhance their partnership and ensure this partnership is grounded to the greatest extent possible in practical activities and direct cooperation, NATO's and Russia's respective military authorities will explore the further development of a concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. This initiative should build upon the positive experience of working together in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the lessons learned there will be used in the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces.

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The present Act takes effect upon the date of its signature.

NATO and Russia will take the proper steps to ensure its implementation in accordance with their procedures.

The present Act is established in two originals in the French, English and Russian language.

The Secretary General of NATO and the Government of the Russian Federation will provide the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the OSCE with the text of this Act with the request to circulate it to all members of their Organisations.

**REVISTA CIDOB d'AFERS
INTERNACIONALS 38-39.**

**European Security: dialogues for the
21st Century.**

Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.
Berlin, 3 June 1996

Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council

Berlin, 3 June 1996

Final Communiqué

1. We met today in Berlin, the capital of a united Germany and the city that stood for the success of Alliance policy and transatlantic cohesion for over four decades. Its unification is now a symbol of the new era of partnership and cooperation.

2. Here in Berlin, we have taken a major step forward in shaping the new NATO, a NATO taking on new missions such as IFOR. Today, we have taken decisions to carry further the ongoing adaptation of Alliance structures so that the Alliance can more effectively carry out the full range of its missions, based on a strong transatlantic partnership; build a European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; continue the process of opening the Alliance to new members; and develop further strong ties of cooperation with all Partner countries, including the further enhancement of our strong relationship with Ukraine, and the development of a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia.

3. This new NATO has become an integral part of the emerging, broadly based, cooperative European security structure. We are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with many of our new Partners and other countries, contributing through the Implementation Force (IFOR) to bringing an end to war and conflict in that country and assisting the building of peace in the region. This joint endeavour, the largest military operation in the Alliance's history, points the way to our future security cooperation throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

4. We have today given new impetus to the process of the Alliance's adaptation and reform, which began in 1990 at the NATO Summit meeting in London and was carried forward at the 1994 Brussels Summit. Taking into account the sweeping changes in the security environment in Europe as new

democracies have taken root and following the adoption of our new Strategic Concept in 1991, we have reorganised and streamlined our political and military structures and procedures; reduced significantly our force and readiness levels; and reconfigured our forces to make them better able to carry out the new missions of crisis management, while preserving the capability for collective defence. In addition, we have been conducting an expanding array of outreach activities with our Partners. We want to make our adapted Alliance better able to fulfil its main purpose: peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

5. Much has been achieved, but now is the moment to take a decisive step forward in making the Alliance increasingly flexible and effective to meet new challenges. Therefore we are determined to:

- adapt Alliance structures. An essential part of this adaptation is to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, which will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves required; and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership;

- develop further our ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management and the Alliance's efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, while maintaining our capability for collective defence; and

- enhance our contribution to security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by broadening and deepening our dialogue and cooperation with Partners, notably through PfP and NACC, and by further developing our important relations with Russia and Ukraine, as we maintain our openness to new members through our established enlargement process and strengthen our links with other organisations which contribute to European security.

6. Today we welcome the progress achieved in the internal adaptation of our Alliance, building on the decisions taken at the 1994 Brussels Summit, in particular:

- the completion of the CJTF concept. By permitting a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including for new missions, this concept will facilitate the mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU, and the participation of nations outside the Alliance in operations such as IFOR. We now request the Military Committee to make recommendations to the Council for the implementation of this concept to the satisfaction of all Allies, taking into account ongoing work to adapt military structures and procedures;

- the establishment of the Policy Coordination Group (PCG), which will meet the need, especially in NATO's new missions, for closer coordination of political and military viewpoints;

- the first results of the Military Committee's Long-Term Study, which will result recommendations for a military command structure better suited to current and future Euro-Atlantic security. We task the Military Committee to continue its work on Long-Term Study, consistent with the decisions we have taken today;

- completion of original work plans of the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) to address the common security concern of proliferation;

- the meeting later this month of the North Atlantic Council (Defence Ministers), in which all 16 NATO countries will take part.

7. In our adaptation efforts to improve the Alliance's capability to fulfil its roles and missions, with the participation of all Allies, we will be guided by three fundamental objectives.

The first objective is to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness so that it is able, in the changing security environment facing Europe, to perform its traditional mission of collective defence and through flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing circumstances, based on:

- situation in Europe and enables all Allies to participate fully and which is able to undertake all missions through procedures to be defined in accordance with decisions by the Council;

- HQ structures which are more deployable and forces which are more mobile, both capable of being sustained for extended periods;

- the ability to provide for increased participation of Partner countries and to integrate new members into the Alliance's military structure;

- the ability to mount NATO non-Article 5 operations, guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions. We will further develop flexible arrangements capable of undertaking a variety of missions and taking into account national decisions on participation in each operation, building upon the strength of NATO's existing arrangements. These operations may differ from one another in contributions by Allies and, as a result of Council decision on a case-by-case basis, aspects of military command and control. The CJTF concept is central to our approach for assembling forces for contingency operations and organising their command within the Alliance. Consistent with the goal of building the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, these arrangements should permit all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures and, as appropriate, in contingency operations undertaken by the Alliance;

- increased political-military cooperation in particular through the PCG, and effective exercise of political control by the North Atlantic Council through the Military Committee;

- the need for cost-effectiveness.

The second objective is to preserve the transatlantic link, based on:

- maintenance of the Alliance as the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty;

- further development of the strong partnership between North American and European Allies, both politically and militarily, and including a continued involvement of the North American Allies across the command and force structure;

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- readiness to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance, wherever possible;
- full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including as necessary through joint consultations on how to address contingencies.

The third objective is the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.

As an essential element of the development of this identity, we will prepare, with the involvement of NATO and the WEU, for WEU-led operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and forces). Such preparations within the Alliance should take into account the participation, including in European command arrangements, of all European Allies if they were so to choose. It will be based on:

- identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate HQs, HQ elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject to decision by the NAC;

- elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the rapid constitution of a militarily coherent and effective operational force.

Further, the Alliance will support the development of the ESDI within NATO by conducting at the request of and in coordination with the WEU, military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions identified by the WEU. On the basis of political guidance to be provided by the WEU Council and the NAC, such planning would, at a minimum:

- prepare relevant information on objectives, scope and participation for illustrative WEU missions;
- identify requirements for planning and exercising of command elements and forces for illustrative WEU-led operations;
- develop appropriate plans for submission through the MC and NAC to the WEU for review and approval.

NATO and the WEU should agree on arrangements for implementing such plans. The NAC will approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, keep itself informed on their use through monitoring with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities and through regular consultations with the WEU Council, and keep their use under review.

8. On the basis of the guidelines agreed today, we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of NATO's Military Authorities:

- to provide guidance and develop specific proposals for further adapting the Alliance's structures and procedures;

- to develop, with regard to the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, appropriate measures and arrangements for implementing the provisions of paragraph 7. Among the arrangements which require detailed elaboration will be provisions for the identification and release for use by the WEU of NATO capabilities, assets, and HQs and HQ elements for missions to be performed by the WEU; any necessary supplement to existing information-sharing arrangements for the conduct of WEU operations; and how consultations will be conducted with the NAC on the use of NATO assets and capabilities, including the NATO monitoring of the use of these assets;

and to report to our December meeting with recommendations for decisions.

9. As part of this work, we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to review the ongoing work on NATO's military command structure and to report to us at our next meeting with recommendations.

10. The second aspect of the Alliance's adaptation is to develop our ability to carry out new roles and missions such as Operation Joint Endeavour. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) is successfully implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an agreement of historic importance for the development of peace, security and reconciliation in the region. The IFOR operation has brought together NATO with 16 non-NATO countries from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and Asia in a unified and effective coalition for peace. This includes 12 of our NACC and PfP Partners, which emphasises our joint commitment to new forms of cooperative security in Europe. Russia's contribution underscores both the ability of the Alliance to build practical new partnerships and Russia's essential role in the new international security environment.

In the six months of its deployment, IFOR has helped to re-establish the belief among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina that peace is possible. A secure environment is becoming a reality. The forces of the former warring factions have been separated and are in the process of demobilising and moving to cantonments. IFOR will not tolerate threats to peace or impediments to freedom of movement. It will continue to fulfil its mandate in an even-handed and fair manner.

IFOR is providing increased support to the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement within its existing mandate, so long as this does not detract from its primary military mission. The success of the civilian mission is key to lasting peace and rehabilitation, in particular through economic and social reconstruction, the conduct of free and fair elections, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and the maintenance of law and order. The apprehending of war criminals and the investigation of war crimes are essential to bring justice and durable peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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We pay tribute to the work of the High Representative and will continue to support him in his difficult coordination task. We note with approval IFOR's effective cooperation with his Office. IFOR is also actively working with other civilian organisations, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in its planning for the return of refugees and displaced persons; the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in investigating war crimes and bringing war criminals to justice; with the International Police Task Force in its task of rebuilding law and order; with the International Committee of the Red Cross in respect of humanitarian issues; and with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in respect of its responsibilities for the preparation and conduct of elections and for arms control and confidence-building measures. In this connection, we call on the Parties to conclude a sub-regional arms control agreement by 11th June, as foreseen in the Peace Agreement.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been ended, but the peace remains fragile. The period between now and September will be crucial for preparing the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina - a significant milestone along the path to democracy and reconstruction. Given the magnitude and complexity of this task, IFOR will be maintained at approximately its current force levels until after the elections which will have to take place in September at the latest under the Peace Agreement, and will retain its overall capability until December, when IFOR's mandate comes to an end.

IFOR also stands ready to provide emergency support, as agreed, to UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia as peace there is realised.

We commend the professionalism, dedication to duty, and bravery of all IFOR participants, jointly and individually, and express deep sympathy to the families of those who have given their lives or been injured in the cause of peace.

NATO has helped provide a vision of peace through cooperative efforts, even among former adversaries. All our countries are deeply engaged, directly and through international cooperation, in establishing the conditions for enduring peace and reconstruction by promoting mutual confidence, justice, reconciliation and military stability. The international community can provide assistance and advice, but the people and leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region must assume their own responsibilities for building peace. We call on all parties to devote renewed energies to these goals and to honour fully their commitment to implement the Peace Agreement.

11. A key part of Alliance adaptation is action stemming from the decision taken at the 1994 Brussels Summit to intensify and expand the Alliance's political and defence efforts against the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons continues to be a matter of serious concern to NATO as it can pose a direct threat to international security. We remain committed to our aim to prevent proliferation in the first place, or, if it occurs, to reverse it through diplomatic means. NATO as a defensive alliance must bear the responsibility to ensure means to protect its members against the risks resulting from proliferation.

The work of the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) - both established following the 1994 Brussels Summit - is an essential element of maintaining Alliance security and an integral aspect of NATO's adaptation to the new security environment facing Europe. We are satisfied with the progress of the work of the SGP and have endorsed the recommendations of the DGP for improvements to Alliance military capabilities to address the risks posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery means.

12. As part of its overall adaptation, the Alliance has continued to adapt to the new security situation facing Europe by strengthening its relations with the Partner countries and with other international organisations playing important roles in enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. This pattern of growing, open and transparent cooperation has become a central feature of the Alliance's concept of cooperative security.

13. We reaffirm our commitment to open the Alliance to new members. The process of enlargement is on track and we are convinced that the overall adaptation of the Alliance will facilitate this process. As decided last December, we have a three-fold process for advancing our preparations this year: we are conducting an intensified dialogue with interested countries; working on a further enhancement of PfP both to help possible new members to join and to provide a strong long-term partnership with NATO for others; and considering the necessary internal adaptations for enlargement. We have today reviewed progress in each of these areas and are pleased at the steady advances being made. We have received a report on the ongoing consultations in the individual, intensified dialogue with, so far, fifteen interested countries. It provides them with an opportunity to improve their understanding of the Alliance and to address implications of NATO enlargement, and provides those who aim for membership with specific and practical details of Alliance membership. The dialogue will continue actively over the coming months. We are pleased to note the national efforts of Partners complementing our work. We will ensure that considerations about enlargement are factored into our deliberations and decisions on the internal adaptation process of the Alliance. We look forward to a report by the Secretary General at our next meeting in December, at which time we will assess progress and consider the way forward.

We reaffirm our determination that the process of opening the Alliance to new members should not create dividing lines in Europe or isolate any country. Our goal remains ever-closer and deeper cooperative ties with all NACC and PfP Partners who wish to build such relations with us. The enlargement of the Alliance is consistent with a wider process of cooperation and integration already underway in today's Europe involving the EU and the WEU as well as the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other European institutions. Our strategy is to help build a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe.

14. Partnership for Peace has become a permanent element of European security cooperation and has demonstrated its value in the current IFOR operation. We are particularly pleased that 12 Partners have joined us in this endeavour, which has benefitted from the experience and interoperability gained in the last two years from the participation of Partner troop contributors in joint PfP exercises and other PfP activities. This first common experience in IFOR charts the course for future security

cooperation. We hope to ensure that cooperative relationships developed during the IFOR operation between Allies and Partners continue in the future to enhance the Partnership. We intend to take further measures to increase Partners' involvement in our efforts to promote security through regional cooperation, including through facilitating participation in CJTF at an early stage. This will be particularly important as the Alliance adapts to meet its new missions.

We are pleased that the Allies and Partners together have made significant progress in achieving the goals set for PfP by the NAC Communiqué of December 1995. The wide interest and active participation by Partner countries have significantly carried forward the Partnership for Peace in a short time.

We seek constantly to enhance the scope and substance of our PfP cooperation. We therefore welcome the report from the Council in Permanent Session on the extra steps which can be taken in the short term, in particular the broadening and deepening of the PfP Planning and Review Process which will accelerate progress towards interoperability, and the intensification of work on civil-military relations and defence policy and planning.

The Council in Permanent Session should also examine ideas outlined in general terms in the report for longer-term strengthening of PfP. Specifically, we should increase opportunities for Partners to assume a more consultative and deliberative role in shaping PfP programmes, including in evaluating and upgrading PfP interoperability objectives and the PfP exercise programme. Partners should also be involved in the PfP exercise and other military planning activities at different levels through the Coordination Cell, and with the MNCs and subordinate commands for detailed operational planning. In addition, we should ensure that the cooperative relationships Partners and Allies are developing in IFOR continue in the future as part of PfP regional cooperative programmes.

15. We are looking forward to our 6th meeting with Partners tomorrow in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The Council provides us with a forum for regular, multilateral consultations on political and security issues. Together with the Partnership for Peace, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, especially through broad participation by Partner countries in numerous NATO-based committees, contributes increasingly to European security and stability by deepening interaction and developing common approaches. We are pleased with the results of the NACC's more focussed discussions, especially in the field of promoting good- neighbourly relations and developing civil-military relations. We look forward to deepening this process. When we next meet in December, we will review the progress made in strengthening NACC's role and further developing cooperation between Allies and Partners, on the basis of a report by the Council in Permanent Session.

16. We reaffirm our strong support for the ongoing political and economic reforms in Russia. In a few days the Russian Federation will hold national presidential elections. We hope that these elections will mark a further consolidation of Russia's reform process.

We remain convinced that the development of a strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is an essential element of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We all want to have solid and constructive bilateral relations with Russia and close, cooperative, far-reaching relations

between NATO and Russia. We have initiated a considerable number of contacts, consultations and programmes to strengthen our partnership. Here in Berlin, we extend again our hand of friendship, partnership and cooperation to Russia.

We welcome Russia's substantive contribution to IFOR in implementing the military aspects of the Paris Peace Agreement. We are pleased with the prevailing spirit of cooperation, shared objectives, and joint efforts to ensure operational military effectiveness. We hope that this experience of working closely together will have a lasting positive impact on our relationship. It demonstrates that we can collaborate effectively on issues of European peace and stability. It points the way towards the construction of cooperative security structures in Europe with the active participation of NATO and Russia.

We are pleased that important consultations have taken place in a 16+1 format on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and the CFE Treaty, among others, and that cooperation in different fields of NATO's activities is ongoing. We are pleased with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness between the Alliance and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters. We want to widen the scope and deepen the intensity of relations with Russia, on both the political and the military levels, in line with the approach set out in the document on "Areas for Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO/Russia Dialogue and Cooperation" which we agreed in June 1995. We reiterate our proposal to achieve a political framework for NATO-Russia relations elaborating basic principles for security cooperation as well as for the development of permanent mechanisms for political consultations.

17. We remain convinced that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors of stability and security in Europe. We are pleased with Ukraine's active participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace. Since our last meeting, NATO-Ukraine relations have deepened through the implementation of the document on enhanced NATO-Ukraine relations agreed in September 1995 and through Ukraine's active participation in IFOR. We welcome the deepening of our dialogue and cooperation in such diverse fields as civil emergency planning, scientific affairs and information activities. In this context, we note with appreciation Ukraine's offer to provide support for enhanced NATO information efforts in that country. We wish to develop our cooperative activities further, through concrete work in the areas set out in the September 1995 document, and take further opportunities to enhance the substance of the relationship. We welcome the recent announcement that all nuclear weapons have been transferred from the territory of Ukraine for dismantlement, in accordance with the US-Russia-Ukraine trilateral statement signed in Moscow in January 1994.

18. We are determined to enhance NATO's information efforts in Russia and Ukraine in consultation with their governments. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to take concrete steps to this end.

19. We will also continue to develop our cooperative relationships, bilaterally and through the Alliance's initiatives, with all newly independent states. Their democratic and economic development,

continued independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are essential factors for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

20. We are satisfied with the growing ties between NATO and the WEU, and are determined to broaden and deepen our cooperation with the WEU, on the basis of the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. We welcome the conclusion of a security agreement between our organisations, and the framework it provides for the exchange of information critical to the pursuit of our common security objectives. We hope that this will open the way for more intensive cooperation. We are pleased that, in response to our mandate to the Council in Permanent Session, additional areas of focussed NATO-WEU cooperation (joint meetings on their respective Mediterranean dialogues and exchanges of information in the field of relations with Russia and Ukraine) have been identified. We will explore possibilities for enhanced cooperation in other areas as well. We attach importance to our consultations, including in joint NATO-WEU Council meetings, on issues of common concern. We welcome the resumption of meetings of the WEU Permanent Council with SACEUR.

We continue to support the WEU in its efforts to enhance the development of its operational capabilities and welcome the decisions taken in this regard last month at the WEU Ministerial Council in Birmingham.

21. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has an essential role to play in European security and stability. We reaffirm our commitment to support the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security and the ongoing process of developing a security model for the 21st Century. We value the OSCE's effectiveness in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and the work of the High Commissioner for National Minorities. These are important contributions to regional stability which we will continue to support and work to strengthen.

The OSCE is playing a vitally important role in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributing to implementing civil aspects of the Peace Agreement, particularly in supervising the preparation and conduct of the first elections, in promoting and monitoring human rights, and in overseeing implementation of confidence- and security-building measures and negotiation of arms limitations. These tasks are a major contribution to building a just and stable peace in the region. IFOR is supporting the OSCE's tasks, and in particular the preparation of the elections, by helping to create a secure environment and promoting freedom of movement. We are also pleased with the practical support that NATO has been able to provide through its Verification Coordination Section to the OSCE in helping establish measures to verify the arms control elements of the Peace Agreement. We support the continued development of such pragmatic cooperation between NATO and the OSCE.

We remain deeply concerned about developments in Chechnya which have caused so much suffering and so many casualties. We welcome the announcement of a ceasefire in Chechnya and look forward to its full and effective implementation. We call for continued meaningful negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, using the continuing good offices of the OSCE. We support the efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve a political settlement of the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

We welcome the established contacts between the North Atlantic Council and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. We will continue our efforts to strengthen dialogue between NATO and the OSCE on issues of common concern, including through senior representation at Ministerial meetings and, on a more routine basis, through the International Staff.

22. We support the ongoing Middle East peace process, and urge all participants to remain committed to it. We reiterate our conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security and stability in the Mediterranean. We attach particular importance to the progress of our Mediterranean dialogue with non-NATO countries. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia are participating today in the political dialogue underway. We are pleased with the interest shown by the dialogue countries and with the talks already held. We are convinced that this dialogue is a contribution to a better mutual understanding with a view to contributing to stability in the region. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to report at our meeting in December on the activities undertaken on the basis of the dialogue.

23. We strongly support the work of the Conference on Disarmament in achieving a truly comprehensive and sufficiently verifiable global ban on all nuclear testing by September this year at the latest and in initiating negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty on the basis of the already-existing mandate.

We emphasise the importance of the START Treaties for international stability and security, and commend the United States and Russia for implementation of their START I obligations. We welcome ratification of START II by the United States Senate last January and urge its early ratification by the Russian Federation.

We look forward to the early entry into force and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and strongly endorse efforts underway to negotiate a compliance regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

We urge the early ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by those states which have not already ratified.

24. We welcome the successful outcome of the CFE Treaty Review Conference in Vienna. The Final Document agreed by the 30 States Parties reaffirms their common commitment to preserve the integrity of the Treaty and achieve its full implementation. The success of the Conference confirms that the CFE Treaty is and will remain for the future a cornerstone of European security and stability. We call upon those States Parties which have not yet fully completed their reductions obligations to do so as soon as possible.

We note with satisfaction the achievement of a cooperative solution to the flank issue. This is an important step in ensuring the full implementation of the Treaty and the preservation of its integrity. In this context, we underscore the importance of full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved. It provides a reaffirmation of the continuing relevance of the basic structures of the Treaty, including the principle of zonal limitations. We look forward to its full and timely implementation.

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The Allies welcome agreement by the States Parties to the Treaty to begin discussions aimed at defining the scope and parameters of a process aimed at improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment. They look forward to participating actively in this work together with the other States Parties, with a view to reporting initial progress at the time of the OSCE Summit in Lisbon in December 1996 including recommendations on the way ahead.

25. We support all efforts to combat terrorism, a universal scourge which remains a source of concern to all of us. We welcome the growing international awareness and cooperation as regards terrorism since our last meeting, and note with satisfaction the conclusions of the Sharm-el Sheikh Summit, as well as the work advanced by the international community in the relevant fora.

26. We express our deep appreciation to the Government of Germany for hosting this meeting.

ABSTRACTS

The Spanish View of European Security for the Next Millenium

Eduardo Serra

Assessing that European security cannot be disassociated from Euro-Atlantic security, Minister Serra points out that after the Cold War the vertical tension between North and South will be the epicenter of the strategic panorama. This tension derives from the existence of risks that are security related, economic, demographic, political, and social in nature. Serra stresses that the most important risks in the security field evolve from a possible failure in the consolidation of the European security and defense architecture, the uncertainty of Russia's future, and the access to weapons of mass destruction. Other risks include cultural differences, the repercussions of emerging markets, and the crisis of the state. The author underlines that Spain, as a medium power, can play a role to promote dialogue, cooperation and solidarity as preventive policies, while underlining the importance of the Mediterranean for Europe.

Comprensión de realidades políticas coincidentes en Europa

Vladimir Baranovsky

Aunque en Europa está perdiendo importancia el principio organizativo básico de la seguridad tradicional, el emergente panorama político y su impacto en la seguridad proporcionan una oportunidad de estabilidad. La ausencia de Estados aislados y de confrontaciones ideológicas, junto con el incremento de acuerdos de seguridad institucionalizados, parecen ser todos ellos elementos que han reducido los efectos de la súbita transformación de la Unión Soviética y el auge de Estados Unidos como única

superpotencia. Sin embargo, como indica Baranovsky, todavía quedan por abordar cuestiones importantes en cinco zonas de seguridad muy heterogéneas: UE-OTAN; Europa Central y Oriental; el Báltico; los Balcanes/Europa Sud-Oriental; y Rusia/Rusia plus. En estas zonas no existen agendas homogéneas de seguridad ni los países que las conforman están exentos de potentes y dolorosos recuerdos y sospechas. De forma solapada a estas zonas, la situación es la siguiente: tendencias múltiples y en conflicto en el territorio de la antigua Unión Soviética, al tiempo que muchos de los países en Europa Central, Oriental y en el Báltico aspiran a unirse al espacio OTAN/UE. En este contexto, persiste el miedo de Rusia a verse marginada y desvinculada de sus aliados potenciales, y degradada en sus relaciones con la OTAN y la UE. Según Baranovsky, aunque el problema de los Balcanes sigue siendo el más importante actualmente, el triángulo formado por Rusia, Ucrania y los países adyacentes sigue siendo el más impredecible.

Security Contents: Politico-Military or Multidimensional?

Pere Vilanova

The description of security problems has dramatically changed since the end of the bipolar system, and there are difficulties in building new concepts to comprehend a new and not yet defined international system. In the bipolar world, based on the North-South and East-West axes, security was described as systemic stability built upon deterrence and the defense of the *statu quo*. After the end of the Cold War, a new concept of multidimensional security was formulated. It lay emphasis on political, social (economic development) and international (peaceful international relations) democracy and the rule of law, putting aside too rapidly the military dimension. Vilanova argues that what have been identified as sources of new threats –narcotrafficking, ecology, migration, terrorism and fundamentalism– are not really new. There is a need to formulate political responses to these risks factors by means of public policies and intergovernmental and supranational action.

Cooperación institucional para la seguridad europea

Dennis Sandole

Sandole describe los esfuerzos compartidos de la OSCE, la OTAN, la UE y el Consejo de Europa para llegar a acuerdos de seguridad común con los países del extinto Pacto de Varsovia. Estos esfuerzos apuntan a una reorientación del paradigma de seguridad en el continente, que el autor denomina “Nuevo Sistema Europeo de Paz y Seguridad” (NEPSS). En este sistema, lo que Sandole identifica como “sistemas integrados de redes de resolución

de conflictos” debieran incluir actores gubernamentales y no gubernamentales, en los niveles locales, subregionales, regionales, nacionales e internacionales, que interactuarán con el objetivo de alcanzar una paz positiva, basada en estrategias de *idealpolitik* –y no una paz negativa, como en el caso de Bosnia, conseguida por la fuerza. No obstante, según el autor, en casos de genocidio o limpieza étnica, los imperativos de *realpolitik* debieran ser tomados en consideración.

Ampliación de la OTAN hacia el Este y relaciones con Rusia

Paul Gebhard

Gebhard aborda las razones de la ampliación de la OTAN, algunos de los temas clave para el futuro de la Alianza y las líneas básicas de los acuerdos con Rusia. Para el autor, la ampliación de la OTAN representa una oportunidad de reforma democrática, prosperidad, y control civil de los asuntos militares en los países de Europa Central y Oriental y, de manera más global, un aumento de la estabilidad en el continente. El autor sostiene que los nuevos miembros deben ser productores y no simples consumidores de seguridad, que la OTAN debe mantener la puerta abierta a nuevas ampliaciones y que las relaciones con Rusia han de ser equilibradas con respecto a la postura de defensa colectiva de la OTAN, especialmente en temas como la interoperabilidad, la integración y el refuerzo de fuerzas. Los acuerdos entre la OTAN y Rusia son muy importantes en este sentido, ya que se inicia un proceso de consultas sobre asuntos de seguridad y prevención de conflictos en el continente y que puede conducir a un eventual tratado sobre fuerzas convencionales en Europa y a un mayor control sobre las armas de destrucción masiva.

El liderazgo en situaciones de crisis

Cameron R. Hume

¿Qué hay que hacer para prevenir el estallido o la continuación de un conflicto interno que tenga consecuencias internacionales? ¿Qué circunstancias podrían generar una acción unilateral por parte de los Estados Unidos, Francia o el Reino Unido para crear coaliciones que dieran una respuesta internacional a estas situaciones de crisis? Para acercarse a las respuestas de estas preguntas, Hume examina la actual y sobrecargada agenda del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y las actitudes ante situaciones de crisis. El autor revisa tres de las fuentes de liderazgo nacional –voluntad, capacidad y visión– y las relaciona con la problemática internacional y las experiencias de las Naciones Unidas en Somalia y Rwanda y de UNPROFOR en Bosnia. A partir de su análisis, Hume argumenta que,

a la hora de afrontar situaciones de crisis, la autoridad para usar la fuerza no debiera divorciarse de los intereses nacionales de los Estados participantes en una misión de las Naciones Unidas, aunque, en una fase posterior, otros actores debieran participar para identificar vías de diálogo, preservar las normas internacionales y hallar soluciones a los conflictos internos.

OSCE y la seguridad europea

Mark Sigler

Afirma Sigler, que desde una perspectiva multidimensional de la seguridad, el papel de la OSCE en la seguridad europea seguirá siendo importante tras la ampliación de la OTAN. El autor examina los instrumentos y mecanismos con que la OSCE aborda la prevención de crisis y conflictos, especialmente las actividades desarrolladas en Bosnia, Chechenia, el Báltico y el Cáucaso. La OSCE, que intenta reforzar la cooperación en temas de seguridad, es una organización única para abordar los retos actuales y futuros para la seguridad del continente, incluyendo situaciones en algunas zonas de la antigua Unión Soviética. Su tamaño –54 miembros– su capacidad de innovar y su flexibilidad, y su toma de decisiones consensuada hacen que la OSCE sea efectiva en temas como la temprana prevención de conflictos, Derechos Humanos, asuntos sociales, desarrollo económico, preocupaciones medioambientales y acuerdos de control de armamentos. No obstante, Sigler señala que el papel de la OSCE en temas de seguridad viene limitado por las características de las actividades de mantenimiento de la paz, ya que éstas requieren el acuerdo político previo de las partes implicadas en un conflicto.

Are there Geostrategic Coherences Among the Southern States?

Miguel Alonso Baquer

Baquer states that there are no strategic coherences among the Southwestern Mediterranean countries –the Maghreb– as a consequence of differences in their defense policies and political natures. However, the five countries –Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya– display commonalities in their respective strategies: resistance to Western values, and defense policies basically oriented towards domestic stability. The author reviews the relations between France, Spain and Italy, and the Maghreb from a historical viewpoint. The European interest in the political stability of the area can be

proved by its willingness to favor economic, social and political development. Baquer identifies as sources of instability social conflicts, economic scarcity, cultural problems, political struggle inside elites in power, and demographic pressures.

Relaciones entre la UE, la UEO y la OTAN

John Roper

Las relaciones de trabajo entre la UEO, la UE y la OTAN han sido criticadas con frecuencia por ser más competitivas que cooperativas. Las razones de estas críticas guardan relación con los diferentes contenidos de los respectivos tratados y las agendas y los sistemas de organización de las tres instituciones, sin olvidar la no siempre sincronizada interacción entre el Reino Unido, Francia, Alemania y los Estados Unidos en lo referente a la seguridad europea. A pesar de que las perspectivas de una estructuración más racional de las instituciones europeas de seguridad han recibido un impulso positivo tras la experiencia yugoslava, no se ha resuelto todavía el problema de solapamiento de funciones entre las tres instituciones, de cara a evitar la repetición y mejorar las relaciones de trabajo. Roper señala que se han dado pasos positivos para solucionar la duplicación funcional entre la UEO y la OTAN: la europeización de la estructura de mandos de la OTAN, la experiencia de las CJTF, y el posible ingreso de Suecia, Finlandia y Austria en la OTAN. Por lo que respecta a la UE y la UEO, las relaciones dependen de los progresos que alcance la Conferencia Intergubernamental en el tema de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común.

Temas pendientes: indicadores para el Norte y para el Sur

Ian lesser

Los Estados del sur del Mediterráneo pertenecen a un “arco de cambio”, y no a un “arco de crisis”, como han pretendido algunos analistas. Desde este prisma, Lesser dibuja cuatro hipótesis sobre el contenido del diálogo y de los problemas de seguridad en esta región. La primera estudia la dimensión de la seguridad interna y las razones de la existencia de Estados “disfuncionales” en el Sur. La segunda resta importancia al fundamentalismo islámico como causa de conflicto; éste estaría más relacionado con preocupaciones tradicionales alentadas desde el extremismo nacionalista, no islamista. En la tercera hipótesis Lesser señala que los Estados del Sur se hallan inmersos en el proceso de incluir “nuevas geometrías” en sus relaciones de seguridad, ya sea con sus vecinos regionales o con la UE y la OTAN.

La cuarta hipótesis coloca la interdependencia entre Europa, Oriente Medio y Eurasia ante los siguientes retos a la seguridad: la proliferación armamentista, el abastecimiento de energía procedente de la cuenca del mar Caspio y su acceso a los mercados occidentales, y los aspectos políticos de la interacción entre Occidente y el mundo musulmán. Estos retos se entrecruzan en el Mediterráneo y lo convierten en la dimensión meridional de la seguridad europea.

The CFSP Political Process

Eugeni Bregolat

The precedents for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) can be found in the immediate years following the Second World War, with the creation of security structures –the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU, and the failure of the European Defense Community– together with the process of economic integration – the European Communities. In the EEC, from 1970 on, steps were given to coordinate foreign policies, a dynamics which culminated in 1992 with the creation of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty. This fact led to significant changes in the WEU in cooperation with NATO. However, despite the positive development of economic integration, the war in Bosnia evidenced the low efficacy and credibility of CFSP. Bregolat states that at present there are no conditions for a CFSP inside the European Union, since differences outweigh common positions.

WEU's Position Towards EDI

Lluís María de Puig

Puig argues that despite the WEU reactivation in the late 80's, the end of the Cold War has produced a change in the European security scenario, giving NATO and the Euro-Atlantic geostrategic area a preminent role. The definition of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which occupies a secondary role, is still full of difficulties, such as the existing division among Europeans on the conception and implementation of a common foreign and security policy. The author underlines that rapprochement or eventual integration between the WEU and the European Union is uncertain, since no decision has been taken on ESDI, its relation with NATO, and the future of Article V on mutual assistance of the Brussels Treaty.

Towards a European Defense Identity Compatible with NATO

Rafael Estrella

The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is a common but not defined goal, due to disagreements among Europeans on its political content. Reasons to explain this are related to the resistance to the idea of a European defense authority, fears of German hegemony, and the conviction that Europe is incapable of defending herself without the assistance of the United States. Estrella states that, with the end of the Cold War, some arguments opposing ESDI lost weight. However, the evolution and restructuring of NATO is not the product of European initiative, but rather an element of the U.S. strategy in Europe. Moreover, while the U.S. has a global strategy, Europe has not yet defined its security interests neither globally nor regionally. The author reviews the steps undertaken by NATO and the WEU towards further collaboration and the development of a European identity. He wonders whether there is enough political will either in Europe or the U.S. to overcome archaic views on trans-atlantic relations and narrow concepts about the future of Europe.

La revitalización de la OTAN y la seguridad europea

Nicholas Williams

Los esfuerzos para construir una Identidad Europea de Seguridad y Defensa (IESD) recibieron un impulso importante tras la experiencia yugoslava, que revitalizó la OTAN y mostró a los países europeos sus limitaciones. Estas se evidenciaron especialmente tras la decisión, adoptada en 1996 en Berlín por los ministros de asuntos exteriores de los países de la Alianza, de construir la IESD dentro del marco OTAN. Williams revisa los futuros retos de la IESD a la luz de la ampliación de la OTAN, el fortalecimiento del *Partenariado* para la Paz y el Acta Fundacional firmada por Rusia. También repasa la iniciativa de diálogo entre la OTAN y algunos países del Mediterráneo, señalando al menos tres factores que pueden afectar su evolución: el propio mensaje de la OTAN, que indica a la vez la voluntad de cooperar con esos países y la amenaza que representa la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva en el Mediterráneo; la apariencia de que la OTAN está construyendo estructuras militares en su flanco sur; y la evidente triplicidad entre la UEO, la UE y la OTAN en el debate sobre acuerdos de seguridad en el Mediterráneo.

Participación de los *think tanks* en cuestiones de seguridad: la situación en EEUU

Alyson J.K. Bailes

El final de la Guerra Fría también implicó el fin de cierta ventaja comparativa que tenían algunos *think tanks* privados en Estados Unidos respecto al impacto de sus trabajos en las políticas de seguridad del gobierno. La autora examina los nuevos actores y circunstancias implicados en el juego político actual y señala algunos factores importantes para la supervivencia de los *think tanks* en el próximo siglo. En su análisis, la autora se centra en dos casos –la ampliación de la OTAN y la situación de Bosnia– que considera ejemplos de la actual interacción entre lo público y lo privado –con referencia a las políticas de seguridad. Esta interacción se caracteriza por la limitación de recursos, la imperfección de la información, la actitud distante y atrincherada de las burocracias y la complejidad y lo imprevisible de los procesos. En este sentido, en lugar de buscar influencia sobre los Gobiernos, legisladores, opinión pública, los *think tanks* debieran atender al impacto de sus productos: la calidad del mensaje, el grado de éxito en definir y alcanzar la audiencia adecuada, y el nivel de receptividad de ésta. Es decir, si los *think tanks* quieren ser importantes, han de inventarse una estrategia para adaptarse a un medio internacional en el que los políticos con poder de decisión conviven con fenómenos internacionales y asumir una nueva corresponsabilidad entre lo público y lo privado.

Public and Private Institutions: Educating Civil Society about European Security Concerns

Rafael Bardají

As an specialist in strategic studies and political adviser, the author develops three basic ideas in his speech: 1) the objective necessity of strategic thinking to increase defense awareness, with the goal of ameliorating the relations between civil society and the Armed Forces, and to create a strategic culture to help to make more permeable the Administration decision-making process; 2) public and private institutions have to understand each other, despite the fact that tradition and time pressures do negatively weigh on Administration decision-making; 3) both parts –Administration and specialists in security– have to make the effort of becoming more flexible, on the one hand, and more capable of producing relevant studies in political terms, on the other.

Think tanks dedicados a la seguridad: la dinámica de redes

Maria do Rosario Vaz

La agrupación de recursos y el desarrollo de posturas comunes son dos aspectos importantes de la actual estrategia de redes entre institutos dedicados al estudio de la seguridad y la política exterior. También, los *think tanks* y otros centros pueden usar las redes como un instrumento para fomentar el diálogo y construir confianza en actividades de prevención de conflictos, dada la necesidad de que se colabore con diferentes actores procedentes de distintas especialidades. La dinámica de redes, afirma la autora, va de lo personal e informal a lo formal e institucional. El fenómeno de redes es resultado tanto de las actuales tendencias hacia la integración como de las demandas transnacionales de seguridad. Las redes, mediante el desarrollo de contactos entre las sociedades civiles (una vez organizadas en entidades que funcionan), pueden participar en la reflexión de los temas de seguridad. Los *inputs* colectivos de los *think tanks*, las ONG, los Gobiernos y otras organizaciones pueden contribuir a crear un lenguaje colectivo en asuntos de seguridad, reducir los riesgos de las percepciones incorrectas y avanzar en los procesos de prevención de conflictos.

Synthesis of the Seminar

Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo

The speaker synthesises the basic ideas expressed in the seminar: 1) the security concern in traditional terms –defense– is evolving towards a more complex, multidimensional vision of security which includes issues as political stability, economic and social progress, and ordered and peaceful changes of societies; 2) former threats have given way to risks factors, which have to be tackled with active policies addressed towards the causes of problems -in other words, to change deterrence policy into a policy of shared or cooperative security; 3) instruments to implement those policies have to adapt to new circumstances and needs; 4) European security means security of the continent and its adjacent areas, and, thus, includes the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. 5) NATO, the WEU, and even OSCE, are basic pillars of European security, even though there is no consensus on the role of the WEU neither political will to develop a European defense identity;. 6) civil societies have to play a role in the new European security framework and need to establish cooperative networks and coordinate their work with governments and international and intergovernmental organizations.

Una reflexión sobre la seguridad europea

Cameron R. Hume

En la conferencia final de las Jornadas, Cameron Hume examina el interés histórico de Estados Unidos en la seguridad europea y revisa algunas de las más importantes cualidades de la relación transatlántica, que encuentra sus orígenes en el Plan Marshall. La creación de la OTAN en 1949 proporcionó una institución que ayudaría a crear un medio para la expansión de las instituciones libres. Hoy en día, seis años después del fin de la Guerra Fría, la compleja agenda de seguridad del continente europeo implica nuevos retos tanto para Estados Unidos como para las instituciones europeas, como por ejemplo la ampliación de la OTAN. Hume señala que existen vínculos demográficos, políticos y económicos que impelen a Estados Unidos hacia Asia y América Central y del Sur, y provocan cambios en las percepciones estadounidenses sobre la seguridad europea. También subraya las dificultades inherentes a la aparición de un poder supranacional en la Unión Europea en temas de política exterior, que tendrá que decidir en asuntos como el uso de la fuerza para salvaguardar la seguridad del continente. Dado que la imprevisibilidad es inevitable, Hume se muestra favorable a una aproximación colectiva a los futuros problemas de seguridad, fundada en el diálogo con Rusia y con países asiáticos y mediterráneos, que enfatice la cooperación—no la competición—y no sea una simple toma de posturas. Esta aproximación debiera tener suficiente energía para aceptar cambios en ambos lados del Atlántico e identificar objetivos a largo plazo.

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La Fundació CIDOB, desde el curso 1989-1990, organiza un Máster en Estudios Internacionales que, a partir del curso 1992-1993, se realiza en colaboración con el departamento de Derecho Público y Ciencias Histórico-Jurídicas de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB).

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La cooperación comunitaria de la Unión Europea con los territorios ocupados de Palestina

M^aCarmen Alegría Vitalla

Fecha de lectura: 27 de junio de 1996

El Tratado de la Unión Europea formaliza una política comunitaria para la cooperación al desarrollo, sólo complementaria e interdependiente de la que llevan a cabo los Estados miembros. Sin embargo, los cambios acaecidos en el panorama internacional, especialmente a partir de 1989, han producido replanteamientos importantes en el ámbito de la política exterior y la cooperación al desarrollo aparece, cada vez más, ligada a los acontecimientos internacionales.

Los territorios Ocupados de Palestina, por su protagonismo en el ámbito de las relaciones internacionales, permiten ilustrar las nuevas tendencias de la cooperación comunitaria al desarrollo.

Se siguen manteniendo, e incluso incrementando cuantitativamente, líneas de cooperación asistencial tradicionales y específicas, como la ayuda humanitaria, la ayuda a los refugiados o la ayuda a las exportaciones. Sin embargo, la problemática generada por acontecimientos como la Intifada, la Guerra del Golfo y las distintas etapas del proceso de paz, ha tenido como consecuencia cambios importantes en la cooperación comunitaria y en su condicionalidad. La política comunitaria de cooperación al desarrollo, tanto cuantitativa como cualitativamente, se está concentrando en el ámbito regional mediterráneo, en el que queda incluida Palestina como un país más.

El objeto de este trabajo es el análisis y la valoración de este proceso, en sus implicaciones tanto comunitarias como palestinas.

Entre el agua y el fuego, el Kurdistán. La cuestión kurda como factor de inestabilidad en Oriente Medio

Jordi Tejel i Gorgas

Fecha de lectura: 9 de julio de 1996

El trabajo aspira a ser una actualización de la situación en el Kurdistán y en Oriente Medio, ya que los importantes acontecimientos que se han producido en el sistema internacional a partir de 1989 (desintegración del bloque del Este y la Segunda Guerra del Golfo) lo justifica. La historia del pueblo kurdo está marcada por continuos conflictos bélicos, deportaciones masivas, intentos de genocidio por parte de los Estados que comprenden el Kurdistán (Irán, Irak, Siria, Turquía). Si bien después de la firma de los Tratados de Sèvres (1920) y de

Lausana (1923), la cuestión kurda se internacionaliza; es a partir de la creación de la zona de seguridad kurda en el norte de Irak (1991) cuando este hecho es más evidente.

La continuidad del “protectorado kurdo” supone un gran desafío para los países de Oriente Medio, pero su desaparición significaría también una desestabilización potencial de una región marcada por el conflicto arabo-israelí. El movimiento nacional kurdo, surgido durante la Segunda Guerra mundial, ha intentado en diversas ocasiones llegar a acuerdos con los Gobiernos de Teherán, Bagdad, Damasco y Ankara para conseguir que los derechos del pueblo kurdo fueran respetados en el marco de una Autonomía dentro de los respectivos Estados. La respuesta hasta ahora ha sido la represión y el no respeto de los Derechos Humanos. Los países occidentales, responsables del desmembramiento del Kurdistán a principios de siglo, podrían cambiar el signo de la historia de este pueblo que continúa luchando por su supervivencia.

Multiculturalismo e integración de los inmigrantes marroquíes en Cataluña

Conxita Gassó Martí

Fecha de lectura: 26 de septiembre de 1996

Actualmente reside en Cataluña un importante colectivo marroquí. En consecuencia, ya se habla de una minoría étnica que se ha establecido de forma permanente y que mantiene costumbres diferentes, las cuales influyen cada vez más en nuestra sociedad. Es importante resaltar de este colectivo el predominio de la inmigración económica, la baja cualificación laboral, el escaso nivel de estudios y su notable heterogeneidad, lo cual contribuye a enmarcar a los marroquíes en una categoría social muy definida, muy visible, y respecto a la que hay una considerable distancia o diferencia cultural con los autóctonos. Es por esto que, actualmente, adquieren mucha importancia la situación social de estas personas y los problemas que obstaculizan su integración, entendida como la participación activa del colectivo magrebí en todos los aspectos de la vida cotidiana de la sociedad de acogida.

Así pues, la realidad muestra que mientras con respecto al control de flujos se ha adoptado una serie de medidas restrictivas hacia los inmigrantes –en conformidad a las existentes dentro de la Comunidad Europea– en cuanto a la integración todavía no hay ninguna política definida.

Partiendo de este razonamiento, el objetivo de este trabajo ha sido el análisis de dos aspectos importantes relacionados con la integración de los inmigrantes marroquíes: cuál es la perspectiva teórica de integración que se debería de adoptar y cuáles son los problemas que esta integración plantea en la práctica.

De esta manera se explica, por una parte, cómo se forman las minorías étnicas, las relaciones entre los inmigrantes y los autóctonos y los modelos de integración que existen,

de entre los cuales se escoge el modelo de comunicación intercultural como modelo ideal. Por otra parte, se demuestra que los objetivos que se quieren conseguir en la práctica, no se pueden cumplir a causa de problemas de carácter legal, económico, social y cultural de los inmigrantes en nuestra sociedad.

Parece evidente que Cataluña todavía no se compromete a integrarlos desde una óptica intercultural, es decir, dentro de un marco social que garantizara el reconocimiento, la valoración y el respeto de las pluralidades culturales y humanas más diversas.

La Coordinadora Española de ONG de Desarrollo: su rol, como plataforma nacional del CLONGD, en el desarrollo institucional del colectivo de las ONGD españolas

J. Francisco Galera

Fecha de lectura: 30 de octubre de 1996

Con este trabajo se puede obtener una visión sobre el nivel de coordinación existente entre las ONG de Desarrollo europeas. El autor lo pone en cuestión y se concentra en el estudio de la coherencia institucional de la Coordinadora Española de ONGD dentro del marco europeo de coordinación de las ONGD.

En el trabajo se presenta, en primer lugar, un análisis de las relaciones de las ONGD europeas con las instituciones comunitarias, a través del cual se puede constatar la evolución en el reconocimiento oficial del que han sido objeto las ONGD en el ámbito europeo.

En segundo lugar se muestra con claridad cuál es la estructura de coordinación formal de las ONGD a nivel europeo: el Comité de Enlace de las ONGD europeas (CLONGD), Dicho Comité de Enlace se enfrenta, en la actualidad, a una profunda crisis como institución, según un estudio de evaluación realizado recientemente y que se analiza detalladamente en este trabajo.

Finalmente, tras realizar una introducción histórica de la Coordinadora Española de ONGD y un apropiado análisis descriptivo de su naturaleza institucional, el autor se centra en el estudio de la coherencia organizacional de este ente. Se ponen en cuestión, mediante un análisis exhaustivo, tanto su misión como sus estrategias de acción, a través del paso de los años, como asimismo todas las acciones que efectivamente se han llevado a cabo desde 1988. Como resultado de este análisis, el autor se pronuncia acerca de la eficacia de la Coordinadora basándose en la interpretación del nivel de coherencia organizacional alcanzado. Igualmente se analiza el grado de autonomía financiera de la Coordinadora sin olvidar tener en cuenta cuál es el grado de representatividad social y cohesión interna de la misma.

La conclusión del trabajo nos da una visión interesante sobre el grado de eficacia que, durante sus primeros años de existencia, la Coordinadora Española de ONG no ha sido capaz de alcanzar en pos del desarrollo institucional del colectivo de las ONG de Desarrollo españolas.

De los acuerdos de paz de Camp David a los acuerdos de paz de Washington (1978-1993): la evolución del proceso negociador entre israelíes y palestinos

Hermínia Masana

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El tema elegido para el trabajo de investigación es el de la comparación de dos momentos clave en el proceso de paz en la zona del Próximo Oriente como han sido los acuerdos de paz de Camp David de 1978-1979 firmados entre Israel y Egipto, y los acuerdos de paz de Washington de 1993, firmados entre Israel y la Organización para la Liberación de Palestina (OLP). El trabajo consta de un estudio de la evolución de los factores y los actores que rodearon aquellas dos etapas, y las diferencias que hubo entre una y otra.

Se estudia la evolución de Egipto, con Sadat como primer dirigente árabe que firma la paz con Israel, con el consiguiente boicot de los países árabes más radicales, aunque este bloque árabe no consiguiera nunca un consenso firme y decidido. Se estudia la evolución del movimiento palestino, y su espectacular progresión de una estrategia basada en la lucha armada a una abierta apuesta por la vía diplomática y la negociación. El cambio dentro de la OLP, y también la Intifada, comenzó a decantar el proceso hacia una opción dialogada y con una opinión pública internacional más favorable a los palestinos. Pero no fueron los únicos factores: la política interna israelí también cambió, y el triunfo electoral de los laboristas –fruto de una visión más pragmática de cómo reconducir el proceso de paz para obtener auténticas garantías de seguridad– también sirvió para allanar el camino hacia una negociación de paz real con los palestinos.

En este contexto es imprescindible estudiar la posición de las principales potencias internacionales y su evolución, desde los EEUU, el aliado más fiel de Israel, continuando con la antigua Unión Soviética, que con su hundimiento también precipitó todos los cambios acaecidos en la región, hasta Europa, que tuvo muy poca influencia real en esta área.

El cambio de alianzas de las grandes potencias se manifestó más que nunca con la Guerra del Golfo provocada por la invasión iraquí de Kuwait, y es por esto por lo que se estudia aquel acontecimiento y también la consecuencia más importante: la convocatoria de la Conferencia de Madrid. Aquella Conferencia fue fruto de la nueva estrategia norteamericana para abrir puentes con el mundo árabe, favorecer la reelección de Bush y realizar una acción lo bastante importante como para que preservara su credibilidad: qué mejor, por tanto, que ofrecer una oportunidad de paz a los palestinos.

La Conferencia fue la primera piedra del proceso que se acabaría por consolidar con las negociaciones de Oslo hasta concluir en el acuerdo de paz entre Israel y la OLP. Aquel acuerdo heredaba de Camp David la disposición a negociar en dos etapas y el principio de la implantación de una autoridad autónoma palestina, pero a partir de aquí, el documento de 1993 constituía un acuerdo sin precedentes, entre otros motivos, por el reconocimiento mutuo entre Israel y la OLP y la renuncia de la OLP al empleo del terrorismo.

Pero aquellas dos etapas, han quedado y quedan prisioneras de acontecimientos imprevisibles, porque los interrogantes sobre el proceso de paz en la zona continúan, en estos momentos, abiertos.

Construcción nacional de Ucrania y Bielorusia durante la *perestroika*

Francesc Serra Massansalvador

Fecha de lectura: 9 de septiembre de 1997

La independencia de Ucrania y Bielorusia, en 1991, fue posible por la descomposición de la Unión Soviética y del propio sistema en que se basaba dicho Estado. Sin embargo, estas repúblicas vivieron unos procesos internos propios que consolidaron un proceso autodeterminista y que lograron que en pocos años lo que aparecía como una tendencia nacionalista marginal se convirtiera en un movimiento nacional que acabó implicando al grueso de las respectivas sociedades y a las élites políticas de ambas repúblicas.

Ucrania y Bielorusia, países que presentaban unas características nacionales consolidadas desde antes de la revolución de 1917, han ido desarrollando un movimiento nacionalista que, lejos de acomodarse al Estado soviético, ha pretendido en sucesivos intentos superar el marco de esta Federación. En el transcurso de la *perestroika*, estas repúblicas logran constituirse en territorios cada vez más soberanos al calor de unos hechos políticos que han trascendido a sus propios ámbitos geográficos, pero a partir de unos condicionamientos propios y de una evolución singular que, en su momento, descuidaron la mayor parte de los analistas políticos. La descomposición de la Unión Soviética, en efecto, es un fenómeno que ha tomado por sorpresa a la mayoría de los observadores, pocos de los cuales se atrevían a augurar que el proceso iniciado por Gorbachov no sólo acabaría con el Estado soviético, sino que terminaría desintegrándose.

Cabe destacar profundas diferencias entre los dos modelos en el proceso de recuperación nacional de ambos territorios. Ucrania, país que había vivido un fuerte movimiento nacionalista anterior a 1917, vive en el período revolucionario la creación de un Estado propio, enfrentado militarmente a la Rusia blanca y a la Soviética ; igualmente el movimiento ucraniano se mantiene vivo, con altibajos, a lo largo del período soviético, y cuando Gorbachov alcanza el poder, en 1985, puede organizarse rápidamente en un movimiento coherente de oposición, en cambio, Bielorusia vive una toma de conciencia nacional muy lenta, a pesar de algunos movimientos intelectuales y políticos interesantes que se producen aprovechando las dos

guerras mundiales; la *perestroika* permite la organización de los nacionalistas bielorrusos, pero de un modo tímido, tardío y ceñido en principio a sectores intelectuales minoritarios, mientras el grueso de la sociedad se mantiene al margen de las reivindicaciones nacionales hasta que la desintegración de la URSS se convierte en irreversible. Tanto el compromiso social con la independencia como el proceso que ha llevado a ella han presentado claras diferencias en una y otra república, lo que ha quedado reflejado en los acontecimientos posteriores y en la evolución de ambas repúblicas como Estados independientes, en la actualidad, la propia estructura estratégica en Europa Oriental queda fuertemente condicionada por las actitudes que llevan a cabo ambas repúblicas en relación a su propia independencia y en relación a su poderoso vecino, la Federación Rusa.

El comercio justo y solidario en el contexto de la desigualdad compensadora

Eduard Cantos i Font

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En la actualidad, asistimos a un proceso de globalización de la producción y de liberalización del comercio que agrava la marginación de los países y grupos humanos más empobrecidos del Sur y del Norte.

Partiendo de la base de que no se puede confiar todo a la actuación normal de las fuerzas de mercado, cuya capacidad como mecanismo de redistribución en términos de equidad se pone en entredicho, se hace necesario el reconocimiento de una realidad heterogénea en la escena económica internacional; y la consideración específica, diferenciada y preferente en favor de las economías estructuralmente débiles que incluya el reconocimiento de una verdadera desigualdad compensadora, y el establecimiento de unas condiciones internacionales, a nivel comercial y financiero, que favorezcan la participación equitativa de los países del Sur y que les brinde nuevas posibilidades de alcanzar mayores cotas de un verdadero desarrollo humano y sostenible.

A partir de estas premisas y teniendo como punto de partida el primer acuerdo sobre un Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias, al que se llegó en el seno de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas para el Comercio y el Desarrollo (UNCTAD), se hace un estudio de las principales propuestas y medidas que se han ido sucediendo a nivel intergubernamental. En concreto, en el marco del Acuerdo Comercial sobre Aranceles y Comercio (GATT)-Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), la UNCTAD y la Unión Europea (UE).

Frente a la ineficacia de las medidas de desigualdad compensadora las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONGD) han planteado sus propuestas. Éstas se concretan en el fenómeno conocido como comercio justo y solidario, del que se analizan sus potencialidades y limitaciones, los obstáculos y recomendaciones para una futura expansión y sus perspectivas como alternativa al modelo comercial imperante.

Finalmente, se realizan una serie de consideraciones en torno al fenómeno del comercio justo y solidario y a las organizaciones europeas de ámbito no gubernamental que trabajan en éste. Así, se subraya la importancia de profundizar en un enfoque que vaya más allá de la lógica de la economía y que encamine su acción a la construcción de alianzas junto a otros actores socioeconómicos, que promuevan la integración de los temas comerciales con los de protección del medio ambiente y los de desarrollo; y que ayuden a crear un auténtico movimiento. Un movimiento que forme parte de una mayor coalición de desarrollo capaz de abordar los temas comunes y complejos que impone el mundo actual en el que vivimos.

Asistencia humanitaria en un conflicto bélico

Elisabet Pedrosa Domènech

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El objetivo de la memoria ha sido analizar, de forma básicamente descriptiva, la actuación de las organizaciones de asistencia humanitaria en los conflictos bélicos de las dos últimas décadas.

Con esta finalidad la primera parte del trabajo está destinada al origen de la asistencia humanitaria en los tiempos de guerra y a la evolución del Derecho Internacional humanitario, que ha ido poniendo reglas y limitaciones a los conflictos bélicos para proteger las poblaciones víctimas de la guerra. Se hace un repaso de la base legal de la acción humanitaria, principalmente a las Convenciones de Ginebra y el Derecho de La Haya; y las incorporaciones más recientes en la evolución del Derecho Humanitario bélico como la iniciativa francesa de los corredores humanitarios, las zonas de exclusión aérea o el debate ideológico entre el *Derecho y el deber* de injerencia propuesto por estudiosos como Mario Bettati.

En la segunda parte, se sigue la evolución de las operaciones de asistencia humanitaria a través de algunos conflictos del siglo XX, con una especial atención a aquellos conflictos que han aportado elementos a la evolución de la asistencia humanitaria -como es el caso de la guerra de Biafra-. En este apartado destaca la relevancia adquirida por parte de las Naciones Unidas -en materia de resoluciones- a partir de la caída del muro y el fin de la política de bloques, en casos tan conflictivos como la guerra del Golfo, las guerras en Ruanda, Somalia y la exYugoslavia.

La tercera parte del trabajo está destinada a los diferentes actores de la acción humanitaria. Por una parte, los actores gubernamentales como el Alto Comisionado para los Refugiados (ACNUR), la Oficina Humanitaria de la Comunidad Europea (ECHO); y por otra Organizaciones Internacionales de trascendencia histórica como Cruz Roja Internacional, y las Organizaciones no Gubernamentales (ONG) como Médicos del Mundo.

Finalmente la cuarta parte está centrada en los proyectos de tres organizaciones de asistencia humanitaria : ACNUR, Cruz Roja Internacional y Médicos del Mundo, en el escenario concreto de Bosnia Herzegovina.